Verb-First Sentences

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1 Introduction

Is there anything special about V1?

Yes, there is.

…

So, this dissertation is now finished, right?

…

…

…

Rather not:

Providing an answer to this yes-/no-question in the shape of a *yes* or *no* would be all too correct. A speaker[1] who poses a question like this in its most prototypical sentence, most literal meaning and most neutral context introduces the demand of reducing sheer amounts of thoughts to two quite simple possibilities: true or false (cf. Lohnstein 2000, 2020; Frege 1892). Nevertheless, such a question is not fruitful as a leading question of a dissertation. So, what is more likely to be of interest is a question that allows for a more manifold answer:

What is so special about V1?

This is the leading question of this dissertation. Sometimes questions that contain a *what* can be answered in a simple fashion. In a dissertation, this wh-expression comes with less of a shortcut and more of the unwrapping of several *Sub-Quaestiones* (cf. von Stutterheim 1989) in addition to the main *Question under Discussion* (cf. Antomo 2015, 2012; Roberts 1996) that seeks for answers. It searches for the reduction of many possibilities to the ones that reveal an essence that – at least from a literal and linguistic perspective – questions inherently search for: truth.

Truth in language is conveyed through very specific means when looking at literal dimensions of matters in a rather raw and neutral context that does not allow for much

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[1] I will vary between gendered pronouns in order to refer to expressions like "speaker" and "addressee", but in case I extensively use one or the other this is not to be understood as exclusion or preference of one or the other. The terms are to be understood as generic.

reading in between the lines. The prototypical way to transfer truth from one human to another is via the use of V2-declaratives with progredient falling intonation.

Dennis and Nina are sitting in the Caféteria:

(1)   Dennis: Horst hat Häuser in Apfeldorf ge\sehen.

In uttering this sentence, the speaker that utters it in the prototypical case wants the addressee to believe the proposition that has been expressed and add it to his or her system of believe. Thus, (1) is aimed at focussing on the transfer of truth.

The question then is how truth can be transmitted via language in terms of literal meaning in the most neutral context. For the purpose of making this matter more graspable, let us look at the same sentence with a slight modification:

(2)   Nina: Wer hat Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen?
      Dennis: Horst hat Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen.

(3)   Nina: Wer hat Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen?
      Dennis: *Hat Horst Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen.

There are two problems as for now (no worries, there will be more) concerning the connection of truth and V1-declaratives: First of all, V1-declaratives cannot answer questions. As questions are usually posed to receive a piece of truth that is being searched for (Karttunen 1977), this does not advocate for a prototype that is an optimal candidate to foreground truth (Reis 2000). Secondly, the sole and isolated use of a V1-declarative seems odd[2], whereas it does not when hearing or reading an isolated V2-declarative. Regarding the second issue, I would like to examine the next examples:

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[2] Unless one allows the category of exclamatory declaratives which will be looked at later throughout this chapter.

After lunch, Dennis and Nina go to Toni's office. Dennis tells Toni:

(4)   a.   Komm ich gerade zu Horst ins Büro. Erzählt er mir, dass er Häuser in Apfeldorf
          gesehen hat. Jetzt weiß er endlich, wie viele Häuser leerstehen.

      b.   Komm ich gerade zu Horst ins Büro. Erzählt er mir, dass er Häuser in Apfeldorf
          gesehen hat. Weiß er doch endlich, wie viele Häuser leerstehen.

After lunch Dennis and Nina go to Toni's office. Dennis tells Toni:

(5)   a.   Horst weiß nun, wie viele Häuser in Apfeldorf leerstehen. War er doch selber in
          Apfeldorf.

      b.   *Weiß Horst nun, wie viele Häuser in Apfeldorf leerstehen. War er doch selber in
          Apfeldorf.

An interesting observation that arises from these examples in (4a) and (5a) is that all of a sudden, the V1-declaratives do not seem to be as odd as beforehand. Looking closer at those sentences, there is a difference in comparison to the isolated utterance of V1-declaratives: There is a V2-declarative in the overall utterance. In examples (4b) and (5b), there is more than one sentence, but there is no V2-declarative; and, again, the example seems odd. The assumption that I deduce from that is that truth is the main interest of V2-declaratives, whereas V1-declaratives merely provide the frame in which truth can be bedded in and foregrounded. Foregrounding truth is a speaker's way of committing to the truth of a particular propositional content and trying to get the addressee to believe what she proclaims as true. The addressee's acceptance is equivocal to integrating this propositional content into her own believe system through the proposition becomes shared knowledge between speaker and addressee. This also means that, as long as there is no V2-declarative that has been uttered, the propositions contained in the discourse cannot enter the discourse participants' mutual mindset and pool of knowledge, also known as the *common ground* (cf. Stalnaker 1987, 2002; Krifka 2012). This is not to mean that V1-declaratives contain no information and that the information contained in the V1-declaratives cannot be added to the common ground. It will be shown later that V1-declaratives do actually contain true

propositions. It rather means the information that is uttered in a V1-declarative or in a chain of V1-declaratives is not as easily accepted as true propositional content without the appearance a sentence in the present discourse that prototypically represents the foregrounding of truth. So, before the propositional content accumulated through the utterance of V1-declaratives is added to the common ground, it is stored and piled up in an interim space that is emptied as soon as a V2-declarative occurs that is associated with the V1-declarative content under the same QUD. In order to illustrate this shortly, let me provide an expanded image of Farkas'/Bruce's (2010) discourse *table*. Though the idea of the *table* will be explained more thoroughly, I will explain shortly what the essentials of the table are. The *table* is a discourse model sketched by Farkas/Bruce (2010). The table as a metaphor of a space of conversation is a place where at least two discourse participants discuss whether an object enters the common ground or not.

(6)   Horst hat Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen.

A	Table	B
p	p: Horst die Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen hat Horst has houses in Apfeldorf seen 'Horst saw houses in Apfeldorf.'	DC_B
Common Ground cg		**Projected Set ps:** $s \cup \{p\} \vee s \cup \{\neg p\}$

After lunch, Dennis and Nina go to Toni's office. Dennis tells Toni:

(7)   a.   Horst weiß nun, wie viele Häuser in Apfeldorf leerstehen. War er doch selber dort.

b.   *Weiß Horst nun, wie viele Häuser in Apfeldorf leerstehen. War er doch selber dort.

A	Table	B
p	**V2-proposition**	DC_B

	Cache:	
	V1-proposition$_1$	
	V1-proposition$_2$	
	V1-proposition$_3$	
Common Ground cg	**Projected Set ps:** $s \cup \{p\} \vee s \cup \{\neg p\}$	

A	Table	B
p	**V2-proposition:** Horst weiß nun, wie viele Häuser in Apfeldorf leerstehen. **Cache:** V1-proposition$_1$: War er doch selber dort. V1-proposition$_2$ V1-proposition$_3$	DC_B
Common Ground cg	**Projected Set ps:** $s \cup \{p\} \vee s \cup \{\neg p\}$	

The *table-stack* or *cache* collects all the propositional content contained in V1-declaratives. They land on the table-stack as they are not specified as primarily common ground relevant, because they show no syntactic form that signals to the addressee that they have to be added to the common ground (or not) as part of the pool of knowledge that is considered true or false and thus not to the commitment slate of the discourse participants. They will be

dragged along by an utterance that is indeed V2 and [-wh], but they do not fall into the same common ground space as the V2-declarative does. This does not mean that they are irrelevant to the discourse, neither are all the other V1-types found in the German language, but due to the lack of judgment that comes with V1, they cannot enter the common ground by themselves. Further examples of V1-sentences below will make this idea even more graspable:

i. Narrative:

(8) Vor wem läufste denn eigentlich weg? *Bin* ich dann hingegangen, ich sag: „Guten Tag, Frau B., guten Tag, Helga." Und dann dachte ich: sollste ihr auch noch en Kuß geben, nicht.

ii. Causative:

(9) Dieses Urteil ist eine moralische Ohrfeige für Frankreichs Regierung, für Präsident de Gaulle im besonderen. *War* es doch der Staatschef, der Anfang

1966 souverän in den Gang der Justiz eingegriffen hatte, als er erklärte, verantwortlich für das Verbrechen seien nur „vulgäre und subalterne" Franzosen, im übrigen aber Ausländer – eben Marrokaner.

iii. Deontic:

(10) … -- das war hier so ein leerer Nachmittag, wo ich mich fragte, warum haben sich die beiden getroffen. *Sollen* sie glücklich sein, die beiden, oder, da ich zum Arzt gehen mußte, *sollen* sie wenigstens ruhig sein, oder, bevor die Diagnose genau feststeht, exogen, endogen, *sollen* sie künftig ein angenehmes, ein glückliches Leben haben…

iv. Exclamatory:

(11) *War* das ein fröhliches Wiedersehen!

v.   Enumerative:

     (12) Die Bundesrepublik wird nach ihrer Unterschrift unter den zu erwartenden Atomsperrvertrag mit leeren Händen dastehen. *Bleibt* die Hoffnung auf eine Entspannung mit nachfolgender Wiedervereinigung.

(Önnerfors 1997: 99)

The items provided above are taken from Önnerfors (1997) who scrutinised particularly V1-declaratives and categorised them into functional types. He established the listed five categories that all carry genuine V1-declaratives pertaining to their syntactic structure. All of these functional types will be examined in the later course of this dissertation in order to see whether the claim that V1- declaratives are only taken up into the common ground when there is V2-declarative present in the same discourse under the same QUD. Furthermore, it will be scrutinised if all of Önnerfors' listed categories actually contain V1-declaratives.

Önnerfors' five types are more or less restrictive with respect to the lexical range of verbs that can be used in them. They also do not only show different pragmatic effects on the addressee, but they come with preferred positions in the discourse and different discourse contents that surrounds them: narrative V1-declaratives are more prone to open a discourse and then be followed up by a narration that is uttered in reference to the initial V1-declarative which serves as a frame to the narration. In contrast to that, enumerative V1-declaratives feel cosier at the end of a discourse that contains material that can then be subsumed under the conclusive frame of the causative V1-declarative. Here, the deontic type is the most restrictive, whereas the narrative type is the least restrictive. Both serve as frames in different position, but the set of propositions denoted by the frame-V1-declarative of both contrastive types also form intersections with the sets of propositions that are contained in the sentences uttered in reference to that frame. The exact difference when it comes to the lexical restrictions between those types is interesting, yet, not essential to what I have to say about the declarative sentence mood. And because this dissertation is not solely dedicated to declaratives, the distinctive features will only be described marginally in the chapter about sentence moods and the syntactic realisations. What is important is the assumption that

genuine[3] V1-declarative do not emerge on their own in case the propositional content is supposed to be accepted as true by the addressee and therefore to be added to the common ground. In all the examples, there is either a previous discourse that contains a V2-declarative that is somehow connected to the V1-declarative(-chain) or the V2-declarative follows up in the discourse after the relevant V1-declarative(-chain). It will also be relevant to compare specifically V1-sentence to V2-sentence and even V-final ones in order to prove that the assumption is true that a specific V2-structure is needed to transfer true propositions into the common ground. The propositional content of the non-V2-sentences is then tagged to the V2-declarative that answers the QUD and, as soon as uttered, the overall content is absorbed and dragged along into the common ground.

In the course of this, it will be supportive to see what the different relevant objects look like in terms of the (sets of) situations they identify. This also demands an answer to the question how they are identified. To illustrate what I mean, below I provide a preview to this topic considering the comparison of two syntactically ambiguous objects – the V1-declarative and the V1-interrogative:

V1-Interrogative Sentence:

(13)   Hat Horst Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen? [Ja./Nein.]

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[3] The distinction between genuine and ingenuine declaratives will be delivered later.

[4] The illustrations in this dissertation are taken from or derived from Lohnstein (2019, 2020).

<u>V1-Declarative Sentence:</u>

(14)   Hat Horst Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen. [Ist ihm aufgefallen, dass sie nicht
        leerstehen. Da war er richtig erleichtert.]

(cf. Lohnstein 2019)

Here, the reader can see that, though the syntactic surface structure is the same, the semantic structure referring to the partitioning of sets of situations is not at all ambiguous. In the case of the V1-interrogative, the denotation is a bi-partition (cf. Lohnstein 2000: 64) that divides the set of situations into two classes: those which are true and those which are false. In the case of the V1-declarative, the situation is slightly different. The situations that can be described as applicable are highlighted in contrast to the set of situations which are not. Specifying this classification more thoroughly, V1-interrogatives get to be classified as inquisitive whereas V1-declaratives are informative objects (cf. Ciardelli et al 2019). Neither of them, however, is assertive, since neither of them identifies one single situation, which makes it true and is therefore essential to foregrounding the truth:

> "Objects representing n-fold partitions (n > 1) are called inquisitive. They are equivalent to questions. If n = 2, the object is a y/n-question. If n > 2, the question conforms to a wh-question. An inquisitive object leads to a partition of the possible states of affairs into classes which are disjoint in pairs, and which yield the whole set under set union […] A typical property of inquisitive objects is that they are not informative. They just split up the available possibilities into classes of equivalent elements, but they do not add any information with the effect that the number of available alternatives becomes reduced. Assume T to be an information state of an individual or a group of individuals. Then, a clause ϕ is informative, if ϕ reduces the alternatives in T […]. If ϕ induces only one class, ϕ is assertive […]"
> (Lohnstein 2020: 11)

This will be discussed in depth in chapter 4 and 5. There, the reader will also see the difference not only between declaratives and interrogatives, but also between all the other relevant syntactic objects that can be realised as a V1-sentence, including adverbial clauses. For this purpose, inquisitive semantics coined by Ivano Ciardelli, Jeroen Groenendijk, Floris Roelofsen and Martin Stokhof (cf. Ciardelli et al 2019) will be applied to an extent that serves the basis of this dissertation.

Coming back to the said ambiguity, the main problem lies with V1-sentences, as the filling of the prefinite position in V2-sentences and the use of complementisers in V-final-sentences prototypically mark their sentence mood visibly:

(15) [Horst-wh] *hat* Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen.

(16) [Was+wh] *hat* Horst in Apfeldorf gesehen?

(17) [Ich glaube,] *dass* Horst Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen hat.

(18) [Ich frage mich,] *ob* Horst Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen hat.

Thus, in contrast to non-V1-sentences, the left periphery of the sentences plays an important role in terms of several matters that will be addressed in the last chapter. To compare, please, see below examples of V1-sentences:

(19) **Hat Horst** Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen. [Ist ihm aufgefallen, dass sie nicht leerstehen. Da war er richtig erleichtert.]

(20) **Hat Horst** Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen?

(21) **Hat Horst** (doch tatsächlich) Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen!

(22) **Sieh** die Häuser in Apfeldorf, Horst!

(23) **Hätte Horst** (doch nur) Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen!

(24) **Hat Horst** Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen, ist er wahrscheinlich ziemlich erleichtert, dass nicht alle leerstehen.

The left periphery in a V1-sentence does not provide sufficient clarification in order to define a sentence mood. Other aspects have to be considered, then, in the morphological, lexical, prosodic and semantic realms for the purpose of tackling the problem of syntactic ambiguity. Having mentioned lexical, morphological, prosodic and semantic means for the purpose of defining sentence mood, it cannot be ignored that there are approaches that view seemingly ambiguous structures as diverse respecting their syntactic deep structure. Therefore, there are two ways to view the way sentence moods are generated:

> „(a) Es gibt gar keine syntaktischen Satztypen im traditionellen Sinn, so nur Satzmodi, die mit bestimmten Oberflächenmerkmalkonfigurationen korrelieren.
> (b) Die Sätze weisen auf einer tieferen Ebene syntaktische Merkmale auf, die die Oberflächenstrukturen determinieren und die Träger der Satzmodi sind."[5] (Rosengren 1992: 439)

This pertains to more than one approach, but I will only refer to Brandt/Reis/Rosengren/Zimmermann (1992), Krifka (2014) and Höhle (1992) as relevant examples. Those will be used in order to explain why I choose a compositional approach that does not depend on silent material that is only feasible in the deep structure and cannot palpably be perceived by an addressee. This issue will be discussed now, in order to justify my way of dealing with sentence mood and in order to be able to concentrate solely on its definition in a compositional manner in the upcoming chapter. But, first of all, it has to be said what kind of syntax will be used in order to model the sentences of interest:

(26)

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[5] (a) There are no sentence types in the traditional sense, but only sentence moods that correlate with certain surface feature configurations.
(b) Sentences show syntactic features on a deeper level which determine the surface structures and are sentence mood carriers.

CP
SpC   C̄

∅
[−wh]-XP
[+wh]-XP

C⁰   FinP

V_{fin} SpFin $\overline{Fin}$

VP   Fin⁰

… [±wh]-XP … V⁰   V⁰+Fin⁰

head movement

Ā-movement

(Lohnstein 2017: 4)

All the approaches that are mentioned in this dissertation use this generative syntactic model (in more or less modified but still recognisable form) for the analyses. The major transformational processes that are relevant to my explications are 1) the fronting of finiteness, that comes in the shape of head movement, and 2) XP-movement, that comes in the shape of A-bar-movement (or -- correspondingly – as internal or external merge.[6] In both cases, the said elements leave the FinP[7] through movement to the left periphery of the sentence where they merge at the functional projections of C⁰ and SpecCP. The XP that is moved out of FinP can be of either type [+wh] or [-wh]. Whether something is moved and which of the two is moved in one of the aspects that has influence on the sentence mood constitution. I will not explain this model in further detail as it is widely used and thus serves as the basis to many well-known works.[8] In addition to that, I will make use of the syntactic model that has been coined by Erich Drach (1937): the *Topologisches Feldermodell*. A draft Drach's model is provided below:

Vorfeld	Linke Satzklammer	Mittelfeld	Rechte Satzklammer	Nachfeld
Horst	hat	Häuser in Apfeldorf	gesehen	…

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[6] It has to be mentioned that a base generated prefield is also possible (cf. Frey 2004).

[7] Also called IP or TP, depending on what literature you read.

[8] For further reading, please, view (Grewendorf 2002; Grewendorf/Hamm/Sternefeld 1987; Chomsky 1995).

Both models are fairly similar; one essential difference is, however, that Drach's model is linear and shows no hierarchical relations between the constituents. Apart from this, the parallels look as follows:

Vorfeld	Linke Satzklammer	Mittelfeld	Rechte Satzklammer	Nachfeld
SpecCP	C^0	FinP	Fin^0	…

The terminology referring to syntactic description may be a mix of both cited models as long as the description then does not lack important details that are essential to the analysis of the syntactic objects presented.

To answer the question why finiteness is fronted at all and therefore what triggers of fronting are, I will work in agreement with the idea that the finiteness moves to the front of the sentence to check certain discourse features (cf. Truckenbrodt 2006; Bayer 2010; Lohnstein 2000, 2020).

> "The effects […] are claimed to be effects of local feature checking of grammatical elements in C with features in the context index in C. They are not effects of semantic composition. I suggest that the need to check *Epist* […] as well as the need to check *A* […] drives V-to-C in German. For example, in all three sentence types […], '*A*' in the context index <*Deont, A* (. . .)> in C requires feature checking."
> (Truckenbrodt 2006: 266)

Additional arguments to justify the fronting of finiteness or the insertion of complementisers can be found in Brandt/Reis/Rosengren/Zimmermann:

> "Die oberste maximale Projektion muß in ihrer Kopfposition sichtbar gemacht werden. Ist diese nicht durch einen Komplementierer besetzt, geht das Verb nach

C[0]. Gleiches gilt dann für konditionale Verb-erst-Sätze, was immer deren oberste Projektion ist."[9]

(Brandt/Reis/Rosengren/Zimmermann 1992: 20)

The reason why I use the terminology fronting of finiteness instead of fronting of the finite verb can be traced back the Josef Bayer's paper about the phenomenon of verb second (2010): He states that it is not actually the whole finite verb that needs to move, but it is moved due to pied-piping (cf. Bayer 2010: 15). The actual elements called to move to C[0] are the inflectional features of the finite verb:

> "Conjecture about V2
>
> The finite verb that appears in 2nd position in a V2-language is in this position only for the reason of generalized pied piping. Even when it is perceived in V2-position, its lexical part is evaluated in its base position, i.e. in German in clause-final position."
>
> (Bayer 2010: 3)

Bayer supports his statement via many different phenomena, one of them being the periphrastic *tun* in German:

(27)   Ich glaube, dass der Klaus gerade den Müll hinunter tragen tut.

(28)   Der Klaus tut gerade den Müll hinunter tragen.

(Bayer 2010: 3)

The circumstance that *tut* is realised though there is *hinunter tragen* present and *trägt* could occupy the second position, pushes the argument that the inflectional features have to be overtly realised in the second position. The periphrastic *tun* is otherwise semantically empty, but carries the postulated finiteness. Further application and further explanations on the basis of the outlined syntactic fundament can be found in later chapters.

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9 The highest maximal projection must be made visible in its head-position. In case it is not occupied by a complementizer, the verb moves to C[0]. The same holds for conditional V1-sentences, whatever their highest projection might be.

For now, it is important to mention a dichotomy that calls for a decision. This dichotomy arises from the question whether silent material is in order to constitute and define sentence moods and the presence of illocutionary types and speech act, or whether those characteristics come about through the pronounced components of a sentence.

In regards to that, I would like to touch upon the first side of those oppositions: Margareta Brandt, Marga Reis, Inger Rosengren and Ilse Zimmermann (1992) produced a theory in which the sentence mood manifests itself in the shape of abstract features that are only comprehensible in the syntactic deep structure of a sentence. One of their major claims is that a compositional approach to sentence mood does not suffice, since the ambiguities on the surface of an uttered sentence are too massive and cannot be solved by means like, for instance, intonation or wh-expressions (cf. Brandt/Reis/Rosengren/Zimmermann 1992: 29-30). They also use generative syntax order to illustrate the syntactic structure of diverse sentence moods, but they do not treat sentences as being completely uniform in their structure. They rather claim that it depends on what sentence mood is prevalent. Thus, they assume different structures for different sentence moods and therefore apply a hybrid approach between *Uniformitätshypothese* and *Differenzhypothese*:

(29) Verb-letzt-Dekl.satz:[10] $[CP/IP \text{ Spec } C/I \; [C^1/I^1 \; C^0/I^0 \; [\dots]]]$

                                                -w   -w

(30) Verb-zweit-Dekl.satz:[11] $[IP \text{ Spec } I \; [I^1 \; I^0 \; [\dots]]]$

                                                (-w)   -w

(31) Verb-erst-Dekl.satz:[12] $[I^1 \; I^0 \; [\dots]]$

                                                -w

(32) Verb-letzt-w-IS:[13] $[CP/IP \text{ Spec } C/I \; [C^1/I^1 \; C^0/I^0 \; [\dots]]]$

                                                +w   -w

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[10] Verb-final declarative sentence

[11] Verb-second declarative sentence

[12] Verb-first declarative sentence

[13] Verb-final wh-interrogative sentence

(33) Verb-zweit-w-IS:[14]   [IP Spec I [I¹ I⁰ [...]]]

                                    +w   -w

(cf. Brandt/Reis/Rosengren/Zimmermann 1992: 32)

The above listed abstractions exemplify the syntactic structure of representatives of declarative and interrogative sentence mood. Those are consulted to explain problems that can be found in sentences like the following:

(34) a.   Hat Horst Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen.

      b.   Hat Horst Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen?

The cited analysis is based on e. g. ambiguities like the one between the V1-declarative sentence and the V1-interrogative sentence. (34a) and (34b) look identical on the surface. Here, they say that the difference in prototypical intonation does not justify the difference in sentence mood sufficiently.

Moreover, they argue that a wh-expression in the beginning of a sentence is not a clear marker of a V2-interorgative sentence, because there are constructions[15] like the following (cf. Reis/Rosengren 1992):

(35) Wieviel schätz mal, daß das Kleid gekostet hat.

(Brant/Reis/Rosengren/Zimmermann 1992: 30)

The problem Brandt/Reis/Rosengren/Zimmermann see with those two cases of ambiguities is that, from their perspective, there are no clear surface items or features that identify the sentences as interrogative, declarative or imperative.

To solve the problem, they assume a [+wh]-/[-wh]-feature in the deep structure of a respective sentence. This is also shown in (29)-(33): Interrogative mood is identified via a

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[14] Verb-second wh-interrogative sentence

[15] When I use this word I do not mean it in the way advocates of constructionalist grammar use it. In this dissertation, it is a synonym to "sentence" or "syntactic object".

silent [+wh]-feature in the left periphery of a sentence, whereas declarative mood is identified via silent [-wh]-feature in the left periphery of a sentence.

Apart from this very essential work from the 1990s, there are younger papers that work with silent material as well. Those do not use [+wh]-/[-wh]-features, but they make use of illocutionary operators. One of them is Manfred Krifka who assumes an illocutionary force operator – to be more exact, an ASSERT-operator – in the underlying structure of a declarative sentence that assigns the sentence its speech act ASSERTION:

> "So far, we have derived a regular semantic object, a propositional relation of type asst. To express assertional mood, we will make use of an assertion operator, ASSERT. It takes an index i, an addressee variable y, a proposition p and a speaker variable x, and yields the value True iff at i, x is liable for the truth of the proposition p to the addressee y.
>
> (9) ASSERT(i)(p)(y)(x) ⇔ at i, the speaker x is liable for the truth of p at the index i towards the addressee y.
>
> Notice that ASSERT is a state predicate; it denotes the state of being liable for the truth of a proposition. The assertion of a proposition involves a change of state, namely a change from an index at which the state of having assertive commitments does not hold to one at which it does hold. The following definition introduces an operation that expresses such index changes. Here $F_{[i]}$ and $G_{[i]}$ are formulas denoting truth values depending on a free index variable i in it."
>
> (Krifka 2014: 8)

Likewise, Tilman Höhle (1988, 1992) established similar assumptions concerning the phenomenon of *Verum Focus*. *Verum Focus* is a means through which a speaker emphasises the truth of a proposition. It can likewise be found in root clauses as well as in embedded clauses, and is situated in the left periphery of a sentence. Höhle states that

> "[…]VERUM nicht segmental – d. h., nicht als Überset-zung einer Konstituente oder einer Merkmalspezifikation in einer Konstituente – lokalisiert. Eine solche Verletzung des Prinzips der strikten Kompositionalität ist weniger ungewöhnlich, als es scheinen mag. Es ist kaum vermeidbar, z. B. die

Kennzeichnung eines Satzes als Deklarativsatz, direkter Interrogativsatz u. ä. auf ähnliche Weise zu generieren. Illokutionstyp-Operatoren (oder funktional ähnliche Elemente wie ‚Satzmodus'-Markierungen) sind nicht segmental lokalisiert. Insofern kann man vermuten, daß die IT-Deutung von VERUM, obwohl sie falsch ist, doch auf einer korrekten Vorstellung fußt: auf einer nicht-segmentalen Lokalisierung dieses Bedeutungselements."[16]

(Höhle 1992: 415)

The problem that arises with such a perspective lies in the distinction of root and embedded clauses:

„Die Idee, den Verumfokus mit Hilfe des Konzepts des Illokutionstyp-Operators (IT-Operator) zu deuten, hat den entscheidenden Vorteil, dass verum als unab-hängig begründetes Bedeutungselement identifiziert werden kann. Höhle […] zufolge scheitert die IT-Deutung jedoch daran, dass Verumfokus in eingebetteten Sätzen möglich ist […], in eingebetteten Sätzen aber kein Illokutionstyp-Operator auftreten kann, weil eingebettete Sätze keine Illo-kution haben." [17] (Höhle 1992: 122)

Lohnstein (2016) therefore suggests to define *Verum Focus* as a semantic category which can likewise be applied to root and embedded clauses. The missing feasibility of Höhle's IT-operator thus poses problems that can be prevented via semantic compositional analysis.

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[16] VERUM not segmental – i.e. not as a translation of a constituent or a feature specification in a constituent – localised. Such a violation of the principle of compositionality is less uncommon than it may seem. It is hardly preventable to generate e.g. the marking of a sentence as declarative sentence, direct interrogative sentence and the like in a similar way. Illocutionary type operators (or similar elements like 'sentence mood markers') are not localised segmentally. Therefore, one can assume that the IT-interpretation of VERUM, though it is wrong, is based on a correct idea: it is based on a non-segmental localisation of this semantic element.

[17] The idea of interpreting verum-focus with the help of the concept of illocutionary operators (IT-operator) provides the advantage that verum can be identified as an independently justified element of meaning. According to Höhle, the IT-interpretation fails, however, because verum-focus is possible in embedded clauses, but that no illocutionary type operator can occur in embedded clauses, because embedded clauses have no illocution.

In contrast to the above presented perspectives, I would like to solve the ambiguity-problem – and therefore concurrently the question of how sentence moods can be categorised – via compositional analysis. This is going to happen according to Altmann (1993), Lohnstein (2000, 2020 etc.), Scholz (1991), Groenendijk/Ciardelli/Roelofson (2010), Truckenbrodt (2007) and similar representatives. The deduction from their explications will encourage the perspective that a sentence mood is a complex sign that gains its characteristics through the presence of specific components, which are: syntactic features (i. e. fronting of finiteness and fronting of an XP from IP), categorial filling, verbal mood/modal background, intonation, *speaking about* vs. *speaking to*. All these categories summarise the obligatory features and elements that have to be given to single out a certain sentence mood in comparison to others. There will be elements mentioned that are actually not obligatory, but need a substitute in for the sentence mood to be identifiable.

In order to support the claim that the Spec-CP-position is the key to the common ground and the enabler of truth, specific information that is essential to the sufficient understanding of the V1-phenomenon has to be provided. For this purpose, I will first explain which approaches to sentence mood will be used in this dissertation. Because I consider a compositional approach to sentence moods as apt, the upcoming chapter will discuss views that support the idea that sentence mood is a complex sign that does not need any silent illocutionary operators in detail. The shortcoming of explications that pertain to the compositional approach thus also is explained by its significance: It will take up a huge amount of core space which is why it has to be outsourced to a later chapter. The approaches that do not seem sensible to the definition of sentence mood were intentionally presented in this introductory chapter.

The issue of sentence mood definition is such a large topic in this dissertation, because all sentence moods have one candidate that is realised via a V1-sentence, whereas not all sentence moods have a syntactic realisation as V2 or V-final. Furthermore, it will be necessary to examine the prototypical illocutionary types that are associated with a certain sentence mood, which then in turn revives the question of what the specific realisation via linguistic means looks like and how the issue of ambiguity can be resolved.

As truth and the proclamation of truth are a core aspect in the distinction of V1 vs. V2 and V-final, there will be a whole chapter dedicated to the topic of assertion and the components that bring assertion into language. Furthermore, it will be listed in what way sentence moods differ specifically and what is obligatory for a certain sentence mood. This also has to be shown in order to approximate the idea of the SpecCP as the truth enabler for the addition of truth to the common ground. All will end the question that was posed at the beginning of this introduction. So, the focus here will be on what is so special about V1 in order to support the statement that V1 in its literal use can accomplish so various aims – except for one: truth.

Now, as all of this has been anticipated, at last, to the overall structure of my dissertation: The introduction sort of gave away the final outcomes first and then retraced the steps that have led to the core ideas and results. This is not the development this dissertation went through and, thus, this is not how I want to lead you – the reader – through the woods of problems and questions. Rather, I will start out with the chosen approach to sentence mood, and the foundation I extract from this for the purpose of separation and categorisation. That will be the first chapter after the introduction. Subsequently, the features that have been distilled from this chapter will be applied to the specific syntactic objects. Although V1-sentences are the major subject of this dissertation, they need to be contrasted with their V2- or V-final-counterparts in terms of the previously deduced sentence mood features. For this purpose, the sentence moods and their significant features will be viewed one by one, as well as adverbial sentences. It will then become evident that there is a minimal class of syntactic objects that is prototypically used to convey truth in language. Those objects are closely linked to the phenomenon of assertion. Thereby, a discrepancy can be made out between assertive and non-assertive sentences and the question how assertion is expressed via linguistic means in German. As this is such a significant division, a whole chapter – following the comparison of V1-sentences and their syntactic counterparts – will be dedicated to the topic of assertion. The findings from those chapters will then end in the question from the beginning of this introduction and with it present the ideas that have served as answer here in a more thorough way: What is so special about V1?

2 Sentence Mood

The first issue of this chapter and one of the big issues of this dissertation is defining what sentence mood actually is. Terms and topics always need a definition, but in this case, I have to clarify which definition I choose, as the expression *sentence mood*, and, along with it, sentence type, comes with the risk of being used quite vaguely or at least diversly. Thus, this chapter will set out in writing what the distinction between sentence mood, sentence type and illocution is. Apart from that, it will list and explicate the different features and parts that play a role in the determination of a sentence mood, considering different approaches that make sense to the general notion chosen in this work. The features that I choose to be taken into account are not fascinatingly new; however, aside the grammatically absolutely vital elements like the syntactic transformations that have been mentioned in the introduction, there are players in the game that have often been dismissed as far less significant, like for instance the dimension of prosody. I will not show the audacity of pushing the attempt to turn meaningful traditionally used and well-known literature upside down. I have far too much respect and admiration for those researchers. I simply want to share my perspective on the matter and help support the compositional approach, as it seems sensible to me in terms of viewing language as a means of communication between human beings with all their senses of perception.

My aim in this chapter is not to discuss the different perspectives on sentence mood and its constitution in extensive detail. I rather strive to collect their core principles and look at the overall similarities in order to extract a definition that I can work with concerning the separation of V1-sentences from V2- and V-final sentences.

2.1 What is Modal?

The terms *modal*, *modality* or *mood* will come up quite often throughout this chapter, which is why it should be defined what is essential about modality. Modality describes an attitude towards the actual world or the way a speaker conceives the circumstances of the actual or an alternative world and the propositional content that reflects these circumstances:

"Semantische Kategorie, die die Stellungnahme der Sprechenden zur Geltung des Sachverhalts, auf den sich die Aussage bezieht, ausdrückt."[18] (Bußmann 2008: 442)

Speakers have different ways of expressing this attitude through linguistic means. Through verbal mood, the speaker is able to distinguish between the actual world and alternative worlds and between different speaker origins/*origines*:

(36) Peter kommt morgen zur Party.	**Indicative**
(37) Peter käme morgen zur Party. (Aber er ist momentan leider in Venedig.)	**Konjunktiv II**
(38) Petra sagt, Peter komme morgen zur Party. (Ob das aber wahr ist, kann nur Peter wissen.)	**Konjunktiv I**
(39) Sei *n* eine Primzahl.	**Konjunktiv I**
(40) Hau ab!	**Imperative**

In comparison to the indicative, the Konjunktiv differs with respect to worlds, time of utterance, origo and perspectives (Sode/Truckenbrodt 2015: 13):

"[…]

a. [c][+origo]: c wird auf die Perspektive des Sprechers zur Sprechzeit in der Äußerungswelt abgebildet.

b. [c][-origo]:c wird auf eine Perspektive abgebildet, die von der des Sprechers zur Sprechzeit in der Äußerungswelt verschieden ist.

[…]

Das Verb trägt uninterpretiertes [±origo] ohne Perspektivenindex [c]

Indikativ am Verb: [+origo] z.B. ist[+origo]

Indirektheitskonjunktiv am Verb: [-origo] z. B. sei[-origo]."[19]

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[18] A semantic category that expresses a speaker's attitude about whether an issue which is being referred to through a statement is valid or not.

19 a. [c][+origo]: c is projected onto the speaker's perspective at the time of utterance in the world of utterance.

b. [c][+origo]: c is projected onto the speaker's perspective which is different from the perspective at the time of utterance in the world of utterance.

The verb carries an uninterpretable feature [+origo] without the index of perspective [c]

Sode and Truckenbrodt thereby assume that the speaker is represented in the C-position. The ways in which the Konjunktiv II can be used signifies *Indirektheit*[20] or *Kontrafaktizität*[21]. The Konjunktiv I, while likewise usable as a way of expressing *Indirektheit*, is also used in *Heischesätzen*[22], but cannot express counterfactual circumstances. Concerning *Indirektheit*, the Konjunktiv I refers to a different origo and not to a different world. Therefore, somehow the speaker's attitude towards a propositional content with respect to its origo can be differentiated; the speaker simply presents a different speaker's utterance without thereby sharing his own attitude towards the utterance he reports. Following Sode (2015), in reportative use, Konjunktiv I and II indicate that the speaker is not the origo of the propositional content, thus receiving the feature [-origo]. In contrast, the canonical use of indicative and imperative receive the feature [+origo], though it has to be mentioned that the indicative can be used reportatively in certain contexts, which, yet, is of no further interest in this dissertation. Furthermore, Konjunktiv I can, unlike Konjunktiv II, be used as requests in so-called *Heischesätze*; here, the Konjunktiv I finds its seldom use in independent root clauses, whereas in reportative speech it has to be embedded under matrix clauses that identify the speaker and thus the real origo of the propositional content that is uttered by the current speaker who is not the origo. The same holds for the reportative use of Konjunktiv II. The counterfactual use of Konjunktiv II, however, can emerge in independent root clauses, and signals that the propositional content expresses circumstances that oppose the ones of the actual world (cf. Sode/Truckenbrodt 2015: 3).

Moreover, Konjunktiv I and imperative were at first evaluated in terms of different domains than indicative and Konjunktiv II: The former represent factual moods, whereas the latter represent epistemic moods. That means that everything that would be factual is evaluated with reference to everything that is a fact in the actual world. Epistemic moods would be evaluated with respect to a system of knowledge (cf. Lohnstein 2000: 4). Yet, Lohnstein

---

Indicative on the verb: [+origo], e.g. ist[+origo]

Indirektheitskonjunktiv on the verb: [-origo], e.g. sei[-origo]

[20] Indirectness.

[21] Contrafacticity.

[22] Request sentences.

modified this interpretation of verbal mood and later defined the function of the Konjunktiv I as being reportative (cf. Lohnstein 2019).

Truckenbrodt (2006) takes those modal backgrounds that verbal moods evoke and models them into context indices in C. According to him, sentences with the (semi-)finite verb in C either include only the epistemic modal background in case Konjunktiv II or indicative are present:

"In a context index <Deont$_S$ (,x)(,<Epist>)> in C

a. Epist is present iff (i) C contains a finite verb with indicative or Konjunktiv II or (ii) C/CP is marked [+WH].

b. x = A(ddressee) iff C contains a finite verb with person inflection."

(Truckenbrodt 2006: 265)

Truckenbrodt's theory will come up again soon; for now, the given information only pertains to verbal mood.

Making the transition to sentence mood, it likewise expresses a speaker's attitude towards an uttered proposition, but slightly different than the pure verbal mood[23]. Those attitudes expressed via the illocutionary types of sentence mood are listed here:

Sentence Mood	Illocutionary Type
Declarative	Assertive
Interrogative	Erotetic
Imperative	Directive[24]

---

[23] Though verbal mood always plays a major role in the definition of sentence mood:

In a context index <DeontS (,x)(,<Epist>)> in C a. Epist is present i¤ (i) C contains a finite verb with indicative or Konjunktiv II or (ii) C/CP is marked [þWH]. b. xF A(ddressee) i¤ C contains a finite verb with person inflection.

Assertive attitudes cover statements, assumptions, claims and similar and come into existence through proclaiming that the uttered content is true (cf. Lohnstein 2000: 75). Erotetic attitudes refer to questions, doubts and similar, and signify the direct opposite or at least a preliminary stage to assertive attitudes: Here, a thought is grasped and a question is proclaimed, which does not state the truth, but rather search for it (cf. Lohnstein 2000: 76). Because the verbal mood in those two sentence moods has to be Konjunktiv II or indicative, the sentences are evaluated in correspondence with an epistemic[25] background (cf. Lohnstein 2000: 80). To add to this, Truckenbrodt assumes the already mentioned context index in C (cf. Truckenbrodt 2006: 265). This has to be explained further: Truckenbrodt first of all follows Zaefferer (2001) by presuming that all speech acts that are expressed through V-in-C-sentences are deontic. This means that a speaker signals to the addressee via a V-in-C-sentence that he wants him to do something: Namely either to carry out the uttered proposition by doing something in the real world, which can be expressed by sentences that prototypically host directive speech acts (imperative); or the speaker exceeds the purely deontic modality and expands the sentence effect on the addressee by adding epistemic modality to it which happens in prototypical V2-declaratives and interrogative sentences. The solely deontic then only carries the parameter "S wants (from A)…" (Truckenbrodt 2006: 264), whereas the latter additionally includes the parameter "that it is common ground" (Truckenbrodt 2006: 265). Thus, an unembedded V-to-C-declarative and -interrogative sentences have a context index of the following form:

> "Context indices on C in unembedded use have the form
>
> <DeontS $(,x)_1$ $(,$<Epist>$)_2$>.
>
> A paraphrase *is 'S wants (from x)$_1$ (that it is common ground)$_2$ that/whether . . .'."*
>
> (Truckenbrodt 2006: 265)

---

[24] This is not a 1:1-relation between sentence mood and illocution, but is only intended to show which illocutions often occur alongside certain sentence moods.

[25] Epistemic = everything that refers to an individual's knowledge.

To be more exact, declarative sentences realise the deontic as well as the epistemic component in wanting from the addressee that the uttered proposition is accepted as true and therefore also becomes common ground:

(41) Nina hat Kaffee gekocht.

p: dass Nina Kaffee kocht

A paraphrase is 'S wants (from x) (that it is common ground) that p'
(cf. Truckenbrost 2006: 265-266)

Interrogatives spell out slightly different, but still contain the same parameters in their index:

(42) Hat Nina Kaffee gekocht?

p: dass Nina Kaffee kocht

A paraphrase is 'S wants (from x) (that it is common ground) whether p'
(cf. Truckenbrost 2006: 265-266)

Directive attitudes imply command, orders and similar. The prototypical case of directive attitudes – the imperative sentence mood – is evaluated referring to a factual[26] background and therefore shows merely deontic features. Looking at its context index, the imperative then differs from the interrogative and declarative sentence:

(43) Koch Kaffee, Nina!

p: dass Nina Kaffee kocht

A paraphrase is 'S wants (from x) that p'
(cf. Truckenbrost 2006: 265-266)

---

[26] Factual = everything that refers to facts.

What follows from this is that the matter of the imperative sentence is not whether something is true or false as its epistemic component is missing due to its semi-finiteness in this case, and the truth is thus neither proclaimed nor searched for:

> "Insofern entfällt beim Imperativsatz – analog zum Entscheidungsfragesatz – der Akt des Urteilens bzw. der Erweiterung der Partition."[27] (Lohnstein 2000: 80)

The term *partition* has not been used up to now and the definition of the attitudes above are quite rough, but this be looked at in more detail later in section 2.3.6.

One might wonder why exclamatory and optative sentences are excluded from this list. The reason for this is that it is not clear whether they are actually sentence moods of their own. But this will also be discussed further in the chapter about V1-sentences and their counterparts.

(44)	Hans füttert den Hund.	**Declarative**	**Assertive**
(45)	Füttert Hans den Hund?	**Interrogative**	**Erotetic**
(46)	Fütter den Hund, Hans!	**Imperative**	**Directive**

In the examples (44)-(46), the reader can see that the uttered proposition is the same in all the sentences. Nevertheless, the way in that the proposition is brought about is different, because the addressee receives different signals concerning the speaker's attitude towards the conveyed information and the grammatical form varies. In (44), the speaker's focus is to let the addressee know that he believes the proposition to be true and thus also wants the addressee to accept it as true. Furthermore, the speaker wants from the addressee that it becomes common ground what the speaker herself expresses to believe to be true (cf. Truckenbrodt 2006). In (45), the speaker signals to the addressee that he does not know whether the proposition is true or false, and therefore demands the addressee to decide what the speaker himself cannot decide. To a certain extent, interrogatives and declaratives show

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[27] Insofar, the act of judgment or the expansion of the partition – analogue to the yes-/no-interrogative sentence – respectively, is omitted with respect to the imperative sentence.

similarities here, as it was demonstrated further above: The speaker likewise wishes a to add a proposition to the common ground; yet the commitment to the truth is not on the speaker's concerning interrogatives – it is for the addressee to commit himself to the truth of a proposition (cf. Truckenbrodt 2006). (46) displays a command towards the addressee to act in such a way that the uttered proposition becomes reality. In this case, there is no epistemic character to the sentence, since the matter is not to enrich the common ground with a true proposition, but rather to change the world in terms of what is postulated by the speaker, which makes the sentences a purely deontic one (cf. Truckenbrodt 2006).

There are complications that arise as soon as sentences are included which are doubtful pertaining to their sentence mood status, as for example exclamatory sentence:

(47)   Was hat der lange /BEIne?

(48)   Was hat DER lange Beine!

(Struckmeier/Kaiser 2018: 279)

Struckmeier and Kaiser (2018) thematise the problem that exclamatory sentences like (48) do not fulfil the index conditions that Truckenbrodt formulates. This boils down to the circumstance that exclamatory sentences can look like interrogatives, but do not serve as questions. This issue will be brought up again at the point where we specifically talk about the role of intonation when defining sentence moods.

The topic of modality will come up again in connection with modal particles. For now, however, the information and theories that are sufficient to approach the matter of sentence mood definition further have been outlined so far. The next issue is the separation of sentence mood, sentence type and illocution.

2.2 Trias Divided

This part will shortly tackle the distinction of the trias sentence mood, sentence type and illocution. These names have been used diffusely over the years in linguistic research.

The exact definition of these labels does not seem to have a universal consensus which is why I distinguish the trias as follows: The sentence type refers to a mere syntactic notion of a

sentence; here, the positioning of the finite verb determines the sentence type. Thus, there are overall three sentence types possible in the German language: V1, V2 and V-final.[28] This means that in V1-sentences, the finite verb genuinely occupies the first position of a sentence and, so, the *linke Satzklammer* or C° position. I emphasise the word "genuinely" here, because there are certain elliptical constructions that display (or rather do not display) an ellipsis in the *Vorfeld* or SpecCP position, which possesses a covert element that can be revived in this prefinite position. The latter examples would actually be V2-sentences. V2-sentences are sentences that show a constituent in the prefinite position of the sentence, therefore in the *Vorfeld* or SpecCP position. V-final sentences carry their finite verb in the last position of the sentence, which is called *rechte Satzklammer* or Fin[0] [29]. Those were originally called "Stirnform" (V1), "Kernform" (V2) and "Spannform" (V-final) (cf. Meibauer 2013: 2).

(49)   Füttert Hans den Hund?

(50)   Hans füttert den Hund.

(51)   (Berta weiß,) dass Hans den Hund füttert.

This categorisation so far is relatively simple to grasp. Turning, however, to sentence mood, a whole bunch of aspects relevant to the specification of sentence mood unravels (cf. also Rosengren et al. 1992: 438). The reason for this is that a definition purely based on sentence types is not possible (cf. Brandt/Reis/Rosengren/Zimmermann 1992: 4), which becomes clear when looking at the list of examples of V1-sentences below:

(52)   Hat Hans den Hund gefüttert?

(53)   Hat Hans doch den Hund gefüttert!

(54)   Hat Hans den Hund gefüttert. (War der trotzdem noch hungrig.)

(55)   Fütter den Hund, Hans!

(56)   Hätte Hans doch den Hund gefüttert!

---

[28] Although it is argued, for instance by Julia Winkler (2013), that sentences can bear V3 as well. But since this is a marginal phenomenon, it will not be discussed in larger detail here.

[29] Also known as T° or I°.

All of the sentences above share the feature of being a V1-sentence, whilst also containing the same proposition. Yet they are far too different concerning their meaning and function. These differences have to be summarised under the term sentence mood. The definition of the sentence mood that will be adapted in this dissertation leans strongly on the views that Hans Altmann (1993) had about it, but it likewise includes essential aspects of the other cited approaches above. He understands a sentence mood as a sign made up of different parts from different linguistic modules which, combined together, create a more or less feasible object that can be categorised under a certain term and idea like *declarative, interrogative, imperative* and so on.[30]

> „Die folgende Darstellung versteht unter „Satzmodus" ein komplexes sprachliches Zeichen[31] mit einer Formseite, normalerweise eine oder mehrere satzförmige Strukturen mit angebbaren formalen Eigenschaften, und einer Funktionsseite, also der Beitrag dieser Struktur(en) zum Ausdruck propositionaler Einstellungen […] oder zur Ausführung sprachlicher Handlungen. Auf die Formseite verweisen Ausdrücke wie „Formtyp", „Satztyp" oder auch „Satzart", auf die Funktionsseite Termini wie „Funktionstyp" oder „Positionstyp" […], „kognitive Einstellung" […] oder „semantischer Modus" […]." (Altmann 1993: 1007)[32]

Rosengren (1992) in its core says the same in a shorter way: „Der Satzmodus ist die semantische Vermittlungsinstanz zwischen den formalen Eigenschaften des Satztyps und seinem Sprechaktpotential."[33] (Rosengren 1992: 435)

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[30] But it has to be emphasised that I will not only include Altmann (1993) in my analysis. More approaches will be added later.

[31] Which does not equal the structuralist definition of a sign (cf. Meibauer 2013: 5).

[32] The following illustration perceives "sentence mood" as a complex linguistic sign consisting of a formal side, usually one or more sentential structures with formal features that can be named, and a functional side, which is the contribution of those structures to express propositional attitudes […] or for the realisation of verbal actions. Expression like "Formtyp", "Satztyp" or "Satzart" refer to the formal side, terms like "Funtionstyp" and "Positionstyp", "kognitive Einstellung" or "semantischer Modus" refer to the functional side.

[33] The sentence mood is the semantic mediating authority between the formal features of a sentence type and its speech act potential.

Along with the definition of sentence moods, certain problems arise. For example, there is a slight problem concerning the naming of the distinct sentence moods. One has to come to terms with the exact name for the sentence, because there are several names out there for one and the same sentence mood. These synonyms are listed in the table below:[34]

Latin terms	German terms
Deklarativsatz	Aussagesatz
Interrogativsatz	Fragesatz
Imperativsatz	Befehlssatz
Optativsatz	Wunschsatz
Exklamativsatz	Ausrufesatz

Altmann uses the German terms instead of the Latin terms to name sentence moods. I prefer the Latin terms; the reason for this is the following: *Aussagesatz* can be directly translated as statement sentence, if one chooses to translate the term literally. The problem that arises when using the German term instead of the Latin one is that the distinction between sentence mood and illocution is not clear. Illocutions are statements, questions, commands etc. Illocutionary types are assertives, directives, commissives, representatives, expressives and declarations. Assertives for example comprise acts of claiming, stating etc., whereas directives include e. g. the act of commanding or ordering or similar kinds of expressions. Calling a declarative sentence an *Aussagesatz* does not make it clear enough whether one is talking about the semantic category of a sentence or the pragmatic function the sentence fulfils. This is why I will be referring to sentence moods via Latin and identify illocutions through German or English labels respectively. Altmann clarifies that he does not assume that an Aussagesatz always contains a statement, however (cf. Altmann 1993: 1007). Thus, the idea about a sentence mood is the same, I simply use the Latin terms to be economic when it comes to distinguishing sentence mood and illocution.

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[34] As this is a dissertation about German sentences, the names of the sentence moods will be given in German as well.

The distinction between *Formseite* and *Funktionsseite* is clear: concerning the form, there are parts like for example the kind of constituent that occupies the prefinite position in a sentence and other grammatical aspects. Those grammatical aspects include the positioning of the finite verb or finiteness in a sentence, the presence or absence of modal particles, sentence initial subjunctions, wh-expressions – pronominal as well as adverbial. Furthermore, he considers morphological features important, which in German mainly focuses on the finite verb and whether it is [+/-IMP] or [+/-IND][35]. Then, it is crucial in what order constituents appear in a sentence, at least to some degree: German is not completely free in its constituent order, but it is not as strict as e.g. Chinese, where the position of an expression determines its syntactic function. Categories to look at when talking about word order is the finiteness or finite verb – among which modal verbs present a particular class –, wh-expressions, and modal particles. Finally, differences in intonation appear to be a game changer in the variation of illocutions.

A further approach that will be included was published by Lohnstein (2000, 2020), who likewise says that a sentence mood can be described compositionally. In contrast to Altmann, however, Lohnstein analyses the question of what sentence mood is using the means of i.a. generative syntax and inquisitive semantics. This will be discussed more thoroughly later.

All of the listed features play an essential role in the definition of a specific sentence mood, yet this does not mean that intonation, for example, on its own is a marker of sentence mood. It rather is the combination of certain features – hence, a **complex** sign – that attributes a certain pragmatic character to a sentence. In the following subsections, a closer look will be taken at the parts that design a sentence mood.

The third and last part of the trias is the illocution. According to speech act theory (Austin 1975, Searle 1975) an illocution is the act performed by a speaker via the language she uses. Thus, by uttering a sentence the speaker can actually do things. In some sentences the presence of the act is more obvious than in others:

(57)   Ich taufe dich auf den Namen Gottlob.

(58)   Komm her!

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[35] Referring to the verb being imperative or indicative.

(59)   Die Erde ist eine Scheibe.

With respect to the distinction 'constitutive' vs 'performative', the first sentence is a performative one and not only describes the act that is carried out but actually carries out an act that changes the circumstances of the extralinguistic world. The second sentence represents a command that the addressee is demanded to carry out. The third sentence reveals a description of the world described in it, yet, leaves it at that. Though there is no explicit act described in the latter two sentences, they could be circumscribed as:

(60)   Ich befehle dir herzukommen.
(61)   Ich behaupte, dass die Erde eine Scheibe ist.

In this case, the two sentences above are declarative sentences with reference to sentence moods, keeping the same speaker intentions as before. Further explanations about this will be provided in chapter 4. What, for now, is significant to be understood, is that sentence mood and illocution do not directly correlate in each case, as well as sentence type and sentence mood do not directly correlate. It is not valid to say that a declarative sentence always is a statement. The most common case of confusion among first semesters concerning the introduction of sentence type, sentence mood and illocution mostly happens with respect to declarative and optative sentences; especially when the instructor explains that the optative sentence is a sentence that contains a wish or desire:

(62)   Würdest du doch nur dein Zimmer aufräumen!
(63)   Ich wünsche mir, dass du dein Zimmer aufräumst.

It is rather common to choose (63) as an example of an optative sentence, rather than the first one.

All that is meant to touch upon the following: When determining the illocution of a sentence, the context of utterance and intonation as well as the use of particles has to be taken into

consideration. Those also clarify whether the lexical content of a sentence is to be understood literally or not.

If a speaker intends to, she can do many things through the use of language that her illocutionary heart desires. Yet, the context has to provide the opportunity for a certain illocution in case it deviates from the prototype.

2.3 Sentence Mood as a Complex Composition
2.3.1 Categorial Filling

Referring to *categorial filling*, Altmann talks about certain elements that influence the constitution of a sentence mood – even if they are not absolutely necessary to define this very sentence mood. For German, those are the finite verb, complementisers, modal particles, subject pronouns in imperative sentences and wh-expressions (cf. Altmann 1993: 1011-1012). The presence of a finite verb makes it clear that the sentence under discussion (whether main or embedded clause) is not infinite, which is important e. g. concerning the exact identification of the addressee:

(65)   Sich noch heute versichern!

(66)   Versichere dich noch heute!

Marga Reis (2003) described that there is a difference in person concerning infinite and semi-finite directive sentences: As the reflexive pronouns indicate, the first is third person and the latter is second person (this will come up again in chapter 3).

Moreover, the categorial filling distinguishes between V1-, V2- and V-final-sentences, depending on its position and the element that precedes it. The following sentences come with various positions of the finite verb, and show that its position alone is not sufficient when it comes to distinguishing sentence moods (cf. Brandt/Reis/Rosengren/Zimmermann 1992: 4):

Main Clauses		
V1	V2	V-final
Declarative sentence	Declarative sentence	
Interrogative sentence	Interrogative sentence	
Imperative sentence	Imperative sentence	Imperative sentence
Optative sentence		Optative sentence
Exclamative sentence	Exclamative sentence	Exclamative sentence

Moving on to wh-expressions – which belong to the elements that are relevant under the term of categorial filling, too -, it is important to say where the wh-expression is positioned, not only due to the change of the sentence type, but because the mere presence of a wh-expression does not automatically make it an interrogative or exclamative sentence. This is witnessed by examples like (66):

(66)   Wieviel, schätz mal, daß das Kleid gekostet hat.[36]
       (cf. Reis/Rosengren 1992: 442)

The sentence contains a wh-expression in first position, but the sentence is not a wh-interrogative. It is an imperative sentence, which becomes even clearer when transforming the word order in the sentence without tarnishing the meaning:

(67)   Schätz mal, wieviel (daß) das Kleid gekostet hat.

Moreover, the semi-finitenss of the matrix verb marks in both cases an imperative clause from the perspective of sentence moods. From an illocutionary point of view, (66) is a wh-question. The scope of the wh-expression is restricted to the embedded clause though. What this is meant to show is that a wh-question (as distinct from a wh-interrogative) inevitably needs a wh-expression at its very beginning, but this, conversely, does not mean that a sentence showing a wh-expression in its sentence initial position is a wh-interrogative

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[36] One has to take into consideration that this is also dialect.

sentence. This is the reason why one single feature is not sufficient for a reliable definition of a sentence mood. Truckenbrodt (2006) emphasises that the [+wh]-element has to be in the left periphery of the sentence in order to induce an epistemic background. Rosengren (1992: 443) and (Brandt et al. 1992: 4) assume a silent [+wh]-feature in the deep structure of a sentence which needs to be c-commanded by a [+wh]-phrase feature in the left sentence periphery.

Moving on from wh-expressions, I want to cover complementisers shortly. Sentence initial complementisers prohibit the movement of finiteness to the C°-head-position (den Besten 1978, Lenerz 1984 i.a.). This is why sentences with complementisers in the first position are always V-final sentences.[37] Thus, complementisers make it impossible for a sentence to be V1 or V2.[38] Nevertheless, there are V-final-sentences that can be used as independent clauses, however, the restriction on independent clauses that can be V-final is quite huge.

The difference between V-final and V1-/V2-sentences is that they lack V-to-C-movement, a consequence of that is that they are not anchored in the discourse and – from the perspective of syntactic theory – do not undergo feature checking in the C-domain:

> "The effects postulated […] are claimed to be effects of local feature checking of grammatical elements in C with features in the context index in C. They are not effects of semantic composition. I suggest that the need to check *Epist*[39] […] as well as the need to check A[40] […] drives V-to-C in German." (cf. Truckenbrodt 2006: 266)

At this point, it is relevant to mention that exclamative and optative sentences are often doubted to be genuine separate sentence moods, since they are assumed to be derived from other sentence moods (like declaratives and interrogatives) and only represent variants in terms of intonation (cf. Rosengren 1997; Lohnstein 2020).

The final elements that are interesting concerning categorial filling in sentence mood are modal particles. They are interesting, because they are not obligatory considering the

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[37] With some exceptions, for instance *weil*-V2-sentences.

[38] I do not talk about dialects – for instance Bavarian -- here. Furthermore, I count *weil*-V2-sentences as a marked phenomenon.

[39] Epistemic background.

[40] Addressee.

constitution of a sentence mood, but they can make it a lot easier to identify, for instance, an optative sentence as such:

(68) (Ach,) Wärst du doch hier!

(69) (Ach,) WÄRST du hier!

Before talking about the particles as such, information about modality with direct correspondence to the effect of modal verbs and modal particles should be added. Again, the term modality is used to describe the speaker's attitude towards an uttered proposition (cf. Müller 2014: 4). To be more exact:

> "Die Sprechereinstellung wird in der Literatur als *ein* Typ von **Modalität** verstanden. Modalität allgemein wird aufgefasst als semantisch-pragmatische Kategorie, die sich darauf bezieht, wie ein Sprecher zur Geltung des in der Äußerung ausgedrückten Sachverhalts Stellung nimmt."[41] (Müller 2014: 4)

Thus, the verbal moods indicative, imperative or Konjunktiv 2 express whether the speaker views the uttered contents as something that holds or does not hold in the actual world and, in the case of the imperative, that he wants to be realised. Likewise, modal verbs can dye a speaker's utterance with respect to this attitude.

(70) Du kannst das sein lassen!

(71) Du musst das sein lassen!

(72) Du sollst das sein lassen!

The modal verbs in the sentences above do not change the proposition as such but the modal background, and the speaker conveys a different attitude towards the uttered content. The

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[41] The speaker's attitude is understood as a type of modality in the literature. Modality can be taken to be a semanto-pragmatic category generally, which refers to the speaker's opinion towards the expressed issue.

first refers to the modal background of capability or possibility[42] in this situation, whereas the second reveals a buletic background and the third a deontic one. Modal particles have comparable options:

(73)   Lass das sein!

(74)   Lass das bloß sein!

(75)   Lass das nur sein!

(Müller 2014: 5)

(73) is a neutral demand by a speaker. In (74) and (75), the utterance receives a certain colouring of speaker attitude. Thus, one can paraphrase the three sentences as follows:

(76)   Lass das sein!   I want you to do p

(77)   Lass das bloß sein!   For now, I want you to do nothing but p

(78)   Lass das nur sein!   I want you to do nothing but p, and you want to do p anyways.

(cf. Müller 2014: 5, Zifonun et al: 1997: 1207)

It is a matter of fact that modal particles tend to occur alongside particular sentence moods. Modal particles in general can occur in every sentence mood, but the exclamative and optative sentence are willing hosts for them in general, and seem almost odd without them:

(80)   Wärst du doch hier!

(81)   Ist der aber dumm!

This appears to be connected to the circumstance that exclamatory and optative sentences are closely connected to certain speaker attitudes: Optative sentences always express a speaker's wish/desire (cf. Grosz 2011) and exclamatory sentences are used by a speaker to bring about

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[42] Though Kratzer (1976) showed in her work „Was *können* und *müssen* bedeuten können müssen" that the German verb *können* can also combine with further modal backgrounds.

a colour of astonishment (cf. d'Avis 2013). Modal particles intensify speaker attitudes and, therefore, are more likely to pair up naturally with optative and exclamatory sentences than other sentences would. In contrast to declarative, interrogative and imperative sentences, optatives and exclamatory almost seem naked without modal particles:

(82)   ?Wärst du hier!

(83)   ?Ist der dumm!

They even call for a substitution in the shape of accents and/or interjections:

(84)   Wärst du HIER!

(85)   IST der dumm!

(86)   Ach, WÄRST du hier!

(87)   Boah, IST der dumm!

Therefore, at first sight, it does not seem far-fetched to assume that modal particles are obligatory in exclamatory and optative sentences. Yet it turns out to be a tendency instead of an obligation (cf. Grosz 2011), as they can be left out and exchanged with specific accents to clarify the sentence mood. Sentence mood expresses not only the question whether the propositional content actually holds, but mixes in other colours of attitude like a directive, assertional of directive one. Modal particles are modal, because they can enhance or bring about more clearly what the underlying meaning of a sentence in a specific context is. In addition to that, they can modify the illocution of sentences:

(88)   Graf Zahl freut sich auf seine Emeritierung.

(89)   Graf Zahl freut sich ja auf seine Emeritierung.

The first sentence claims the truth about the proposition that a person named Count Zahl is happy about his emeritus status. Adding the assertive modal particle *ja*, modifies the statement as follows:

(89)	Graf Zahl freut sich auf seine Emeritierung.	p is true p = dass Graf Zahl sich auf seine Emeritierung freut
(90)	Graf Zahl freut sich ja auf seine Emeritierung.	p is true and the addressee does not object p = dass Horst sich auf seine Emeritierung freut

So, modal particles do not actually change the illocutionary type completely, since in both cases the utterance can still be categorised as assertive, but they modify the assertive relation to the addressee's reception of the utterance. So, modal particles do not constitute or change a sentence mood. They simply enhance it (cf. also Rosengren 1992: 438).

2.3.2 Morphological Features and Element Order

When talking about morphological features, what is meant by this concerning German is the morphological features of the verb in a sentence. The features of the finite verb tense, mood, (genus verbi), person and number are – some more, some less – relevant to the constitution of sentence mood (cf. Scholz 1991: 57).[43] There are languages in which other morphological categories may have influence on the sentence mood, but in German the impact of those features is smaller than that of other features. Yet, in the imperative and optative sentence, verbal morphological features play an important role to sentence mood constitution, so they are not totally irrelevant.

What is more relevant in the first place here is whether there is a finite verb in the sentence – which would call for a categorization into V1, V2, V-final – or whether the verb is infinite. There are in fact infinite main clauses in German like the ones below expressing commands and wishes

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[43] At least, the finite verb often has the biggest influence on sentence mood, which does not exclude the influence of other elements in the sentence.

(91)   Aufgestanden!

(92)   Hinsetzen!

(93)   Noch einmal in Wuppertal sein!

(94)   Wohin sich wenden?

(95)   Alle Linguisten die Klappe halten!

(cf. Reis 1995, 2003)

Infinite verbs do not have a verbal mood or any other specification that helps categorise sentence moods. Fully finite verbs, however, possess an inflectional paradigm that distinguishes them from semi-finite verbs in that they are specified for tense and mood. The semi-finite imperative only shows the features of person and number. These differences might seem small at first, but they can have an impact on the construction of sentence moods, so that the construction of certain kinds of sentences is less attainable through a finite verb that has one feature and not the other and vice versa. The most common example is the semi-finite imperative verb which can only be used in imperative sentences. How the presence or absence of morphological features plays out on the separate sentence moods and sentence types will be talked about in the upcoming comparative chapter 3.

Turning to element order: There are languages in which the order of the lexical items used in a sentence not only determines which syntactic function a constituent has but also which sentence mood the sentence has. Chinese is an extremely restricted language with reference to word order when expressing syntactic functions.

	Chinese Word with Accent	**Translation**
(96)	mā[44] 妈	„mother"
(97)	má 麻	„flax"
(98)	mǎ 马	„horse"

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[44] The marks above the vowls represent different ways of pronouncing a syllable. Those different tones distinguish the syllables from each other with respect to their meaning.

(99) mà 骂   „scold someone"

(100) ma 吗   Question particle

The sentence below then could be translated as follows:

(101) mā   mà   mǎ   ma?

       妈   骂   马   吗?

       Mother(subject)   scold   horse (direct object)   ma (question particle)

       'Does the mother scold the horse?'

The subject and the object occupy a fixed position in a sentence. This correlates with a lack of inflection in Chinese. The positions are a substitute for the missing inflectional system in that the prefinite position is the fixed place for the subject in Chinese. This means that for instance the prefinite position correspondence to the function of the subject in a sentence. In German, however, the **subject** can be placed more freely in a sentence and due to its person-number-congruence that can be identified with the help of its inflection:

(102) **Der Mann**[3rd person, singular] füttert[3rd person, singular] den Hund spät.

(103) Den Hund füttert[3rd person, singular] **der Mann**[3rd person, singular] spät.

(104) Spät füttert[3rd person, singular] den Hund **der Mann**[3rd person, singular].

Nevertheless, German is not completely free in the positioning of constituents, because the position of the finite verb influences the sentence mood. The sole fronting of finiteness in the case of (106) generates a question, whereas the additional topicalization in (105) generates a declarative sentence:

(105) Der Mann **füttert** den Hund spät.

(106) **Füttert** der Mann den Hund spät?

(107) Wen **füttert** der \Mann?

(108) Der Mann **füttert** /wen?

Furthermore, the position of the wh-expression is crucial to the question whether the sentence at hand is an interrogative sentence or not. In case the wh-expression is placed in the prefinite position in SpecCP in German and the finiteness is fronted, the sentence is a wh-interrogative (cf. (107)). The wh-expression can also be placed somewhere else in the sentence, but then the kind of question that is uttered changes from a direct independent wh-interrogative question to an echo-question (cf. (108)). The latter comes with restrictions that the former does not meet, which will be discussed more thoroughly in chapters 3 and 5. The symbiosis of word order and verb morphology can therefore not be ignored, which will be illustrated in more detail in chapter 3.

Before this can happen, however, the dimension of intonation has to be discussed, because intonation will be important not only in the distinction of echo-question and canonical interrogatives (like (107) and (108), but especially concerning the distinction of syntactically ambiguous sentences.

2.3.3 Intonation

There are more and less extreme routes that can be taken when integrating the component of intonation into the analysis of sentence moods and the speech acts they bring about. Sag and Libermann (1975) go as far as saying that the differing tonal contours in one and the same sentence mood can pinpoint the speaker's intention quite precisely. Here, they specifically talk about the TILDE-contour: One problem that is discussed in reference to this special type of contour is that wh-interrogatives naturally come with a fall sentence melody at the end of a sentence, but that ingenuine and genuine question cannot be distinguished through this fall, though echo-questions, for instance, display a final rise (cf. Sag/Liberman 1975: 489).

They then proceeded to say that a genuine wh-interrogative question shows a low continuous stress on the significant constituent and ends in a fall, whereas in an ingenuine question that rather leans towards a statement, the TILDE-contour occurs (cf. Sag/Liberman 1975: 495).

I will not go as far (for now) as saying that those very delicate distinctions in prosody can actually identify certain speech acts. But I will employ the view that intonation is essential when comparing ambiguous sentence moods like the V1-interrogative and the V1-

declarative. Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg (1990) look at prosodic patterns in languages that occur in terms of phrasing, accent placement, pitch range, and tune. They state that a speaker chooses a particular

> "intonational contour to convey relationships between (the propositional content of) the current utterance and previous and subsequent utterances – and between (the propositional content of) the current utterance and believes H[45] beliefs to be mutually held. These relationships are conveyed compositionally via selection of pitch accent, phrase accent, and boundary tone."
>
> (Pierrehumbert/Hirschberg 1990: 308)

In this dissertation, it therefore seems to be relevant to look at the intonational contour of a sentence towards its end, which I will call *progredient intonation* or *sentence tune,* and to look at certain pitch accents, meaning those in optative and exclamatory sentences. It will – concerning assertion – also be essential to look at the phenomenon of verum-focus, but this will not take up as much space as the significance of progredient falling and rising intonation or the said two pitch accents overall. It has already been mentioned that there are extreme language systems when it comes to the relevance of intonation, like Chinese, where the way a speaker pronounces a syllable pitchwise changes the meaning of the syllable or word completely.

(109)   我想要一匹马

wǒ xiǎng yào yī pǐ **mǎ**

I   want a   horse

'I want a horse.'

---

[45] hearer

(110)   我要亚麻

        wǒ yào mà **má**

        I   want flax

        ‚I want flax.'

The importance of the correspondence between intonation of a syllable and lexical meaning also evokes a specific use of sentence tune. The overall melody of a sentence is not associated with speech acts, because a progredient rising contour in syllables at the end of a sentence can change the lexical meaning and therefore causes failure of the whole utterance in the context under discussion and concerning the QUD. That is why Germans are often misunderstood when they speak Chinese, because they mark yes-/no-questions through a rise; this, however can change the meaning of the last word in the respective sentence and definitely does not induce the illocution of a question, because there is no rising sentence tune Chinese that serves that function. Due to that, Chinese use the syllable *ma* (吗) that mark the sentence as a question, for instance:

(111)   你想要一匹马吗

        Nǐ xiǎng yào yī pǐ mǎ **ma**

        Want you   a   horse

        'Do you want a horse?'

German shows different emphases when it comes to the use of prosodic features: When looking specifically at intonation and sentence mood, one can mostly find the following standard correlations:

Sentence mood	**Prototypical** **progredient intonation**
V2-Declarative	Falling
V1-Declarative	Falling
V2-Interrogative	Falling
V1-Interrogative	Rising

V2-Exclamatory	Falling + Exclamatory Accent
V1-Exclamatory	Falling
V1-Optative	Falling (+ Optative Accent[46])
V1-Imperative	Falling[47]

The list shows that the V1-interrogative sentence naturally comes with rising intonation at the end of the sentence, whereas the rest of the sentence moods tends to show falling intonation at the end of the sentence. This table is an overview with respect to canonical prosody. This has to be emphasised, because the reader will see later that sentence moods occur with different intonations as well, but then show slightly different outcomes.

> „Es versteht sich, daß man bei Vernachlässigung der Intonation entweder zu einer deutlich geringeren Anzahl von Formtypen oder zu einer großen Zahl von Homophonien kommt. Entscheiden kann den Streit wohl nur ein externes Kriterium, nämlich das der auditiven Unterscheidbarkeit von Satzminimalpaaren durch kompetente Sprecher […]."[48] (Altmann 1993: 1016-1017)

Altmann here alludes to the syntactic ambiguity of sentences that are semantically different and are either distinguishable by context or by intonation or both. I will show this down below in consideration of V1-sentences:

(112)   Hat Anna mir einen Kuchen ge\backen. (Da habe ich mich doch gefreut)

(113)   Hat Anna mir einen Kuchen ge/backen?

(114)   Hat Anna mir einen KUchen ge\backen! (Das hätte ich nicht erwartet)

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[46] I call it *optative accent*, because the accent behaves differently from the exclamatory accent. The exclamatory accent is obligatory, whereas the optative accent can be replaced by a modal particle.

[47] The table does not reflect deviations from broad focus like contrastive focus, or verum focus. The reason for this is that, while these intonation types have pragmatic consequences, they do not change anything about the sentence mood.

[48] It is clear that there will be fewer formal types or a bigger number of homophone objects if we ignore the role of intonation. Surely, only an external criterion of auditive differentiability on the basis of sentential minimal pairs can decide the argument.

The sentences above show syntactic ambiguity in case they are not reduced through their intonation. The intonation here serves to distinguish declarative, interrogative and exclamatory mood. Without it, one could not exactly determine the sentence mood. The question is, however, whether intonation can always be said to clearly distinguish the form types of sentences. Rosengren (cf. down below) is of a different opinion. Intonation is the stepchild among sentence mood features. It is considered marginally relevant by many authors. The following excerpt is a view representative of a large number of researchers:

> „Wenn wir vorläufig vom sogenannten Exklamativsatz absehen […], kann man auch nicht durch Hinzunahme des Tonmusters eine eindeutige und überzeugende Klassifizierung erhalten. Zwar ist der steigende Tonverlauf prototypisch für den E-IS. Nicht jeder E-IS wird aber mit steigender Intonation gesprochen. Der w-IS weist seinerseits auch nicht immer fallende Intonation auf. Unklar ist übrigens auch die Einordnung des Assertionsfragesatzes […], der steigende Intonation verlangt. Die Intonation hilft uns gewiß bei der Disambiguierung der Sätze nach Satztypen, sie ist aber als Definitionsmerkmal weder notwendig noch hinreichend."[49] (Rosengren 1992: 438)

What arises from this is the question whether intonation is important at all and, if so, where its relevance lies. Rosengren says that it is not necessary concerning sentence mood constitution. I therefore want to look at the symbiosis between intonation and illocution now.

Living beings that are in possession of a vocal tract have the ability to produce sounds that differ in pitch. The difference in pitch can signal a certain meaning or intention in certain situations, concerning most human languages:

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[49] If we ignore the exclamatory accent for now, we cannot produce a clear and convincing classification, not even through the addition of a prosodic pattern. Agreed, the rising tune is prototypical of the E-IS. But not every E-IS is spoken with a rising contour. The wh-IS does not always display falling sentence tune, either. Furthermore, the categorisation of the rising declarative, which requires rising intonation, is unclear. Intonation surely helps us concerning the disambiguation of sentences with respect to sentence types, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the purpose of assembling defining features.

(115)   Du hast eine neue Fri\sur.

(116)   Du hast eine neue Fri/sur?

(117)   Du hast eine neue Fri\SUR!

The sentences above share the same proposition and syntax; the finite verb is in second position, the SpecCP-position is filled through a [-wh]-expression and there is no complementizer. Comparing the first two sentences, the sentence mood is that of a declarative sentence. This is odd, because only the intonation differs: (115) shows falling intonation and (116) shows rising intonation. So far, it has been said that rising intonation is prototypically linked to interrogative sentences. However, even those can emerge with falling intonation in specific situations:

The investigator stared at the supposed murderer after a long conversation that shows no way out for the suspicious person:

(118)   Herr Müller… Haben Sie den Mann (also) umge\bracht.

The intonation does not imply a question though the form of the sentence does and the interrogative mood is supported by the investigative context. The investigator could have used a V2-sentence with falling intonation instead, but then the disguise of the interrogative canonically used for questions and search of truth would have been missing, and would have revealed a clearer bias. Similar things can be observed in the rhetoric of court room scenes: The persons questioning a witness – and here it does not matter whether it is the defence or the prosecution – are obligated to approach this witness and collect information via questions in either the form of genuine interrogatives or at least via question tags. Posing leading questions like the one in (118) will legally either end in objection from the opposing side or an according ruling by the judge.

The fact that despite the differing intonation, the first two sentences share the same sentence mood indicates that intonation is not a necessary marker for the distinction between sentence moods (cf. also Reis 1991). What differs in this case is the speaker intention or illocution. Though the speaker utters a declarative sentence in both cases, a falling V2-decarative in the

first case and a rising V2-declarative in the second case, in the first case the declarative signifies a statement whereas in the second case it signifies a question. To be more exact, it seems to lead the addressee to perceive a yes-/no-question, though in the declarative case it is rather biased.

Moving on to the third example (117): This example is an exclamatory sentence. Here, too, the contents and form do not differ from the preceding examples except for the intonation and accentuation. The sentence is pronounced with progredient falling intonation. There are no modal particles particularly necessary that might further emphasise that this is an exclamatory sentence, the only aspect that serves to distinguish (117) from its declarative variant (115) is the exclamatory accent. Now, the question is whether the declarative sentence, the interrogative sentence and the exclamatory accent show deviations in terms of illocution.

What can be drawn from this is: There are prosodic characteristics that are relevant in the categorisation of sentence moods and there are others which are not: Intonation is helpful in terms of disambiguation, but not in terms of sentence mood definition. We will see in this chapter whether this is true or not. It was stated that intonation mainly is a marker of illocution (Reis 1991: 74; Truckenbrodt 2013: 21). But at the same time a certain way of pronouncing a sentence helps untangle the ambiguity of sentence moods, and, following Struckmeier/Kaiser (2018) and Kaiser (2014) and (which will be spelled out in chapter 5), helps identify the denotation of a sentence in terms of (sets of) situations. The most prominent case of ambiguity is the V1-declarative and the V1-interrogative.

(119) Herr Wegerhoff: **Hat der Chris den Football ge/worfen?**
 Frau Wegerhoff: Ja, so sieht es aus.
(120) Herr Wegerhoff: **Hat der Chris den Ball ge\worfen.** Ist dann einfach gegangen. Der hat sie ja wohl nicht mehr alle.

Although Sag and Liberman (1975) attempted to show that nuances in prosodic contouring of sentence tune can separate pairs like echo-questions and genuine interrogatives, I will not employ this analysis. I want to concentrate on rougher prosodic structures than nuances. The

features that will be interesting concerning the compositional approach to sentence mood are:

i.   Progredient intonation/Sentence tune/contour/melody

ii.   Pitch accents[50]

Those two aspects of intonation in a sentence will become important to the issues of illocution, disambiguation of sentence moods and the presentation of the denotation of a sentence (cf. chapter 5). Though sentence moods are not fixed on prosodic features as well as they are not bound to a certain illocution, there is a close correlation in prototypical cases. Truckenbrodt (2013) recently summarised that rough correlation as follows:

> „Bedeutungen von [\] und [/] im Deutschen:
>
> a.   [\] und [/] am Ende eines Wurzelsatzes operieren semantisch auf einer im Zusammenhang mit dem Wurzelsatz salienten Proposition p.
>
> b.   Mit [\] drückt der Sprecher aus, dass er zu p eine assertive Einstellung hat, i.e. p als wahr darstellen will. ("Ich sage, dass p").
>
> c.   Mit [/] drückt der Sprecher aus, dass er zu p eine fragende Einstellung hat, i.e. vom Adressaten wissen will, ob p wahr ist. ("Sag mir, ob p")"[51]
>
> (Truckenbrodt 2013: 14)

Truckenbrodt speaks about a "salient proposition" and hereby means propositions that are not necessarily part of a literal meaning of a sentence:

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50 Accent tones or edge tones (cf. Kaiser/Struckmeier 2018: 268).

51 The meaning of [\] and [/] in German:

a.   [\] and [/] at the end of a root sentence semantically operate on a salient proposition in connection with the root sentence.

b.   Through [\] the speaker expresses that he has an assertive attitude towards p, i.e. he wants to present p as true. ("I say that p").

c.   Through [/] the speaker expresses that he has an erotetic attitude towards p, i.e. he wants to know from the addressee whether p is true. ("Tell me whether p").

(121) Wer singt?

→ Salient proposition: p = dass jemand singt

The proposition p "dass jemand singt" is implied by "Wer singt?". Kaiser/Struckmeier (2018) categorise the function of the sentence tune in a similar way. They say more generally that the prosodic contour (edge tones) of a sentence describes the speaker's attitude towards the propositional content and its commitment to the proposition, whereas accent tones determine whether the proposition should be added to the common ground or not:

> "Basically, the accent tones are associated with the status of information relating to the discourse situation (given vs. new) or the common ground in the sense of Stalnaker (1987). The final tone movement of a sentence, which can be precisely described via (the combination of accent and) edge tones, is associated with the speaker's attitude towards the content of the sentence (e.g. statement vs. uncertainty vs. continuation) […]. While accent tones signal, (sic!) that accent tones should be added to the common ground (H*)[52] or not (L*), the different use of edge tones signals, if the speaker is committing to the proposition (L%) or not (H%)." (Kaiser/Struckmeier 2018: 268)

I do not fully agree with Truckenbrodt (2013) that a falling sentential contour signals assertion, but I would rather say that a falling tune signals that the respective sentence is informative and not inquisitive. This will be spelled out in chapter 5 in more detail. Most sentences prototypically come with falling intonation towards the end:

(122) Waltraud hat heute keine Schokolade geges\sen.	**V2-Declarative sentence**
(123) Hat Waltraud heute Schokolade geges\sen.	**V1-Declarative**
(124) Wer hat heute keine Schokolade geges\sen?	**V2-interrogative sentences**
(125) Iss Schokola\de!	**Imperative sentences**
(126) Waltraud hat heute keine Schokolade geges\sen!	**Exclamatory sentences**

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[52] Instead of "H" and "L" for high and low or rising and falling intonation respectively, I use dashes "/" and "\".

(127)   WAS hat Waltraud heute schon wieder geges\sen!   **Wh-Exclamatory sentence**

(128)   Hätte Waltraud doch heute Schokolade geges\sen!   **Optative sentences**

(129)   Dass Waltraud heute schon wieder SchokoLAde gegessen \hat!

Those are the sentence moods that prototypically emerge with falling intonation towards the end of the sentence in all their sentence types. Specific singularities will be mentioned concerning optative and exclamatory sentences when talking about certain sentence mood characteristic pitch accents. The sentences below can also display falling intonation, but here the situation is not as clear as with the ones above:

(130)   /WER hat heute keine Schokolade gegess\en?   **V2-interrogative sentences**

(131)   Hat Waltraud heute keine Schokolade gegess\en, fress' ich'n Besen.   **V1-adverbial sentence**

V2-interrogatives usually exhibit progredient falling intonation. They can display a rise at the end of the sentence, but this is mostly the case with special kinds like **echo-question** (cf. Reis 1991).

(132)   Nina: Kannst du bitte die Mail zur Eintragung ins GVV verschicken?

        Janina: **Ich soll die Mail zur Eintragung ins GVV verschi/cken? / Ich soll WAS verschic/ken?**

However, even in echo-questions the overall sentence tune can be falling towards the end, but those cases are rarer.

Moreover, echo-questions are no sentence mood of their own, but turn other sentence moods into questions pragmatically and attribute them a quotation character (cf. Reis 1991).

For now, it has to be summarised so far that the only sentence mood that does not canonically appear with progredient falling intonation is the interrogative sentence in the shape of the V1-sentence type.

As mentioned earlier, Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg (1990) state that sentences contain an

57

"intonational contour to convey relationships between (the propositional content of) the current utterance and previous and subsequent utterances – and between (the propositional content of) the current utterance and believes H[53] beliefs to be mutually held. These relationships are conveyed compositionally via selection of pitch accent, phrase accent, and boundary tone." (Pierrehumbert/Hirschberg 1990: 308)

As the progredient falling intonation pertains to the majority of sentence moods, I will start with that. The generalised pattern that can be attributed to that class is as follows: H* L L%. "H" stands for a high tone, "L" for a low tone. In case the tone is marked via "*", it is a pitch accent, in case one finds a "%"-mark, one is confronted with a boundary tone. I have used and will further use dashes for the purpose of notation instead.

A compositional approach that emphasises the importance of intonation is employed by Struckmeier and Kaiser (2015) as well as Kaiser (2014) i.a., who agree with the compositional theory by Lohnstein (2000) and Truckenbrodt (2006), but criticise that intonation is – in their opinion – scarcely integrated into the compositional analysis (cf. Struckmeier/Kaiser 2015: 265). I do not want to be the judge whether their opinion about the prioritisation is appropriate, but I want to emphasise that I think a more prominent role of intonation in compositional analysis is sensible.

To illustrate this, I will contrast two very prominent kinds of examples of ambiguity below, namely the ambiguity between V1-interrogative vs. V1-declarative vs. V1-exclamatory and V2-interrogative vs. V2-wh-exclamatory:

(133) Kommt die Sonja wieder zu \spät. (Ich habe mich so aufgeregt.)

(144) Kommt die Sonja wieder zu /spät?

(135) Kommt die Sonja wieder zu \SPÄT! (Das hätte ich nicht erwartet.)

---

53 hearer

(136)   Was hat der für /BEIne?

(137)   Was hat DER für \BEIne!

         (Kaiser/Struckmeier 2018: 279)

(138)   Was hast du nur ge/tan?

(139)   Was hast du nur ge\TAN!

I will come back to exactly those examples after explaining Kaiser's approach. Kaiser explains that not only discourse relevant component like context, addressee and speaker have influence on the interpretation of one and the same syntactic object, but also pitch accents and boundary tones or the overall sentence tune respectively (cf. Kaiser 2014: 15):

(140)   Sonja kommt zu \spät.

(141)   Sonja kommt zu /spät?

(142)   Sonja KOMMT zu \spät.

(cf. Kaiser 2014: 16ff)

The syntactic features as well as the categorial fillings are the same and result in the same declarative sentence mood. The interpretations of the sentences differ: (140) is a neutral statement, brought about by the progredient fall, (141) is a question which is indicated through the progredient rise, and (142) is also a statement but with a reaction that puts an emphasis on the truth of that statement (verum-focus) after someone else in the previous discourse had claimed the opposite of (142).

Now, those examples show in what way contours and pitch accents can change the speaker's intention. But besides the speaker's intention sentence mood can be shifted through intonation. First, I will look at the example V2-interrogative vs. V2-wh-exclamatory again:

(143)   Kommt die Sonja wieder zu /spät?

(144)   Kommt die Sonja wieder zu \SPÄT! (Das habe ich nicht erwartet.)

Thus, the exclamatory accent helps separate those two kinds of sentences. Even though the status of the exclamatory sentence as a separate sentence mood is still doubtful (cf. chapter 2), the effect that the exclamatory accent evokes i.a. is that speaker's intention of posing a question vanishes and there provokes a different continuation of the upcoming discourse. Doubts about sentence mood status cannot be found in the following examples:

(145) Kommt die Sonja wieder zu /spät?

(146) Kommt die Sonja wieder zu \spät. (Geh ich in Ninas Büro, und was sehe ich? Niemand ist da.)

Those examples would not be distinguishable if it was not for the falling or rising intonation at the end of the sentence, because they both prototypically end in a fall at their sentence boundary.

The distinction between V1-interrogative and V1-declarative can, in isolated use without further integration of previous or upcoming discourse parts,[54] not successfully be evoked by comparing surface structure. Brandt et al. (1992) provided the solution of a silent operator in the left periphery, but I want to opt for prosody here (in chapter 5, I will also emphasise the importance of the addressee's reaction or the prelude to a respective sentence and thus the overall discourse structure). Remember that I am talking about canonical sentences in a neutral context, which exclude phenomena like peer language or any conventions that require mutual knowledge between specific individuals in a very specific situation. In the most canonical case, the final boundary tune is the feature that distinguishes those two sentence moods even in their isolated use.

Another interesting question is what the essential role of a progredient fall is in contrast to a progredient rise. The assumption here is that a progredient rise wants to draw the addressee's attention to an extraordinary circumstance which can be associated with issues like uncertainty or the like. Those issues can be such signal to the addressee's that her attention and engagement is needed. Concerning a V1-interrogative, the rise then calls for

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[54] The discourse that surrounds V1-sentence – so, what exactly precedes or follows after a specific V1-sentence- will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 5.

clarification in a situation where the speaker is uncertain about the truth or falsehood of the salient proposition. What is further intriguing regarding rises and falls becomes clear when considering the V1-interrogative in comparison to V2-interrogatives:

(147)   Warum kommt Sonja zu /spät?
(148)   Sonja kommt zu /spät?

Both sentences canonically embody questions, but they usually come with a different tune. V2-interrogatives prototypically display a fall at the end[55] and V1-interrogatives display a rise at the end in the prototypical case. Nevertheless, both interrogatives have the same aim: Clearing up an uncertainty. But with respect to V2-interrogatives, a signal towards the addressee about the speaker's uncertainty is not needed in terms of intonation. This is due to the fact that the V2-interrogatives give away its need for clarification in terms of its wh-expression. The rest of the proposition is clear regarding its truth status and thus does not need any marker that states "Please, help me clear this up". In order to avoid confusion with imperatives displaying non-canonical word order and a wh-expression at their beginning, the full-fledged finite verb supports the character of the interrogative further:

(149)   Warum kommt Sonja zu /spät?
(150)   Warum, sag mir, kommt Sonja zu \spät.

The need of a compositional approach can therefore be emphasised further on the basis of the explanations so far – likewise the plea for the importance of intonation.

Intonation plays a role in the distinction between unintegrated and integrated clauses, too. According to Reis/Wöllstein (2010), V1-adverbial sentence show two focus-background-structures and therefore two nuclear accents: one in the protasis and one in the apodosis. Furthermore, the tune is a progredient rising one in the protasis in V1-adverbial sentences (cf. Reis/Wöllstein 2010:148):

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[55] The more marked types of interrogatives like echo-questions experience a progredient rise. However, here the situation is such that the whole proposition is questioned instead of just the wh-expression.

(151)   Ist Nina im Bü\RO, trinke ich mit ihr einen KAF\fee.

V1-adverbial protases have their own nuclear accent, which is why the overall V1-adverbial sentence possesses two focus-background structures. V-final-adverbial sentences display a different overall contour in that they have only one nuclear accent and therefore only one focus-background-structure. Therefore, V1-adverbial sentences in cases like (151) emerge with a more disintegrated protasis and thus a paratactic relation between protasis and apodosis, and V-final-adverbial sentences integrate their protasis into their apodosis and are hypotactic in nature (cf. Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 148):

(152)   Wenn Nina im BüRO /ist, trinke ich mit ihr einen Kaf\fee.

Exclamatory sentences and optative sentences also show a tendency towards progredient falling intonation:

(153)   Ach, käme doch nur ein SkeLETT in die \Bar!
(154)   Boah, IST der \dumm!

After going through the unclear cases, declarative, interrogative, imperative, optative and exclamatory sentence pertaining to the overall sentence melody appear to be transparent. But since the exclamatory accent and the optative accent play an important role in their definition, the discussion will continue with this morsel of prosody.

It has already been mentioned that modal particles are not obligatory in optative sentences, but that the optative sentence comes with certain restraints omitting either the modal particle or the characteristics optative accent. Omitting the modal particle in optative sentences has been said to cause an obligatory exclamatory or optative accent (cf. chapter 2) in order to remain in the category of optative sentences. It is most likely that an interjection would be needed for further support of the desiderative of optative sentences.

Though, as with modal particles, the intonation is not sentence mood constitutive, it nevertheless supports the communication of the wish or hope in the case of the integration of modal particles. Moreover, it even substitutes for the illocutionary support the modal particles provide in case of their absence in the shape of an additional accent. The accent then serves as disambiguating and can form mimimal pairs with non-optative sentences. Changing any other prosodic feature apart from the accent, - like a final rise in intonation – changes the illocution of the sentence from a wish or hope into a question:

(155)   (Ach,) KÄme eine Skelett in die \Bar. (Das würde meinen sehnlichsten Wunsch erfüllen.)

(156)   (Boah), kommt da ein SkeLETT in die \Bar! (Das habe ich nicht erwartet.)

(157)   Käme ein SkeLETT in die \Bar. (Bestellte es sich ein Bier und einen Schwamm.)

(158)   Käme ein Skelett in die /Bar?

Turning to the black sheep of the family once more, the exclamatory sentence is hugely dependent on prosody. Its specific intonation is one of the two core features, if not the core feature, that is constitutive for the exclamatory sentence. What the exclamatory sentence mood is standardly said to bring about, is a nuance of excitement, surprise or astonishment (d'Avis 2013: 197). That is:

> „Das wichtigste Merkmal von Exklamativen in Bezug auf Intonation ist die Anwesenheit eines sogenannten Exklamativakzents. […] Nach Altmann […] handelt es sich um einen nicht-fokussierenden Akzent. Er lässt sich sowohl von Kontrastakzenten als auch von anderen Fokusakzenten akustisch gut unterscheiden. Seine besonderen Merkmale sind größere Maxima bezogen auf die Grundfrequenz, er kann auch auf einem informationsstrukturell nicht fokussierten Ausdruck liegen, die akzentuierte Silbe weist eine größere Länge auf, der F_0-Gipfel liegt gegenüber thematischen Akzenten weiter hinten, also spät in der Silbe, meist hinter einem Intensitätsgipfel […]. Während der Exklamativakzent in Zuordnungsansätzen als formales Element ohne eigene Bedeutung gesehen wird, versuchen Vertreter von Ableitungsansätzen ihn mit bestimmten Funktionen in

Zusammenhang zu bringen, etwa als Widerspiegelung der emotiven Involviertheit

des Sprechers […].“[56] (d'Avis 2013: 174)

Exclamatory sentences would not be exclamatory in the literal sense if they did not have an accent that is stronger than a regular broad focus for example. To comprehend this, please, look at the following sentences:

(159)   Ist der /dumm?

(160)   Ist der \DUMM!

(161)   Was hat er /gemacht?

(162)   Was hat er \geMACHT!

(163)   Der hat nicht mehr alle Latten am \Zaun.

(164)   Der hat nicht mehr alle LATten am \Zaun!

(165)   Hat der den Football in den Baum gewor\fen.

(166)   Hat der den Football in den BAUM gewor\fen!

Above, one can see contrastive pairs of representatives of sentence moods that have already been presented, like: interrogative, declarative etc. As soon as the exclamatory accent is added to those sentences of any sentence mood, the mood changes. Furthermore, the exclamatory accent can be put on any constituent in a sentence, depending on which circumstance of abnormality is to be described:

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[56] The most important aspect of exclamatory sentence in reference to intonation is the exclamatory accent. […] According to Altmann, […] it is a non-focus accent. It can be distinguished well from contrastive accents and focus accents. Its special characteristics are bigger maxima in reference to the basic frequency, it can also be put informationstructurally non-focussed expressions, the accentuated syllable is longer, F_0-peak is further in the back in comparison to thematic accents, i.e. late in the syllable, most often following an intensity-peak. While the exclamatory accent is considered a formal element without its own meaning in *Zuordnungsansätzen*, advocates of the *Ableitungsansatz* try to attribute its own function to it, e.g. as a reflection of the speaker's emotive integration into the situation […].“

(167)   Der hat nicht mehr alle LATten am Zaun!

(168)   DER hat nicht mehr alle Latten am Zaun!

(169)   Der HAT nicht mehr alle Latten am Zaun!

Apart from the intonation and the abnormality effect, there is not much else that differentiates the exclamatory sentence from all the other sentence moods, especially when considering the sheer range of sentences that can be turned exclamatory by simply adding the exclamatory accent. But the singularities when it comes to restrictions on wh-phrases have already been pointed out beforehand, and they still have to be kept in mind. Intonationwise, there is no specificity to make out up to now, when it comes to special features concerning the distinction between V1, V2 and V-final.

About the mimicry effect of the exclamatory sentence: The V2-declarative canonically focusses the truth and makes a statement, while the V1-interrogative seeks for the truth and asks a question. This chapter does not seek to answer the question whether exclamatory sentences are actually derivations of other sentence moods. Yet, one has to address that – at this point – they can only be distinguished from other sentence moods via their exclamatory accent. That does not necessarily mean that exclamatory sentences are derivations of another sentence mood. What happens when using the exclamatory accent is that in the case that looks similar to the declarative, the exclamatory sentence does not focus the truth, but rather focusses the astonishment about the truth or the fact that is being presented? Concerning the exclamatory sentence that looks similar to the interrogative sentence, not the question is in the centre of attention but the excitement or surprise about the uttered proposition. This means that the exclamatory accent presents the interpretation of the sentence as a question. Therefore, there are still arguments in favour of the sentence mood status of the exclamatory sentence, but there are also arguments that do not support this theory.

2.3.4 *Speaking to* and *Speaking about*

This matter is something that is not covered by Hans Altmann (1993), but is nevertheless an essential part in the distinction of imperative and non-imperative sentences. Look at the two sentences below for comparison:

(170)   Gib mir das Gold!

(171)   Du gibst mir das Gold.

The first sentence is V1-imperative sentence, whereas the second is a V2-declarative sentence. Both share the same proposition and they can have similar illocutions. Both sentences address a single individual: the first does so through using the imperative form and the second one uses the overt second person singular pronoun. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the utterance relation between speaker and addressee when comparing these sentences. The imperative sentence does not state anything in that he tells the addressee something that he believes to be true. He asks the addressee in a directive fashion to change the world in terms of the uttered proposition. As he cannot deliver a description about the current world via using the imperative, he likewise does not have the instruments to talk about anything, especially not about the addressee or the truth value of the proposition. The relation that is presented through using an imperative therefore is a mere talking-to relation (cf. Platzack &Rosengren 1998, 2017: 4; Lohnstein 2020: 19). The opposite is the case for the V2-declarative sentence. Looking at the illocution of the sentence in (171), the reader could argue that the directive illocutionary type is covered here as well. But in this case, without having a restricted context, the sentence could have other functions as well, as for example a solely descriptive one:

Mary gives the piece of gold to Hans and states:

(172)   Du gibst mir das Gold.

In this situation, the speaker is simply stating the facts that hold in the actual world. He is therefore talking about the actions that the addressee Maria is carrying out here instead of ordering her to do something.

The declarative sentence is predestined to instantiate a talk-about relationship. Through using the sentence in (172), the speaker talks about the current circumstance prevailing and he utters his belief about the truth of these circumstances:

> "The finite clause with its truth-oriented meaning maps per default onto a constative speech act type at the illocutionary interface, where the speaker talks ABOUT the proposition of the clause, anchoring it in time and space in the actual world. The imperative and the infinitive clause with their action-oriented meaning per default map onto a constitutive speech act type, where the speaker talks TO the addressee […]" (Platzack & Rosengren 2017: 4)

The characteristics of the *speak to*-feature of imperative sentences will be applied later, when specific attributes in correspondence with verb morphology.

2.3.5 Inquisitive, Informative, Assertive

Inquisitive semantics deals with the question about how information is exchanged in natural languages and conveys a formal perspective on language meaning and the update of information throughout a discourse. The purpose of exchanging information is a "process of raising and resolving issues" (Ciardelli & Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2017: 7). Issues are the basis of human discourse, as speakers communicate with each other to settle a prevalent issue through discourse[57]. For the purpose of using the profitable aspects of inquisitive semantics, it is not necessary to depict language in a way as formal as they did. What is yet fruitful about their approach is the way they view the denotation of sentences.

Groenendijk, Roelofsen, Ciardelli and Stokhof, among others, have dealt with sentence moods using the means of inquisitive semantics. They define a proposition – in accordance with e. g. Stalnaker (1978) – as a set of possible worlds which in turn can represent "a body of information" (Ciardelli & Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2017: 19):

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[57] Even if the issue is only to do something trivial like passing the time through nonsensical conversations.

"Such a body of information may be seen as the information available to a certain conversational participant; in that case it can be taken to represent the information state of that participant. On the other hand, a body of information may also be seen as the information conveyed by a certain sentence; in that case it can be taken to constitute the semantic content of that sentence, the proposition that it expresses. And finally, a body of information could be seen as the information that has so far been commonly established by all the participants in a conversation; in that case it embodies the common ground of the conversation, which constitutes a minimal representation of the conversational context." (Ciardelli & Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2017: 19-20)

I will not go deeply into the formal semantics that is provided by inquisitive semantics in order to model information states, issues and contexts, since this scientific field is too large in information size for this dissertation and most of the formal knowledge contained in it is not needed for my purposes. What is needed, however, is the way of categorising certain semantic objects (or sentences in this case) with reference to their information state. This will show parallels between the perspective Lohnstein (2000, 2020) has on sentence moods and it will enhance Altmann's (1993) and Rosengren's (1992) approaches as well.

According to their theory, sentence moods can be categorised as assertive, informative and inquisitive objects. Interrogative sentences are categorised as inquisitive, as they do not add new information to the common ground, but divide the states of affairs under discussed issue.

"Objects representing n-fold partitions (n > 1) are called inquisitive. They are equivalent to questions. If n = 2, the object is a y/n-question. If n > 2, the question conforms to a wh-question. An inquisitive object leads to a partition of the possible states of affairs into classes which are disjoint in pairs, and which yield the whole set under set union […] A typical property of inquisitive objects is that they are not informative. They just split up the available possibilities into classes of equivalent elements, but they do not add any information with the effect that the number of available alternatives becomes reduced. Assume T to be an information state of an

individual or a group of individuals. Then, a clause ɸ is informative, if ɸ reduces the alternatives in T […]. If ɸ induces only one class, ɸ is assertive […]"
(Lohnstein 2020: 187ff.)

For the model of a discourse and thus the sentences that are uttered in it, three elements are considered important: issues, contexts and propositions. Issues are sets of information states that are raised by the Question under Discussion or QUD:

"Definition 2.3. [Issues]
An issue is a non-empty, downward closed set of information states.
Definition 2.4. [Resolving an issue]
We say that an information state s resolves an issue I just in case s ∈ I. If s resolves I, we will sometimes also say that I is settled in s."
(Ciardelli & Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2017: 23)

Issues can be raised by questions – like (122) the V1-interrogative sentence A – and can be addressed or resolved by non-inquisitive objects – like V2-declarative sentence (173) B:

(173)   A: Wo gehst du nachher hin?
         B: Ich gehe nachher ins Kino.

Speaker A raises an issue by posing a question that he wants B to answer this question. A therefore introduces a QUD in a specific context. In answering A's question through uttering content that is relevant concerning the question raised by A, B resolves the issue. The QUD does not have to be voiced repetitively in a discourse, but it is prominent by itself as long as it has not been answered sufficiently. In accordance with Frege, a sentence cannot simply cover informative content, in that it expresses semantic content simply in order to convey what is true or false, but it can also bring inquisitive content into the game via raising an issue, prototypically in uttering an interrogative sentence (cf. Ciardellli & Groenendilk & Roelofsen 2017: 26):

"An interrogative sentence and an indicative[58] one contain the same thought; but the indicative contains something else as well, namely, the assertion. The interrogative sentence contains something more too, namely a request. Therefore, two things must be distinguished in an indicative sentence: the content, which it has in common with the corresponding sentence-question, and the assertion."

(Frege 1918: 294)

The same content is meant to be the proposition here which is handled differently depending on the sentence mood and, along with it, the syntactic transformations. Furthermore, propositions are defined as sets of worlds (though there will be an additional approach presented in chapter 5 that relies on situations as the basis to propositions), whereas worlds in return contain information states and therefore propositions contain information states, too:

"the informative content of a proposition is the set of all worlds in which the proposition is true. Evidently, the fact that the connection between truth and propositions is more direct in the classical setting is an immediate consequence of the fact that classical propositions exclusively encode informative content."

(Ciardelli & Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2017: 28)

All in all, from the perspective of inquisitive semantics, propositions and the informative content and issue connected to it can be defined as follows:

"Definition 2.9. [Propositions]

A proposition P is a non-empty, downward closed set of information states.

The set of all propositions will be denoted by P."

(Ciardelli & Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2017: 21)

---

58 This means declarative.

"Definition 2.10. [Informative content]

For any proposition P: info(P) := ∪P

Definition 2.11. [The issue embodied by a proposition]

The issue embodied by a proposition P is the one that is resolved in a state s

just in case s ∈ P."

(Ciardelli & Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2017: 22)

When talking about issues and propositions with respect to sentence mood, truth and falsehood cannot go unnoticed:

"We say that a proposition P is true in a world w just in case w is compatible

with the informative content of P, i.e., w ∈ info(P).

Definition 2.12. [Truth]

A proposition P is true in a world w just in case w ∈ info(P)."

(Ciardelli & Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2017: 27)

The relation between a proposition and states in the world was framed by Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus logico philosophicus*: „Einen Satz verstehen, heißt, zu wissen, was der Fall ist, wenn er wahr ist."[59] (cf. Wittgenstein 1921)

Let us illustrate this approach by an example:

In a world that contains the individuals Mary, Hans and Ede:

(174) A: Wer hat den Hund gefüttert?

        B: *Nuri hat den Hund gefüttert.

(174) raises the issue and introduces the QUD of finding out who fed the dog. The addressee answers the question, yet, the answer cannot be true as it delivers an information state that is not compatible with the world in which the issue is raised. This is due the circumstance that

---

[59] Understanding a sentence is the same as knowing what is the case if it is true.

Nuri is not part of the world described. Truth therefore is dependent on information states. If the information state and thus the contained elements like individuals and index dependent properties are included in the world described through a sentence, then this information state is able to contribute to the truth of a proposition (though it still may be false, for example because it does not answer the question properly with respect to aspects like relevance e. g.).

> "Definition 2.13. [Support]
>
> An information state s supports a proposition P if and only if s ∈ P.
>
> From the fact that propositions are downward closed it follows that truth and support are closely connected.
>
> Fact 2.14. [Truth and support]
>
> A proposition P is true in a world w if and only if P is supported by {w}.
>
> (Ciardelli & Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2017: 27)

Having outlined what issues and information states are, the ground is laid to specify what a context is and in how far it is important concerning the definition of sentence moods and if it is deducible from the compositional nature of a sentence mood and its grammar.

But before touching upon this, I want to refresh the notion about the discourse. A discourse is a dynamic body of information made up of issues, information states, propositions and contexts. It is dynamic, because the mentioned parts of a discourse can change throughout time and, so, for example QUDs can differ, worlds can be switched (for example between actual and alternative worlds) or contexts can be altered. This dynamic change is brought about by discourse participants, their common ground (the mutually and consciously shared knowledge), time and world and the according utterances produced by the discourse participants:

> „Ein Diskurs ist demzufolge eine Sequenz bestimmter Informationszustände, die durch neue Äußerungen der Gesprächsteilnehmer verändert werden können. In einen Diskurs neu eingeführte Äußerungen werden akzeptiert, indem sie der Menge der gegenseitig akzeptierten Überzeugungen hinzugefügt werden. Der

aktuelle Gesprächskontext k wird damit zu dem Kontext k' aktualisiert."[60]

(Lohnstein 2000: 39-40)

This means that a context can change due to the updated knowledge in a discourse. Furthermore, this is to say that contexts are index dependent, construed out of the above mentioned elements essential to a discourse:

„Ein Kontext ist durch unterschiedliche Koordinaten charakterisiert, die den Sprecher, den Hörer, die Zeit, den Ort sowie verschiedene andere für die Interpretation deiktischer und demonstrativer Ausdrücke notwendige Spezifikationen enthält."[61]

(Lohnstein 2000: 40)

To expand this, in inquisitive semantics, contexts are modelled as pairs of issues and information states. Therefore, the pairing exists between the common ground and the QUD of the discourse between the current discourse participants (cf. Ciardelli & Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2017: 36). Truckenbrodt adds to the definition of a context in including the common ground and the addressee. This does not contrast but agree with the former context features:

Context indices on C in unembedded use have the form
<$Deont_s$ (,x)$_1$ (,<Epist>)$_2$>.
A paraphrase is '*S wants (from x)*$_1$ (*that it is common ground*)$_2$ that/whether . . .'.
(Truckenbrodt 2006: 265)

---

[60] A discourse therefore is a sequence of certain information states which can be changed through the utterance of discourse participants. Utterances that are newly introduced into a discourse are accepted by adding them to the set of mutually accepted beliefs. The current discourse context k is then updated to context k'.

[61] A context is characterised through different coordinates which contain the speaker, the hearer, the time, the place as well as more diverse features that are necessary for the purpose of interpreting and specifying deictic and demonstrative expressions.

In inquisitive semantics, the issue is the part that the discourse participants thrive to resolve on the basis of updating the pool of information states. What exactly updates and accommodation in a discourse mean, will be discussed more deeply in chapter 4.

Having settled the question about what a context is, it is now interesting and necessary to find out what informative and inquisitive objects in natural languages are.

> "We will say that a proposition P is informative just in case its informative content is non-trivial, i.e., info(P) ∈ W. On the other hand, we will say that P is inquisitive just in case establishing its informative content is not sufficient to settle the issue that it raises, i.e., info(P) ∈ P." (Ciardelli & Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2017: 28)

To be more exact about issues, then, inquisitive objects demand the update of a discourse via information states that are brought into the discourse through uttered sentences which are then either accepted or denied. What this concretely looks will be illustrated when talking about the model of the table by Farkas and Bruce (2010). Inquisitive objects denote more than one proposition or information state which is why the matter of update cannot be settled via an inquisitive object. In order to update a discourse and the entailed common ground, informative or assertive objects are necessary.

2.3.6 Sentence Moods and Partitions

The term proposition has come up quite often so far without looking thoroughly at what it signifies in terms of what Frege said. Gottlob Frege (1983: 35) talks about propositions when he uses the term *Gedanke*[62]. This would be the lexical contents (for example facts, circumstances, events etc.) of a sentence regardless of the grammatical transformations that it has undergone and the grammatical features it carries. Consider the following sentences:

(175)   Hans hat den Hund gefüttert.

(176)   Hat Hans den Hund gefüttert?

(177)   Hat Hans den Hund gefüttert. (Kam die Katze und aß sein Futter auf.)

---

[62] thought

(178)   Wer hat den Hund gefüttert?

(179)   Füttere den Hund!

(180)   Fütterte doch nur jemand den Hund!

(181)   Hat Hans den HUND gefüttert!

All the sentences above contain the same thought: that Hans has fed the dog. The differing sentence mood an

d the implied changes in verbal mood, sentence type and other grammatical issues do not change the semantic contents of the sentence. Lohnstein (2000: 35) outlines the purpose and character of propositions as follows:

> "In der Mögliche-Welten-Semantik wird eine Proposition als Funktion aufgefasst, die all diejenigen Welten auf das Wahre abbildet, in denen der durch die Proposition ausgedrückte Zustand (das Ereignis oder der Sachverhalt) besteht; alle anderen Welten werden auf das Falsche abgebildet. Eine Proposition teilt damit die Menge der möglichen Welten in zwei disjunkte Teilklassen: In die Menge derjenigen Welten, in denen sie wahr ist, und in die Menge derjenigen Welten, in denen sie falsch ist."[63]

Hence, propositions serve as a function that reflects what the speaker holds to be true in that it separates true propositions from false propositions. If something is true, it cannot be false at the same time.

The question now is how we can apply the knowledge about propositions to the conception about sentence mood. Hamblin (1976) and Karttunen (1977) stated that the semantics of questions in particular is feasible through the set of true answers they denote (cf. also Lohnstein 2000: 39). Lohnstein (2000) suggests that sentence moods are feasible through

---

[63] In possible world semantics a proposition is understood as a function that maps all those worlds to the truth in which the expressed state (event or fact) is valid. All the other worlds are mapped to falsity. A proposition therefore divides the set of possible worlds into two disjunct classes: Into the set of possible worlds in which it is true and those in which it is false.

making use of partitions. The answering room is structured in itself: It contains non-empty sets of propositions. Partitions are prevalent when the answers exist in disjunctive pairs of equivalent answers and the union of the set of disjunctive answers is equivalent to the overall set of answers (cf. Lohnstein 2000: 59). Answers can serve to reduce a class of propositions partially or completely, but they can likewise be irrelevant (cf. also Higginbotham (1993); Hale/Kayser 1993).

To be more exact, he talks about the partitioning of an answering room. The answering room in general has to be understood as a set of propositions. This set of propositions can be separated or reduced. Partitions signify those separations. Therefore, partitions viewed from the perspective of formal semantics are separations of an answering room filled with propositions (cf. Lohnstein 2000: 59). Interrogatives that fulfil the prototypical function of answering a question show partitions that differ with respect to the kind of question that is posed. V1-interrogatives denote a bi-partition and thus separate the answering room into those propositions which are true and those which are false. Looking at *wh*-interrogatives, the answering room is not a bi-partition, but n-fold. Crucially, these properties of partitions correlate systematically with the occupation of the prefield in German sentences.

Declaratives and imperatives behave differently in terms of their denotation. Declaratives denote one true proposition, whereas the focus of V2-declaratives is to foreground the said true proposition and the focus of the V1-declarative is to identify a proposition whose truth is not the main issue of the utterance. Imperatives do not denote propositions or sets of propositions; they rather denote a property which is transferred to the addressee in order for her to realise it (cf. e.g. Lohnstein 2000: 64).

2.4 Interim Conclusion

So far, the categories that are considered relevant to the definition of sentence mood or the disambiguation of sentence moods have been listed and explained. The categories provided by Altmann (1993) were extended through other approaches that lay a bigger emphasis on the denotation (cf. Lohnstein 2000, 2020; Ciardelli & Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2017), the role of intonation (cf. e.g. Sag/Liberman 1975) or the discourse anchoring (cf. e.g. Truckenbrodt 2006) of a specific sentence mood as well as the relation and behaviour between speaker and

addressee and their way to tackle discourse issues (cf. e.g. Farkas/Bruce 2010; Platzack/Rosengren 2017). The exact realisation of the listed features will now be scrutinised in a comparative overview of V1-sentences and their counterparts. This is important in order to shows which features are actually present in which sentence moods and their sentence types and to show which features are more or less relevant or whether and in what way they are relevant at all. Therefore, I will proceed with the said comparison in chapter 3.

3 V1-Sentences and their V2- and Verb-Final Counterparts

The intention of this chapter is to show which of the features the representatives described in chapter 2 actually have. This description pertains to the prototypical cases that can be used in neutral contexts in the most conventional way known to speakers of the German language. In the course of this description, it will be shown whether the particular V1-sentence has a V2- or verb-final-counterpart. It will become evident that V1-, V2- and V-final-sentences that represent the same sentence moods are not necessarily interchangeable. This will be shown with the help of the categories that were listed as relevant in chapter 2. This chapter serves as a basis from which I will extract information about assertive and non-assertive sentences (cf. chapter 4) and will later help identify what is special about V1-sentences (cf. chapter 5).

I thought about including parentheticals into the mix as well. However, for now it turned out that they do not provide any beneficial input to the general story about V1-sentences and the respective core ideas, even though they are interesting with respect to the question whether they are unintegrated or not. The reason for my decision to leave parentheticals out can be captured in the words Nicole Dehé uttered about parentheticals:

> "one-word-expressions like *what, say, like* […] and sentence adverbials […], comment clauses […] and reporting verbs […], nominal appositions […], and non-relative clauses […], question tags […], and clauses which may not […] be introduced by a connector, and which can […] or cannot […] be elliptical." (Dehé 2001: 1-2)

Thus, the syntactic objects that will be viewed here are: declarative, interrogative, imperative, optative, exclamatory and adverbial sentences. Concerning the adverbial sentences, I will concentrate on conditional sentences. This chapter is structured along the lines of the listed syntactic objects that are to be discussed.

At first, I will present eight hypotheses about the constitution and differentiation of sentence moods. Here (i-vi), the relevant overt features that compose a sentence mood will be listed and discussed. Furthermore, a conclusion about the consequences referring to silent illocutionary operators and the instantiation of assertion will be drawn.

The subsections concerning prosodic features will be rather short in this chapter, as they have been spoken about thoroughly in chapter 2 and will be discussed to a larger extent in chapter 5 again. In this chapter, the relevant issue with prosody is the manifestation of the progredient falling tunes and relevant pitch accents.

3.1 Hypotheses

Before going into a detailed discussion about the contrast between sentence moods and their V1-representatives, I want to present the hypotheses in i-viii:

i.   Concerning the V1-declarative, Declarative sentence mood is evoked through an empty prefinite position in front of a full-fledged finite verb and progredient falling intonation.

ii.   Concerning the V1-interrogative, interrogative sentence mood is evoked through a progredient final rising contour and an empty prefinite position.

iii.   Imperative sentence mood is evoked through imperative verbal mood. The directive character is produced through person and number of the semi-finite verb.

iv.   Optative sentence mood is evoked through *Konjunktiv II* and is supported by modal particles and a reduction to irreality and counterfactuality takes place. Modal particles abolish the negated element of the V1-interrogative sentence.

v.   The protasis of conditional adverbial sentences can only be distinguished from V1-interrogatives, -declaratives and -optatives in connection with its apodosis. The apodosis reduces the alternatives that the protasis entails (p v ¬p).

vi. The exclamatory sentence does not represent a sentence mood of its own. This is due to the possibility of imitating every sentence mood as long as the exclamatory accent is present.

vii. Sentence moods are not built on silent operators, but are composed through overt features.

viii. Non-assertiveness is evoked through an empty prefinite position and/or the lack of fronting of finiteness.

The hypotheses i-v comprise the features that are needed to distinguish the singular sentence moods from each other, even despite the syntactic ambiguity among V1-declaratives, V1-interrogatives, V1-imperatives, V1-optatives and V1-adverbials. The exclamatory sentence will not be categorised as a separate sentence mood vi. Hypotheses vii and viii are conclusions that can be traced back to the findings of i-iv: The compositional approach to sentence moods makes an analysis reliant on silent operators obsolete; furthermore, the lack of assertion is not dependent on the lack of an illocutionary operator ASSERT, but results from the absence of lexical elements and syntactic operations.

What will become evident in this chapter and what is included in the above listed hypotheses is that the compositional categories (syntax, categorial filling verbal morphology, intonation) are all relevant concerning the definition of a sentence mood and the disambiguation of their assignment to the same sentence type V1. For some sentence moods one compositional category is more relevant than for other sentence moods, but all sentence moods can be defined on the basis of those categories to some extent.

All sentence moods are dependent on the description through syntactic operations.

CP

SpC   C̄

∅
{ [−wh]-XP }
{ [+wh]-XP }

C⁰   FinP

V_{fin} SpFin   Fin̄

VP   Fin⁰

... [±wh]-XP ... V⁰   V⁰+Fin⁰

... head movement ...

Ā-movement

(Lohnstein 2017: 4)

Since this dissertation focusses in V1-sentences, the syntactic ambiguity and semantic contrast can only be analysed on the grounds of categorial filling, verbal morphology, discourse sequencing and intonation, because the syntax is ambiguous.

Krifka (2012) and Gärtner (2010) among others assume a covert illocutionary operator to explain the different outcomes of declarative, interrogative, imperative and optative mood. Altmann (1993) – confer chapter 2 –, Truckenbrodt (2006), Lohnstein (2000, 2020), Scholz (1991), Wratil (2013), Portner (2004), Önnerfors (1997) and more assemble compositional features of sentences to describe their varying semantic character despite their equal syntactic type. Those researchers deliver material concerning the analysis of sentences that mirrors the contents of hypotheses i-iv.

Canonical V1-declaratives have the same surface features as V1-interrogatives, but all three deviate from one another in at least one significant point: V1-interrogatives prototypically show progredient rising final intonation, which signals non-reduction/openness in the shape of a bi-partition and they are usually followed by an answer or at least demand one to provoke a reduction of the bi-partitioned answering room (cf. Pierrehumbert 1990, Lohnstein 2000). Conditional V1-adverbial sentences look like declaratives of interrogatives, but are connected to an apodosis that makes it clear that not answer due to a bi-partitioned answering room is requested on the sole grounds of the apodosis[64]. The discourse

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[64] Adverbials overall can be used as questions, but the protasis that is ambiguous when compared to V1-declaratives and -interrogatives cannot be confused with the same due to the directly following apodosis.

sequencing is the only indicator of difference, because intonation is variable among protases (Reis/Wöllstein 2010).

Imperative sentences are disambiguated through the verbal mood: The verb in question if semi-finite, showing only person and number specifications, which serves the mere purpose of identifying an addressee in a speaking-to relation and assigning him a property. The subject is covert, except in the polite use of the imperative.

Optative sentences are often understood as an elliptical conditional adverbial sentence (Biezma 2011) which Scholz (1991) convincingly rejects. They could also resemble V1-interrrogatives was it not for the Konjunktiv II which evokes a possible but unlikely conditional reading. Optatives demand Konjunktiv II and are prone to modal particles and an optative accent. In the explications below about the optative sentence, I will argue against Grosz (2013) who claims that optative sentences containing a finite verb with indicative morphology is possible. Here, I premise that the Konjunktiv II is obligatory. Furthermore, it seems comprehensible that modal particles are usually used in optative sentences to reject the negative element of the V1-interrogative. For the case that a modal particle is missing, substitutions in the shape of interjections or (optative) pitch accents similar to the exclamatory accent have to be provided by the speaker. The combination of counterfactuality through the Konjunktiv II and the rejection of the negated element of the interrogative sentence instantiate the wish-reading.

Exclamatory sentences will be abandoned as a separate sentence mood despite d'Avis' plea based on the circumstance that certain wh-phrases and tenses are odd in exclamatory sentences (2013). The main argument against an independent sentence mood is that every sentence can become an exclamatory sentence as soon as it receives an exclamatory accent.

As said further above, V1-adverbial sentences – or rather their protasis – share surface features with declarative, interrogative and optative sentences, and are mainly distinguished by their apodosis, as they can take on both rising and falling progredient intonation. The difference to the optative sentence is further motivated through a lack of pitch accent, and modal particles seem marked in use as well.

After outlining the assumptions on the basis of the provided theoretical frame, I will now attempt to verify my ideas in the upcoming chapters in a more detailed way with the help of

concrete well- and ill-formed examples. Here, I will additionally draw the line between V1-sentences and their V2- and V-final-counterparts, but the hypotheses above are intentionally focused on the description of V1-setneces only, since they are the main point of interest in this dissertation.

3.2 Declarative Sentences

i. Concerning the V1-declarative, Declarative sentence mood is evoked through an empty prefinite position in front of a full-fledged finite verb and progredient falling intonation.

The reader will see that the genuine V1-declarative sentence[65] relies on intonation to be distinguished from the V1-interrogative sentence, its categorial filling to fulfil a certain functional type (narrative, resumptive, causative, deontic), its verbal morphology to be distinguished from the optative (Konjunktiv II) and imperative sentence (imperative mood), and it sequencing/discourse surroundings to be distinguished from adverbial sentences and non-canonical V1-sentences with progredient falling intonation. Furthermore, the different functional types reveal different preferences for different discourse surroundings, too.
The detailed illustration of those aspects follows up now.

3.2.1 Syntax and Discourse Sequencing

The first aspect to look will be the syntax and discourse surroundings of declaratives. A V2-declarative, like the one above, is categorised as a canonical declarative sentence. It is prototypically associated with the being assertive (Meibauer 2013: 24, Stalnaker 1978, 2011; Altmann 1993, Lohnstein 2000, 2019, 2020 etc.).

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[65] "genuine"= not generated through topic-drop.

(182)   Nathalie: Wer hat Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen?

       Toni: **Horst hat Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen.**

The two main processes that take place in order to generate the syntactic structure of a V2-declarative sentence are fronting of finiteness and fronting of a [-XP] out of the *Mittelfeld*[66] of FinP into the *Vorfeld* or SpecCP. The second kind of declarative in German is the V1-declarative sentence:

(183)   Kommt ein Skelett in die Bar. (Bestellt einen Schwamm und ein Bier. […])

The syntactic differences – at least referring to the surface structure of the sentence – are apparent at first sight: In the declarative sentence in (182), the finite verb is placed in the second position of the matrix clause, in example (183), the finite verb occupies the first position, as the prefinite slot is not filled, neither overtly nor covertly. The possibility that the prefinite position bears silent operators that identify the sentence as declarative and assertive has already been negated in the introduction (cf. respective explanations in chapter 1). It will become even clearer throughout this chapter why a compositional analysis of sentence moods is sufficient or even necessary for the identification of a sentence mood for the purpose of this dissertation.

It has been claimed that V1-declaratives like the ones that have been discussed up to now are simply elliptic V2-declaratives (cf. Engel 1974: 212; Poitou 1993: 117; Scholz 1991: 132) and that the ellipsis in the prefield is recoverable or that there is some sort of empty category or operator in prefinite position (cf. Vikner 1995: 60). Those views will be presented in the following lines and I will show with the help of Önnerfors (cf. 1997: 12ff.) i. a. that this theory can be contradicted and that there are convincing arguments to assume that the V1-declarative is not a V1-derivative but a phenomenon of its own.

The V1-declarative sentence looks similar to the examples below at first sight:

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[66] Middle field or FinP respectively.

(184) a. Kommt ein Mann in die Kneipe. Bestellt zwanzig Bierchen…

      b. Sie ist Mittel der Verständigung, ist Trägerin von Kritik.

      c. Hab ich nicht verstanden, möchte ich auch gar nicht wissen.

(Önnerfors 1997: 50)

      d. Komme morgen. Bleibe 3 Tage.

(Altmann 1987: 33)

Yet, if one takes a closer look at those constructions, one can see that – concerning examples b, c and d – an element in the prefield has been dropped and is still recoverable in the present discourse:

(185) a. Kommt ein Mann in die Kneipe. Bestellt zwanzig Bierchen…

      b. Sie ist Mittel der Verständigung, (sie) ist Trägerin von Kritik.

      c. (Das) Hab ich nicht verstanden, (das) möchte ich auch gar nicht wissen.

      d. (Ich) Komme morgen. (Ich) Bleibe 3 Tage.

(cf. Önnerfors 1997: 50)

In b. one can find a sequence which has been reduced by one argument. c. shows a null topic construction or topic drop respectively and d. is a message in the shape of a telegram in which one encounters topic drop again.

The topic of a sentence[67] is the "psychologische Subject"[68] (Gabelentz 1972: 369) of a sentence which does not necessarily coincide with the grammatical subject (the psychological subject can also occur in the shape of a direct object for instance). The psychological subject or topic is what motivates the addressee to think about what the speaker utters. The counterpart to the psychological subject is the „psychologische Prädikat"[69] (Gabelentz 1972: 369) which

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[67] I will not go deeper into the matter of how many kinds of topics are there and how they are to be distinguished. For the purpose of proving that a V1-declarative is not a topic drop sentence, it suffices to know what a topic is in general.

[68] Psychological subject

[69] Psychological predicate

embodies the part of the sentence that expresses what the speaker thinks or wants to say about the psychological subject:

> "the most general characteristic of predicative constructions is suggested by the terms 'topic' and 'comment' […]: the speaker announces a topic and then says something about it" (Hockett 1958: 201)

In order to simplify this short definition, Musan (2010: 26) said that the topic is the element in a sentence about which the speaker says something and that the comment is the part of the sentence that contains what is said about the topic.

Topic drop then is the ellipsis of the element that can be identified as the topic. The examples below illustrate this:

(186) A: Was ist mit Sofia?

   B: Ist mir fremd gegangen!

   B: Hab' ich seit drei Wochen nicht mehr geseh'n!

(Fries 1988: 20)

(187) A: Was ist mit Sofia?

   B: (Sofia) Ist mir fremd gegangen!

   B: (Sofia) Hab' ich seit drei Wochen nicht mehr geseh'n!

(Fries 1988: 20)

When looking at the examples cited above, one can see that without further difficulties it is possible for a speaker to recover an element that is necessary concerning the completion of the verb valence or an element fulfilling the function of an argument via previous discourse (cf. Önnerfors 1997: 50).

On what grounds can one argue that b., c. and d. are sentences that are no real verb first structures and just a. is a genuine representative of this sentence type, and therefore not only a derivation of the verb second declarative sentence? This is a question that has to be asked,

because assumptions were made (cf. Platzack 1987; Diesing 1990) that there is either an empty category in SpecCP or a silent element like *es, da* (cf. Önnerfors 1997: 18).

Furthermore, it has been claimed (cf. Vikner 1995: 69) that i.a. the V1-declarative possesses an empty operator in the prefinite position: "I take both *yes/no* question and V1-declaratives to have an empty operator in CP-spec." Brandner (1994) supports this theory and tries to validate it in stating that both V1-declarative and V1-interrogative cannot be embedded:

(188)   a.   *Diana sagte, hat Chris den Football geworfen.

          b.   Diana sagte, Chris hat den Football geworfen.

What is problematic here, however, is that an exact specification of the operator is not provided (cf. Önnerfors 1997: 63).

Additionally, Brandt et al. (1992) – as discussed in the introduction chapter 1 – argue that V1-declaratives among other sentence moods do not even have a prefield. They assume an IP-structure in root-V1-sentences. Önnerfors solved this problem by proving that, on the one hand, the authentic verb-first declarative sentence possesses a *Vorfeld* and, on the other hand, that the *Vorfeld* does not contain and elliptical element. According to Önnerfors (1997: 488 ff.), the sentences in (186), in which an element has been dropped, are not comparable to authentic verb first sentences, as in genuine V1-declarative there is no element which may be reconstructed in the empty SpecCP without creating an ungrammatical or at least odd sentence:

(189)   ?Es kommt ein Mann in die Kneipe. Bestellt zwanzig Bierchen…

It was argued that the reconstruction of specific expressions like *es* and *da* would be legitimate and thus an argument in favour of the ellipsis hypothesis (cf. Engel 1974: 212; Poitou 1993: 117; Scholz 1991: 132). The following explications will, however, illustrate that a prefinite ellipsis does not correspond to authentic V1-structures.

Following the logic that a V1-declarative could be a deduction from a V2-declarative, one would also be willing to say that both sentences are substitutes for example without

grammatical consequences in the case of substitution. If one further believes that the V1-declarative sentence is an elliptic counterpart of the *es*-V2-declarative, then one has to account for certain peculiarities and restrictions that come up along with the construction of an *es*-V2-declarative:

(190)   *Es komme ich gestern in die Kneipe.
(cf. Önnerfors 1997: 53)

(190) contains ungrammatical *es*-V2-constructions; the reason for this is that *es*-V2-declaratives do not allow the use of a subject in the shape of a pronoun, whereas V1-declaratives do not evoke complications concerning those kinds of subjects (cf. Önnerfors 1997: 53):

(191)   Komme ich gestern in die Kneipe. Bestelle mir einen Tee. […]
(cf. Önnerfors 1997: 53)

Another interesting point that supports the claim that a V1-declarative is sentence type independent of the V2-declarative arises when one looks at embedded structures:

(192)   a.   Ich glaube, es/da kam gestern ein Mann in die Bar.
        b.   *Ich glaube, *kam gestern ein Mann in die Bar.
(cf. Önnerfors 1997: 51)

(192a) is well-formed, because *verba dicendi* license dependent V2-sentences (cf. Lohnstein/Staratschek 2016: 5). But they do not license the embedding of V1-declaratives.
In case one supports the argument that the V1-declarative is correspondent to a V2-stucture, there must be an explanation for the fact that *es* and *da* cannot be omitted in an embedded structure though they might be in the same sentence when it is a root clause.

Aside from the problems that arise in correspondence with the syntax of the considered sentence types and the thesis that they could have anything in common, there are semantic aspects that do not agree with the thesis under discussion.

(193)   a.   Es sitzt eine Katze auf der Treppe.

        b.   ?Es sitzt die Katze auf der Treppe.

(cf. Önnerfors 1997: 53)

Syntactically indefinite subjects in *es*-V2-declaratives are fine (cf. Brandner 1994). The question is whether V1-declaratives function better under such conditions:

(194)   a.   Sitzt eine Katze auf der Treppe.

        b.   Sitzt die Katze auf der Treppe.

(cf. Önnerfors 1997: 53)

The syntax is not the problem concerning the examples above, but semantically definite subjects are odd in such sentences. Furthermore, it is not possible to suggest an ellipsis in the prefield in sentences for which the following holds:

> "in Sätzen, in denen sämtliche obligatorischen Ergänzungen vorhanden sind, aber nach dem finiten Verb stehen, […] eine ‚Ellipsen'-Interpretation […] ausgeschlossen"[70] (Auer 1993: 195)

So, this far it should have been proven that V1-declaratives actually exist. Questions like whether they can be exchanged with their V2-counterparts will be discussed in chapter 4 and it will slightly be discussed in connection with the enumerative V1-declarative. Furthermore, the question what purpose they fulfil and why they can only be used in relatively restricted grammatical contexts will be answered in a different chapter 4, too. So far, it can be

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70 in which all the obligatory elements are present, but stand behind the finite verb,[…] an ellipsis-interpretation […] not possible

presumed that V1-declaratives have no topic-comment-structure and are thus [-TKG] (cf. Önnerfors 1997: 82 ff.)

Apart from the sentence internal syntax, there are differences between the functional types that Önnerfors listed with respect to their position in a discourse. The narrative V1-declarative can occupy the initial position of a discourse (which is its preference in jokes), but it can also be placed in different places of the discourse (cf. Önnerfors 1997: 101):

(195)   Ich bin gestern in die Uni gegangen. **Ist** da auf einmal der Feueralarm losgegangen. Alter, da hab ich mich erschreckt, das glaubst du gar nicht.

According to Auer (cf. 1993: 215), the narrative V1-declarative catalyses a narration in that it comes about as highly expressive; this is due to the linear linking of the V1-declarative to the previous discourse for once (in case there is a preceding discourse) and, secondly, because the *Spitzenstellung* of the finite verb emphasises that a poignant event should be in the focus of attention, but not whether the proposition is true or false.

The causative declarative type shows the most restrictive pattern in positioning: It always emerges in connection to a sentence that precedes it and that it stands in reference to. This cannot be the other way around, because the causative V1-declaratives provides a reason for or result of the preceding discourse:

(196)   Die Linguisten fühlen sich einander sehr nah und nehmen weite Strecken auf sich, um einander zu treffen. Kein Wunder! **Reden** sie doch sehr oft über *move* und *merge.*

Pittner (2013: 505) supports Önnerfors' observations and adds that causative V1-declaratives are not integrated into the sentence they refer to. Yet, she says that they are pragmatically subordinated, because they secure "die Akzeptanz der Proposition des Bezugssatzes"[71] (Pittner 2013: 505) and themselves contain uncontroversial information.

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[71] The acceptance of the proposition in the reference sentence

The enumerative type containing *folgen*, *hinzukommen* and *bleiben* behaves similarly: Though the different verbs have different semantic effects, all of the enumerative sentences cannot be placed discourse initially. The reason for this is that they either present a quantity that is a rest of the preceding discourse or a quantity that still has to be added to the preceding discourse (cf. Önnerfors 1997: 136):

(197) Sechs Zwerge sind schon fertig im Bad. Bleiben noch der siebte Zwerg und Schneewittchen.

(198) Sechs Zwerge sind ziemlich unglücklich. Kommt noch hinzu, dass der siebte Zwerg noch nichts gekocht hat.

(199) Die sechs Zwerge sind ziemlich sauer. Folgen nun noch Probleme mit dem Gasherd.

A noticeable feature of the enumerative type is that it is very close to its V2-counterpart, the *es*-enumerative type:

(200) Sechs Zwerge sind schon fertig im Bad. Bleiben noch der siebte Zwerg und Schneewittchen.

(201) ?Sechs Zwerge sind schon fertig im Bad. **Es** bleiben noch der siebte Zwerg und Schneewittchen.

Önnerfors argues here that the exchange for an *es*-V2-declarative in cases like above is not ungrammatical (as it was with the narrative type), but that there are subtle differences in meaning and that the link to the previous discourse is tighter in the V1-version (cf. Önnerfors 1997: 132). Furthermore, he provides examples in which the exchange of V1- and V2-declaratives is not well-formed:

(202) a. Wir müssen Peter unbedingt im Krankenhaus besuchen. Fritz ist betrunken.

Anna hat kein Auto. Bleibst also nur noch DU.

b. *Wir müssen Peter unbedingt im Krankenhaus besuchen. Fritz ist betrunken.

Anna hat kein Auto. Es bleibst also nur noch DU.

(Önnerfors 1997: 132)

The exclamatory and deontic V1-declaratives show different restrictions concerning their discourse position. Deontic V1-declaratives cannot occur discourse initially, but they are not as closely linked to their previous discourse:

(203) Ulrike: Wo ist Hubert?

Frank: Ich habe keine Ahnung. Ich gehe jetzt erst einmal essen. Soll er doch sein, wo er will. Mir ist es egal.

Although they need a reference in the previous discourse, there can be material that impedes between the deontic V1-declarative and its reference sentence. Concerning the exposed position of the finite verb, Önnerfors (cf. 1997: 155) says here that in deontic V1-declaratives this is not for the purpose of close linking to the previous discourse, but in order to emphasise the deontic character of the sentence. Exclamatory V1-declaratives do not even need any verbal mentioning of any referent. The reference can be inferred from context:

The grandparents see their grand-child after a trip around the world for the first time:
(204) Bist DU (aber) groß geworden!

What Önnerfors does not go into detail about is what role presuppositions play in exclamatory sentences. Moreover, he admits that a distinction between a separate function type of an exclamatory declarative sentence and the other functional types or even other sentence moods is not easily attainable which is why he does not exclude the possibility that there is no exclamatory V1-declarative (cf. 1997: 183); even though the exclamatory type is emphatic in nature.

Having looked at the syntax and the discourse structure concerning declarative sentences, the next section will deal with the categorial filling of declarative sentences.

3.2.2 Categorial Filling

Every representative of a sentence mood that has been identified as prototypical[72] displays a finite verb[73]. In all but the imperative sentence mood the finite verb has to be full-fledged finite. I will now proceed to list the additional lexical items that define and support a respective sentence mood, starting off with declarative (205-206) and interrogatives (207-208) in comparison:

(205)   Sonja hat Nathalie einen Kaffee ausgegeben.

(206)   Hat Sonja Nathalie einen Kaffee ausgegeben.

(207)   Wer hat Nathalie einen Kaffee ausgegeben?

(208)   Hat Sonja Nathalie einen Kaffee ausgegeben?

V2-declaratives need a [-wh]-constituent in their prefinite position aside from the finite verb that is obligatory. V1-declaratives as well as V1-interrogatives do not need any element in the prefinite position, but in contrast to elliptical V2-declaratives, V1-declaratives contain all the verbal arguments that complete the valency of the verb in the postfinite area, the middle field or FinP of the sentence, which is also the case in V1-interrogatives:

(209)   **Ich** habe vorhin **Sonja** und **Lisa** gesehen.

(210)   (**Ich**) habe vorhin **Sonja** und **Lisa** gesehen.

(211)   Habe **ich** vorhin **Sonja** und **Lisa** gesehen. Die Lisa ist ganz schön gewachsen.

(212)   Habe **ich** vorhin **Sonja** und **Lisa** gesehen?

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[73] This has to be mentioned in correspondence with infinite imperative sentences.

As one can see, in the V2-sentence that displays topic drop, one argument – in this case the subject of the sentence – is first moved from the FinP to SpecCP (topicalisation), and then it is dropped. In all the other sentences, the arguments that complete the valency of the verb remain in the FinP unmoved (cf. Auer 1993: 195; Önnerfors 1997: 50).

The five types of V1-declaratives that have been discussed in the last section show different lexical restrictions from type to type. The narrative type shows the biggest freedom in the choice of finite verbs; the tendency leans towards verbs that express communication and movement, whereas static verbs are rarely found, but there is no actual prohibition on the use of verbs (cf. Önnerfors 1997: 112 ff.).

(213) ***Gibt** es eine Sonne.

(214) ***War** einmal ein König in Thule.

(Önnerfors 1997: 114)

(215) **Schreit** die mich auf einmal an.

(216) **Geht** die einfach aus dem Raum.

In jokes, static verbs seem to be less of a problem:

(217) **Stehen** zwei Hühner vor einem Berg Eierbriketts. Sagt das eine: „Guck mal lauter Babys aus Afrika."

(Önnerfors 1997: 114)

Individual level predicates are bad in narrative V1-declaratives:

(218) ***Ist** Maria **intelligent**.

(219) ***Weinen** Kinder **leicht**.

(Önnerfors 1997: 116)

This preference is due to the circumstance that V1-declaratives present events and chains of events for the purpose of *textuelle Verkettung*[74]. Individual-level predicates do not reflect events, but focus on the permanent trait of an entity (cf. Diesing 1988; Kratzer 1988; Drubig 1992: 61). About this, Ehrich (1992: 74) said:

> "Zeitneutrale Eigenschaften sind in ihrer Dauer unbegrenzt und allenfalls gebunden an die Lebensdauer des Individuums, welches sie charakterisieren. […] Situationen sind zeitlich gebunden, sie haben eine bestimmte Dauer und ein Ende." [75]

Therefore, verbs must be used that are prone to emphasising the sequence of events in a narrative frame. Apart from that, there are no significant lexical requirements on the narrative declarative type.

The two types that come with the highest degree of restriction are the enumerative and the deontic type:

(220)   Ich habe mich heute wahnsinnig über Maria geärgert. **Soll** sie (doch) hingehen, wo der Pfeffer wächst!

(221)   Der Klimagipfel ist nun vorbei. **Bleibt** die Hoffnung, dass sich die Großmächte nun etwas Gutes einfallen lassen.

The deontic type (220) contains the modal verb *sollen* which is its defining lexical features. The enumerative type resumes the previous discourse via expressions like *bleiben*, *hinzukommen* and *folgen*. The remaining three V1-declarative types – narrative, causative and exclamatory – are far less restricted concerning their lexical filling (cf. Önnerfors 1997: 124 ff.). The difference to the enumerative and deontic functional type is that the lexical

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[74] Textual interlinking

[75] Time neutral traits are unlimited in their duration and at most bound to the lifespan of the individual which they characterise. Situations are bound to time, they have a certain limit of duration and they end at some point.

necessities of those two types do not allow any other lexical item to occur as the finite verb which makes this the most defining features for them. This is due to the meaning of those verbs: *sollen* is based on a deontic modal background (cf. Kratzer 1976). V1-declarative containing *sollen* are closely associated with V1-declaratives that contain indicative *mögen*. The difference between the two lies in their modality: *sollen* decribes a necessity, whereas *mögen* describes a possibility (cf. Rosengren 1993: 21; Önnerfors 1997: 152):

(222)   Mag er (doch) abreisen!

(223)   Soll er (doch) abreisen!

In both cases, the speaker conveys a certain degree of indifference towards the entity that he speaks about (or their actions). There seems to be only a subtle distinction between the two that can be reduced to the **tendency** of one or the other of the following readings:

(224)   **Mag** er (doch) abreisen.   a.   **Ich lasse zu, dass p eintrifft**

I allow for p to happen..

b.   Mir ist es egal, ob p eintrifft.

I do not care whether p happens.

(225)   **Soll** er (doch) abreisen.   a.   Ich lasse zu, dass p eintrifft.

I allow for p to happen.

b.   **Mir ist es egal, ob p eintrifft.**

I do not care whether p happens.

When *mögen* is used with Konjunktiv, the story is different, but this will be confronted in the next section, as well as the fact that *sollen* cannot be used with Konjunktiv in V1-sentences. Here, the question whether the deontic V1-declaratve can serve as a *Heischesatz* will be discussed, too. Deontic V1-declaratives are receptive to the modal particle *doch*, but here it is not obligatory, in contrast to the causative type, which will be explained a few lines down below.

The enumerative type is similarly dependent on specific verbs: *bleiben, hinzukommen* and *folgen* indicate the resumption of the discourse contents that preceded the respective V1-sentence and represent a quantity (of situations) that has to be added to the preceding mass of discourse situations:

> "in such cases the verb standing at the head of the sentence may also indicate that the idea expressed before was incomplete and is being continued by the very sentence which starts with such an unusual manner." (Adolf 1944: 78)

It can be ruled out that the verbs used in the enumerative functional type can be used in a local reading, because in order to be read as referring to a location, a local adverb or an NP signifying the location is needed (cf. Önnerfors 1997: 126):

(226)   Der Rat hat getagt und diskutiert. Bleibt uns nur noch, auf den Rauch zu warten.

(227)   Der Rat hat getagt und diskutiert. Bleibt er also noch **in Rom**.

(228)   Maria kann nicht kochen, ich kann nicht kochen. Bleibst du.

(229)   Maria kann nicht kochen, ich kann nicht kochen. Bleibst du **in der Küche**.

The *rest*-reading is therefore unmistakeable. The condition that guarantees well-formedness of V1-declaratives containing *bleiben, hinzukommen* and *folgen* is that at least one thought (and therefore one utterance) must have preceded them (cf. Önnerfors 1997: 133). The difference between *folgen/hinzukommen* and *bleiben* is that the former two have a focus on the additive meaning. The signal that the sentence they are used in adds a specific thought to the preceding discourse, whereas *bleiben* signifies that there is a rest that is missing from the preceding discourse to be complete:

(230)   Die ganzen Versager verschwanden im Nu. Bleibt nur eine Hoffnung, und die bist du.[76]

(231)   Die Einreichung der Schrift und die Verteidigung sind durch. Kommt noch die

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[76] from sing *Bleibt nur eine Hoffnung* from the movie *Hercules, Disney*

Veröffentlichung hinzu.

(232) Das Eslein hat sich gestreckt, das Tischlein hat sich gedeckt. Folgt noch der Knüppel aus dem Sack.

Apart from the particular group of verbs, the enumerative functional type shows no further demands concerning its lexical filling.

The causative functional type is different from the preceding types in that its specification lies less on the necessary verbs than on the in this case obligatory modal particle.

(233) Dornröschen war wohl ziemlich müde. **Wusste sie doch**, dass sie in einen hundertjährigen Schlaf fallen würde, sobald sie die Nadel des Spinnrads berührt.

Restrictions on the choice of verbs are not existent in the causative type; they do not show preferences towards any sort of predicate class:

(234) Die Kinder haben Angst. **Gibt** es doch ein Monster unter ihrem Bett.

(235) Die Großeltern sind fast hintenübergefallen. **Ist** ihr Enkel doch schon so groß.

The modal particle *doch* is, however, indispensable:

(236) ?Dornröschen war wohl ziemlich müde. Wusste sie, dass sie in einen hundertjährigen Schlaf fallen würde, sobald sie die Nadel des Spinnrads berührt.

(237) ?Die Kinder haben Angst. Gibt es ein Monster unter ihrem Bett.

(238) ?Die Großeltern sind fast hintenübergefallen. Ist ihr Enkel schon so groß.

The V1-sentences are not directly ungrammatical, but they lack a definite orientation, because the exact reading is not clear. The relation between the referential sentence and the V1-declarative cannot clearly be categorised as causative when *doch* is missing. This makes a good transition to sub-classes of V1-conditionals, because a similar phenomenon can be met here. First of all, however: It has already been said earlier that causative V1-declaratives

cannot be embedded into the sentence they refer to even though the link between them is very tight. So, I am not saying that causative V1-declaratives and their referential clause share the same syntactic relationship as protasis and apodosis in a V1-conditional, but their lexical needs in connection to their interpretation are similar:

(239)	Kommt der Hase zu spät, geht der Igel alleine spazieren.	**Hypothetical Conditional**
(240)	?Kommt der Hase zu spät, geht der Igel alleine spazieren.	**Irrelevance Conditional**
(241)	?Kommt der Hase zu spät, geht der Igel alleine spazieren.	**Concessive Conditional**
(242)	?Kommt der Hase zu spät, geht der Igel alleine spazieren.	**Adversative**

The reading of the different kinds of V1-adverbial sentences cannot be distinguished in the above presented examples. The situation gets better when certain items are added:

(243)	Kommt der Hase zu spät, geht der Igel alleine spazieren.	**Hypothetical Conditional**
(244)	Kommt der Hase auch zu spät oder nicht, geht der Igel alleine spazieren.	**Irrelevance Conditional**
(245)	Kommt der Hase auch zu spät, geht der Igel alleine spazieren.	**Concessive Conditional**
(246)	?Kommt der Hase zu spät, geht der Igel alleine spazieren.	**Adversative**

Irrelevance conditionals and concessive conditionals are different, because in the former the truth or falsehood of the protasis is not relevant to the true outcome of the apodosis.

Concessive conditionals display a true apodosis in spite of the falsehood of the protasis. This can be signified in V1-conditionals through the addition of *auch* (concessive) or *auch…oder nicht* (irrelevance conditional) (cf. Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 118; Pittner 2013: 509). V1-adversatives lack a lexical item to express their semantic relationship and the contrastive-confrontative relationship is realised through inflectional features of the verb, which will be deepened in section 3.

Now, let us compare the causative V1-declarative to the conditionals above:

(247)   Dornröschen war wohl ziemlich müde. Wusste sie, dass sie in einen hundertjährigen Schlaf fallen würde, sobald sie die Nadel des Spinnrads berührt.

The causative reading does not come through without *doch*. One could even assume that the gapping of *doch* supports a bare conditional reading of the following manner:

(248)   Wusste sie, dass sie in einen hundertjährigen Schlaf fallen würde, sobald sie die Nadel des Spinnrads berührte, war Dornröschen wohl ziemlich müde.

It could thus be speculated that the modal particle that supports the causative reading simultaneously serves as a blockage to a probable syntactic bond between the referential clause and the V1-declarative. But since this is only a speculation and I cannot further prove this at this point, I will not push this narrative. At least for now. For now, I simply want to emphasise the importance of lexical elements in terms of clarifying the semantic reading of a clause that otherwise has the same gestalt as clauses that are intended to mean something else than a hypothetical conditional. The causative V1-declarative is the only case in which a modal particle can be rendered obligatory (cf. Önnerfors 1997: 170).

The semantics and therefore the denotation of the V1-declarative as a whole as well as the configuration of the discourse that preceded or follows V1-declaratives will be dealt with in chapter 5. For now, it can be said that V1-declaratives go along with higher restrictions considering the categorial filling than V2-declaratives do.

The exclamatory V1-declarative (from now on categorised as V1-exclamatory sentence) is not bound to a specific group of verbs:

> "Meines Erachtens ist nicht anzunehmen, daß aufgrund von Restriktionen im Bereich der lexikalischen Füllung bestimmte Verb(typ)en per se von der Verwendung in eV1-DS[77] ausgeschlossen sind; Beschränkungen in bezug auf Verben, die in eV1-DS – und exklamativ verwendeten Sätzen überhaupt – verwendet werden können, folgen m.E. aus generellen Restriktionen, die im Bereich des propositionalen Gehalts vorliegen […]: In exklamativ zu verwendenden Sätzen muß ein graduierbares bzw. quantifizierbares Element vorliegen. Erfüllt kein anderes Element im Satz die Anforderung, so wird sie an das Verb gestellt. Diese Restriktionen sind jedoch nicht eV1-DS-spezifisch."[78] (Önnerfors 1997: 171 ff.)

As Önnerfors says, the demands on the categorial filling in the V1-type of exclamatory sentences is not specific to the sentence type. Therefore, I will come back to the categorial filling of exclamatory sentences when I talk about all exclamatory sentence types later in this section.

For now, I will move on to the verbal morphology of declarative sentences.

3.2.3 Verb Morphology

Verbal mood has already been discussed in chapter 2 which is why I will not explain this inflectional phenomenon in detail again. The V2-declarative sentence is the most flexible

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[77] Exclamatory V1-declarative

[78] I do not think that due to restrictions in the field of lexical filling certain verb (al type)s can per se not be used in eV1-DS; restrictions in relation to verbs which can be used in eV1-DS – and exclamatory sentences overall –,in my opinion follow from restrictions that are present in the area of the propositional content. […]: In exclamatory sentences there has to be a scalar element. If no other element meets the requirement, the verb has to meet the requirement. Those restrictions are, however, not specific to aV1-DS.

when it comes to verbal mood, in contrast to the optative and the imperative sentence. It can host the indicative, Konjunktiv I and Konjunktiv II. In comparison:

(249) Lara hat heute einen weißen Schoko-Macchiato bestellt.	**Indicative**
(250) Lara hätte heute einen weißen Schoko-Macchiato bestellt. (Aber wir haben uns nicht zum Kaffetrinken im Milia's getroffen.)	**Konjunktiv II**
(260) Lara sagte, sie habe heute einen weißen Schoko-Macchiato bestellt.	**Konjunktiv I (reportative)**
(261) Bestelle sie einen weißen Schoko-Macchiato.	**Konjunktiv I (*Heischesatz*)**

V1-declaratives show higher restrictions on verbal mood:

(262) Hat Lara heute einen weißen Schoko-Macchiato bestellt. (Ich war darüber ja nicht besonders überrascht.)	**Indicative**
(263) ?Hätte Lara heute einen weißen Schoko-Macchiato bestellt.	**Konjunktiv II**
(264) *Lara sagte, habe sie heute einen weißen Schoko-Macchiato bestellt.	**Konjunktiv I (reportative)**
(265) Bestelle sie einen weißen Schoko-Macchiato.	**Konjunktiv I (*Heischesatz*)**

When using the Konjunktiv I in a *Heischesatz*, there are no complications that arise with the isolated V1-declarative in (265). But if one inserts the Konjunktiv I into the different types, it gets partially problematic:

Narrative	
(266) a. Kommt Chris eben in Ninas Büro. Er hat ihr einen Kaffee vorbeigebracht.	**Indicative**
b. Komme Chris in Ninas Büro. Er bringe ihr einen Kaffee vorbei.	*Heischesatz*

The *Heischesatz* is not grammatically inadequate, the sentence loses its narrative character when the speaker uses Konjunktiv I. This is due to the purely deontic mood of the Konjunktiv I in *Heischesätze*. The original use of a narrative V1-declarative intends to present a salient set or even chain of sets of events that cascade in a sequence. The Konjunktiv I does not present events in a *Heischesatz*, but it demands the realisation of events.

The causative and enumerative types meet similar dead ends: The function of the causative type to resume preceding discourse information and provide propositional content that delivers a reason for said discourse information. Giving reasons implies knowing what the outcome of an event is even if a speaker uses future tense:

Causative			
(267)	a.	Ich habe mich vorhin sehr gefreut. Bin ich doch eben in Ninas Büro und habe mit ihr einen Kaffee getrunken.	**Indicative**
	b.	Ich habe mich vorhin sehr gefreut. Werde ich doch eben in Ninas Büro gehen und habe mit ihr einen Kaffee getrunken.	**Future tense**
	c.	*Ich hätte mich vorhin sehr gefreut. Sei ich doch eben in Ninas Büro und hätte mit ihr einen Kaffee getrunken.	**Heischesatz**

But the Konjunktiv I cannot prognose the outcome of an event and can thus not present a cause in reference to a preceding discourse; it can only utter the desire of a future state of events.

Concerning the enumerative type, the problem is similar to the one we met with respect to the narrative type: The grammar does not turn bad, but the actual enumerative nature is lost in translation:

Enumerative			
(268)	a.	Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. Bleibt die Hoffnung, dass sie später da ist.	**Indicative**
	c.	Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. ?Bleibe die Hoffnung, dass sie später da ist.	**Heischesatz**

As with the difficulty of giving a reason using the Konjunktiv I in causative sentences, similarities emerge in the presentation of quantities of rest or addition which are added to the previous discourse. The quantity has to be known to be added in a V1-declarative fashion. The prospective and directive gestalt of the Konjunktiv I can, again, not accomplish this.

The deontic declarative type is a double-edged story: As it can appear with *sollen* and *mögen*, there is the possibility of utilising a *Heischesatz* – namely through a *mögen*-construction.

Deontic		
(269) a. Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. Soll sie alleine Kaffee trinken!	**Indicative**	
Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. Mag sie alleine Kaffee trinken!		
b. Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. *Solle sie alleine Kaffee trinken!	**Heischesatz**	
Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. Möge sie alleine Kaffee trinken!		

While *sollen* can never form a *Heischesatz*, *mögen* is the very common in contemporary German in this kind of sentence (Önnerfors 1997: 146). The reason for the blockage of *sollen* in such a sentence can have two reasons: One is pushed by Önnerfors who says that *mögen* in Konjunktiv I and *sollen* have two different readings. According to him, *mögen* describes a positive attitude brought forward by a speaker towards the outcome of a future event. Yet, *sollen* in a V1-declarative is associated with a speaker's indifference towards such a future event. I furthermore think that the lexical semantics of *sollen* in combination with Konjunktiv I would provide an overload of deontic meaning: *sollen* in itself is deontic, which is why it is simply unnecessary to reinforce the deontic reading through the use of Konjunktiv. This does not online pertain to Konjuntkiv I, but also to Konjunktiv II.

Deontic	
(270) a. Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. *Sollte sie alleine Kaffee trinken!	**Konjunktiv II**
b. *Ich hätte mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. Sollte sie alleine Kaffee trinken!	
c. Ich hätte mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. Soll sie alleine Kaffee trinken!	**Indicative**

This seems to be a special issue in V1-declaratives, because Konjunktiv II and *sollen* are not a problem in V2-declaratives:

Deontic	
(271) a. Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. Sie sollte alleine Kaffee trinken!	**Konjunktiv II**
b. Ich hätte mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. Sie sollte alleine Kaffee trinken!	
c. Ich hätte mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. Sie soll alleine Kaffee trinken!	

What is lost in those V2-declaratives is the indifference-reading[79]. Another difference between V1- and V2-declaratives concerning their morphology is that the latter can cover the whole person-number-paradigm, whereas the V1-variant can only express 3rd person singular and plural (cf. Önnerfors 1997: 147):

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[79] Which is also to be found in V1-declaratives using indicative *mögen.*

Deontic	
(272) a. Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. Sie sollte alleine Kaffee trinken!	**3rd person singular**
b. Ich hätte mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit die gefreut, aber du warst nicht da. Du sollst/solltest alleine Kaffee trinken!	**2nd person singular**
c. Ich hätte mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit dire gefreut, aber du warst nicht da. ??Sollst du alleine Kaffee trinken!	**2nd person singular**

The Konjunktiv II is fine in the causative and enumerative type:

Causative	
(273) a. Ich habe mich vorhin sehr gefreut. Bin ich doch eben in Ninas Büro und habe mit ihr einen Kaffee getrunken.	**Indicative**
b. Ich habe mich vorhin sehr gefreut. Wäre ich doch eben in Ninas Büro gewesen und hätte mit ihr einen Kaffee getrunken.	**Konjunktiv II**
c. Ich hätte mich vorhin sehr gefreut. Wäre ich doch eben in Ninas Büro gewesen und hätte mit ihr einen Kaffee getrunken.	

Enumerative	
(274) a. Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. Bleibt die Hoffnung, dass sie später da ist.	**Indicative**
c. Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. Bliebe die Hoffnung, dass sie später da ist.	**Konjunktiv II**
Ich hätte mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie	

war nicht da. Bliebe die Hoffnung, dass sie später da ist.

In both cases, the relevant aspects are already known: In the causative V1-type, the existence and the gestalt of the reason is not affected by the verbal mood. The same is the case concerning the quantity that is singled out and added to the previous discourse through the enumerative V1-declarative. The Konjunktiv II presents a counterfactual world here, but the speaker expresses that she knows what the world would have looked like if the reason and the addition of the quantity would have been realised. This is not the case in the Konjunktiv I; here, the directive act and the prospective character are in the centre of attention. Önnerfors (cf. 1997: 125) draws attention to the similarity between the enumerative V1-declarative when used with Konjunktiv II and the optative sentence. The confusion between the two can be real, but when talking about optatives, its typical features will prevent confusion.

The narrative type is theoretically possible with Konjunktiv II, too:

Narrative			
(275)	a.	Kommt Chris eben in Ninas Büro. Er hat ihr einen Kaffee vorbeigebracht.	Indicative
	b.	Käme Chris in Ninas Büro. Er brächte ihr einen Kaffee vorbei.	Konjuntiv II

What happens now is that the mode of narration changes. Önnerfors (1997) and Auer (1993) emphasised that the *Spitzenstellung* of the finite verb establishes a very close link to the previous discourse, a salience of the event(s) presented through the V1-proposition and a strong expressive reading. The prominence of the pure frame-like presentation of events is still given in Konjunktiv II, but the expressive character and the relevance of *here-and-now* that comes with it are lost through the distance that is created through the counterfactual nature of the Konjunktiv II. Furthermore, a purely isolated reading of the V1-declarative with Konjunktiv II one is almost impossible. The sentence in (275b) does not seem to be a paratactical but a hypotactical construction in the shape of a V1-conditional.

As the reader can see above, hard restrictions (those which prevent sentences from becoming ungrammatical) occur mainly concerning the non-narrative V1-declarative sentences. The narrative type is the most neutral one of the listed types as its only role is to initiate a passage of narration. The deontic type, for instance, is more specific and restricted due to its lack of epistemic background and its prospective nature. Prospective here means that the utterance expressed by the deontic V1-declarative refers to future events and cannot refer back to events that have already occurred. The utterance that precedes the deontic sentence can refer to past events, but it cannot be included in the deontic sentence via subordination for example. The V2-declarative sentence that precedes the deontic *sollen*-sentence merely provides a base to which the deontic sentence formulates a consequence of action and on that basis states what shall happen in the course of future events.

Moving away from verbal mood and turning to tenses: V2-declaratives, in contrast to V1-declaratives, show full finiteness and are not bound to restrictions in the use of tenses, as for instance exclamatory sentences are. V1-declaratives are not that much more problematic in terms of tense, unless the functional type has prospective traits and is thus oriented towards future circumstances, like the deontic and enumerative type:

Enumerative	
(276) a. Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. Bleibt die Hoffnung, dass sie später da ist.	**Präsens**
b. Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. ?Ist die Hoffnung geblieben, dass sie später da ist.	**Perfekt**
c. Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. ?Wird die Hoffnung bleiben, dass sie später da ist.	**Futur I**

Deontic

(277)	a.	Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. Soll sie alleine Kaffee trinken!	**Präsens**
	b.	Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. *Hat sie alleine Kaffee trinken gesollt!	**Perfekt**
	c.	Ich habe mich auf ein Kaffeetrinken mit Nina gefreut, aber sie war nicht da. *Wird sie alleine Kaffee trinken sollen!	**Futur I**

The prospective character of both functional types is due to lexical features: Both verbs in this context do not express a mere narration of past events, but refer to events that may occur as a consequence of what the previous discourse depicts. Furthermore, the deontic nature of *sollen* and the missing epistemic component prohibit exactly this narrative style, too.

Narrative

(278)	a.	Kommt Chris eben in Ninas Büro. Er hat ihr einen Kaffee vorbeigebracht.	**Präsens**
	b.	Ist Chris eben in Ninas Büro gekommen. Er hat ihr einen Kaffee vorbeigebracht.	**Perfekt**
	c.	?Wird Chris in Ninas Büro kommen. Er wird ihr einen Kaffee vorbeibringen.	**Futur I**

Causative

(279)	a.	Ich habe mich vorhin sehr gefreut. Geh ich doch eben in Ninas Büro und trink mit ihr einen Kaffee.	**Präsens**
	b.	Ich habe mich vorhin sehr gefreut. Bin ich doch eben in Ninas Büro und habe mit ihr einen Kaffee getrunken.	**Perfekt**

c.	Ich habe mich vorhin sehr gefreut/freue mich/werde	**Futur I**
	mich sehr freuen. Werde ich doch gleich in Ninas	
	Büro und mit ihr einen Kaffee trinken.	

With the narrative V1-declarative there, difficulties tend to arise when the time of utterance and time of event (cf. Reichenbach 1947) drift further apart. This, again, probably has to do with the expressive and linking character of the narrative frame.

After having unfolded the aspects of verbal morphology, the intonation of declarative sentences will be relevant next.

3.2.4 Intonation

The V1-declarative is dependent on the progredient falling intonation. This distinguishes it from the V2-declarative which will be shown more through in chapter 4. Shortly, we will look at the distinction now:

(280)   Ist die Sonner schon \aufgegangen. [Hab' ich doch schon Frühstück gemacht.]

(281)   Ist die Sonne schon /aufgegangen? [Ja./Nein.]

(282)   Die Sonne ist schon /aufgangen? [Ja, siehst du doch./Nein, warum denkst du das denn?]

As seen in the V2-declarative, it is still noticeable that the sentence is of declarative mood. With the V1-counterpart this clarity fades away, because of the syntactic equality to the V1-interrogative. Falling intonation is thus needed as the dividing factor.

ii.   Concerning the V1-interrogative, interrogative sentence mood is evoked through a progredient final rising contour and an empty prefinite position.

V1-interrogatives and -declaratives look the same on the surface. They can host the same material pertaining to verb classes (though some functional types of the declaratives are more or less restricted) and the same verbal moods. The significant differences between the two come up in reference to their intonation, their discourse surrounding and denotations: V1-interrogatives attract progredient rising intonation. Furthermore, they are prototypically followed by an answer "yes" or "no" in the discourse. Finally, they denote a bi-partition. All those features are audible either made clear by the speaker (intonation, signalling of undecided bi-partition) or the addressee (answer in the following discourse).

Interrogative sentences are also to be contrasted with V1-optatives and V1-adverbials: V1-optatives canonically contain modal particles that reject the negative element of an interrogative sentence. Furthermore, the Konjunktiv II is odd in a V1-interrogative, as it automatically calls for a continuation that gives it the shape of a V1-conditional. V1-conditionals have been compared to V1-interrogatives in the sense that the protasis that signals denotational openness is followed by the decisive apodosis that signifies the consequence of what happens if the protasis is validated.

The way to those assumptions will be discussed in detail and supported through evidence in the upcoming chapters.

3.3.1 Syntax and Discourse Sequencing

Turning to interrogatives, the interrogative sentences that will be viewed here are independent root-clauses excluding those containing multiple wh-expressions, extraction of wh-expressions from embedded sentences or wh-infinites; echo-questions will not be covered in depth, but they will be relevant (for details on those cf. e.g. Lohnstein 2013; Reis 2016). The two types that are sufficient to serve the here drawn comparison are the

following: yes-/no-interrogatives (V1) and wh-interrogatives (V2). The wh-interrogative is the one to be looked at first:

(283)   Wer kommt in die Bar?

The situation is similar to the V2-declarative sentence except for the intonation and the filling of the SpecCP. The SpecCP is not filled with a [-wh]-element but with a [+wh]-element that has scope over the whole sentence in the case of the V2-interrogative sentence. This [+wh]-expression is crucial concerning the distinction between V2-interrogatives and V2-declaratives as well as V1-interrogatives. The [+wh]-expression cannot – in contrast to the [-wh]-expression in the V2-declarative – be dropped. The V1-declarative and -interrogative share the same syntactic surface structure, as well as other features, except for their prototypical intonation (cf. subsection 3*)*, their denotation (cf. i.a. chapter 5*)* and the discourse the precedes and follows after them (cf. chapter 5). The V1- and V2-interrogative share the same sentence mood, but can be distinguished through their syntactic surface, because one possesses a prefield that displays a [+wh]-expression and the V1-interrogatove shows an empty prefield. Moving on, the reader will find an example of a prototypical V1-/yes-/no-interrogative down below:

(284)   Kommt ein Skelett in die Bar?

When looking at the yes-/no-interrogative sentence, one can directly see that syntactically it does not differ from the V1-declarative sentence on the surface. As far as this goes, V1-declarative and V1-interrogative are therefore syntactically ambiguous. This is, however, no reason to believe that a silent operator is the force that brings about the difference between interrogatives and other V1-sentences. Because they do not share this ambiguity on the level of prosody, context and semantics which is to be shown in the chapter 5.
Moreover, the discourse they are followed by is different from the discourse of V1-declaratives: V1-interrogatives are typically accompanied by an answer "yes" or "no" in the

following discourse. This differs from the discourse surroundings that were attributed to V1-declaratives earlier.

The upcoming chapter will talk about the issue of categorial filling in interrogative sentences.

3.3.2 Categorial Filling

V2-interrogatives are distinguishable from V2-declaratives pertaining to their prefinite constituent, because V2-interrogatives are defined as such since they carry a wh-expression in their SpecCP. As has already been discussed shortly in the introduction, there are other sentence moods that could be confused with wh-interrogative sentences, because they carry a wh-item in their prefied. This was mentioned in connection with an example of an imperative sentence that embeds an indirect wh-interrogative sentence (253) (cf. Reis/Rosengren 1992). But if one takes a closer look, their surface elements are not the same: Namely, in order to disambiguate wh-interrogative sentences from the following marked form of the imperative sentence, a fully finite and thus non-imperative epistemic verb is needed that either carries indicative or Konjunktiv II:

(285)	Wieviel hat das Kleid gekostet?	**Root-wh-interrogative**
(286)	Wieviel, schätz mal, dass das Kleid gekostet hat?	**Imperative + indirect wh-interrogative**

Thus, a canonical V2-interrogative sentence is composed of a wh-element in the prefinite position that has scope over the whole sentence and a full-fledged finite verb in C^0. The V1-interrogative sentence lacks the wh-element in SpecCP. Those two representatives of the interrogative sentence mood then differ in categorial necessities which results in a different denotation and a different continuation of the discourse that follows them (which will be discussed in chapter 5). The V1-interrogative therefore must rely on extra-lexical features to claim its status as a different sentence mood.

After already touching upon verbal mood, verb morphology in interrogative sentences will now be discussed.

3.3.3 Verb Morphology

As has already been stated in the chapter 2, interrogative sentences include both deontic and epistemic parameters in their context index at C (cf. Truckenbrodt 2006: 265) like V2-declaratives have been shown to, too. The difference between declaratives and interrogatives is that interrogatives can only host Konjunktiv in echo-question, which have already been identified as a marked repetitive species of "interrogatives":

(287)	Hat Lara heute einen weißen Schoko-Macchiato bestellt?	**Indicative**
(288)	Hätte Lara heute einen weißen Schoko-Macchiato bestellt?	**Konjunktiv II**

Even concerning *Heischesätze*, interrogatives do not appear to be open for use. This is no huge surprise if one regards the function of a *Heischesatz*, which is to express a demand or wish. The canonical purpose of an interrogative is to seek out truth and not to express a demand or wish in a manner like a *Heischesatz* does. To explain this further, please, consider the following examples:

(289)   Reichst du mir das Salz?

(290)   Mögest du mir das Salz reichen.

At first sight, sure, both sentences convey a request to the addressee to pass the salt. But one has to differentiate between grammar and speaker intention as well as implicature here. If one is strict and looks at the examples from a grammatical perspective, (289) demands no action, but an answer in verbal form *yes* or *no*. Of course, anyone who acts like that would be viewed as weird, posh or nit-picky, as she would disregard the conventional rules that come with a sentence like (289).[80] Then, though archaic, (290) does not postulate for an answer;

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[80] For further information about indirect speech acts cf. Austin (1962), Searle (1969).

actually, the addressee answering would be odd again, because the Konjunktiv I and its deontic nature in this case pose a request towards the addressee which would result in according actions if the addressee was cooperative. What this tells the reader is that the epistemic component in combination with its denotations prohibit the use of Konjunktiv I in canonical interrogatives.[81]

The next section will deal with the progredient intonation of interrogative sentences.

3.3.4 Intonation

The V1-interrogative is dependent on the progredient rising intonation. This distinguishes it from the V1-declarative:

(291)   Ist die Sonner schon \aufgegangen. [Hab' ich doch schon Frühstück gemacht.]

(292)   Ist die Sonne schon /aufgegangen? [Ja./Nein.]

After the discussion of interrogative sentences, the chapter will now proceed with imperative sentences.

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[81] This refers to default cases in neutral contexts. But it has to be mentioned that examples from the internet and certain literary examples allow Konjunktiv I in wh-interrogative (cf. Müller 2012):

(322)   Man kippe etwas Kondensmilch 4% Fettgehalt hinzu.
        Habe ich das bis hier her richtig verstanden? So jetzt meine
        Fragen: Was nehme man am besten als Gefäß? Ich habe leider
        nicht sehr viel Platz. Wo stelle man dies dann am besten auf?

<u>3.4 Imperative Sentences</u>

    iii.   Imperative sentence mood is evoked through imperative verbal mood. The directive character is produced through person and number of the semi-finite verb.

The imperative sentence mood is the clearest and simplest sentence mood in definition: Its branding of being the only sentence mood that has only one sentence type realisation (V1) and of being the only sentence mood hosting a semi-finite verb, makes it exclusive. Its lexical filling is restricted to non-individual level predicates and thus postulates verb classes that are dynamic and denote events. The salient feature of the imperative sentence is that it assigns a property to the addressee and instantiates a speaking-to relationship.

Further details, for instance about the contrast towards other directive kinds of sentences, will be given in the upcoming sections.

3.4.1 Syntax and Discourse Sequencing

Depending on how **strictly** one categorises imperative sentences, not only one possibility comes into place here:

(293)   **Geh nach Hause!**

(294)   Sie gehen jetzt nach Hause!

(295)   Dass du mir ja nach Hause gehst!

(296)   Nach Hause gegangen!

(297)   Alle Linguisten nach Hause gehen!

(298)   Nach HAUse geh! (Nicht in die Kneipe!)[82]

As already said, the V1-imperative sentence is the clearest case of imperative sentences, because it unambiguously contains imperative mood, is of directive character and is not confusable with other sentence moods (like (299)) in a neutral context:

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[82] Those sentences are only interpretable as imperative sentences on the illocutionary level.

(299)   Ich befehle dir, nach Hause zu gehen.

Melani Wratil (2013) herself excludes the V-final sentences, infinitives, adhortatives and similar from the pool of sentences with imperative sentence mood:

> „Wie die Erläuterungen […] deutlich machen, besitzen nur Sätze, deren finites Hauptverb im Modus des Imperativs flektiert, und Höflichkeitsimperative ein entsprechendes Illokutionspotenzial. Nur sie können demnach im Gegensatz zu den […]Adhortativsätzen, dass-Verb-Letzt-Imperativsätzen, Infinitiven und allen übrigen als Befehl oder Aufforderung verwendeten Indikativ- und Konjunktivsätzen, tatsächlich dem Typus des Imperativsatzes zugeordnet werden.“[83] (Wratil 2013: 126)

Which leaves us with the sentences that present full-fledged imperative verbs, which are politeness constructions and imperatives that show a prefinite filling:

(300)   Nach Hause geh! (Nicht in die Kneipe!)

Wratil (cf. 2013: 129) says with respect to sentences like (300) that they are V2-structures. She further includes the following constructions in this:

> „So können Pronominal- und bestimmte Temporaladverbien […] ebenso wie topikalisierte Akkusativ- […], Dativ-, und Präpositionalobjekte […] vor dem Verb

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[83] As the explications [..] make it clear that only sentence whose finite main verb is conjugated in the imperative mode, and politeness imperatives have illocutionary potential. Only they, in contrast to adhortatives, can therefore adhortatives, dass-V-final sentences, infinitives and all the other indicative and Konjuktiv sentences that are used as a command, can really be assigned to the type of the imperative sentence.

im Imperativ angeordnet sein und damit eine dem Deklarativsatz entsprechende Verb-Zweit-Struktur konstituieren." [84] (Wratil 2013: 129)

Yet, the V2-examples above cannot be used discourse initially. They refer to a preceding piece of discourse which can also be shown via the salient use of contrastive focus and a thereby developed echo-character:

Diana enters the room and immediately turns to Chris:

(301)   Diana: Geh nach Hause!

         Chris: Wohin soll ich gehen?

         Diana: Nach \HAUse geh, du Unhold!

Diana enters the room and immediately turns to Chris:

(302)   Diana: *Nach \HAUse geh!

         Chris: Ich wusste bisher nicht, dass ich überhaupt irgendwo hingehen soll…

The strict imperative reading is interesting for our purposes, because – as often said – the least marked version in the most neutral context appears to be the best representative of a sentence mood. If one has to prepose a very specific context first in order to justify that something is a good example of a particular sentence mood, then everything could be in some way categorised via using the context as a major justification item. If a sentence in its isolated use without too many preconditions can, however be classified as e.g. declarative, interrogative, imperative etc., its grammatical features are sufficiently representative without any further ado.

It is important to notice that certain V2-constructions that are perceived as imperatives, can – depending on their intonation – likewise be V2-declaratives:

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[84] So, pronominal adverbs and certain temporal adverbs as well as topicalised accusative, dative and prepositional objects can be positioned in front of the verb that carries imperative mode and thus they can constitute a V2-structure that equals the declarative sentence.

(304)   Dann schreibt ihr einen Leserbrief!/.

(cf. Wratil 2013: 130)

(305)   Sie gehen sofort nach Hause!/.

The ambiguity resolves when a) the context is non-neutral or b) the discourse surroundings and the information from there inferable semantic denotation shows a clear tendency to a specific sentence mood. More about that will come up in chapter 5.

In sum, imperative sentences can occur in two syntactic variants, V1- and V2- basically. But the V2-imperatives that are not politeness constructions are marked and therefore not prototypical. The V1-imperative is not tied to huge restrictions and does not come with ambiguities to declaratives (cf. Wratil 203: 129).

Concerning the discourse surroundings of an imperative sentences, isolated use of the same is the default situation.

The next section will deal with the categorial filling of imperative sentences.

3.4.2 Categorial Filling

Talking about the imperative sentences, they are the most modest sentence mood regarding their needs of categorial filling. Imperative sentence can exist in the shape of one single not even full-fledged semi-finite verb (cf. Donhauser 1986; Lohnstein 2019: 20):

(306)   Lauf!

Of course, if a speaker uses a verb that demands more arguments due to the valency of the verb, like for instance *geben*, the complements of this verb have to be realised overtly, unless they are inferable from the context or previous discourse:

(307)   Gib Nathalie ihren Kaffee!

Furthermore, imperative sentences cannot be used with predicates that ask the addressee to change something about parameters that are unchangeable in itself; so, the use of individual level verbs is out (cf. (308)):

(308) *Sei groß!
(309) Sei leise!

Kaufmann (2012: 7) mentions the possibility that individual level predicates can be ok in imperative sentence. She uses the following examples:

(310) Close the door!
(311) Be blond!

Her explanation in favour of the well-formedness of (311) is that a certain context can legitimise such a construction:

> "Out of the blue, the sentence might sound awkward, but it becomes perfect if you imagine someone muttering it to herself while on her way to a blind date." (Kaufmann: 2012: 7)

And, yes, in soliloquy this is an option, because the speaker (in the preferable case) knows best what she is talking about; and even if the addressee is not oneself but an external addressee, this would be an option if the person I am talking to and I know what is meant by *being blond*, because this sentence is then peer language instead of literal meaning. But, seriously: If one justifies every reading as a possible reading on the basis of context, why should be bothered with the study of grammar then? When a person learns a new language, they are taught the most literal meaning that the majority of people, who speak that foreign language, understand. This opens doors so that one can gain more freedom in order to make jokes or speak in code with a peer, but a literal and grammar-based method of learning the language is not taught first for no reason.

The imperative sentence is the only sentence that does not overtly realise its grammatical subject[85] (cf. Wratil 2013: 121; Lohnstein 2019: 22). The semi-finite verb of the imperative only shows agreement-marking and no marking for verbal mood or tense which does not suffice to license a subject. The usual case of the grammatical subject is induced through a *speaking about*-relationship between the finite verb and the subject (cf. Lohnstein 2019: 22) which cannot be found in constructions that lack tense and verbal mood:

(312)   Geh jetzt raus!

(313)   Alle Linguisten jetzt rausgehen!

Even if the subject is realised in canonical imperative sentences, the pronunciation is not grammatically necessary and it does not change the *speaking to*-relation:

(314)   Geh du jetzt raus!

Portner argues, however, that the realisation of third person subjects meets difficulties (cf. 2004: 10). This is no wonder since the just established *speaking to*-relation is evaluated in a domain that only include the addressee in the shape of second person singular or plural. The politeness imperative sentence carries and overt subject, but – as has already been touched upon in section 3 – the difference between imperative sentences and other sentence moods like declaratives is not necessarily obvious:

(315)   Jetzt schreiben Sie einen Leserbrief!/.

All in all, canonical V1-imperative sentence needs at least a semi-finite verb and arguments that saturate the valency of the verb except for the grammatical subject. The section about verb morphology will go into detail about verbal mood.

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[85] In topic-drop sentences the subject can be omitted as well, but it require a mentioning in previous discourse or a very clear inference from context.

3.4.3 Verb Morphology

It has already been established in the syntax section of this overall chapter that the canonical type of imperative sentences is the V1-imperative sentence. This semi-finite version of the imperative sentence only allows for the imperative verbal form (cf. Donhauser 1986). However, there is no other mark for mood or an identifier of the imperative than the lack of mood and tense; the imperative only possesses person and number specification – a circumstance which blocks it from the use of sentences that contain judgment and the transfer of truth. (cf. Lohnstein 2019: 22 ff.) The Konjunktiv II can occur in all sentence moods except for the imperative sentence, since all the other sentences can paint a picture of alternative worlds in a speaking-about manner. The missing indexical information (semi-finiteness and therefore lack of tense and verbal mood) also inhibits a *speaking about*-relation and therefore solely allows for a *speaking to*-relation towards the addressee:

> „Der verbale Modus Imperativ weist im Gegensatz zu Indikativ und Konjunktiv im Deutschen ein nicht voll ausgeprägtes Flexionsparadigma auf, denn es treten weder Tempusmarkierungen noch gewisse Personenmarkierungen auf. Zugleich etabliert diese verbmodale Spezifikation einen eigenständigen Satzmodus Imperativ. Dies hat dazu geführt, den Imperativ nicht als eigentlichen Verbmodus zu betrachten, sondern -ganz analog zu Fragesätzen- als Satzmodus. Indikativ und Konjunktiv II, die Frage- bzw. Deklarativsätze zu bilden erlauben, können hingegen nicht einfach -parallel zum Imperativ- als Satzmodi betrachtet werden, da außer der modalen Markierung am Finitum weitere syntaktische Operationen zu ihrer Konstitution notwendig sind."[86] (Lohnstein 2000: 112)

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86 The verbal mood imperative shows a not fully developed inflectional paradigm in German in contrast to indicative and Konjunktiv, because neither markers of tense nor person occur. Additionally, this specification of verbal mood establishes its own sentence mood, the imperative sentence. This led to not considering the imperative as an actual verbal mood, but – analogous to interrogative sentences – as a sentence mood. Indicative and Konjunktiv II, which allow for the construction of interrogative or declarative sentences respectively, cannot – parallel to the imperative – be considered an independent sentence mood, because apart from the modal marking on the finite verb, more syntactic operations that would be necessary constitute them are missing.

Concerning the existence of root clauses that have directive character: Even if one includes root infinitive imperative sentence into the mix, tense would not play a role as there is none – and here even verbal mood is not discussable as there is none. A far more interesting topic is the issue of number in root infinitives when looking at reflexive verbs:

(316)   Versichere dich!/*sich!

(317)   Sich/ *Dich versichern!

(cf. Truckenbrodt 2006: 276)

As Reis (2003) explains, root infinitives[87], though displaying a directive character similar to the V1-imperative sentence, show discrepancies regarding that spoken-to addressee. As the reader can see in (317), the addressee is not realised as second person, which would be expectable concerning imperative-like sentence, but is only well-formed when combined with a third person reflexive pronoun. Furthermore, the lines are blurry considering the ascription of a property to a specific addressee when one looks at the following examples:

(318)   Noch einmal Achterbahn fahren!

Here, the root infinitive even loses its directive effect, because the expressed desire is not ascribed to an external source, like an addressee, to fulfil. This is one of the reasons why sentence mood in itself is a grammatical complex sign (Altmann 1993). Illocutions are often closely linked to the respective sentence mood, but in most cases, they are not sufficiently specifiable and cannot only be classified roughly into categories like *assertive*, *directive* (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) etc.

The further difference between V1-imperatives and other forms of imperative-like sentences that show a desiderative illocution have already been discussed earlier which is why I will

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[87] Cf. also Reis 1995, Gärtner 2013.

not proceed on the directive matter of imperative sentences in this section. But the topic of desires makes a good transition to the next category of sentences: optative sentences.

3.4.4 Intonation

The V1-declarative is dependent on the progredient falling intonation. This distinguishes it from echoe-questions:

(319) \Geh!

(320) /Geh!

Having looked at imperative sentences and their defining features, the next sentence mood to discuss is the optative sentence.

3.5 Optative Sentences

    iv.   Optative sentence mood is evoked through *Konjunktiv II* and is supported by modal particles and a reduction to irreality and counterfactuality takes place. Modal particles abolish the negated element of the V1-interrogative sentence.

Optative sentences are no elliptical conditionals (Scholz 1991), but are often treated like those (Biezma 2011), as the similarity to the protasis of a V1-conditional on the surface is high. The ellipsis, however, not be spelled out concretely, as it lacks specificity. Optatives are likewise no interrogative sentences, because they need the Konjunktiv II, which has already been declared unusual in V1-interogatives in the last subchapter. Furthermore, they do not denote a bi-partitioned answering room, but they reject the negated element of an interrogative via the use of modal particles or the like. The need for the Konjunktiv II and affinity to modal particles assigns them their irreal and counterfactual character and thus solely evokes an *wish*-reading. Optative accents can substitute for the modal particle or even enhance the expressive desiderative reading.

A detailed analysis of those claims and an opposition to Grosz's argument (2013) that indicative is possible in optative sentences will be provided in the upcoming sections.

3.5.1 Syntax and Discourse Sequencing

The optative sentence is represented by two sentence types: the V1 and the V-final sentence. There is no V2-optative. It has been argued that the optative sentence is an elliptic structure that is dependent on a matrix clause that is not audible but can somehow be recovered from the context. This perspective was coined as the *Tilgungshypothese*. (cf. Grosz 2007: 153; Biezma 2011: 75; Evans 2007: 373; Rosengren 1993). Evans refers this ellipsis to the circumstance that the silence of the matrix clause has been conventionalised.

(321)   Wenn ich doch nur größer wäre ~~[, dann könnte ich weiter gucken]~~.

Biezma assumes that the optative sentence answers a question that introduces a topic and that the matrix clause reflects the topic, which is given information and can therefore be mute (cf. Biezma 2011: 90). The "absence of the consequence" (Biezma 2011: 90) is therefore defined as topic drop.

Ulrike Scholz (cf. 1991: 16 ff.) heavily argues against this view and defends her perspective in the following manner: She says that the optative sentence is a structural type of its own and therefore independent of any matrix sentence. Any hypothesis that claims the optative sentence to be an independent sentence abides by the *Unabhängigkeitshypothese*.

One argument of hers pertains to modal particles: Modal particles should not have any effect in the legibility of the whole sentence when the matrix sentence that is supposed to be there anyway~~s~~, at least according to the *Tilgungshypothese*, is recovered and the optative sentence therefore embedded. But in combination with a supposed matrix clause that is made visible, the insertion of a modal particle becomes problematic:

(322) a. Wenn es **doch nur** Sommer wäre!/ Wäre es **doch nur** Sommer!

     b. ?Ich würde mich so freuen, wenn es **doch nur** Sommer wäre./?Ich würde mich so freuen, wäre es **doch nur** Sommer.

Returning to Biezma's assumption, the difference between elliptical structures like topic drop is that the element that is deemed to be the ellipsis is clearly recoverable from the previous discourse and context. If one compares this to optative sentences, one can see that the matrix sentence is just a happy guess when it comes to its exact recoverability (cf. Scholz 1991: 18):

(323) A: Würdest du dir den Film anschauen, wenn er gut wäre?

     B: Nein, ~~ich würde mir den Film anschauen,~~ wenn er schlecht wäre.

(324) A: Wäre doch nur gutes Wetter!

     B: Was dann? Dann würdest du rausgehen?

     A: Nein, dann würde ich im Haus bleiben.

There is something else that is special about optative sentences: The optative sentence is utterable out of context, because the matrix clause and its specific lexical content are irrelevant to the discourse. Scholz (cf. 1991: 18) states that in the case of a genuine ellipses, the deleted lexical content of the matrix clause is recoverable from context inference. The content of the matrix clause, if one assumes that optative sentences are actually elliptical, could be anything. It would not strike me as surprising if most of the speakers that use an optative sentence would not even have a specific potential matrix clause in mind while uttering the optative sentence.

From my perspective on the basis of lacking recoverability of matrix clauses and the oddness that shines through when embedding an optative sentence that prototypically hosts modal

particles, I will treat optative sentences as independent syntactic constructions that form their sentence mood.

What follows now is the aspect of categorial filling.

3.5.2 Categorial Filling

Optative, exclamatory and adverbial sentences are dependent on more kinds of specifications: The optative sentence cannot bear wh-expressions, neither in the prefinite position nor in other places of the sentence (cf. Grosz 2013: 150). In contrast to Grosz (2013), I advocate Scholz' (1991) view that optative sentences need the Konjunktiv II to be identified as optatives, but more about possible indicative optatives in the next section. The Konjunktiv II-indicative-struggle had to be mentioned here nevertheless, because it is probably the obligatory core feature of optative sentences. Often, the prototypical sentences used even contain two particles that succeed one another:

(325)   Wäre Hans <u>doch nur</u> gekommen!

In order to be sure whether they are actually obligatory, sentences will be looked at here that do not contain particles. What one can definitely say about particles in optative sentences is that they are typical or even prototypical, as they come naturally and support the notion of the wish that is contained in every optative sentence:

(326)   ?Wäre Hans gekommen!

A further argument towards the prototypicality that likewise leads towards the question whether particles are obligatory become apparent when regarding the following variation of (327) and (328):

(327)   ?Wenn es wärmer wäre!
(328)   ?Wäre es wärmer!

The only clue that one has that signifies the deviation from a conditional clause without the optative reading is the exclamation mark at the end of the sentence which stands for an exclamatory change in the intonation of a sentence; but this is obviously useless in spoken language. A slight change improves the situation:

(329)   Wenn es WÄRmer wäre!
(330)   WÄre es wärmer!/Wäre es WÄRmer!

The added pitch accent helps identify the sentence at hand as an optative sentence, though this will be discussed in more detail in the section about intonation. Furthermore, one can add interjections to the sentence: The interjection *ach* marks the sentence and gives it a character of wishing for something which makes the modal particle in this case obsolete (cf. Grosz 2013: 150; Altmann 1993: 125):

(331)   Ach, wenn es wärmer wäre!
(332)   Ach, wäre es wärmer!

Interjections are no compelling feature, neither are specific prosodic patterns nor modal particles. But: One of those elements has to be present aside the Konjunktiv II in order to identify the sentence as optative. The difference between the opposing sentences is that they do not carry any exclamatory accent signified through the exclamation mark (which, again, is useless considering spoken language anyway), but they specifically have an accent on the finite verb or the first part of the predication. In the latter case, the interjection supports the wishful character of the optative sentence. Again, a particle is not needed to express the wish the speaker has. Several cases have been demonstrated here that show that modal particles are not obligatory. However, they seem to be the standard way to express the wish component in optative sentences. The issue of the desiderative character of optative sentences and the supporting elements to exactly this illocution of the wish will come up again later. For now, I will turn to verb morphology.

3.5.3 Verb Morphology

In reference to optative sentences, Patrick Grosz (2013) brought up the question whether the Konjunktiv II can be the only verbal mood that is legitimate. Grosz (2013: 147) argues that there are very restricted situations in which the optative sentence may adopt indicative mood:

(333)   a.   Der Sprecher ist seit einer Stunde im Keller und geht soeben zur Stiege:

        (Oh!) Wenn das Gewitter jetzt nur schon vorbei ist!

      b.   (Oh!) Dass das Gewitter jetzt nur schon vorbei ist!

(334)   a.   Die Nacht ist kühl. Auch zieht in Westen ein Gewitter auf. Wenn es nur bald

        vorübergeht! (Ferdinand Raimund, Der Verschwender.)

      b.   Da sagte der Kutscher: wenn wir nur nicht den Steinbrüchen zu nahe kommen!

        (Annette von Droste-Hülshoff, Die Judenbuche.)

(Grosz 2013: 146)

The problem that there is with the indicative version of optative sentences, is that they are either used in high literature or are very restrictive in terms of the context they are used in. Furthermore, it is odd that the indicative works in V-final-sentences that are introduced via *wenn* and *dass*, but meet a dead end concerning their optative character when being used in V1-variants:

Der Sprecher ist seit einer Stunde im Keller und geht soeben zur Stiege:

(335)   ?Ist das Gewitter (jetzt nur) schon vorbei!

In this case, the interpretation of the sentence in (335) would mainly be drawn inferring from the context. The desiderative character in canonical optative sentences, however, rather comes across through the use of a counterfactual verbal mood of *Konjunktiv II* that substitutes for a lack of items like *wünschen* which would otherwise express the desiderative state. The *Konjunktiv II* decouples the whole proposition from being dependent on a specific context, because an optative sentence can be uttered in a neutral context and still be

recognised as the wishful body the optative sentence is. Thus, I proceed under the assumption that the optative still carries the Konjunktiv II as an identifier, because it does not depend on restrictions and is applicable in both V1- and V-final-sentences.

It is not surprising that the optative sentence shows an affinity towards the Konjunktiv II, since it displays *Kontrafaktizität*, alternative worlds and the possibilities and situations contained in them. It refers to circumstances that are not the case in the actual world. This is the inherent trait of a wish: desiring something that is currently not the case. Optative sentences prototypically express wishes, which is why they are so welcoming to the Konjunktiv II.

The Konjunktiv I cannot definitely be attributed to optative form, but Grosz states that the examples below can "im weitesten Sinne"[88] also be clarified to be optative sentences, because they contain a wish/hope/desire (cf. 2013: 147-148):

(336)   Es lebe der Sport!

(337)   Möge er jedes Ziel erreichen!

He then proceeds to say that those examples are not strict optative sentences and justifies this, as those „[…] sind jedoch in Hinblick auf den propositionalen Inhalt stärker eingeschränkt […], weshalb ich sie für den Zweck dieses Artikels ausklammere."[89] (Grosz 2013: 147)

That reasoning is quite vague.

Opposite to Grosz, I would not categories *Heischesätze* like (336) and (337) as optative, as the grammatical features do not advocate this view, but rather the illocution of the wish again is the main point of argument pro optative status here. I do not think that this is a sensible approach. Again: sentence moods occur alongside prototypical illocutions, but defining sentences from the illocutionary perspective first is putting the cart before the horse.

The same is the case here: The infinitival expression of the same functional category (wish/hope) is also included here by Grosz:

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[88] "in the broadest sense"

[89] are, however, more restricted considering the propositional content […], which is why I exclude them for this purpose.

(338)   Noch einmal Venedig sehen!

       (Reis 2003: 188)

However, he does not treat them as equal to their Konjunktiv II and indicative counterparts, arguing that the they are more restricted referring to their propositional content. As shown further above, root infinitives cannot merely be interpreted as pure wishes, but in times a taste of command is more urgent in them which has a more directive relation to the addressee than canonical optative sentences do. In fact, not similar to the imperative like root infinitives that need an addressee to be valid, optative sentences only need a speaker and still function well in every neutral context.

This leads me to the issue of assumed indicative optative sentences again: Unlike Altmann (1993) and Scholz (1991), Grosz (2013) argues here that the difference between indicative and Konjunktiv II wrt. their use is based on the likelihood of the realisation of the wish that is formulated in the optative sentence. Here, he says that indicative mood signifies a more likely realisation – declaring it not counterfactual but also not factual either –, whereas Konjunktiv II categorises the realisation of the wish or hope as less likely, and emphasises its counterfactual character (cf. Grosz 2013: 163 ff.).

> „Ein konjunktivischer Optativsatz […] drückt dementsprechend im Allgemeinen einen Wunsch nach etwas Kontrafaktischem aus, wohingegen ein indikativischer Optativsatz […] eine Hoffnung auf etwas Mögliches, aber Ungewisses ausdrückt."[90]
>
> (Grosz 2012: 147)[91]

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[90] An optative sentence containing Konjunktiv II […] therefore generally expresses the wish for something counterfactual, whereas an optative sentence containing indicative […] expresses the hope for something possible, but unlikely.

[91] An optative sentence containing Konjunktiv II hence generally expresses a wish with respect to something counterfactual, whereas an sentence containing indicative expresses the hope for something possible but unlikely.

The question is what distinguishes the optative sentence mood from other sentence moods that bring about the same functional type, namely communicating a wish or hope:

(339)   (Ach,) käme (doch) nur ein Skelett in die Bar!

(340)   (Ach,) dass/wenn (doch nur) ein Skelett in die Bar

        käme!

(341)   (Ach,) KÄme ein Skelett in die Bar!

(342)   Ich wünschte, es käme ein Skelett in die Bar.

(343)   Meinst du, er kommt auch wirklich in die Bar?

All those sentences above express a wish or hope though they are not all optative sentences. It is nothing new here that different sentence moods can share the same illocutions even though certain illocutions are prototypical in reference to one sentence mood and rather unlikely to be contained by another. Thus, whereas a wish or hope is inherent to optative sentences, it is not when it comes to declaratives or interrogatives, even less so with exclamatory. Here, once more, Grosz' approach from the pragmatic rather than the grammatical side becomes clear:

> „Ein Optativsatz lässt sich funktional wie folgt definieren. Erstens wird er dazu verwendet, ein Begehren nach dem beschriebenen Sachverhalt auszudrücken, ohne ein lexikalisches Element zu enthalten, dem eine entsprechende Bedeutung zukommt (wie beispielsweise die Verben *wünschen* und *hoffen*, oder Satzadverbien wie *hoffentlich*). Zweitens erfordert ein Optativsatz, dass der Sprecher nicht in der Lage ist (beispielsweise durch Autorität über das Subjekt), diesen Sachverhalt herbeizuführen; dadurch unterscheidet sich der Optativsatz vom Imperativsatz.“[92] (Grosz 2013: 147)

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[92] An optative sentence can functionally be defined as follows. First of all, it is used in order to express a desire for a described issue without using a lexical item that carries a respective meaning (like e.g. the verbs *to wish* and *to hope* or sentence adverbs like *hopefully*). Secondly, an optative sentence requires that the speaker is not able to achieve the desired issue (for instance through authority over the subject); in that the optative and imperative sentence are different from each other.

If this criterion of distinction is the only one dividing imperative and optative, then what about sentences like the following:

(344) *Janina is sitting in her armchair, feeling sluggish:*

    Janina: Wenn ich doch nur nicht so faul wäre!

    She then continues working on her dissertation.

    Janina: Na, geht doch! Jetzt fühle ich mich besser.

Example (344) shows a direct realisation of the desideratum in the optative sentence. The speaker takes action and causes her wish to become true all by herself. Though I get Grosz' point, I think the distinction between imperative and optative sentences rather lies in the explicit directive character of the imperative towards an addressee, whereas the optative is not necessarily directive at all, but simply puts emphasis on the situation that is currently not the case. Whether this situation becomes factual is less relevant, if at all relevant, in optative sentences than in imperative sentences. But if one is very pedantic, the imperative signifies a smaller chance of the world changing along the lines of the imperative sentence: While optative sentences are often addressed towards the speaker themselves, imperative sentence mostly address an entity that is different from the addressee. Therefore, in the optative sentence the likelihood that the speaker themselves can change the actual world to accommodate their wish is greater, because it is harder to influence someone else than it is to influence oneself.

But let us for a moment assume, the way through illocution rather than grammar first is more adequate. For this way of approaching the optative sentence, please, look at the examples below again:

(345)   *The speaker is standing by the window and is watching the thunderstorm:*

| (Oh!) Wenn das Gewitter doch nur schon vorbei wäre! | **Wenn-V-final + Konjunktiv II** |

(Oh!) Dass das Gewitter doch nur schon vorbei wäre!	**Dass-V-final** **+** **Konjunktiv II**
(Oh!) Wäre das Gewitter doch nur schon vorbei!	**V1 + Konjunktiv II**

(cf. Grosz 2013: 146)

(346) *The speaker has been in the basement and is now approaching the stairs:*

(Oh!) Wenn das Gewitter jetzt nur schon vorbei ist!	**Wenn-V-final** **+** **Indicative**
(Oh!) Dass das Gewitter jetzt nur schon vorbei ist!	**Dass-V-final** **+** **Indicative**

(cf. Grosz 2013: 146)

Comparing the Konjunktiv and indicative examples, they both express a hope. The Konjunktiv II does so more clearly, the indicative less, but both do.

What happens when removing the contextual information from the picture is that the sentence containing Konjunktiv II still clearly expresses a hope or wish, but in the indicative sentence it becomes very difficult to make out the same illocution. One could argue now that only the modal particles support the wish here. We have already learned that only the Konjunktiv II is mostly not enough to convey a wish, but in combination with either modal particles or an accent on certain words, the wish or hope can be brought about. I now remove the particles and add the accent:

(347) (Oh!) Wenn das Gewitter schon vorBEI wäre!

	Wenn-V-final **+** **Konjunktiv II**
(Oh!) Dass das Gewitter schon vorBEI wäre!	**Dass-V-final + Konjunktiv II**
(Oh!) Wäre das Gewitter schon vorbei!	**V1 + Konjunktiv II**

(cf. Grosz 2013: 146)

(348) (Oh!) Wenn das Gewitter schon vorBEI ist!   **Wenn-V-final + Indicative**

(Oh!) Dass das Gewitter schon vorBEI ist!   **Dass-V-final + Indicative**

(cf. Grosz 2013: 146)

It appears to be the case that the indicative here, albeit the accent, cannot be distinguished from a mere exclamative sentence. The Konjunktiv II version, yet, still remains optative in the sense of wish or hope illocution.

My point is that a context is able to change the illocution. This will be shown explicitly in the chapter 4. Concerning sentence mood, it is, however, important to exclude restrictive contexts in order to see which grammatical material is essential to the sentence mood and which prototypical illocution can be inferred from a context as neutral as possible. It is apparent that the indicative examples fail to be categorised as optative sentences under such circumstances. It is far more reasonable to include the infinitival and Konjunktiv I examples into the optative category, then, as they bring about a wish or hope without any further contextual information needed. But this will not be discussed here.

The next section shortly looks into the progredient intonation of optative sentences.

3.5.4 Intonation

The V1-declarative is dependent on the progredient falling intonation. This distinguishes it from V1-interrogatives with unusual use of Konjunktiv II:

(349) Wäre er doch \hier!

(350) Wäre er doch /hier?

The next section will deal with adverbial sentences.

<u>3.6 Adverbial Sentences</u>

    v.   The protasis of conditional adverbial sentences can only be distinguished from V1-interrogatives, -declaratives and -optatives in connection with its apodosis. The apodosis reduces the alternatives that the protasis entails (p v ¬p).

Conditional V1-adverbials show parallels to declaratives, interrogatives and optatives – at least referring to their protasis. This is not far-fetched, because the protasis builds a frame to the proposition of the apodosis. The validation of the apodosis always happens in conjunction with the condition that is presented through the propositional content of the apodosis. Declaratives and interrogatives possess a frame-character, too: The narrative declarative provides a frame to the expressive chain of events that follows after it; the interrogative builds a frame with reference to which the bi-partition is reduced. Optatives show parallels to the protasis, because they signify something that has not happened yet: Concerning an optative sentence the propositional contents that is not the reality (yet) is desired to become real; concerning the conditional adverbial sentence it is not the counterfactual desire that is the centre of attention, but the condition that stands between reality and irreality.

Conditional adverbials are overtly distinguished from optatives, interrogatives and declaratives through their discourse surroundings (apodosis = contrast to all three sentence moods) and the ability to take in indicative (contrast to optatives). Furthermore, it can adapt likewise falling and rising progredient intonation in the protasis, which has no overall effect on its semantics.

A separate chapter about categorial filling will not be integrated, because the lexical restrictions of adverbial sentences as far as they are relevant to this chapter have been sorted out already.

In detail, this can be comprehended on the basis of the following explications.

3.6.1 Syntax and Discourse Sequencing

Moving on with adverbial sentences, the question is in which sentence types adverbial sentences occur and in what reading adverbial V1-sentences can be realised. Furthermore, it will be asked to whether the host clause and the non-host-clause of the V-final-versions have the same syntactic structure as their V1-cousins. To be more specific, the degree of syntactic integration will be analysed (cf. Reis/Wöllstein 2010; Pittner 2011; Freywald 2013). The aspects of interchangeability, and therefore the lexical properties of certain adverbial sentences, will be viewed in the next ubsections, as well as the prosodic features (especially concerning the status of integration). Adverbial sentences appear in the shape of V1- (351), V2- (353) and V-final (352).

(351)   Regnet es morgen, bleibe ich zu Hause.

(352)   Wenn es morgen regnet, bleibe ich zu Hause.

(353)   a. Regnet es morgen, ich bleibe zu Hause.

             b. Regnet es morgen: Ich bleibe zu Hause./, ?ich bleibe zu Hause.

             c. *Es regnet morgen: Ich bleibe zu Hause.

             d. *Es regnet morgen: Bleibe ich zu Hause.

As V2-variants of adverbial sentences are often realised through the colon-reading, they will not be of further interest here. Therefore, please view the V1-adverbial sentences down below:

The following examples show which V1-options there are:

(354)   Hätte ich nicht seit meiner frühen Jugend Migräne gehabt, wäre ich Musiker geworden.

(Zifonun et al. 1997: 2281)

Hypothetical Conditional

(355)   Schüttet es auch noch so sehr, nimmt er keinen Schirm mit.

(Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 119)

Irrelevance Conditional

(356)   War der Versuch auch mißglückt, gab er die Hoffnung

Concessive

doch nicht auf. (ebd.: 2313)

(357) Hatte Karl eine Arbeit abgeschlossen, stürzte er sich mit Eifer in eine neue. (Heidolph/Flämig/Motsch 1981: 792)	**Temporal**
(358) War Öl lange Zeit zu billig, (so) ist es seit einiger Zeit zu teuer. (Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 122)	**Adversative**

V1-adverbial sentences that have no introductory element are mostly interpreted as conditionals (cf. Pittner 2013: 507), even though they might have an additional temporal, concessive or adversative reading. Causative readings are not included in the group above, because – as it has already been stated earlier in this chapter – their character of subordination is a pragmatic one.

Reis and Wöllstein (2010) brought up the discussion about the scale of integration in especially V1-adverbial clauses. They noticed that V1-adverbial cannot simply be exchanged with their V-final-counterparts, which is why they assume semantic differences (cf. Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 157).

V-final hypothetical conditionals and conditionals with a temporal reading show no noticeable restrictions on interchangeability (cf. Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 115 ff.):

(359)   Wenn es regnet, (dann) bleiben wir zu Hause.

           Regnet es, bleiben wir zu Hause.

(cf. Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 115)

(360)   a.   Wenn/Sobald du heute Abend kommst, machen wir gleich den Kamin an.

        b.   Kommst du heute Abend, machen wir gleich den Kamin an.

(cf. Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 116)

In the cases above, the substitution of V1 for V-final is unproblematic. But binding into a V1-adverbial sentence is a problem. (cf. Freywald 2013: 4-5):

(361)   Wenn er$_i$ Urlaub hat, möchte jeder$_i$ gerne die Stadt verlassen.

(362)   *Hat er$_i$ Urlaub, möchte jeder$_i$ gerne die Stadt verlassen.

(Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 144)

The failing binding constructions are an indicator of a lack of integration into the host clause. Pittner (cf. 2011: 10) states that binding of a left peripheral expression would be possible if the left peripheral subordinate clause was sentence internally reconstructable, but that her test subjects consider those examples less bad than Reis/Wöllstein (2010) and Freywald (2013) present them, yet she does not provide any concrete data to prove this (cf. Pittner 2011: 10).

Further evidence supporting the *unintegrated*-thesis can be found in ellipses:

(363)   A: Unter welchen Umständen würden Sie einen Bentley kaufen?

         B: Wenn ich Millionär wäre.

         B: *Wäre ich Millionär.

(Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 143)

It seems that conditional sentences that contain an introductory complementiser in C^0 can serve as an answer to the question in (363 A) without the overt expression of their matrix clause. The V1-variant fails this test and cannot serve as a proper answer though the host clause is the same to both dependent clauses.

Correlates, too, prove to be problematic in V1-adverbial sentence, although they are acceptable in the default version (cf. Freywald 2013: 4-5):

(364)   Ich bin **dann** glücklich, wenn ich etwas erreicht habe.

(365)   *Ich bin **dann** glücklich, habe ich etwas erreicht.

(cf. Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 145)

In essence, Pittner (2011) does not oppose Reis/Wöllstein (2010), but she shifts the focus of reason for the unintegrated state of V1-adverbial sentences:

> „Es wurde gezeigt, dass sich ein Großteil der syntaktischen Evidenz für die Unintegriertheit von V1-Konditionalsätzen auf fehlende informationsstrukturelle Integration zurückführen lässt. V1-Konditionalsätze weisen eine eigene FHG auf und beinhalten eine im Vergleich mit der Matrixproposition weniger wichtige Informationseinheit, die auf der globalen Ebene der Informationsstruktur Hintergrundinformationen darstellt, welche nicht fokussiert werden können."[93] (Pittner 2011: 20)

Reis/Wöllstein (2010) and Freywald (2013) also show that those variants are not so easily exchangeable due to sequence specificities: The syntactic phenomena deemed relevant are: position of the V1-adverbial sentence (*Vorfeld, Mittelfeld, Nachfeld*), the capability to answer questions solely via using the adverbial fragment, binding between adverbial and matrix clause and correlates:

(366) Wären alle Fahrräder mit Licht unterwegs, würden weniger Unfälle passieren.   *Vorfeld*[94]

(Freywald 2013: 4)

(367) Ypsilanti müsste, würde sie die Regierung anstreben, mit den Linken koalieren.   *Mittelfeld*

(Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 140)

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[93] It was shown that a huge part of the syntactic evidence of unintegratedness of V1-conditionals can be traced back to informationstructural integration. V1-conditionals display their own FHG and contain an information unit that represents background information on the global level of information structure which cannot be focused.

[94] Though the V1-versions can theoretically claim all the listed positions, their preference is the *Vorfeld*. (cf. Freywald 2013: 4)

(368) Drei Wochen lang hat meine Anzeige also zu keinem *Nachfeld*
Ergebnis geführt, sieht man von ein paar verrückten
Briefen ab.

(Pittner 2011: 90)

Although V1-sentences can be put in the *Vorfeld* as well as the *Mittelfeld* and *Nachfeld*, they prefer the prefinite position of all (cf. Freywald 2013: 4; Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 117):

(369)   a.   *Es ist meine Angelegenheit, bin ich mit Fräulein Renate befreundet.

   b.   Bin ich mit Fräulein Renate befreundet, (so) ist das meine Privatangelegenheit.

(Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 117)

The question that comes up through such a comparison is if the V1-version is as integrated in the overall syntactic structure of the sentence as the V-final-version is. The generic analysis would be to position the V1-protasis in the prefinite slot of the apodosis:

(370)   a.   [CP1 [CP2 V1-Protasis] [CP1 [C° Apodosis]]]

   b.   [CP1 [CP2 [C° Regnet] [IP es]], [CP1 [C° bleiben] [IP wir zu Hause.]]]

      (Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 169)

However, it has been shown with the help of the analysed syntactic phenomena above that it would be more sensible to assume that V1-adverbial sentences are actually unintegrated. Especially the binding behaviour of V1-adverbial sentences is a huge indicator in favour of a less integrated status.

They therefore fundamentally assume that V1-adverbial structures are always unintegrated and thus share a paratactical relation with the apodosis, whereas V-final adverbials can and most often do occur in hypotactical relations (cf. Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 113).

Now, since the unintegrated status of the V1-adverbial clause has been reasoned via syntactic evidence, the next issue is: How exactly is the V1-adverbial clause connected to the rest of the overall sentence? For this purpose, Reis/Wöllstein suggest one of the following two hypotheses:

> "Das deklarative Zweitkonnekt in V1-Gefügen ist entweder ein V2-Deklarativ mit (zu rechtfertigender) Vorfeld-Ellipse oder ein V1-Deklarativ."[95]
>
> (Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 113)

Their findings lead to the result that both possibilities are sensible. I will particularly explain the approach to the V2-declarative + prefinite ellipsis, as this looks very promising concerning my overall theory about V1-sentences that is explicated in chapter 5.

(371)   Wenn Chris heute zum Footballgucken kommt, (so) können wir Mario Kart spielen.

(372)   Kommt Chris heute zum Footballgucken, (so) können wir Mario Kart spielen.

Reis and Wöllstein could not find any cases in which the *so*-version of conditional sentences turned out to be ungrammatical (cf. Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 150). If one positions a *so* in the prefinite position of the apodosis, this apodosis is then a V2-declarative which hosts a V1-adverbial clause that is adjoined to the host clause:

> „Wir nehmen, im Einklang mit den Restriktionen für (basisgenerierte) Adjunktion in Chomsky (2004), genau dasselbe für unsere V1-Gefüge an: V1-Protasis in Erststellung ist linksperipher an die Wurzelprojektion der Apodosis adjungiert […] und in Letztstellung rechtsperipher […]. In beiden Positionen ist sie dort basisgeneriert und satzintern nicht rekonstruierbar.[96]

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[95] The declarative *Zweitkonnekt* in V1-constructions either is a V2-declarative and contains an ellipsis in the prefield (that has to be justified) or it is a V1-declarative.

[96] We assume, in accordance with restrictions on (base-generated) adjunction in Chomsky (2004), exactly the same considering our V1-constructions: V1-protasis in the first position is adjoined to the left periphery of the root projection […] and in final positioning it is adjoined to the right periphery […]. In both positions it is base-generated there and not sentence internally reconstructable.

a. [CP1 [CP2 V1-Protasis] [CP1 [C0 Apodosis]]] [CP1 [CP2 [C0 Regnet] [IP es]], [CP1 [C0 bleiben] [IP wir zu Hause.]]]

b. b. [CP1 [CP1 [SpecC Wir [c⁰ würden] [IP zu Hause bleiben]]], [CP2 [C0würde] [IP es regnen.]]]"

(Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 169)

Reis/Wöllstein (cf. 2010: 170) say that there is no reason to exclude the analysis that the overall structure of V1-conditionals can be a V1-declarative; however, the *so*-constructions provide an argument in favour of the V2-analysis, which will thus be adopted.

The next section that concerns adverbial sentences is the topic of verb morphology.

3.6.2 Verb Morphology

Last but not least, I want to turn to adverbial sentences now: V-final adverbial sentences can occur with indicative and Konjunktiv II:

(373) Wenn Toni heute in der Uni ist, freue ich mich.	**Indicative**
(374) Wenn Toni heute in der Uni wäre, freute ich mich.	**Konjunktiv II**
(375) *Wenn Toni heute in der Uni sei, freute ich mich.	**Konjunktiv I (reportative)**
(376) a. Freue Janina sich, wenn Toni heute in der Uni ist. b. *Freue Janina sich, wenn Toni heute in der Uni sei.	**Konjunktiv I (*Heischesatz*)**

In V1-adverbial sentences, the *Heischesatz* is not possible:

(377) Ist Toni heute in der Uni, freut Janina sich.	**Indicative**
(378) Wäre Toni heute in der Uni, freute Janina sich.	**Konjunktiv II**
(379) *Sei Toni heute in der Uni, freue Janina sich.	**Konjunktiv I (reportative)**
(380) a. Freue Janina sich, ist Toni heute in der Uni b. *Freue Janina sich, sei Toni heute in der Uni.	**Konjunktiv I (*Heischesatz*)**

The Konjunktiv I in the shape of a *Heischesatz* is only possible in matrix clause, but not in the subordinated clause here. Furthermore, it is at all only possible in V-final-version of adverbial sentences.

V1-adverbial sentences show a tendency towards Konjunktiv II verbal mood. Except for the adversative adverbial sentence in which indicative mood is obligatory (381), the other types correlate with a use of indicative in written language (cf. Auer/Lindstöm 2011) rather than in spoken language:

(381) War/*Wäre Öl lange Zeit zu billig, (so) ist es seit einiger Zeit zu teuer.
(Freywald 2013: 4)

Additionally, indicative adverbial V1-sentences mostly occur in the shape of a preposed protasis (cf. Freywald 2013: 4):

(382) a. Haben zwei Spieler die gleiche niedrigste Karte, so zahlen beide.
           (Auer/Lindström 2011: 229)
       b. b. Kein Anschluss unter dieser Nummer – so kann man es passend auf den Punkten [sic!] bringen, liest man, mit welcher Hilflosigkeit die Justiz den immer dreister werdenden Methoden von Telefonabzockern gegenübersteht. (Pittner 2011: 90)

However, the indicative is not outrageously unacceptable like in most of the adverbial sentences; the Konjunktiv simply improves the felicity of adverbials in several contexts. Specifically, in V2-adverbials that are not introduced via subordinate elements, the indicative is welcome in combination with semi-factive verbs or in copula-constructions:

(383) a. Sie weiß, es gibt/*gebe/*gäbe nur diese eine Möglichkeit.
       b. Das Ding ist, das Auto hat/*habe/*hätte keine Winterreifen.
(Freywald 2013: 6)

Moreover, the position of protasis and apodosis is not negligible in adverbial sentences concerning indicative and Konjunktiv II:

(384)   Läse sie, schliefe er ein.

Liest sie, schläft er ein.

*Er schläft ein, liest sie.

Er schliefe ein, läse sie.

(cf. Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 139)

The situation concerning the subcategories of conditional adverbial sentences is far more complicated than depicted here. It is, however, not my intention to be more explicit about those very detailed phenomena; what is important here, is that the difference between V1- and V-final- adverbial sentences concerning verbal mood comes across. V1-adverbial sentences are far more restrictive and often even bound to a specific syntactic order of protasis and apodosis to make the indicative more legible. Talking about tense, there are no significant restrictions in that no tense is excluded from the use in adverbial sentences, which is no wonder as, overall, they are V2-declaratives and thus represent the most flexible sentence mood concerning verbal mood and tense.

The issue of intonation will be dealt with in the next subsection.

3.6.3 Intonation

Both falling and rising progredient intonation in the protasis are legitimate in V1-conditionals.

(385) Komme /ich, bringe ich Kuchen \mit.

(386) Komme \ich, bringe ich Kuchen \mit.

The next section will be concerned with the exclamatory sentence.

vi.   The exclamatory sentence does not represent a sentence mood of its own. This is due to the possibility of imitating every sentence mood as long as the exclamatory accent is present.

It has come up several times now that the case of the exclamatory sentence is doubtful referring to its separate sentence mood status. In the upcoming section, it will be argued that exclamatory sentences constitute no sentence mood of their own.

It will not be mentioned in a separate subsection which prosodic traits the exclamatory sentence bears, since that has been sufficiently mentioned at several places during the dissertation and will come up thoroughly again in chapter 5.

3.7.1 Syntax and Discourse Sequencing

Exclamatory sentences are a short issue in terms of their syntax: The exclamatory sentence is represented by all sentence types: the V1-, V2- and the V-final sentence. As I do not assume any illocutionary operators that signify sentence mood, I neither think that the syntactic structure of an exclamatory sentence differs from the structure of the sentences it resembles. Even if one goes the route Franz d'Avis (2013) chooses, who says that exclamatory sentences are a sentence mood of their own, there are no essential syntactic specificities to be found concerning exclamatory sentences. Therefore, I will not provide the reader with an additional syntactic analysis of the variants of exclamatory sentences.

Since there is no indicator of the exclamatory character in the surface syntax and illocutionary operators are – in my approach – excluded as well, the essence of making a sentence exclamatory must lie in a different dimension. The reader will get to know more about this in the section 3.

For now, I will move on to exclamatory sentences: Exclamatory sentences have long been problematic concerning the manifestation as an independent sentence mood (cf. Altmann 1993: 126; Sadock/Zwicky 1985: 162; Zaefferer 1989: 64 etc.; Rosengren 1992, Roguska 2007 etc.). Önnerfors, too, could not decide whether the exclamatory V1-declarative was a type of

its own (cf. 1997: 183). They contain in most of the cases everything that the sentence they are "derived from" contains, which advocates the view of no individual sentence mood here. The next chapter of categorial filling discusses possible pros of an individual sentence mood and the validity of those arguments in favour of an exclamatory sentence mood.

3.7.2 Categorial Filling

Now, for the categorial filling: Exclamatory sentences tend to feature interjections or modal particles in them. Yet, similar to optative sentences, those are not obligatory:

> „[…] Modalpartikeln: Als Modalpartikeln finden wir in Exklamativen *aber*, *aber auch*, *vielleicht* und *doch*. In V2-Exklamativen ohne w-Phrase kann auch *ja* vorkommen. Modalpartikeln sind bei Exklamativsätzen nicht obligatorisch."[97] (d'Avis 2013: 174)

They simply support the character of astonishment that is the core illocutionary feature of the exclamatory sentence. Similar to the optative sentence, which is closely connected to the speaker's intention of expressing a wish, the exclamatory sentence is closely connected to the speaker's intention to express his astonishment about an unexpected outcome (cf. d'Avis 2013: 172). This astonishment can be conveyed, for instance, through certain modal particles or interjections:

(387) Boah, kann die gut Klavier spielen! (Das überrascht mich.)

(388) Kann die aber gut Klavier spielen! (Das überrascht mich.)

Additionally, Franz d'Avis notes that certain elements occur in bigger likelihood, as wh-elements and interjections:

> „Anwesenheit bestimmter Elemente: Hier ist bei Exklamativen vor allem zu
> unterscheiden zwischen w-Sätzen, also Sätzen mit einer satzeinleitenden w-Phrase,

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[97] Modal particles: The modal particles we find in exclamatory sentences are *aber, aber auch, vielleicht* and *doch*. In V2-exclamatory sentences also *yes* can occur. Modal particles are not obligatory in exclamatory sentences.

und Sätzen ohne w-Phrase. Exklamative findet man in beiden Bereichen, zudem kommen sowohl V2- als auch VL-Exklamative mit einer w-Phrase vor. Vor Exklamativsätzen findet man zudem oft Interjektionen, vgl.

[…] Boah/ey/wow/hey/uff/oh/geil/verdammt/verflucht/Mann/Alter/Gott/ mein Gott/Herrgott/Wahnsinn/Scheiße/Kacke/Mist, ist DER aber groß!"[98]

(d'Avis 2013: 174-175)

Essentially, exclamatory sentences allow for prefinite elements, including wh-expressions. D'Avis lists restrictions on these prefinite wh-elements: He states that wh-pronouns, inflectional *welch-* + nominal complement, *was für ein* + nominal complement and adverbial wh-expressions can occur in exclamatory sentences as well as in interrogative sentences, whereas the latter are questions, canonically speaking. Forms of wh-expressions that can only occur in exclamatory sentences are: *welch ein* + nominal complement, non-inflectional *welch* + nominal complement, *wie* in a scalar meaning without an adjective, and *was* in scalar meaning:

(389)	Wer DA alles 'rumläuft!	**Wh-expressions**
(390)	Wen DIE geheiratet hat!	
(391)	Wem DER alles geholfen hat!	
(392)	Wessen Kleider DIE schon wieder an hat!	
(393)	Welchen TOLlen Mann die aber auch geheiratet hat!	**Inflectional** *welch* **+ nominal complement**

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98 Presence of certain elements: Here, considering exclamatory sentences, one has to distinguish between wh-sentences, i.e. sentences containing a wh-phrase at the beginning of the sentence, and sentences without a wh-phrase. Exclamatory sentence are to be found in both areas, moreover, V2- as well as V-final exclamatory sentences that contain a wh-phrase exist. Furthermore, there often are interjections in front of an exclamatory sentence, cf:

Boah/ey/wow/hey/uff/oh/geil/verdammt/verflucht/Mann/Alter/Gott/ mein Gott/Herrgott/Wahnsinn/Scheiße/Kacke/Mist, ist DER aber groß!

(394) Welchen TOLlen Mann hat die geheiratet! Welchem BLÖDmann die doch ihr Buch geschenkt hat!	
(395) Was für einen TOLlen Mann die doch geheiratet hat!	*was für ein* + **nominal complement**
(396) Was für einen TOLlen Mann hat die geheiratet!	
(397) Was DIE aber auch für einen tollen Mann geheiratet hat!	
(398) Was hat DIE für einen tollen Mann geheiratet!	
(399) Wo ist DIE doch überall gewesen!	**Adverbial wh-expressions**
(400) Womit DER sich alles auskennt!	
(401) Wovon DIE auch immer träumt!	
(402) Wann DIE immer kommt!	
(403) Welch TOLlen Mann die geheiratet hat!	**non-inflectional** *welch* + **nominal**
(404) Welch TOLlen Mann hat die geheiratet!	**complement**
(405) Welch einen TOLlen Mann die geheiratet hat! Welch einen TOLlen Mann hat die geheiratet!	*welch ein* + **nominal complement**
(406) Wie DIE gerannt ist! Wie ist DIE gerannt!	*wie* **in a scalar meaning without an** **adjective**
(407) Was DIE groß ist! Was ist DIE groß! Was DIE gerannt ist! Was ist DIE gerannt!	**and** *was* **in scalar meaning**

(cf. d'Avis 2013: 187-188)

In collecting those sentences in comparison to each other, d'Avis intends to show that there are restrictions on the use of wh-expressions in interrogative or exclamatory sentences respectively; he thereby argues that exclamatory sentences cannot simply be treated as sole copies of, in this case, an interrogative sentence, because there are exclamatory sentences

containing wh-expressions that interrogative sentences cannot contain in the same manner. Portner/Zanuttini (2003) call those wh-expressions "e-only-phrases"[99]. Roguska (cf. 2007: 51) and d'Avis argue that such applications presuppose their only true answer already and can thus not be uttered as interrogatives and genuine questions. The listed example above might seem to be a huge battery of exceptions to the argument that exclamatory sentences are not independent sentence moods, but if one looks closely, the only category that is affected by this exception is all in all a certain class of sentence containing wh-expressions.

What has to be mentioned, too, is that the V1-variant of the exclamatory sentence seems similar to the optative sentence as soon as it contains the Konjunktiv II, which, again, is a counterargument to the thesis that the exclamatory sentence is a sentence mood of its own:

(408) Hätte die bloß viel Geld!

(409) Hätte DIE (vielleicht) viel Geld!

(d'Avis 2012: 180)

Here, modal particles are needed to distinguish the bunch, because – as has been mentioned further above – certain modal particles are more receptive to exclamatory sentences (like *vielleicht*, *aber*) and others are more common in optative sentences (like *bloß*).

In the next section, the question whether verb morphology is restricted in any way will be discussed.

3.7.3 Verb Morphology

The exclamatory sentence has earlier been described as the chameleon among the sentence moods, as it can take any syntactic shape, thereby kind of mimicking different sentence moods. It has been claimed the only crucial grammatical feature that allows for a separate semantic category emerging in the sentence mood of the exclamative sentence, is the exclamative accent which is the central feature of this category. This being said, the copying character would suggest that the exclamatory sentence is similarly open to verbal moods as those sentence moods are that it resembles. Yet, d'Avis (2013) states that the indicative is

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[99] Exclamative-only-phrases.

predominant in exclamatory sentences. He only discusses the use of the Konjunktiv II in connection with the V1-type of exclamatory sentence. Here he observes that V1-exclamatory sentences resemble V1-optative sentence:

(410)   Hätte die bloß viel Geld!

(411)   Hätte die (vielleicht) viel Geld!

(d'Avis 2013: 180)

Regarding (410) and (411), the only element that distinguishes optative and exclamatory sentence is the kind of modal particle that is used. The same effect can be noticed referring to interjections:

(412)   Ach, hätte die viel Geld!

(413)   Boah, hätte die viel Geld!

The lack of accessibility considering the imperative sentence is likely due to the circumstance that the expression of astonishment or unexpectedness is only conveyable in sentences that have a full-fledged inflectional paradigm. To express astonishment through language a speaker is dependent on verbal means that can express a *speaking about*-relation.

Apart from verbal mood, tense is a bit more complicated in exclamatory sentences than in the non-exclamatory version.

(414) ??Dass DER schnell gelaufen war!	**Plusquamperfekt**
(415) ??War DER schnell gelaufen!	
(416) ??DER war schnell gelaufen!	
(417) ??Dass DER schnell gelaufen sein wird!	**Futur II**
(418) ??Wird DER schnell gelaufen sein!	
(419) ??DER wird schnell gelaufen sein!	

Perfekt and *Präteritum* are better, but *Futur I* does not read well:

(420) ??Dass DER schnell gelaufen war!	**Plusquamperfekt**
(421) Ist DER schnell gelaufen!	**Präsens**
(422) DER ist schnell gelaufen!	
(423) Dass DER schnell gelaufen ist!	
(424) Lief DER schnell!	**Präteritum**
(425) DER lief schnell!	
(426) Dass DER schnell lief!	
(427) ??Wird DER schnell laufen!	**Futur I**
(428) ??DER wird schnell laufen!	
(429) ??Dass DER schnell laufen wird!	

The prototypical tense used in an exclamatory sentence is the *Präsens*. This does not mean that other tenses are automatically odd, yet *Plusquamperfekt* and *Futur II* need a specific context to produce a well-formed reading:

> „Für das Futur II könnten wir uns Folgendes überlegen: Ein Vater ist über die Fortschritte seiner Tochter im Geigenspiel nicht so informiert. Er weiß zwar, dass sie Unterricht nimmt, aber nicht, dass sie schon soweit ist, ihr erstes öffentliches Konzert zu geben, das an diesem Nachmittag stattfinden soll. Der Vater erfährt das nun am Morgen und da er seine Tochter erst am Abend wiedersehen wird, äußert er (14).
>
> (14) Dass du heute ABEND schon das erste Mal gespielt haben wirst!"[100]   (d'Avis 2013: 177)

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[100] For the Futur II we could think about the following: A father is not well-informed about his daughter's progress when it comes to playing the violine. He knows that she takes lessons, but he does not know that she has become so good that she can play a public concert that is scheduled for the afternoon. Her father learns this in the morning and since he is going to see his daughter in the evening he says:

An explicit reason for the possibility of using Konjunktiv II in V1-exclamatories, but not in other exclamatory sentences, and the restricted use of tenses like *Futur II* and *Plusquampefekt* could not be found in d'Avis' work. I assume that exclamatory sentences are best used with indicative and *Präsens*, because those are the closest to the *Ereigniszeit* (Reichenbach 1947). Astonishment not only refers to astonishment in reference to the situation that is being spoken about, but often goes along with astonishment in the specific moment of the *Sprechzeit*. The same can be observed with narrative V1-declaratives: Sure, they are not wrong when a speaker utters a tense or verbal mood that deviates from indicative or *Präsens*. But they do not appear to be as natural. Those listed sentences are very expressive in nature and often reflect a vivid picture of the described moment that is strongly bound to illustration of how the speaker perceives the here and now.

3.8 No Silent Operators and (Non-)Assertivity

After discussing all the relevant objects, the following hypotheses serve as a resumption of the results that could be extracted from the ongoing argumentation:

    vii.   Sentence moods are not built on silent operators, but are composed through overt features.

    viii.   Non-assertiveness is evoked through a missing [-wh]-phrase in the prefinite position.

ad vii: The former discussion has shown that the specific character of a sentence mood can be derived from the parts of a sentence and the way in which they are combined. Covert operators are not necessary in any of the sections that define a sentence mood, because the preceding hypotheses about every single sentence mood could be described as evident. The overt compositional material that could be found can be viewed in the table below:

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(14) Dass du heute ABEND schon das erste Mal gespielt haben wirst!

V1	Categorial Filling	Verbal Morphology	Discourse Sequencing	Progredient Intonation
Declarative	Fully Finite event verb	Indicative Konjunktiv II	V1-declaratives and at least one V2-declarative (position dependent on functional type of the declarative sentence)	Falling
Interrogative	Fully finite verb	Indicative (Konjunktiv II)	Answer that reduces the bi-partitioned answering room	Rising
Imperative	Semi-finite verb	Imperative		Falling
Optative	1) Fully finite verb 2) Modal particle or optative accent	Konjunktiv II		Falling
Conditional adverbial	Fully finite verb	Preferably Konjunktiv II Indicative	Protasis + Apodosis	Variable

Ad viii: It has become apparent that, among the canonical sentence moods and their sentence types, the V2-declarative sentence with a prefinite [-wh]-phrase is the prototypical host for assertion. All the other sentence moods and even the V1-declarative are not apt to carry or focus assertion which will further be shown in the upcoming chapter. The central issue with the V2-declarative is that it is the only sentence that possesses a [-wh]-phrase in front of the fully finite verb. This leads to the assumption that assertion is linked to the prefield of a main clause.

3.9 Interim Conclusion

This chapter showed in detail in how far the categories discussed in chapter 2 apply to the different sentence moods, their sentence types and special realisations like the conditional sentence. After the overview, it can be said that all features contribute to viewing the phenomenon of sentence mood as a complex sign and therefore support the compositional approach to the same. Some salient results will be repeated here: What crystallised out referring to V1-sentences in this chapter is that V1-sentences are sensitive to groups of verbs that enhance *textuelle Verkettung*, expressiveness and display chains of events. In accordance with that, tenses that are closer to the *Ereigniszeit* appear to be more adequate in V1-constructions as well which makes sense as it supports the expressive and event-oriented reading. This applies particularly to V1-declaratives – which were proven to be genuine V1-sentences – which will turn out to be informative objects and therefore non-inquisitive and non-assertive. Concerning the orientation towards events, the imperative sentence provides arguments, too, because individual-state predicates do not work well in imperative sentence. Regarding V1-interrogative, a close relationship to V1-conditionals has been pondered, not only due to their similar syntax, but also because their semantic relation of V1-interrogative question/V2-declarative answer and protasis/apodosis showed semantic parallels which were reinforced through the intonation in the conditional sentence. It will be interesting to see what the denotations of V1-sentences look like in connection with the previous findings – it will be particularly interesting to see, how the discussed features interact with the overall discourse environment and how this helps to distinguish sentence moods further.

The most important finding in this chapter is, however, that the overt components of a sentence and its surrounding discourse are sufficient indicators concerning the identification of a sentence mood.

4 Assertion

The following chapter will deal with the concept of assertion. It will first be discussed what kinds of sentences attract assertion. After that, the (grammatical) reasons for this will be elaborated. A compositional theory about the generation of assertion can be established through looking at the components of sentence mood. After the illustration of what overt grammatical elements do in a sentence, the pragmatic topics of commitment and bias, and at-issueness and the QUD have to be included to find distinctions between the thin line of grammar, context and illocution. This will be particularly interesting concerning *rising declaratives*.

Starting off, I will shortly touch upon the problem of literal and contextual meaning.

4.1 What is Assertion?

A problem that arises in the definition of assertion can be seen in the example (432 a-c):

(432)   "The vote was anonymous."

          H has at least four distinct options:

    a.   S thinks e has the meaning 'It was a secret ballot' in English,

          S was speaking literally, and this is what he was saying (literal

          meaning).

    b.   S was speaking sarcastically, not literally, and was nonliterally

          stating that it was a public vote (nonliteral meaning).

    c.   c. S (mistakenly) thinks "anonymous" means 'unanimous,' and, if

          speaking literally, was saying that everyone voted for it (false linguistic

          belief).

d.   S meant to utter "unanimous" and to say that everyone voted for

it (slip of the tongue).

(Bach and Harnish 1979: 23)

The example above instantiates the problem that a sentence can be ambiguous in having different meanings dependent on a certain context. So, the same proposition of a sentence can have a different interpretations in different contexts.

One question that comes up when tackling the matter of sentence meaning and contexts is whether every sentence indispensably needs a specific context to have a meaning and thus be decodable for a hearer. At this point, Frege's principle of compositionality suggests that the meaning of a sentence can be deduced from the meaning of its parts and the way in which they are combined:

(433)   Die Bedeutung eines komplexen Ausdrucks leitet sich aus der Bedeutung seiner Teile und der Art ihrer Zusammensetzung ab.[101]

The lexical meaning of the words and their combination via syntax are the sole elements that put together the meaning of a sentence. John Searle (1980) disagreed with this approach to meaning. He said that Frege's idea that sentences can appear in a neutral or "null context" (Searle 1980: 223) is not possible. The meaning in a null context is understood to be the literal meaning of a sentence.

Taking into account that the meaning of a sentence can be derived compositionally in case it is well-formed, the context does not necessarily play an important role for each and every single meaning a sentence can have, unless one assumes that every situation in which a sentence is uttered is a specific and non-neutral context. If one considers every sentence only interpretable in a certain context, one has to be able to explain why a word or a sentence can have a neutral and literal meaning which may change when they are uttered under different contextual conditions. Following Frege's words, a sentence can have a literal meaning that is

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[101] The meaning of a complex expression is deducible from the meaning of its single elements and the way they are combined with each other.

valid in a neutral context (cf. Searle 1980: 223). This becomes even clearer when talking about learning a language. Assume that a speaker, no matter of which age, learns German and comes across the following sentence:

(434)   Ich habe Hunger.

This person than is taught what the words on their own mean and that they put together to signal to a potential hearer one's current state of hunger. Thus, literal sentence meaning needs no context to be understood. An assertion therefore does not need a specific context to be understood as such. This, however, does not mean that a context cannot influence a speaker's intention as shown in (432).

This does not answer the question what an assertion is: Bach and Harnish go along with Austin's (1976: 2) and Searle's (cf. 1975: 359) explanation that assertions are constatives[102]. Constatives are sentences whose purpose is of a descriptive nature.

(435)   *Compatibility Condition* (CC):

      i. If S is saying that *I-(... p ...)*, S is expressing the belief that *p;*

      ii. If S is saying that *!(... p ...)*, S is expressing the desire that H make it

      the case that *p;* and

      iii. If S is saying that *?(... p ...)*, S is expressing the desire that H tell S

      whether or not *p.*

      *(*Bach/Harnish 1979: 34)

(436)   In uttering e, S asserts that P if S expresses:

      a. the belief that P, and

      b. the intention that H believes that P.

      (Bach/Harnish 1979: 42)

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[102] I will deal with the question why assertions are not performatives in section 4.8.

The component of belief is clearly included and is the core aspect of their theory, in that they integrate the speaker's belief and they simultaneously say that the hearer also has to believe what the speaker says and presents as their belief. The aspect of stating that someone believes something is also found in Frege's explications about the *Behauptungssatz* – a V2-declarative if we compare it to the contemporary technical linguistic term. Frege, in contrast to Bach/Harnish, additionally includes judgment in his theory. With those words in mind, we will now take the next step towards characterising the notion *assertion* more precisely.

4.2 Sentence Mood and Assertion

Among others, Frege talks about the first notion that we can get of assertion in his "Begriffsschrift" and in his paper "Über Sinn und Bedeutung". He introduces the notion of judgment and claims that the same is an essential core of what he calls a *Behauptungssatz* (Frege 1892: 29), as already said in his case equivalent to a V2-declarative sentence. He says that a declarative sentence, is to be divided into two parts: "Sinn" or sense, "Gedanke" or thought, and "Bedeutung" or meaning respectively (Frege 1892: 29).

A *Gedanke* or proposition is the semantic content that a sentence contains which can be true or false. Therefore, a proposition can adopt a truth value – but how? As it seems, the state of a sentence before a sentence is categorised as true or false must be that it is neither of the two; thus, is be undecided (Farkas 2010; Tsiknakis 2016/2017) . Before deciding on whether a proposition is true or false, a speaker finds himself in the dilemma of prejudgment. This dilemma can, following Lohnstein (2000), be described via the notion of a bi-partition in technical terms. The next step for a speaker to take would be to reduce this bi-partition[103] in order to be left with the true propositions. As long as a thought has not been judged, the bi-partition cannot be reduced and no assertion actually arises, or in other words, it is undecided whether the sentence is true or false and which thought is chosen to be expressed by the speaker. This is the case with V1-interrogative sentences, e. g., where the speaker does not commit himself to the truth of a sentence, but rather requests the addressee – to do this job for him.

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[103] The theory including that illustrates partitions as meaning of certain sentence moods will be introduced more thoroughly in the chapter that deals with sentence moods.

Yet, the question is how one can refer all this rather technical language to what was explained about Frege and his theory beforehand, and what is actually going on when he talks about judgement, and what leads to judgement. This can be sketched like below:

(439) **Declarative Sentence**

  i.   <u>Thinking</u> – grasping a thought

    ➔ selecting the proposition

  ii.   <u>Judgement</u> – accepting that the thought is true

    ➔ Assigning a truth value to the proposition

  iii.   <u>Assertion</u> – proclaiming the judgement

    ➔ establishing the judgement of the proposition w.r.t. the context

(cf. Lohnstein 2000: 73-74; following Frege 1892)

Following this, in terms of Frege to think is to select or grasp and shape a thought without having any further opinion about it, at first. To judge, however, is to take one more step and decide whether the thought or the propositional content of the thought is true or false and to proclaim it. Only if this decision which is equal to the reduction of propositional partitions[104] takes place, the speaker can assert something. Assertion then means to communicate what has been judged. Frege does not explicitly and necessarily include an addressee in his theory. But based on the circumstance that he assumes that assertion can only happen if the judged proposition is proclaimed, one can deduce that there is some other interactive goal to communicate the judgment to, even if one thinks about concepts like soliloquy. So, the proclamation of the judgment is needed to include an extra-individual community into the process of assertion: "This act of judging is an individual epistemic act. It becomes a social act together with its commitments of truth by its proclamation." (Lohnstein/Staratschek 2020: 13).

Belief and judgment are not the only things that constitute assertion. Several researchers have stated that the act of judging and pronouncing that judgment simultaneously go along with commitment (Gunlogson 2003, 2008, 2011; Farkas/Bruce 2010, Stalnaker 2002, Antomo

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[104] More about reduction will be said later.

2015 etc.). Assertion, therefore, also has to do with the speaker's committing to what they believe and judge to be true, as it seems. Furthermore, the question arises in which situations of a discourse a speaker actually asserts something; a matter that drives one to look at the topic of what is at-issue in a discourse and what a speaker commits to. Those two points, commitment and at-issueness, will be looked at in the upcoming sections.

4.3 Commitment, Bias, Sources, Openness

Gunlogson (cf. 2008: 7) bases her notion about commitment on the discourse commitment slate Hamblin (1971) originally coined. This commitment slate includes "[…] a set of propositions representing the positions taken by an agent (i.e., participant) in the discourse." and can also be represented as a speaker's commitment list (Gunlogson 2008: 8). She expands the commitment slate by adding a possible world semantics to it which means that a "[…] proposition is construed as a set of worlds, those worlds in which it is true" (cf. Gunlogson 2008: 8). This can formalised as:

(440) $Cs_{\alpha,d}$ = { w ∈ W:[3] all discourse commitments of agent α in discourse d are true in w }
        (Gunlogson 2008: 8)

When a speaker commits himself to a proposition, he thereby commits himself to the truth of this specific proposition:

(441)   Es regnet in Wuppertal.

This means, as soon as a commitment is added to a speaker's set of commitment, other commitments of his set become eliminated. Those commitments that are eliminated are the ones that correspond to a proposition that is not true in a respective world. In the course of adding and eliminating commitments, the agent always is at a certain point in the discourse where the update of his commitment set takes place. This also counts for the other agents participating in the discourse. Thus:

(442) $C_d = < cs_\alpha, cs_\beta \ldots >$

(Gunlogson 2008: 9)

If one takes one further step now and looks at the examples that are discussed throughout this paper, one can deduce that, as well as truth is treated differently from example to example, assertion is not present in all of the examples, and commitment shows up in diverse manners, too:

(443)   Fritz hat den Hund ge\füttert.

(444)   Hat Fritz den Hund ge\füttert.

(445)   Fritz hat den Hund ge/füttert?

(446)   Hat Fritz den Hund ge/füttert?

(443) is a prototypical V2-declarative sentence with falling final intonation and likewise a prototypical example of containing a reduced set to those propositions which are true in a certain world, simultaneously containing assertion and commitment. In uttering the sentence, the speaker/agent commits himself to truth of the sentence and likewise asserts its truth. (446) is a question which does not include a reduced set of propositions yet and is thus open to being true or false, rather searching for the truth and thus demanding a reduction of a bi-partitioned room of answers (yes or no), hence, no assertion takes place. Neither does the speaker commit to the truth of the sentence, as he rather expects the addressee to commit to the truth in the answer that he provides. This is assumed, because the speaker poses a question in the shape of a V1-interrogative in order to let the addressee know that he (the speaker) does not know the answer to the question himself and demands the addressee to provide him with the missing answer via reducing the bi-partitioned set of propositions. He therefore wants the addressee to commit or not commit to the proposition that is contained in the V1-interrogative.

Those two cases are quite clear then. The problematic candidates are (444) and (445) as they mix up certain features that are standardly found in the canonical cases of (443) and (446). In (444) the problem is the positioning of the finite verb in combination with the verbal mood

and the intonation: The finite verb is located in the left periphery, but the sentence lacks topicalization, which would be present in a prototypical V2-declarative sentence. Sentences that allow for V1-positioning are V1-declaratives, V1-interrogatives, imperative sentences, exclamatory sentences and optative sentences. The interrogative sentence can be ruled out since (444) shows falling intonation at the end of the sentence. In order for (444) to be exclamatory the sentence would have to have an exclamatory accent which is not there. Optative sentences prototypically contain finite verbs carrying the verbal mood of Konjunktiv II and imperative sentence need verbs in the verbal mood of the imperative. This means that the sentence is a V1-declarative. This is problematic in so far that doubts arise with reference to the question whether V1-declaratives are actually assertive. This issue will come up in the course of testing sentences for assertion (cf. section 4.6). Yet for now, I will leave it at the claim that V1-declaratives evoke certain problems considering assertion although they are called *declarative* and therefore actually predestined concerning and associated with carrying assertion.

(445) is problematic respecting the parameters of verb positioning and intonation. Syntactically, the sentence looks like a V2-declarative due to fronting of finiteness and topicalization. However, the intonation does not fall at the end of the sentence, but rather shows the structure of an interrogative sentence in rising towards the end. Those objects are called declarative questions (cf. Gunlogson 2008, 2011 among others). They show the grammar of a V2-declarative but the intonation of an interrogative which is why Gunlogson assigns them the illocution of a question (standardly assigned to interrogatives) and the sentence mood label of the declarative sentence. These are similarly tricky as the V1-declaratives are when looking at assertion, because they actually feature hybrid relations when it comes to speaker intention and commitment. The speaker does somehow but not fully commit herself to the truth of the proposition and she therefore moves in close quarters floating somehow between assertion and question. Although this example will, too, come up later again in the testing of assertion, I want to go deeper into this right now as it shows that committing to the truth of a proposition is not always a black or white business. Furthermore, I will talk about the context sensitivity of rising declarative in the upcoming

lines. In the following passages, the reader will be confronted with certain problematic uses of cases (443)-(445). The first example can be considered below:

Fritz enters the room, sits down next to his colleague and says:

(447) Ist dein Auto ka/putt?

(448) *Dein Auto ist ka/putt?

(449) *Dein Auto ist ka\putt.

(450) *Ist dein Auto ka\putt.

The utterances in (447)-(450) can be described as *out of the blue*-utterances (cf. Gunlogson 2008: 4). This means that those sentences are uttered without any preceding discourse that allows an anaphoric reference to some specific discourse content the speaker can refer to. A preceding discourse which the sentences refer to would make the information contained by the proposition in (447)-(450) old information. However, since the sentences are discourse initial and out of the blue, the speaker cannot refer back to anything verbal recently uttered and therefore introduces something new into the current discourse.

As one can see, the V1-interrogative is a well-formed and contextually acceptable grammatical item and not in any way odd to an addressee. It is perfect for the purpose of opening dialogues. The V1-declarative, the V2-declarative with falling intonation and with rising intonation yet are odd. In the example below, the situation seems to lighten up wrt. the realms of grammar:

Fritz enters the room and sits down next to his colleague Karl. He notices that Karl is looking for a garage. Fritz asks:

(451) Ist dein Auto ka/putt?

(452) Dein Auto ist ka/putt?

(453) Dein Auto ist ka\putt.

(454) *Ist dein Auto ka\putt.

Suddenly, all the examples except for one – the V1-declarative – are fine. This is the case although the sentences are uttered out of the blue. The essential difference here is that one significant piece of contextual evidence has been added to the discourse situation: Fritz sees that his colleague is looking for garages which builds a logical basis concerning his assumption that his colleague's car might be broken. This does not mean that the car actually has to be broken or necessarily is, but the conclusion Fritz draws from the contextual evidence not only legitimises the propositional content of (451)-(453) but also seems to allow for certain sentence moods. However, still it evidently blocks the V1-ds. The question is why, since all the other examples seem to function here. I would like to try to expand the range of reactions in terms of sentence moods even more down below:

Fritz enters the room and sits down next to his colleague Karl. He notices that Karl is looking for a garage. Fritz asks:

(455)   Ist dein Auto kaputt?

(456)   Dein Auto ist kaputt?

(457)   Dein Auto ist kaputt.

(458)   Was ist los mit deinem Auto?

(459)   Wäre dein Auto doch nicht kaputt!

(460)   Lass' dein Auto reparieren (, denn es ist kaputt)!

(461)   Ist dein AUto kaputt!/?! / Dein AUto ist kaputt!/?!

(462)   *Ist dein Auto kaputt.

Apparently, all the sentence moods work on the grounds on present contextual evidence – apart, however, from the V1-declarative which seems to be an orphan among his fellow sentence moods. This is particularly interesting when comparing the V1-declarative to the V1-exclamatory sentence which actually does not differ by that much from his let us call it "sibling", since the V1-declarative provides the basis to the V1-exclamatory in case the intonation falls at the end of the sentence. The only difference between the two is the exclamatory accent. It does not seem to be the case that the illocution is fixed concerning out-of-the-blue utterances and commitment, because intentions like assertions, questions,

commands, expressions of surprise and even wishes can be appropriate here. My speculation is that the V1-declarative does not fulfil either one of his major functions in this situation. Another area that might open doors for the V1-declarative is the area of bias: When a speaker is biased, she is already at least leaning towards a direction of truth, which can be detected in her use of language as well. So, sticking to our example, compare the options given below:

Fritz enters the room and sits down next to his colleague Karl. He notices that Karl is looking for a garage. Fritz asks:

(463)   Ist dein Auto ka/putt?

(464)   Dein Auto ist ka/putt?

(465)   Dein Auto ist ka\putt.

(466)   *Ist dein Auto ka\putt.

(463) being a V1-interrogative signifies openness and contrasts the V2-declarative in (464). The V2-declarative is a reduction of propositional alternatives to one true proposition through which a speaker does not signal openness, whereas the interrogative leaves the answering room open for the addressee to reduce it. With reference to Farkas/Bruce (2010), Tsiknakis (2017, 2016) described categorises openness and non-openness in terms of *Entschiedenenheit* (decidedness) and *Unentschiedenheit* (undecidedness). He states that the positioning of a [+wh]-phase in the left periphery of a sentence tells the addressee that the proposition is undecided, whereas a [-wh]-phrase signifies decidedness. If no XP is moved to the prefield, in the case of the V1-interrogative the proposition is undecided or open as well. Topicalization in the case of a V2-declarative with falling intonation signals that the proposition is decided. What is not included in this mix, is the factor of intonation, because: Concerning declarative and interrogative mood, the rising declarative is an object that is neither the one nor the other, but shows definite bias. Bias requires a non-neutral speaker (cf. Gunlogson 2008: 3). This speaker's bias manifests in that the speaker does not use an interrogative to pose a question – which would be the prototype of questioning – but uses a declarative sentence mood and casts an intonation on it typically used in interrogatives. The

sentence mood here hints at the speaker already having a certain tendency towards the truth of the proposition contained in the rising declarative like in (464). The pragmatic advantage yet is that the speaker does not have to make a full-fledged commitment to the proposition at hand. Again, the V1-declarative cannot be used as a candidate expressing bias here, which again leads me to presume a different handling of assertion in comparison to its V2-counterpart. Gunlogson talks about far more concerning the topic of bias than can be covered here, including situations like *if-not-if-so*-sequences, asking for advice, speculative and polite questions (cf. Gunlogson 2001: 3 ff). These special cases are interesting, but they go beyond the scope of this dissertation and the gist of the story can be covered with what has been provided so far.

What is necessary and intriguing to look at, also in connection with commitment and bias, when it comes to assertion is the topic of the common ground and the corresponding concept of the *table* by Farkas/Bruce (2010), at-issueness, as well as the associated distinction between assertion, presupposition and implication. This is interesting because bias, for example, does not directly address an assertion and rather seems to be closer to implications. Assertions add new propositions to the common ground, whereas the propositions already contained in the common ground are presuppositions that do not have to be discussed or put on the table for discussion anymore since the participants of the discourse at hand have already mutually agreed on the acceptability on them. Bias tries to push a proposition towards being accepted in the common ground but eliminates the speaker's responsibility for pushing it.

4.4 Common Ground, At-Issueness, *Table*

The common ground is the knowledge that is shared by discourse participants and of which the discourse participants know that it is shared among them (cf. Krifka; Musan 2012: 1).

Or to say it with Stalnaker's words: "[…] the common ground of a conversation is just what is common belief among the participants in a conversation." (Stalnaker 2002: 706)[105] Further above it was also said that Stalnaker views the common ground as all the shared presuppositions of the participants of a discourse. This is a compact, well-arranged but

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[105] Though he chooses to draw a thin line between common ground and common knowledge. This will not be an issue in this chapter.

rather general definition of the common ground which is in itself true, but has to be explained more thoroughly.

First of all, one should consider what a discourse situation actually is. It is an interaction based on communication between individuals that has a dynamic structure. This dynamic character results from the circumstance that the participation in the discourse consists of acts of communication and thus is accommodated with every communicative act, of which assertions are the most relevant considering the purposes of this chapter.[106]

This knowledge or information can be characterized as a set of propositions which are structured and arranged regarding certain background questions[107] called *Question under Discussion* or *QUD* (Klein/Stutterheim 1989, Gutzmann 2010, Simons et al. 2011). This set of propositions is accepted by speaker and addressee as true and the fact that both accept the said propositions to be true is known to speaker and addressee, as well the contextual order and reference in which the propositions occur (cf. Jacobs 2001: 651). The common ground consists of information which the discourse participants have agreed on: Therefore, this information must be old, as everyone has agreed on including it in the common ground and the commitment slate. Concerning the new information introduced to the discourse, the discourse participants have to decide whether they include it in the common ground. This happens via verbal or non-verbal acceptance or denial of an utterance by the discourse participants.

Furthermore, it is important whether the discourse content is at issue: Content that is at-issue can be described as referring to the main-point of the utterance and answering the Question under Discussion:

> "Diagnosing at-issueness. Content which is at-issue is frequently described as the "mainpoint" of an utterance […]. This notion has been formalized in Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver & Roberts 2010 as relevance to the current Question Under Discussion […]. At issueness has also been described formally as a proposed update to the common ground. […]" (Snider 2017: 2)

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[106] Though one might also include non-verbal acts as well which is incredibly interesting but would go beyond the scope of what this dissertation could manage to discuss.

[107] If one chooses a question-based approach here, which I do.

Snider (2017) uses the revised definition which contains speaker intention and a condition under which the uttered proposition is at-issue. Furthermore, an addressee is included in his revision:

> "The definition is as follows, where ?p denotes the question whether or not p:
>
> (2) Revised definition of at-issueness […]
>
> a. A proposition p is at-issue iff the speaker intends to address the QUD via ?p.
>
> b. An intention to address the QUD via ?p is felicitous only if:
>
> i. ?p is relevant to the QUD, and
>
> ii. the speaker can reasonably expect the addressee to recognize this intention. Using this definition of at-issueness, Tonhauser 2012 lists three features of at-issue content and then lays out six diagnostics for identifying the at-issue status of a sentence implication.
>
> (3) Features of at-issue content: […]
>
> I. At-issue content can be directly assented or dissented with
>
> II. At-issue content addresses the question under discussion (QUD)
>
> III. At-issue content determines the relevant set of alternatives"
>
> (Snider 2017: 2)

Farkas/Bruce (2010) model a discourse situation including the common ground and at-issue content in the shape of a *table*: A discourse context includes discourse participants (speakers and addressees), a speech situation, the time of the discourse, a certain content that is shared in this context and transmitted via a language that all the discourse participants can understand use properly themselves (in order to guarantee a functioning conversation) and the already mentioned table. The table is an abstract platform that is used to collect discourse relevant propositions and decide whether they are accepted or not. All of that can be formalised as follows:

(466) a. Discourse context: ⟨Sp, Addr, table, tc, sc, . . . ⟩

 b. sc = Sp says p to the Addr at time tc in situation sc putting p onto the table.
 (Lohnstein 2020: 14)

The table is a device that keeps track of the said content which the participants can lay on it in the form "of syntactic objects paired with their dentations"[108] (Farkas/Bruce 2010: 86) which refers to the *Question Under Discussion* and therefore at-issue content[109], called S (cf. Farkas/Bruce 2010: 9). It is a place where at least two discourse participants discuss whether an object enters the common ground or not. The discourse participants[110] – called Speaker A and Speaker B by Farkas/Bruce (Farkas/Bruce 2010: 9) – draw from their individual list or stack of propositions that they believe to be true, which are named DC_A and DC_B (Speaker A's and Speaker B's discourse commitments respectively), and want the addressee to accept as true likewise. In case S is accepted by all the discourse participants, it joins the common ground cg which would empty the table and symbolise the ideal outcome of a discourse. The projected set ps describes possible outcomes of the discourse that come into consideration once S is placed on the table, which assumes what the future common ground might look like. The ps thus covers the ways that make it possible to reach the empty state of the table whereas the most canonical way is the acceptance of S into the cg and a different way would be to agree to disagree on S, for instance, or leaving the QUD unresolved (cf. Farkas/Bruce 2010: 106):

(467)

A	Table	B
DC_A	S	DC_B
Common Ground cg	**Projected Set ps**	

(Farkas/Bruce 2010: 89)

The QUD is the main question that builds the background to a specific discourse context. The background of a discourse context can be described as a question, because

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[108] Other kinds of communicative instruments like gestures and facial expressions will not be considered here.

[109] Which will be explained more thoroughly later.

110 Well, yes, there can also be a soliloquy.

"Fragen etablieren ein unmittelbares Diskursziel, nämlich ihre Klärung, während Assertionen darauf abzielen, dieses Ziel zu erfüllen."[111]

(Antomo 2015: 10).

Beside Antomo, other linguists, like Klein/von Stutterheim (1992), Roberts (1996), Roberts et al. (2009), Simons et al. (2011), von Stutterheim (1989) und von Stutterheim/Klein (1989), have argued that assertions uttered in a discourse are actually uttered to answer a question that forms the background if this discourse. This (explicit or implicit) question is called *QUD* by Roberts (1996) and Simons et al. (2011), and *Quaestio* by von Stutterheim (1989), and every assertion of a discourse I evaluated against the background of the QUD or Quaestio respectively and therefore aims at answering it (Antomo 2015: 10). This can also be taken to correspond back to Frege, as his preceding step to an assertion is the grasping of a thought and thus the shaping of a question in the form of an interrogative sentence. The QUD is a question that demands an answer in the form of an assertion as well which is why assertions are deducible or at least oriented towards this question.

The QUD may change throughout the discourse, depending on whether it is resolved or exchanged for another question due to different reasons (for example because the discourse participants could not agree on an answer that each one accepted). At any rate, the current QUD determines the discourse structure as the discourse participants ideally behave in accordance with the QUD in order to answer and thus resolve it, which categorises a content irrelevant to the QUD or already included in the common ground and thus known to the discourse participants as not appropriate and therefore odd. However, not only the content itself may be off in a particular discourse situation, but the way in which a participant's contribution is uttered can be inadequate, too. (cf. Antomo 2015: 10-11)

The inadequacy of certain reactions by a participant leads to the assumption that assertions are restricted to certain contexts and likewise to a specific QUD. A question, prototypically represented via interrogative sentence mood, intends to reduce the present alternatives (cf. i. a. Lohnstein 2000) possible with respect to answering the question to those that serve as appropriate answers:

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111 Meaning: Questions establish a direct discourse aim, namely to settle them, whereas assertions are targeted in fulfilling this aim.

(468) Q: Wer ist glatzköpfig?

       *Q′:   Ist Peter glatzköpfig?

       *Q′′: Wie ist das Wetter?

(cf. also Antomo 2015: 12)

The example above is problematic, because it shows a dialogue that is not cooperative. This first and foremost refers to the Maxim of Relation. An utterance which does not answer the QUD directly violates this Maxim and does not reduce the bi-partitioned room of alternatives to the relevant content needed to answer the question properly, which states that not any kind of assertion can be used to satisfy the need of the QUD. Answers which exclude all but one possible answer are called exhaustive Roberts (1996):

(469) Q: Wer ist glatzköpfig?

       Q: Peter ist glatzköpfig und niemand anders.

       Q′:   Peter. (+> niemand anders)

             (cf. also Antomo 2015: 12)

Every assertion thus embodies selectional restrictions considering the present context, as it reacts to what is already known and thus presupposed in the common ground and what is not (cf. Antomo 2015: 14; Onea 2011). This does not mean that an assertion cannot be uttered in more than one context; it rather says that there are contexts in which certain assertions are inappropriate or odd, as shown in (469) above (cf. Antomo 2015: 14). Furthermore, utterances in a discourse may not primarily fulfil the function of answering the QUD, but rather serve to comment on or evaluate something without satisfying the clarification (which is therefore no at-issue content) of the QUD which points at the issue that a discourse has a primary and secondary structure, which is, however, of no further relevance to this chapter (Antomo 2015: 15-16). It is yet important to mention this, because only assertions reacting to the QUD directly are at-issue, and only those are relevant to the explications of this chapter:

(470)   Relevance to the QUD

      a.   An assertion is relevant to a QUD iff_ it contextually entails a partial or complete answer to the QUD.

      b.   A question is relevant to a QUD iff_ it has an answer which contextually entails a partial or complete answer to the QUD.

      (Antomo 2015: 15-16; cf. Simons et al. 2011: 8)

Coming back to Farkas' and Bruce's concept of the table and of emptying the table, S is at-issue when it is placed on the table, therefore being evaluated against the background of QUD.

Now, assume that the discourse participants start out with an empty table. Propositional objects may be placed on the table to open the decision about whether they may go into the common ground or not.

Now, imagine a discourse situation – Speaker A utters the following sentence:

(472)   Hans hat den Hund gefüttert.

In uttering this sentence to Addressee B, Speaker A places the proposition on the table and therefore also expresses and commits to his believe that he considers this proposition to be true.

(473)

A	Table	B
p	p: Hans den Hund gefüttert hat	DC_B
Common Ground cg		**Projected Set ps:** $s \cup \{p\} \vee s \cup \{\neg p\}$

This way, he also postulates that the addressee accepts that the proposition is true, too, and thereby allows it to be included in the common ground through which the table would be empty and would have reached its ideal state. Accepting the asserted propositional content without any rejection equals the act of confirmation (cf. Farkas/Bruce 2010: 92). For Stalnaker, adding p to the common ground means context change as the common ground has to be accommodated and updated because of the growth of the set of propositions contained in the common ground by one more true proposition (2008: 708 ff, 1999: 84 ff). Furthermore, the asserted proposition is, following Gunlogson (cf. 2001), added to each participant's discourse commitment list (cf. Farkas/Bruce 2010: 93).

However, there are other ways, less canonical one, to deal with the object on the table: The addressee may reject the assertion and both participants can agree to disagree on a propositional content, so that the table would be emptied, too, but the proposition is not included in the common ground and therefore is not integrated in the individual commitment lists, either.

(474)

A	Table	B
p	p: Hans den Hund gefüttert hat	¬p
Common Ground cg	**Projected Set ps**	

(cf. Farkas/Bruce 2010: 102)

Placing a question on the table looks different from uttering an assertion:

(479)   Hat Hans den Hund gefüttert?

A table filled with a canonical question like (479) would look like this:

A	Table	B
	p: Hans den Hund gefüttert	DC_B

	hat	
	¬p: Hans den Hund nicht gefüttert hat	
Common Ground cg		**Projected Set ps:** s ∪ {p} ∨ s ∪ {¬p}

(cf. Lohnstein 2020: 21)

In contrast to standard assertions concerning which confirmation is the canonical way for the addressee to react, the speaker keeps the decision whether p or ¬p hold open. He rather signals that he himself is committed to neither and wants the addressee to tell him which one holds for the questioned content on the table.

A	Table	B
$\exists x[p(x)]$	p1: Hans den Hund gefüttert hat	DC_B
	p2: Maria den Hund gefüttert hat	
	p3: John den Hund gefüttert hat	
	p4: Mary den Hund gefüttert hat	
Common Ground cg	**Projected Set ps:** s ∪ {p1} ∨ s ∪ {p2} ∨ s ∪ {p3} ∨ s ∪ {p4} ∨ s ∪ {p5} ∨ . . .	

The canonical way of dealing with the situation would be for the addressee to decide if p or ¬p is the case, and thus resolving the question via an assertion which could then enrich the common ground. A non-canonical way would be for the addressee to reject the question and leave the issue of p or ¬p unresolved. (cf. Farkas/Bruce 2010: 103 ff)

In case of a wh-question, mostly represented through a V2-interrogative sentence, the situation is similar to the one of the V1-interrogative question, bringing about a difference of partitioning in the answering room (cf. Lohnstein 2020: 21)

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(480)   Wer hat den Hund gefüttert?

In contrast to the V1-interrogative, the wh-interrogative denotes an n-fold partitioned answering room which the addressee is asked to reduce it to one true proposition of the n-fold possibilities available (Lohnstein 2000). The SpecC position is filled with a wh-expression which, opposite to an empty prefield, opens up the answering room, whereas an empty prefield and fronting of the finiteness on its own show a binary partition of the answering room (cf. Lohnstein 2000).

Though one might assume now that the fronting of finiteness without the fronting of an XP to the SpecC position generates a bi-partition and thus the postulation towards the addressee to reduce that bi-partition, the following sentences show a different picture:

(481)   Kommt ein Skelett in eine Bar. Bestellt ein Bier und einen Schwamm.

(482)   Füttere den Hund!

(483)   Fütterte er doch den Hund!

(484)   Füttert Hans den Hund!

(485)   Füttert Hans den Hund, füttere ich ihn nicht.

(486)   Füttert Hans auch den Hund, füttere ich ihn trotzdem.

Each one of these constructions is different from the V1-interrogative that was examined. Neither they demand the speaker to decide on p or ¬p in the shape of an answer, though each one shows only the fronting of the finiteness to the left periphery of the sentence. What these sentences actually do will be illustrated in chapter 5.

Furthermore, constructions containing bias like the rising declaratives behave differently with reference to the common ground, the table and the QUD/at-issueness as well. As rising declaratives look like declaratives but fulfil the pragmatic function of a question, their hybrid behaviour makes one riddle whether they can saturate the QUD and whether they can be at issue. To do this, the bias would have to be hierarchically higher ranked than their questioning nature:

(487) Was ist mit deinem Auto?

(488) *Dein Auto ist kaputt?

(489) *Ist dein Auto kaputt.

So, this does not really work. The bias, however, might have the power to push the proposition inside the common ground and into the commitment list of all discourse participants, since the question is a shallow disguise for an originally (grammatically) assertive object. Thus, although it does not serve to answer the QUD overtly, the proposition might nevertheless be decided to be true.

(490) Was ist mit deinem Auto?

(491) *Ist dein Auto kaputt.

If this assumption holds, the V1-declarative cannot demonstrate commitment or bias, either, since bias means that one leans towards the opinion that a respective proposition is true, but does not clearly pronounce it like that. Commitment, too, would mean that the speaker asserts the truth and thereby commits to it which the V1-declarative has not served to achieve up to now. As it was mentioned beforehand, state that the standard assertion is conveyed through a V2-declarative sentence with falling intonation. When it comes to testing this sentence for assertion, one is yet confronted with certain problems. This also has to do with the presumed circumstance that both, rising declaratives and V1-declaratives cannot be at-issue. Particularly concerning rising declaratives, the question is whether the declarative mood has any assertive features here at all or whether the proposition is brought into the discourse as a presupposition or implicature. In order to get a better grasp of this in the chapter about V1-constructions and their counterparts,

4.5 Tests for Assertion

In this section it will be asked whether V1-declarative sentences are assertive to the same degree as V2-declaratives or whether they are assertive at all. I will consider: question-answer-pairs, verum-focus constructions and sentences containing assertive modal particles. The following data will be used in the upcoming analyses:

Comparison of V1- and V2-declaratives wrt.:

i. Question-Answer-Pairs

(492) A: Hat Fritz den Hund gefüttert?

        B: *Ja, hat Fritz den Hund gefüttert.

        B: *Ja, Fritz hat den Hund gefüttert?

        B: Ja, Fritz hat den Hund gefüttert.

ii. Verum-Focus

(493) A: Erna hat ihren Ranzen noch nicht gepackt.

        B: *Doch, HAT Erna ihren Ranzen gepackt.

        B: *Doch, Erna HAT den Ranzen gepackt?

        B: Doch, Erna HAT ihren Ranzen gepackt.

iii. Assertive Modal Particles

(494) a. ?Kommt ja ein Mann in die Bar.

        b. *Ein Mann kommt ja in die Bar?

        c. Ein Mann kommt ja in die Bar.

4.5.1 Questions and Answers

V1-declaratives as well as rising declaratives cannot serve to be answers to questions, especially not y-/n-questions cf. Altmann 1993: 13; Önnerfors 1997; Reis 2000):

> "V1-DS präsentieren die ausgedrückte Proposition als ein Ereignis, V2-DS dagegen als eine Tatsache[…] Illokutiv führt das dazu, daß mit V1-DS wahre Propositionen ausgesagt werden, während mit V2-DS ausgesagt wird, daß sie wahr sind. […] Im mit V1-DS realisierten Subtyp ist der konstitutive Wahrheitsanspruch für die ausgedrückte Proposition 'im Hintergrund', im V2-DS 'im Vordergrund', so daß

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nur mit Deklarativen in V2-Form die Wahrheit des DS buchstäblich ‚assertiert'
werden kann."[112] (Reis 2000: 224)

(495) A: Hast du heute schon gegessen?

    B: *Habe ich heute schon gegessen.

    B: *Ich habe heute schon gegessen?

    B: Ich habe heute schon gegessen.

The same grammatical incompatibility can be observed in correspondence to wh-questions
and V1-declaratives and rising declaratives as answers:

(496) A: Was ist passiert?

    B: ***Hat** mich einer an der Kasse geschubst.

    B: *Mich hat einer an der Kasse geschubst?

    B: Mich hat einer an der Kasse geschubst.

One may deduce that V2-declaratives are apt when it comes to answering questions whereas
V1-declaratives and rising declaratives are not. Talking about answers to questions, it is
important to distinguish them from topic drop constructions. (cf. Fries 1988: 22)

(497) A: Was ist mit Sofia?

    B: **Hat** mich gestern geohrfeigt.

In (497), there might be a chance to confuse the answer with a V1-sentence, though it is a V2-
declarative containing topic drop. The element that has been dropped is silent, but leaves a
trace behind that is recoverable:

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[112] V1-DS present the expressed proposition as an event, but V2-DS present it as a fact […]. On an
illocutionary level this leads to the circumstance that true propositions are expressed via V1-DS,
whereas V2-DS state that those propositions are true. [..] In the subtype expressed through a V1-DS,
the constitutive claim that a proposition is true is 'in the background'; in the V2-DS it is in 'the
foreground' so that only V2-declaratives can literally 'assert' the truth.

(498) A: Was ist mit Sofia?

       B: [Sofia/Die/Sie] **Hat** mich gestern geohrfeigt.

The next section will show that a behaviour of V1-declaratives similar to the one encountered here can be observed for sentences containing verum-focus.

4.5.2 Verum-Focus

Verum-focus serves to end discussions about an expressed proposition via minimising "all opinions different from the speaker's one about the election by verum focusing a strong tendency on the addressee not to behave otherwise than believing the proposition expressed" (Lohnstein 2016: 14–15) and communicates to the hearer that the proposition under discussion has already been put on the table at least or even included in the common ground (Lohnstein 2016; Gutzmann 2010; Farkas & Bruce 2010; Romero & Han 2004):

(499) A: Die Wahlen wurden korrekt durchgeführt.

       B: Stimmt überhaupt nicht.

       A: Doch, die Wahlen **WURden** korrekt durchgeführt.

(Lohnstein 2016: 14)

Speaker A claims that the elections were processed in a correct and rightful way. Speaker B contradicts and challenges this statement and therefore first rejects the inclusion of A's proclaimed true proposition into the common ground. A, again, insists on the truth of his utterance and simultaneously forces the inclusion of the same as true into the common ground through using verum-focus.[113] In both cases A chooses V2-declaratives which does not provoke any grammatical problems. In (500) the reader encounters the same situation with the slight change that the V2-declarative has been switched with a V1-declarative in A's verum-focus-sentence:

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[113] Even if the proposition under discussion is not necessarily included in the common ground, it is at least put on the table.

(500)　A:　Die Wahlen wurden korrekt durchgeführt.

　　　　B:　Stimmt überhaupt nicht.

　　　　A:　*Doch, **WURden** die Wahlen korrekt durchgeführt.

What meets the eye immediately is that, again, the use of a V1-declarative instead of a V2-declarative produces difficulties: V1-declaratives and verum-focus apparently are not compatible. This has already been observed by Önnerfors (1997: 1981):

> "Das finite Verb darf allerdings wohl nicht selbst allein betont sein, da dies vermutlich Verum-Fokus […] nach sich ziehen würde; dieser dürfte jedoch in V1-DS nicht vorkommen."[114] (Altmann 1993: 33)

The same can, again, be said about rising declaratives:

(501)　A:　Die Wahlen wurden korrekt durchgeführt.

　　　　B:　Stimmt überhaupt nicht.

　　　　A:　*Doch, **WURden** die Wahlen korrekt durchgeführt.

　　　　A:　*Doch, die Wahlen **WURden** korrekt ausgeführt?

This all repeatedly leads back to Reis' statement that in V2-declaratives the truth is foregrounded. In both, V1-declaratives and rising declaratives it is not. Especially in the matter of the verum-focus this shines through even more, since this phenomenon puts the finger on what is true in a discussion and forces the discussion to a halt by making it undeniably clear that the truth has been revealed and can enter the common ground.

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[114] The finite verb must not be emphasised as the only constituent in the sentence, because this would probably generate verum-focus […]; but verum-focus might not be allowed to appear in V1-DS.

4.5.3 Assertive Modal Particles

Modal particles like *ja* do not determine the assertion of a sentence, but they support the inclusion of the proposition into the discourse and the common ground. The hearer is in accordance with the speaker when it comes to accepting that the proposition is true (cf. Müller 2014; Gutzmann 2010):

(502) a.   Herr Müller freut sich auf seine Pensionierung.

        b.   Herr Müller freut sich **ja** auf seine Pensionierung.

(Müller 2014: 35)

V2-declaratives are prototypical environments of modal particles in case a speaker wants to include a proposition in the common ground and enforce that a proposition is true. Trying the same referring to V1-declaratives and rising declaratives, one may observe what is shown below:

(503) a.   ***Freut** Herr Müller sich ja auf seine Pensionierung.

        b.   *Herr Müller freut sich ja auf seine Pensionierung?

Concerning modal particles and V1-DS, Altmann states that only *doch*, *eh* and *sowieso* are particles that work in a V1-DS (cf. Altmann 1993: 1020).[115]

Without A-bar-movement or lexicalisation of the position in front of the finite verb, merely fronting finiteness in sentences with lexical material like in (503 a) does not work. In this case, the assertive modal particle seems to block such a construction. Furthermore, assertive modal particles are apparently bound to assertion on the illocutionary level of language and are in conflict with questions as such which is why the rising declarative does not provide fruitful grounds for assertive modal particles.

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115 Respecting the matter of modal particles and their use and compatibility with certain kinds of sentences see also Gutzmann (2008) and Kwon (2005).

4.6 Interim Conclusion

It was important to fixate that assertions instantiate judgment about the current world and thereby foreground truth, and that this circumstance is linked to a certain direction of fit (word-to-world). Likewise, important was the stress on the observation that assertiveness is influenced by the positioning of truth: In case it is foregrounded, one is confronted with an assertion; when it is backgrounded, the assertiveness simultaneously fades to expressiveness, for instance. Additionally, it was shown that illocutions are not in general 1:1-relatable to sentence moods; yet, V2-declaratives with falling intonation and assertion show a strong correlation which leads one to the claim that they share a prototypical relationship. It has further been made clear that V2-declaratives with falling intonation signal the speaker's commitment to the truth of the present proposition, which other declaratives and also other sentence moods could not as easily be connected to. Added to that was the circumstance that assertions are the go-to mechanisms to push a proposition into the common and include it into an addressee's commitment slate. Considering sentence moods and assertion, it was shown through several context related tests that not every declarative sentence is appropriate in every context; especially when one remembers the opposition of rising declaratives and V2-declaratives with falling intonation in *out of the blue*-contexts. Further tests also showed that V2-declaratives with falling intonation were the only objects that worked in other environments sensitive to assertiveness, too: questions, assertive modal particles, verum-focus and the relation to the QUD/at-issueness. The fronting of finiteness, topicalisation and sentence-final falling intonation appear to be a strong trigger for assertiveness, unless the restrictive features of performativity intervene. This all leads up to the fact that assertiveness and the interpretation of a sentence can be derived from the overt language material at hand, and are not in need of silent operators.

Concerning V1-sentences and assertion, one can assume that V1-sentences lack the ability to assert truth – this i.a. stands in correspondence to their inability of being at-issue and of displaying commitment to a proposition. The next chapter will distill more of the characteristics of V1-sentences with the help of the previous chapter and present not only the denotations of V1sentences, but also their overall relation to the discourse.

5 What is so Special about V1?

In the previous chapters, essential aspects about sentence moods and all the features that define and distinguish them have been assembled and unfolded. It is now time to find out what is the matter with V1, what it offers and what it lacks. For the purposes of this dissertation, the focus will lie on:

i.   V1-sentences and the discourse

ii.   intonation

iii.   frame-setting

iv.   inquisitiveness, informativeness and assertiveness

v.   situations and events

vi.   the table and the cache

All this is in the end bound to the question of how a speaker prototypically displays judgment and truth through his or her means of language.

The critical view on intonation will come up again, but this time in correspondence with the discourse and a theory about substitution. Then it will be thematised that the behaviour of V1-sentences in the discourse entails aspects like discourse anchoring, their position in the discourse (are they bound to certain positions or are they free?) and therefore also the discourse that precedes or, especially, the discourse that follows after them. In the course of this, the phenomenon of frame-setting will come up and it will be asked whether V1-sentences (and of them all or only some) provide judgment in the Fregian sense or whether they rather serve as a frame. This idea will lead to the modelling of (sets of) situations or events and their relation to propositions and, in the end, V1-sentences. As it will become evident that only V2-declaratives are able to identify a single class of situations, it will be reasoned that V2-declaratives have a different role in common ground management (as has already been discussed in the chapter about assertion) than other sentences do. The results of the comparison based on situation semantics will then result in the assumption that the propositional content of V1-sentences can accumulate in an area that is added to the original model of the *table,* which will be called *cache.* The cache can be emptied through the utterance

of a V2-declarative that belongs to the same discourse passage or QUD as the V1-declaratives stocked up in the cache do.

Optative and exclamatory sentences have been eyed suspiciously respecting their sentence mood status. The fact that those two are the only ones that emerge in the shape of V-final variants (alongside their V1-/V2-candidates) is not surprising then. But this is just a fickle thought that is probably worth looking into more deeply in future discussions. Nevertheless, I want to include optative and exclamatory sentences, but this will not be done as deeply as with the other sentence moods, because I do not want to commit myself to the statement that both of them are indeed separate sentence moods – though I have voiced my intuitions about it. Furthermore, I will not look at parentheticals any further, as they have turned out to be a very vague group of items (except for the feature of a commentary function). Except for the meta-function that can be attributed to them as an outstanding trait, on the level of sentence-like parentheticals, they very much resemble the sentence they imitate. Therefore, they behave similarly to the exclamatory sentence in their mimicry character and represent a problematic class. The focus of the upcoming explication will therefore lie on declarative, interrogative and imperative sentences.

5.1 Discourse

Before talking about preferred positions of V1-sentences, I will address discourse anchoring and how it is brought about again shorty. Referring back to Truckenbrodt (2006) and Lohnstein (2000, 2007, 2020) i.a., it was said that finiteness is fronted to check discourse features. Truckenbrodt says that V-to-C-movement checks the parameter *<Deont, A (…)>* in V-to-C-sentence with semi-finite verbs (imperative) and verbs that carry Konjunktiv I; *Epist* is additionally checked in V-to-C-constructions that contain fully finite verbs with indicative and Konjunktiv II (cf. 2006: 266). Lohnstein describes feature checking as *modale Verankerung*:

> (i)   V-Bewegung bewirkt modale Verankerung im Diskurskontext.
>
> (ii)   [± wh]-Bewegung bewirkt Reduktion bzw. Erweiterung der propositional induzierten Bipartition.
>
> (Lohnstein 2000: 170)

V-to-C-movement of (semi-)finiteness generate a link between the syntax and the pragmatic function of the sentence in the present context. It has been shown that a certain categorial filling and intonation further specify the exact sentence mood, but V-to-C-movement is important to anchor the sentence in the discourse first and foremost. The additional occupation of the prefinite position through [-wh]/[+wh]-elements is not necessary to check *Epist* or *Deont*; it is necessary to indicate which kind of partition (bi-partition, n-fold partition) the sentence denotes. This can be spelled out as follows:

> „Existiert eine solche Schnittstelle nicht, so bleibt der Zusammenhang zwischen syntaktischer Struktur und pragmatischer Funktion zufällig. Um eine Anbindung dieser beiden Komponenten an den Satzmodus herzustellen und damit eine systematische Relation zwischen beiden zu etablieren, sollte analog zum wh-Merkmal eingeführt werden, welches den Ort der Verankerung der Proposition im Diskurskontext oder im sprachlichen Kontext festlegt. Dieses Merkmal dient der obligatorischen Verbbewegung bei Hauptsätzen. Wir können dieses Merkmal als [± Diskurs] bezeichnen. Ein weiteres Merkmal wird benötigt, um Reduktion bzw. Erweiterung der Partition zu markieren. Dieses Merkmal ist nun aber bereits mit dem [±wh]-Merkmal gegeben, welches seinen wesentlichen Eigenschaften nach gerade Interrogativ- von Deklarativsätzen trennt."[116]
>
> (Lohnstein 2000: 171)

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[116] If such an interface does not exist, the relation between syntactic structure and pragmatic function remains coincidental. In order to generate a connection of those two components with the sentence mood and to therefore establish a systematic relation between the two, it should be introduced which one determines the place of propositional anchoring in the discourse context or in the linguistics context, analogously to the wh-feature. This feature serves the purpose of obligatory verbal movement in main sentences. We can name this feature [±discourse]. An additional feature is necessary to mark reduction or expansion of a partition respectively. But this feature is already named [±wh] whose major characteristic is to separate interrogative and declarative sentences.

Considering this, it is interesting that those sentence moods who can be identified as distinct and genuine sentence moods contain "at least" a V1-sentence type that therefore displays fronting of finiteness. Because all sentence moods can be represented by V1-sentences, they can serve as an interface between the syntactic features and the illocution (cf. Lohnstein 2013: 68).

Though all V1-sentences are anchored in the discourse and check *Epist* or *Deont*, not all of them can placed at a random discourse position. There are V1-sentences that can be used at any position in the discourse, whereas there are some which have to be placed at the end of a particular discourse passage and some can be used well at the beginning of a discourse. Some seem to be usable at the beginning of a piece of discourse, which refers back to the use out of the blue, but in taking a closer look, one can see that there is an anaphoric relation to some previous discourse.

I will start out with the group of V1-sentences that can be used in the beginning of a discourse: V1-sentences that can be uttered discourse-initially, are V1-interrogatives, for example. V1-interrogatives can open a discourse, but trigger an expectation that the discourse is continued in a certain way. A V1-interrogative that is not followed by an addressee's reaction who commits herself to the answer she gives referring to the V1-interrogative, is odd or at least reflects an uncooperative moment between speaker and addressee:

(524) Jack: Willst du mit mir den Hügel hochlaufen?

       Jill: Ja, gerne.   **Cooperative Answer**

(525) Jack: Willst du mit mir den Hügel hochlaufen?

       Jill: Willst du Elefanten fliegen sehen?   **Non-Cooperative Answer**

According to that, the continuation of the discourse with reference to those V1-sentences that can be used discourse-initially differs in character from sentence mood to sentence mood.

V1-interrogatives in there most basic and prototypical[117] use demand a V2-declarative as an answer (524) and thus a discourse continuation in that shape. Narrative V1-declaratives can be used discourse-initially, too, especially in the shape of introductions to jokes. Yet, they also usually expect a V2-declarative at some point of the QUD-related discourse in order to make a true statement, but they can first be followed by further V1-declaratives:

Paul enters the room in visible rage:

(526)   Hat mich doch gerade eine Studentin um eine weitere Fristverlängerung gebeten. **Die hat wohl den Schuss nicht gehört.**

(527)   Hat mich doch gerade eine Studentin um eine weitere Fristverlängerung gebeten. ***Hat die wohl den Schuss nicht gehört.**

V1-imperatives postulate no verbal reaction, but one could abstractly say that they aim at an object that results in assertion and thus in a sentence through which assertion can be established – a V2-decarative – because they want the addressee to realise their uttered proposition and make it true. This is modelled in the shape of To-Do-Lists by Portner (2011: 4 ff.) who says that a To-Do-List is a set of properties denoted by an imperative and attributed to an individual:

(528)   Nina: Liebe Kolleg*innen! Tragt bitte die Kommentare ins System ein!

The commentaries are inserted into the system according to Nina's request:

(529)   Nina: Liebe Kolleg*innen! Vielen Dank! **Die Kommentare wurden ins System eingetragen.**

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[117] I understand that thinking from a pragmatic perspective there can be non-canonical discourse continuations like the following:

(525a)   Chris: Regnet es heute?
          Dennis: Guck doch bitte einfach mal aus dem Fenster!

But as stated in the introduction to this dissertation, my focus lies on canonical uses of sentences.

Thus, the fulfilment of the property that is assigned to the addressee's To-Do-List can be pronounced in the shape of a V2-declarative sentence. This is, however, no requirement concerning the verbal discourse continuation. The realisation of the property does not have to be realised verbally and usually is not.

V1-optative sentences express the wish that something shall become true similar to the imperative, but not in a strict directive way as the imperative does. They are more monologues and have the speaker himself as the addressee, unlike the imperative which usually addresses individuals other than the speaker himself.[118] Nevertheless, they share sort of the same aim. One tries to change the world via a directive act and the other wants the world to change as well, but does not commit someone in a directive way to bring about a change in the actual world, yet pronounces a wish for change. But here, too, the verbal continuation of the discourse is not intended. The optative sentence, indeed, functions well without the fulfilment of the uttered wish.

Because the statement of truth is prototypically brought through V2-declaratives, V1-sentences like V1-interrogatives do not foreground a truth value, however, their denotation consists of true propositions. (cf. Lohnstein 2019; Karttunen 1977; Groenendijk & Stokhof 1982; Ciardelli, Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2013)

What is also protruding is that the most ambiguous syntactic objects can be identified through the discourse they are surrounded by, which is why I addressed the issue of discourse continuation and discourse precedence in the first place. To spell this out again, the reader can view the examples of V1-interrogative, -declaratives and -conditionals below in direct comparison:

(530) Dennis: Hat Chris heute Football geschaut?

         Diana: Ja, zumindest sagte er das vorhin.

(531) Dennis: Hat Chris heute Football geschaut.

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[118] Imperatives can also address the speaker himself:

(533a) Janina, jetzt raff dich endlich mal auf!

| Diana: | Und weiter? |
| Dennis: | Ich hätte das nicht gedacht. Wir wollten doch zusammen gucken. |

(532)   Hat Chris heute Football geschaut, waren wir nicht dabei.

At this point, I want to hark back to the issue of ambiguity that has been brought repeatedly throughout this dissertation. Ambiguity was identified as a problem between certain V1-sentence as they do not show sufficient differences at their surface concerning their lexical filling or their syntactic structure. To remind the reader, approaches like the one suggested by Brandt et al. that was cited and explained in the introduction and picked up again here and there, suggested a solution in the shape of silent operators [+wh] or [-wh] depending on the sentence mood. But the problem could be solved in a different way, through looking at how the respective V1-sentence is continued or what precedes it.

Imperative and optative sentences are not ambiguous, because they demand a specific verbal mood, namely imperative and Konjunktiv II. It was shown in chapter 3 That V1-interrogative, -declarative and -conditional sentences are welcoming towards indicative and Konjunktiv II, some even towards Konjunktiv I, but none to the imperative. Furthermore, the optative sentence is disambiguated through the additional demand on an optative accent, a modal particle or an interjection.

The interrogative sentence resolves its ambiguity with the declarative and the conditional V1-sentence through its progredient rising tune which is a signal towards the addressee to react with an appropriate answer. The progredient fall in V1-declaratives and V1-conditionals does not signal that the speaker expects reaction from the addressee, which is why the discourse is continued by the speaker herself for the purpose of disambiguation. Intonation will become important in section 5.2 again.

But first of all, onwards we go with those V1-sentences that are surrounded by a certain body of discourse and can be distinguished from each other along those lines i. a.:

i. Narrative:

(533) A: Vor wem läufste denn eigentlich weg?

B: *Bin* ich dann hingegangen, ich sag: „Guten Tag, Frau B., guten Tag, Helga." Und dann dachte ich: sollste ihr auch noch en Kuß geben, nicht.

ii. Causative:

(534) Dieses Urteil ist eine moralische Ohrfeige für Frankreichs Regierung, für Präsident de Gaulle im besonderen. *War* es doch der Staatschef, der anfang 1966 souverän in den Gang der Justiz eingegriffen hatte, als er erklärte, verantwortlich für das Verbrechen seien nur „vulgäre und subalterne" Franzosen, im übrigen aber Ausländer – eben Marrokaner.

iii. Deontic:

(535) … -- das war hier so ein leerer Nachmittag, wo ich mich fragte, warum haben sich die beiden getroffen. *Sollen* sie glücklich sein, die beiden, oder, da ich zum Arzt gehen mußte, *sollen* sie wenigstens ruhig sein, oder, bevor die Diagnose genau feststeht, exogen, endogen, *sollen* sie künftig ein angenehmes, ein glückliches Leben haben…

iv. Enumerative:

(536) Die Bundesrepublik wird nach ihrer Unterschrift unter den zu erwartenden Atomsperrvertrag mit leeren Händen dastehen. *Bleibt* die Hoffnung auf eine Entspannung mit nachfolgender Wiedervereinigung.

(Önnerfors 1997: 99)

Causative and enumerative V1-declaratives cannot be used discourse initially. This seems trivial at first, but if one looks at exclamatory sentences in comparison, this circumstance is worth mentioning:

(537)   IST der dumm!   → "I already thought he was stupid, but I never expected him to be
                        that stupid."

It has already been said that the exclamatory sentence is presuppositional in character (cf. Michaelis 2001: 1040) and thus refers to something that has already been discussed in some previous discourse or that is inferable from the context.

Causative and enumerative V1-sentences in contrast need explicitly voiced material directly preceding them in order to bring express or enumerative reading though they might at first look like a narrative V1-declarative or an exclamatory sentence. Their position is also dependent on their categorial filling: The enumerative type demands a group of verbs (*bleiben, folgen, fehlen,* cf. chapter 3) that represent a quantity that is missing in in the preceding discourse. The V1-sentence type in combination with those specific verbs can therefore only be grammatical if an overt discourse precedes that has presented a quantity from which the quantity of the enumerative-V1-sentence is missing.

Referring to the causative V1-sentence, the modal particle *doch* is needed to make it clear that the proposition in the causative V1-sentence contains the reason for the preceding discourse and is considered obligatory (cf. chapter 3). The modal particle therefore emphasises the causative relation between the causative V1-content and the information that has been given in the directly preceding discourse. V1-sentences are the best or even the only option to bring about the causative (538) and enumerative (539) interpretation in combination with their just mentioned specific positioning:

(538)   a.   Die Wahlen sind durchgeführt. Bleibt noch die Auszählung der Stimmen.

        b.   *Bleibt noch die Auszählung der Stimmen. Die Wahlen sind durchgeführt.

(539)   a.   Die Königin hatte Glück. Hat sie doch noch rechtzeitig Rumpelstilzchens Namen
             erfahren.

        b.   *Hat sie doch noch rechtzeitig Rumpelstilzchens Namen erfahren. Die Königin
             hatte Glück.

The categorial filling of those V1-declarative types signals to the addressee that a certain amount of the discourse is subsumed under and thus framed by them.

Though Önnerfors describes the difference between the causative V1- and V2-construction as nuanced, one still has to acknowledge that there is a difference in reading between those two sentence types which cannot be dismissed easily (cf. chapter 3). The situation with enumerative sentences is similar. But this discussion will not be furthered at this point.

What can be concluded from this chapter is that different sentence moods come with a different environment of discourse, either before or after the respective sentence. Concerning the ambiguous cases of V1-sentence, this has been shown to help identify which sentence mood is presented. What also comes across concerning the V1-sentences that come with a prototypical precedence or continuation of discourse of a frame-character. This can be seen especially concerning V1-conditionals and narrative V1-declaratives. I will spell out this idea of frame setting in the next section with the help of situation semantics. What will also be necessary to discuss is the role of intonation. This is due to the circumstance that the discourse environment alone is not sufficient referring to the identification of a sentence mood among ambiguous sentences. This is because in those cases where the prototypical discourse does not precede but follow the respective ambiguous sentence, one cannot predict what body of discourse is following from the ambiguous surface of a sentence alone. That is why intonation as another significant factor of distinction has to be included into our analysis, too. It, among other factors, can also push the discourse into a certain direction: a rise provokes a reaction and discourse continuation by the addressee, falls and accents do not necessarily provoke this.

That also has consequences concerning the denotation of a V1-sentence.

What the denotation of a V1-sentence is and how this is connected to intonation, the discourse and frame-setting, will be discussed in section 5.2.

5.2 Intonation, Situations, Events and Frame Setting

The question at hand is how items can be distinguished although they look the same on their syntactic surface and though the conditions concerning their categorial fillings are alike. Along the lines of the approach that was proposed by Brandt et al., Rosengren stated that intonation is not constitutive element that can define sentence mood. I do not want to fully disagree here. But: Please, consider the following examples:

(540)   Dennis: <u>Hat der Chris heute Football ge/schaut?</u>

        Diana: Ja, zumindest sagte er das vorhin.

(541)   Dennis: <u>Hat der Chris heute Football geschaut.</u>

        Diana: Ja, und?

        Dennis: Ja, der hätte mal Bescheid sagen können.

(542)   Dennis: <u>(Boah,) Hat der Chris heute FOOTball ge\schaut!</u>

        Diana: Und weiter?

        Dennis: Ich hätte das nicht gedacht. Wir wollten doch zusammen gucken.

(543)   Diana   <u>Hat Chris heute Football ge/schaut</u>, waren wir nicht da\bei.

There are two surface indicators that help with defining the sentence mood of which the first has been discussed already:

    i.   Surrounding discourse elements

    ii.   Prosody: Sentence tune and accents

This does not necessarily mean that intonation is sentence mood constitutive. But similar to the situation concerning the optative sentences that needs substitutions in the shape of interjections or modal particles to be identified as optative (cf. chapter 3), there has to be a substitute of the intonation that indicates the sentence mood. This means, even if the present intonation deviates from the prototypical pairings that were listed in the chapter about intonation (see below for repetition), there is still the overall discourse material in reference to the present QUD that surrounds the V1-sentence at hand. Thus, below I list the intonation

that prototypically goes along with a respective V1-sentence as well as the remaining body of discourse that helps define it:

Syntactically ambiguous V1-sentences	Prototypical intonation	Discourse environment
(544) Interrogative	Progredient rising intonation	Answer in the shape of a V2-declarative
(545) Declarative	Progredient falling intonation	Occurrence of V2-declarative[119]
(546) Exclamatory	Exclamatory accent + falling tune	
(547) Conditional	V1-Protasis: Progredient rising or falling intonation Apodosis: dependent on the overall sentence mood	(Protasis &) Apodosis

Intonation can influence the place of occurrence in a discourse. Though V2-declarative sentences can be used just fine if they show a progredient falling tune, once a rise is pronounced, the situation has been shown to be different (cf. chapter 4):

Arthur Freed enters the room. His friend is sitting at the desk:

(548)   *Es regnet draußen?

Arthur Freed enters the room wearing a wet raincoat. His friend is sitting at the desk:

(549)   Es regnet draußen?

The sentence in (548-549) can only be used at the beginning of a discourse if there is information inferred from the context that the rising declarative obviously refers to. In (549), the speaker has evidence of rainy weather from the wet raincoat the person entering the room is wearing. Thus, the progredient rise in tune causes restrictions on the discourse

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119 In case the speaker intends to utter a sentence that foregrounds truth.

position of a rising declarative or vice versa. Similarly, exclamatory sentences signal to the addressee that they are either astonished about something that they perceive in the immediate context (551), whereas the inference cannot be drawn in (550):

Arthur Freed enters the room. His friend is sitting at the desk:

(550)   *Es regnet draußen!

Arthur Freed enters the room wearing a wet raincoat. His friend is sitting at the desk:

(551)   Es REGnet draußen!

The accent therefore marks the proposition as deviating from the norm in an unexpected way. Arthur Freed did not expect rainy weather.

As the only sentence mood that naturally comes with a progredient rising tune is the V1-interrogative, putting a rising tune on declarative, imperative, optative and exclamatory sentences as well as V2-interrogatives brings along changes and restrictions, too:

(552)   Dennis: Chris hat heute Football ge\schaut. Dieser Sack.

        Diana: Chris hat heute Football ge/schaut?

(553)   Diana: Geh nach Hau\se!

        Chris: Geh nach Hau/se? Hast du das gerade wirklich gesagt?

(554)   Rachel: Hätte ich Barry doch nur geHEIra\tet!

        Monica: Hätte ich Barry doch nur geHEIra/tet? Hast du noch alle Latten am Zaun?

(555)   Daenerys: Beugt Ihr das \Knie, gebe ich Euch meine Ar\mee.

        John: Beugt Ihr das /Knie? Meint Ihr das ernst? Das wird mein Volk nie akzeptieren.

The examples show that every sentence mood that is atypically pronounced with a rise at the end of the sentence is converted into echo-questions. The echo-question can by definition not be used at the beginning of a discourse, because through it the speaker repeats or quotes what he assumes a preceding speaker to have said:

> "Pragmatisch ist für EwS konstitutiv, daß mit dem EwS w-Fragen gestellt werden, die – im Unterschied zu mit w-IS gestellten Fragen – stets einen zusätzlichen 'Echo'-Effekt haben: Bei EwS-Verwendungen als 'Echo-w-Fragen' i.e.S. wird die Proposition einer Vorgängeräußerung wiederaufgenommen und dabei eine bereits geschlossene Stelle als noch offen thematisiert."[120] (Reis 1991: 50)

The only exception from the conversion into an echo-question can be seen in the V1-declarative which turns into a V1-interrogative in case of a final rise at its sentential boundary. This is due to the already mentioned circumstance that the V1-declarative and -interrogative are ambiguous with respect to their syntax.

(556)   Hat Chris heute Football ge\schaut.

(557)   Hat Chris heute Football ge/schaut?

The V1-interrogative can take any position in a discourse, but – in case the addressee abides by the prototypical conversational rules according to Grice (1975) – is followed by a V2-declarative answer. Thus, the V1-interrogative tackles difficulties when it is positioned at the end of a discourse.

All in all, it can be said that a rising tune induces a yes-/no-question, independent of the sentence mood it is put on; the rise indicates a bi-partition of an answering room that is independent of a particular sentence mood. An exception are echo-questions which do not exactly repeat the literal content of the echoed sentence, but insert a wh-expression for one constituent:

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[120] Pragmatically, it is constitutive of EwS that one asks questions through EwS that – different from questions that are posed through w-IS – always have an additional 'echo'-effect: Regarding EwS-uses as 'echo-w-questions' the proposition of a preceding utterance is taken up again and therefore an already closed point is thematised as still open.

(558) Janina: Julie singt Musical.

Teresa: Julie singt Musical? **Answering room: bi-partition**

Teresa: Julie singt was? **Answering room: n-fold partition**

Therefore, intonation does not only have an effect on the pragmatic side of sentences but also on the semantic side. What the answering room specifically looks like will be shown later in this chapter. All in all, a rising tune signals openness.

Thus far with the rising sentence tune, I want to move on with falling sentence tune and accents: The V1-declarative can be placed discourse initially, though certain functional types do not like this position; those are the enumerative, causative and deontic type.

The narrative declarative is the only type that can be well used in the beginning of a discourse, but even here, not every application of the narrative declarative is fine in the beginning of a discourse. This has already been discussed in reference to the functional types of enumerative and causative as well as narrative declarative sentences.

Introductions to jokes that are uttered for the purpose of an expressive manner are fine discourse initially. Furthermore, the joke-environment can be continued via V1-chains, but this seems to be singular to jokes. In other narrative environments, pure V1-chains are problematic. The problem is resolved if a V1-declarative(-chain) is followed by a V2-declarative:

(559) Peter: Kommt ein Skelett in die Bar. Bestellt ein Bier und einen Schwamm.

(560) Peter: Was ist passiert?

Paul: Hat der mir gerade den Einkaufswagen in den Rücken gerammt.

Peter: Nein, nicht dein Ernst. Und dann?

Paul: Dann habe ich mal kräftig die Meinung gesagt./*Habe ich ihm dann kräftig die Meinung gesagt-.

Peter enters the room, looks at Paul and says out of the blue:

(561) Regnet /es?

  *Regnet \es.

What this shows is that, in contrast to V1-interrogatives, V1-declaratives are restricted intonation can influence the grammaticality of sentence mood positioning, since non-prototypical pairing of intonation and sentence mood causes restrictions. Furthermore, it restricts the isolated use of V1-sentences. V1-declaratives in a neutral context are bad in isolation; V1-interrogatives are not.

The influence of intonation becomes even more interesting when looking at V1-conditionals. Reis and Wöllstein as well as Pittner pointed out a parallel between the protasis in V1-conditionals and the V1-interrogative sentence:

> "V1-Konditionalgefüge sind also offenbar auf Konstellationen beschränkt, in denen (i) die Wahrheit des Konsequens von der Wahrheit des Antecedens abhängt (⇒ hypothetische Konditionale), (ii) der Wahrheitswert des V1-Antecedens in der thematisierten Welt offen ist. Das passt gut zur Semantik von V1-Entscheidungs-Interrogativen: Zum einen beinhaltet diese nach Standardmeinung ebenfalls die Offenheit des Wahrheitswerts der Frageproposition, zum andern bildet der positive Wert ebenfalls die Grundlage der Fortsetzung, d. h. der Antwort."[121] (Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 129 ff.)

The syntactic and semantic similarities of V1-conditionals and -interrogatives can be considered emphasised through their prosodic characteristics. The V1-conditional, unlike its

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121 V1-conditional constructions are apparently restricted to constellations in which (i) the truth of the consequence is dependent on the truth of the antecedence (⇒ hypothetical conditionals), (ii) the truth value of the V1-antecedence in the thematised world is open.

This matches the semantics of V1-interrogatives: On the one hand, according to the general opinion, it implies openness respecting the truth value of the proposition of the question, on the other hand, the positive value likewise represents the basis for the purpose of continuation, i.e. the answer.

V-final-counterpart, takes on two separate nuclear accents, one in the protasis and one in the apodosis. This signifies the unintegrated status of the protasis. The protasis is not traditionally subordinated but rather builds a frame or domain in which the apodosis is evaluated. Thus, the syntactic link is weaker than in the *wenn*-construction and shows more independence of the two semantically linked parts. The parallelism between protasis and apodosis in the conditional and question and the V1-interrogatives and the utterance of consequence from a positive or negative answer is thus not that far-fetched:

To comprehend this more thoroughly, let us look at the example below:

(562)   a.   Sucht er eine Stelle? Dann wird er sich über das Angebot freuen.

          b.   Hättest du morgen Zeit für mich? Dann würde ich dir die Sache schildern.

(Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 135)

At a closer look, the provided structure in (563) is not that different from a V1-conditional structure:

(563)   a.   Sucht er eine Stelle, (dann) wird er sich über das Angebot freuen.

          b.   Hättest du morgen Zeit für mich, (dann) würde ich dir die Sache schildern.

(Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 135)

The parallels between interrogatives and V1-conditionals seem graspable syntactically as well as semantically:

> „Was wir hier vor uns haben, ist ‚grammatikalisierter Diskurs' […], d. h. die Diskursrelation zwischen Entscheidungsfrage und (aus der in der Regel unmarkiert vorausgesetzten ja-Antwort) gezogenen Folgerungen […], spiegelt sich in der Antecedens-Konsequens-Relation von V1-Konditional-Gefügen."[122]
> (Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 135)

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122 What is presented to us here is a 'grammaticalised discourse' […], i.e. the discourse relation between yes-/no-question (from the usually unmarked presupposed *yes*-answer) drawn conclusion […], reflects itself in the antecedence-consequence-relation of V1-conditional constructions.

Though the protasis and apodosis of the V1-conditional have a closer link through a *wenn-dann*-construction than a V1-interrogative and its answer, the semantic pattern between the two parts is quite similar: The protasis signals openness towards the outcome of the apodosis. The same is the case with the V1-interrogative; the outcome can be yes or no or an explicit positive or negative answer lie in (563). The separate nuclear accent in the protasis supports this V1-interrogative similarity even more: The two nuclear accents, in the protasis and one in the apodosis, imply a level of disintegration and independence in the V1-apodosis. Likewise, the possibility of pronouncing the protasis with a rising or falling tune supports this view. The prominent difference that parts the two constructions is that conditionals require one speaker who utters them, whereas interrogatives are usually posed by a speaker to be answered by an addressee that differs in person from the speaker.

From the comparison of rising and falling sentence tunes and the contribution of accents, it can be drawn from this that a rising tune cannot bring about truth in a sentence. Its function is to question the truth, not to state that something is true. But this does not mean that a rising tune is the only indication of a missing capacity when it comes to the utterance of truth. It was mentioned that V1-declaratives, V1-imperatives, V1-exclamatories and -optatives are no good candidates concerning the transfer of truth, either, even though they usually occur with a falling sentence tune.

Thus, the sentence type, categorial filling (precisely, in the case of a falling V2-interrogative sentence, where the wh-item in the prefield expresses the interrogative sentence mood) as well as verbal mood and intonation are essential tools in order to prototypically proclaim the truth or falsehood of an issue and disambiguating sentences. In order to deepen this analysis and make it more comprehensible, other means have to be included into this work: Further ways of illustrating that the seemingly ambiguous sentences are not ambiguous, can be found through situation semantics. This way of modelling will also help to see what intonation does to a semantic object and what the remaining discourse like depending on the composition of a sentence.

Situation semantics (cf. Perry and Barwise 1983; Kratzer 1998, 2002, 2008 etc.) is an alternative to possible world semantics that does not operate with worlds, but with smaller

fragments: situations. Likewise, events (Davidson 1967; Maienborn 2010) form a smaller unit to possible worlds, as they belong to possible worlds.

> "Suppose that I am in a room full of people, some of whom are sleeping, some of whom are wide awake. If I say, "no one is sleeping," have I told the truth or not? Again, it depends on which situation I am referring to. If I am referring to the whole situation including all the people in the room, then what I have said is false. However, one can well imagine situations where I am clearly referring only to a part of that situation. Imagine, for example, that I am conducting an experiment which requires an assistant to monitor sleeping people, and I look around the sleep lab to see if all of my assistants are awake and ready to go. Surely, then I may truly and informatively say, "No one is asleep. Let's begin." …. The crucial insight needed goes back to Austin … As Austin put it, a statement is true when the actual situation to which it refers is of the type described by the statement." (Barwise & Perry 1983: 160)

Perry and Barwise coined the term and theory of situation semantics, though the further development by other linguists is not completely equal to the named roots. Kratzer (1998, 2002, 2008) took up what Perry and Barwise set into motion and developed it further. She defines a situation as a state that exemplifies a proposition in the following way:

(564)   Exemplification

A situation *s* exemplifies a proposition *p* if whenever there is a part of *s* in which *p* is not true, then *s* is a minimal situation in which *p* is true.

(cf. Kratzer 1998; 2002: 660)

Now, it was brought up that there are situations and there are events. Some might say, those two are the same. However, differences between the two can be made out:

> "Ereignisse und Situationen scheinen zunächst die gleichen Eigenschaften zu besitzen, sodass die theoretische Annahme beider Konzepte redundant erscheint. Kratzer […] macht jedoch deutlich, dass zwischen Ereignissen und Situationen in

dem Sinne unterschieden werden muss, dass Situationen – gemäß (17)[123] – minimale Wahrheitsbereiche für Propositionen sind. Davidsons […] Ereignisrepräsentationen lassen sich jedoch in situationssemantische Repräsentationen integrieren, sodass sie die Bedingungen in (17) erfüllen. Das Ereignis e wird Teil einer Situation, die die Proposition P exemplifiziert: ∃e [e ≤ s & p(s)] – Es gibt ein Ereignis e, das ein Teil der Situation s ist, die die Proposition p exemplifiziert."[124] (Lohnstein 2019: 12)

Davidson (1967) revolutionised the standards of verbal analysis in so far as that he did not – as up to then customised – perceive a transitive verb merely through its relation to a respective subject. If this was so, the sentence in (565a) can be represented like (565b):

(565)   a.   Jones buttered the toast.

          b.   BUTTER (jones, the toast)

(Maienborn 2010: 3)

Davidson noticed that that kind of analysis does not do the semantics of a transitive verb justice. If a transitive verb is grammatically defined through its relation to a subject, certain things cannot be described, like e.g. the way the toast was buttered or the time it happened. Davidson therefore stated that a transitive verb refers to an event argument that is not phonetically realised but exists in the verbal structure and share a relation not only with the verb, but also with the direct object in this case:

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123 Refers to the exemplification by Kratzer in (564).

124 Events and situations seem to possess the same characteristics at first so that the theoretical assumption of both concepts appears to be redundant. Kratzer, however, clarifies that one has to differentiate between events and situations in so far that situations – according to (17) – are minimal truth value domains of propositions. Davidsons event representations can, however, be integrated into representations of situation semantics so that they satisfy the condition in (17). The event e becomes part of a situation that exemplifies proposition P: ∃e [e ≤ s & p(s)] – There is an event e that is part of a situation s which exemplifies proposition P.

(566)   c.   ∃e [BUTTER (jones, the toast, e)]

(Maieborn 2010: 3)

So far, this analysis only refers to action verbs. The Neo-Davidsonian approach takes it one step further and applies the theory of a hidden event argument not only to action verbs, but to stative verbs as well:

> "The position *E* corresponds to the 'hidden' argument place for events […]. There seem to be strong arguments in favour of, and little to be said against, extending Davidson's idea to verbs other than verbs of change or action. Under this extension, statives will also have *E* positions."
> (Higginbotham 1985: 10)

Not only that, but accomplishments and achievements could be included in the event analysis as well (cf. Maienborn 2010: 8). Another expansion of the original Davidsonian approach is the introduction of thematic roles into the analysis. Here, a binary relation between an event and the thematic role is established in order to further specify and distinguish the semantics of the event structure:

Neo-Davidsonian account of event structure:
(567)   a. Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom with the knife at midnight.

b. ∃e [BUTTER (jones, the toast, e) & IN (e, the bathroom) & INSTR (e, the knife) & AT (e, midnight)]

c. ∃e [BUTTER (e) & AGENT (e, jones) & PATIENT (e, the toast) & IN (e, the bathroom) & INSTR (e, the knife) & AT (e, midnight)]

(Maienborn 2010: 9)

The exact difference between situations and events is not so important that it would destroy the upcoming explanations about the semantics of V1-sentences when they are used

interchangeably. But it is always sensible to point out when two things are not synonymous in every case.

A similarity between the two is that events, like situations, cannot be true or false. However, they belong to a world and can be identified.

> „Ganz ähnlich lässt sich das Konzept Proposition auffassen. Wenn S die Menge der möglichen Situationen ist, so spezifiziert eine Proposition p diejenige Menge von Situationen, die sie zutreffend beschreibt. Alle anderen Situationen bilden das Komplement p' von p […]. […] Die charakteristische Funktion der Menge p bildet jede Situation, die von der Proposition p zutreffend beschrieben wird, auf das Wahre ab und jede andere Situation auf das Falsche:"[125] (Lohnstein 2019: 8)

This explanation can be supported by Bierwisch's explications about the relationship between events and propositions. He says that events instantiate propositions:

(568) e INST p
(cf. Bierwisch 1986)

Events and situations exist in the actual world independent of propositions. They are instances of propositions. This means that out of events or situations propositions can be generated and propositions can describe events or situations, not the other way around. Events and situations, furthermore, can be parts of worlds, whereas the maximal element that a situation be part of is a world. Whereas individuals can be part of a world and situations can be part of a world, situations cannot be parts of individuals:

(569)   Teil von-Relation für Situationen:

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[125] The concept of a proposition can be considered to be similar: If S is the set of possible situations, a proposition specifies the set of propositions that it describes as true. All the other propositions make up the complement p' of p […]. […] The characteristic function of the set p maps every situation to the truth that is described as true and every situation that is not described as true it maps to falsehood.

Sei S eine Menge von möglichen Situationen, und sei A eine Menge von möglichen Individuen. „≤" ist eine partielle Ordnung auf S ∪ A, sodass gilt:

a. Für kein s ∈ S gibt es ein a ∈ A, sodass s ≤ a,

b. für alle s ∈ S gibt es genau ein s' ∈ S, sodass s ≤ s' und für alle s" ∈ S gilt: Wenn s' ≤ s", dann ist s" = s'[126]

(cf. Lohnstein 2019: 9; Kratzer 2002: 660)

Additionally, situations are persistent. Meaning, when a situation is part of a proposition and part of another situation, the other situation is simultaneously part of the proposition:

(570) Persistenz von Propositionen:

Für beliebige Situationen s und s' gilt: Wenn s ∈ p und s ≤ s', dann ist s' ∈ p.

(cf. Lohnstein 2019: 9; Kratzer 2002: 660)[127]

Now, because it has been explained that situations are parts of propositions, the question is whether situations or sets of situations are represented differently from sentence mood to sentence mood. To find out the answer to this question, one has to look at the syntax that is linked to a specific sentence mood: To throw a bridge to the essential syntactic transformations of fronting of finiteness and [-wh]-XP-movement to the SpecCP, it can be argued that finite constructions contain propositions that instantiate situations that exist in the actual world:

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[126] Part of-Relation for Situations:

Let S be a set of possible situations, and let A be a set of possible individuals.

"≤" is a partial order over S ∪ A, so that:

a. For no s ∈ S there is an a ∈ A, so that s ≤ a,

b. for all s ∈ S there is exactly one s' ∈ S, so that s ≤ s' and for all s" ∈ S holds: If s' ≤ s", then s" = s'

[127] Persistence of Propositions:

For a random situation s and s' holds: If s ∈ p and s ≤ s', then s' ∈ p.

(571) Hypothese über (In-)Finitheit und Ereigniseinbettung (H-Situation):

a. Selbständige infinite Konstruktionen denotieren Eigenschaften von Eventualitäten, die nur in nicht-realen möglichen Welten existieren.

b. Selbständige finite Konstruktionen denotieren Situationen, die Propositionen exemplifizieren.[128]

(cf. Lohnstein 2019: 12-13)

Chierchia (1995) and Davidson (1986) likewise state that VPs have an additional position for eventualities:

> » A basic assumption I am making is that every VP, whatever its internal structure and aspectual characteristics, has an extra argument position for eventualities, in the spirit of Davidson's proposal. […] In a way, having this extra argument slot is part of what makes something a VP, whatever its inner structure. «
> (Chierchia 1995: 204)

This makes sense when thinking about infinite constructions, when Chierchia's words are connected to the previous hypothesis. Furthermore, Lohnstein states that semi- and infinite sentences cannot take on a truth value, because they characterise eventualities which do not exist in the real world, but only in imagined alternative worlds; finite sentences, in contrast, refer to temporally and modally specified situations (cf. Lohnstein: 2019: 3)

Finite sentences, in contrast to infinite sentences and the eventualities that they contain, refer to particular situations of the actual world and therefore describe *Austinian Topic Situations*. Those topic situations are limited by the world the finite sentence refers to and thus its proposition is only instantiated by the situations contained in this world. Furthermore, due to the condition of finiteness that is bound to an Austinian Topic Situation, they can be evaluated with respect their truth or falsehood:

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[128] Hypothesis wrt. (In)finiteness and Embedding of Events (H-Situation):

    a.   Independent infinite constructions denote features of eventualities which exist only in the non-real world.

    b.   Independent finite constructions denote situations that exemplify propositions.

"When a statement is true, there is, of course, a state of affairs which makes it true and which is toto mundo distinct from the true statement about it: but equally of course, we can only describe that state of affairs in words" (Austin 1950: 6)

After explaining the necessary aspects about situations and events, there is an assumption that follows up: The assumption that I want to bring up here goes along with what Lohnstein (2020) said about the connection between V2-declaratives, assertion and situations. Assertive sentences "induce only one class" (Lohnstein 2020: 13) of alternatives. The enrichment of the common ground via assertion is realised through the identification of a situation or an event. To identify this class of situations, two syntactic transformations have to be processed: fronting of finiteness and [-XP]-movement to SpecCP. Only fronting finiteness is not sufficient to achieve a reduction of classes of situations. Sentences that lack XP-movement to SpecCP look different:

V1-Interrogative Sentence:

(572)   Kommt ein Mann in die Bar? [Ja./Nein.]

Inquisitive objects like the V1-interrogative sentence above separate the classes of events into partitions. However, they cannot represent one single class of situations or one situation. Therefore, they cannot be informative, since they can only do that: separate. They cannot reduce sets of events or situations (cf. Lohnstein 2019: 15). The separation not only happens due to the fronting of finiteness, but is essentially induced through the progredient rising sentence tune. In cases of falling tune, other objects can emerge which will be explained in

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[129] The illustrations in this dissertation are taken from or derived from Lohnstein (2019, 2020).

the following lines. Thus, syntax and intonation are co-dependent here; moreover, it does no matter which verbal mood is present – the partition remains a bi-partition. The same is the case if a different semantic object (like an imperative sentence e.g.) is turned into an echo-question via rising intonation:

Echo-question → former imperative:

(573)   Geh nach HAU/se? [Ja./Nein.]

An object in which the room of alternatives is not only separated into parts, but actually reduced, is either called informative or assertive, depending on the degree of reduction:

V1-Declarative Sentence:

(574)   Kommt ein Mann in die Bar.

V2-Declarative Sentence:

(575)   Ein Mann kommt in die Bar.

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V2-declaratives are assertive objects, because they identify one single class of situations. Informative objects like V1-declarative sentences present a class of situations, too, but this class is merely highlighted in contrast to a backgrounded class; more classes than one can be represented by an informative object, but these classes are not disjoint as classes of inquisitive objects are. Truth and with it the foregrounding of only one class of situation is not relevant in V1-declaratives, because they are not focussed on representing the truth which is brought about by an object containing of one single reduced class of situations.

Putting a rising tune on a V2-declarative turns it into a rising declarative. Here, the denotation becomes a bi-partition, but the question is not as genuine as with interrogative sentences, because the speaker signals a bias via the use of a V2-declarative instead of an interrogative (cf. chapter 4).

The lack of foregrounding of truth can also be recognised in other V1-sentences that represent different sentence moods: V1-declaratives, -imperatives, -optatives and -interrogatives. Though the exclamatory sentence is not categorised as a separate sentence mood, it is discussed nevertheless, as well as the adverbial conditional sentence.

The V1-imperative sentence not only lacks an XP in the prefield, but also lacks verbal features to complete the finite paradigm of the verb and is restricted to verb that are not individual-level predicates (cf. chapter 3). This leads to a lack of representation of truth and a shift in commitment to actually achieve truth: The speaker attributes a property to the addressee through a use of the imperative (cf. Lohnstein 2020; Portner 2004). Thereby the speaker tries to commit the addressee to the realisation of the uttered propositional content. So, the speaker not only distances himself from the commitment to the truth of the proposition, but likewise directs the addressee – and not himself – to making the proposition become true.

Optative sentences and exclamatory sentences both are not focussed on proclaiming the truth, either. Referring to the exclamatory accent, this is a very intriguing issue, because not

even the V2-exclamatory sentence conveys an assertion and therefore a true statement, but a presupposition (cf. Michaelis 2001). Here, the accent shifts the focus from assertion to a proclamation of astonishment.

Concerning the V1-optative and V1-exclamatory sentence, the semantic object can be categorised as informative and therefore not inquisitive, but also not assertive. The optative sentence, similar to the imperative sentence, refers to a set of situations in a world different from the actual world, which is mainly triggered through the obligatory Konjunktiv II in combination with V1 (or V-final) sentence type and supported through the optative accent, interjections and/or modal particles. The difference is the mere expression of desire in the optative sentence that does not direct someone to make the proposition become true. Therefore, no property is attributed to an addressee. The set of situations is simply presented as an object of desire. The desire is highlighted in comparison with a set of situations that is the case in the actual world, but does not appeal to the speaker's desire. In parallel, the exclamatory sentence is informative, too, in that it does not thrive for the presentation of truth, but for the presentation of astonishment about a certain set of situations that is the case in contrast to a set of situations not being the case.

The next assumption that has to be included into the upcoming explanations is that V1-sentences can be viewed as similar to frames (cf. Jacobs 2001; Hinterwimmer 2011). The expression *frame* is motivated through Jacobs' and Hinterwimmer's explications about frame topics; however, I do not intend to start a discussion about the notion of what a topic is and what not. My main interest lies in the phenomenon of an object framing a different object in that it builds a domain for the other object to be evaluated in with reference to its truth conditions (cf. Hinterwimmer 2011: 12; Jacobs 2001: 656). There are similarities between sentences containing adverbials (cf. (576)) and V1-sentences with respect to setting up such domains:

(576)   Gesundheitlich geht es Maria gut.
(Hinterwimmer 2011: 11)

Here, the part of the sentence following *gesundheitlich* "specifies the way in which the predicate *gut gehen* (be fine) is to be understood." (Hinterwimmer 2011: 11). The adverbial therefore serves as a frame-setter in the respective sentence. Jacobs defines frame-setting as follows:

(577)   In (X Y), X is the frame for Y iff X specifies a domain of (possible) reality to which the proposition expressed by Y is restricted.

(Jacobs 2001: 656)

"X" here has direct influence on "Y" in that "X" restricts "Y" in reference to its outcome of truth or falsehood.

This goes together well with the claim analysis that V1-declaratives only highlight a class of situations in relation to another class. The highlighted class thereby creates a frame in which other situations can occur. This can further be supported through looking at V1-conditional sentence:

V1-Conditional Sentence

(578)   Kommt ein Mann in die Bar, [bestellt er ein Alt.]


events characterised by q   events characterised by p

(apodosis)   (protasis)

    i: Wenn ein Mann in die Bar kommt, dann bestellt er ein Alt.
    ii: [MUST: Ein Mann kommt in die Bar.] (Er bestellt ein Alt.)
    iii: The apodosis follows from the protasis.

What the examples above tell us, is that the protasis provides a frame of sets of situations with reference to which the sets of situations represented by the apodosis can be true or false. This analysis is based on the threefold quantificational structure proposed by von Fintel (1994) in which the restrictor serves as the frame to the apodosis:

(579)   threefold quantificational structure

```
                              /    |    \
                             /     |     \
                      quantifier restrictor        scope

                          |         |                |
                         ∀e    Ein Mann kommt in die Bar in e    Er bestellt ein Alt in e
                                  (protasis)                       (apodosis)
```

Referring to event semantics (cf. Maienborn 2011), Kratzer's and von Fintel's structure can be translated as follows:

(580)   ∀e[[kommen(e) & Agent(ein Mann, e) & Loc(in die Bar, e)] (bestellen(e) & Thema(ein Alt, e))]
   (cf. von Fintel 1994; Kratzer 1987, 1991; Maienborn 2010)

The apodosis is evaluated in reference to the protasis, since the protasis serves as a condition to the outcome of the apodosis. Thus, the class of events induced through the protasis frames the class of situations presented through the apodosis and serves a domain in which the apodosis is valuated.

Imperative sentences can similarly be analysed as a frame, but in a less verbal and less speaker-oriented way: The V1-imperative sentences provides a class of events that the

speaker wants to be realised. However, the evaluation and realisation of this class are dependent on the cooperation of the addressee, which is why the speaker ascribes the addressee the property reflected in the proposition of the V1-imperative sentence.

<u>V1-Imperative Sentence:</u>

(581)   Komm in die Bar!

$\lambda A[\forall e[\text{kommen}(e) \ \& \ \text{Agent}(x, e) \ \& \ A(x, e) \ \& \ \text{Loc(in die Bar}, e)]] \ (\lambda z \lambda e'[\text{Addressee}(z, e')])$
$= \forall e[\text{kommen}(e) \ \& \ \text{Agent}(x, e) \ \& \ \text{Addressee}(x, e) \ \& \ \text{Loc(in die Bar}, e)]$

(cf. von Fintel 1994; Maienborn 2010; Lohnstein 2020)

I will come back to those examples later, but I want to go with something else first: All sentences containing a VP likewise contain events or situations respectively. However, the way in which they are presented play a role in the treatment of truth and judgment:

> "V1-DS präsentieren die ausgedrückte Proposition als ein *Ereignis*, V2-DS dagegen als eine *Tatsache*[…] Illokutiv führt das dazu, daß mit V1-DS wahre Propositionen ausgesagt werden, während mit V2-DS ausgesagt wird, daß sie wahr sind. […] Im mit V1-DS realisierten Subtyp ist der konstitutive Wahrheitsanspruch für die ausgedrückte Proposition ‚im Hintergrund', im V2-DS ‚im Vordergrund', so daß nur mit Deklarativen in V2-Form die Wahrheit des DS buchstäblich ‚assertiert' werden kann."130

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130 V1-DS present the expressed proposition as an event, but V2-DS present it as a fact […]. On an illocutionary level this leads to the circumstance that true propositions are expressed via V1-DS, whereas V2-DS state that those propositions are true. [..] In the subtype expressed through a V1-DS,

V1-sentences can function as frames, even though this does not hold for all of them: In conditionals the V1-protasis serves as a domain in which the apodosis is evaluated. The truth of the overall conditional sentence is thus dependent on the V1-protasis. Looking specifically at the narrative V1-declarative, it creates a frame that signals to the addressee that a narrative body of information is introduced. The following discourse is then evaluated with respect to that narrative domain. Likewise, the causative and enumerative type signal to addressee that the preceding discourse ought to be evaluated subsuming it under a frame that represents a conclusion regarding the former type and that represents a missing quantity that has an exposed place in the discourse regarding the latter. The deontic type also shows frame-like features through relating to the preceding discourse in that the set of situations that it presents is also a consequence of the preceding discourse. The V1-declarative thus is not focussed on the transfer of truth, but rather serves as a frame in which another object more apt to convey truth may occur: a V2-declarative sentence. The frame setters cannot only stand at the beginning of a discourse; they can also frame a discourse from the other side, as it is the case concerning the enumerative and causative type of V1-declaratives:

Narrative:

(582) A: Vor wem läufste denn eigentlich weg?

        B: *Bin* ich dann hingegangen, ich sag: „Guten Tag, Frau B., guten Tag, Helga." Und dann dachte ich: sollste ihr auch noch en Kuß geben, nicht.

Causative:

(583) Dieses Urteil ist eine moralische Ohrfeige für Frankreichs Regierung, für Präsident de Gaulle im besonderen. <u>*War*</u> <u>es doch der Staatschef, der</u> <u>anfang 1966 souverän in den Gang der Justiz eingegriffen hatte, als er</u>

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the constitutive claim that a proposition is true is 'in the background'; in the V2-DS it is in 'the foreground' so that only V2-declaratives can literally 'assert' the truth.

erklärte, verantwortlich für das Verbrechen seien nur „vulgäre und subalterne" Franzosen, im übrigen aber Ausländer – eben Marrokaner.

Enumerative:

(584) Die Bundesrepublik wird nach ihrer Unterschrift unter den zu erwartenden Atomsperrvertrag mit leeren Händen dastehen. *Bleibt* die Hoffnung auf eine Enspannung mit nachfolgender Wiedervereinigung.

(Önnerfors 1997: 99)

Though V1-interrogatives showed similarities to V1-conditionals, as discussed in chapter 3 on the basis of Reis/Wöllstein (2010), their situation when it comes to frame-setting is different: The structures provided in (575) and (578) show two different relations of the sets of situations. V1-interrogatives show two disjoint, bi-partitioned classes which is why one class is not capable of framing the other class of situations, neither does one class specify the other then. The specification is given in (578), however, because the sets of situations are presented as one defining the other for being for truth or falsehood. But looking back at the assumption by Reis/Wöllstein (2010) that V1-interrogatives and V1-conditionals show similarities, it has to be mentioned that the parallelism is not drawn between protasis/apodosis and V1-interrogative question of speaker/V2-declarative answer of addressee; they rather sketch the similarity between the relation of protasis/apodosis and the link between the V1-interrogative answer of the speaker and what the speaker utters as a consequence, following the addressee's answer *yes* or *no* (cf. Reis/Wöllstein 2010: 135):

(585) Bianca: Hast du dein Jäckchen mitgenommen??

Janina: Ja.

Bianca: Dann wird dir nicht mehr kalt sein.

→ Hast du dein Jäckchen mitgenommen, (dann) wird dir nicht mehr kalt sein.

Intonation can perhaps be viewed as an indicator of the presence of a frame: All the frames that have been presented show a co-occurrence with falling tune. Falling tune has been only associated with informative and assertive objects so far, whereas a rise was pondered to induce an inquisitive nature.

This thought about intonation leads me to a final thought about informativity and frames: Whether the V1-imperative sentence can be seen as frame, is a tricky issue. It attributes a property to an addressee in accordance to which the addressee is supposed to act in order to make a certain situation become reality. Seen like this, the imperative sentence would create a domain in reference to which the outcome of the addressee' actions and attempts to make the proposition of the imperative become true would be evaluated. But since I have to admit that I am not sure that this is the right analysis of the imperative, I do not want to fixate on this perspective. The reason why I thought about this kind of analysis is that the imperative sentence is neither an assertive nor an inquisitive object which would make it informative as a logical consequence to me (hence the illustration above with which I am not fully satisfied). The question then is whether informative objects are always frame setters. This question would then have to be applied to the optative sentence as well, because it is neither inquisitive nor informative like it is the case with imperative. But I do not have a clear solution for this problematic question so far.

Now, the question is how V1-sentences behave towards the common ground. This question is relevant, because – as was shown above – the propositional content of a V1-sentence differs in presentation of its denotation from V2-sentences. V1-sentences can be either inquisitive (V1-interrogatives) or informative (V1-declarative, -imperative and -protasis in a conditional sentence). Since the phenomenon of assertion was closely examined in chapter 4 with respect to its effect on the common ground, the same should be done concerning non-assertive objects, too. This is going to happen in section 5.

5.3 Cache and Common Ground

Fronting of finiteness brings about frame setting, feature checking and discourse anchoring. It does not trigger assertion in a neutral context and thus does not enrich the common ground either. The fronting of an [-wh]-XP to the SpecCP in combination with fronting of

finiteness identifies a single class of events and is the link to inserting true information into the common ground. Therefore, I assume the *Vorfeld* of German to be an opener to the common ground in case the fronted XP is [-wh]. This opening-function allows a true proposition to be added to the common ground.

It has been argued that V1 is not a good prototypical candidate for adding true propositions into the common ground. It has to be acknowledged, however, that this does not to mean that the whole information content uttered in a V1-sentence is lost in a black hole despite utterance, is excluded from the common ground and therefore irrelevant to the overall discourse. What is rather the case is that fronting of finiteness manages to establish discourse anchoring in the shape of feature checking, but that a missing [-wh]-XP in the prefield – no matter if articulated or dropped – also causes a lack of addition of the propositional content of the V1-sentence to the common ground. As long as only V1-root clauses are pronounced, the content has no chance of being recognised as belonging to a sort of true story. It has been shown throughout this dissertation in many ways that V2-declaratives are the prototypes of the German language of proclaiming a judgment in the Fregian sentence and therefore conveying truth. V1-sentences are relevant to a discourse, but no single situations can be identified in them due to the lack of topicalization, the propositions they contain cannot enter the common ground. The reason for this is that the common ground is made up of true propositions. The propositions that are displayed via V1-sentences are therefore stored in a cache as long as truth cannot be resolved:

Nathalie and Dennis enter the office. Janina is sitting at the desk:

(586) Nathalie: Waren wir gerade bei Horst. War er total außer sich. War er doch glatt in Apfeldorf.

Janina: Ja, und? Was war in Apfeldorf los?

Dennis: Horst hat in Apfeldorf Häuser gesehen.

A	Table	B
p	**V2-proposition Cache:**	*DC$_B$*

	V1-proposition₁ **V1-proposition₂** **V1-proposition₃**	
Common Ground cg	**Projected Set ps:** $s \cup \{p\} \vee s \cup \{\neg p\}$	**Cache:** **V1-proposition₁** **V1-proposition₂** **V1-proposition₃** (etc.)
A	**Table**	**B**
p	**V2-proposition:** Horst hat in Apfeldorf Häuser gesehen**.** **Cache:** **V1-proposition₁:** Waren wir gerade bei Horst. **V1-proposition₂:** War er total außer sich. **V1-proposition₃:** War er doch glatt in Apfeldorf.	DC_B
Common Ground cg	**Projected Set ps:** $s \cup \{p\} \vee s \cup \{\neg p\}$	

What could be seen concerning the V1-sentences that have been analysed is that a V2-declarative clause is inevitable in the matter of focusing truth. Without them, a question like

the one in (586) cannot be properly answered and the pronounced content cannot enter the common ground the same way a V2-declarative with falling sentence tune can.

Thus, as soon as this V2-declarative needed in the relevant context is provided, the cache can be cleared, too, and the truth of the asserted proposition can be acknowledged and hence allow for the V1-content that is linked to the assertive sentence to be dragged along out of the cache onto the table and thereby into the common ground.

V1-interrogatives cannot denote truth, but the speaker can use them to signal to the addressee that she is searching for a true answer, and thus, for an assertion. Thereby, she asks (figuratively speaking) the addressee to turn the bi-partition that is inquisitive in nature into a true answer via reducing the bi-partition to the class of situations that is true in the actual world:

Nathalie turns to Janina:

(587) Nathalie: Hat Horst Häuser in Apfeldorf gesehen?

Janina: Ja, hat er.

A	Table	B
p	**V2-proposition** **Cache:** **V1-proposition$_1$** **V1-proposition$_2$** **V1-proposition$_3$**	DC_B
Common Ground cg	**Projected Set ps:** $s \cup \{p\} \vee s \cup \{\neg p\}$	

A	Table	B
p	**V2-proposition:** Horst hat in Apfeldorf Häuser gesehen. **Cache:**	DC_B

	V1-proposition₁:	
	Hat Horst in Apfeldorf Häuser gesehen?	
Common Ground cg	**Projected Set ps:** s ∪ {p} ∨ s ∪ {¬p}	

Once the bi-partition is reduced, the reduced content can be added to the common ground. The V1-interrogative itself or rather its content alone cannot be added to the common ground, or at least not to the part of the common ground that holds only asserted true propositions or judgment respectively.

The same is the case with imperatives. The speaker that utters an imperative directs the addressee to act in a way that makes the proposition of the imperative sentence true. In case the addressee acts along the line of the speaker's directions, the proposition can be asserted:

(588)   Nina: Liebe Kolleg*innen! Tragt bitte die Kommentare ins System ein!

The comments are inserted into the system, according to Nina's request:

(589)   Nina: Liebe Kolleg*innen! Vielen Dank! Die Kommentare wurden ins System eingetragen.

A	Table	B
p	**V2-proposition** **Cache:** **V1-proposition₁** **V1-proposition₂** **V1-proposition₃**	DC_B
Common Ground cg	**Projected Set ps:** s ∪ {p} ∨ s ∪ {¬p}	**Cache:** **V1-proposition₁**

		V1-proposition$_2$
		V1-proposition$_3$
		(etc.)

A	Table	B
p	**V2-proposition:** Die Kommentare wurden ins System eingetragen. **Cache:** **V1-proposition$_1$:** Tragt bitte die Kommentare ins System ein!	DC_B
Common Ground cg	**Projected Set ps:** $s \cup \{p\} \lor s \cup \{\neg p\}$	**Cache:** **V1-proposition$_1$:** Tragt bitte die Kommentare ins System ein! (etc.)

Sentence (588) is an imperative sentence that does not reveal a situation that reflects the actual world, as the propositional content is something the speaker desires to become true and thus orders the addressee to act by. After the addressee's action is as such that speaker's directions have been followed, the world has been changed in way that the proposition of the originally imperative sentence has been realised, it can be asserted. That way, the proposition that is intended from the speaker to be realised by the addressee can enter the common ground, as it has become true and assertable. Optative sentences do not display a true statement either. The similarity to the imperative sentence has already been pointed out as well as the core difference between them.

A sole chain of V1-sentences cannot infer judgment, cannot convey truth and thereby not reach the common ground to introduce new commitments to propositions that are valued as true. A V2-declarative then drag along all the information that has piled up in the cache and adds it to the common ground.

Informative content is considered as updating content by Ciardelli & Groenendijk & Roelofsen (2017). The difference I see is that the lack of judgment that is linked to the lack of assertion does not allow the propositions represented by the V1-constructions to enter the same realm of the common ground. If we go back the definition of the common ground, it was said that the common ground is the knowledge that is shared by discourse participants and of which the discourse participants know that it is shared among them (cf. Krifka /Musan 2012: 1). But there is a difference between mutually sharing knowledge and mutually sharing knowing and accepting it as true. Thus, I suggest that the informative content that is represented by V1-sentences enters an area of the common ground in which the knowledge has not been accepted as true yet. They are buffered in the cache on the table. Inquisitive objects cannot enter this area, because the alternatives they represent are a bi-partitioned room of answers at least, which is why they are not reduced enough to enter the informative area of the common ground. Assertive objects cannot only enter the area reserved for informative objects, as they deliver an information update, but can also be inserted in a space of the common ground that hold knowledge that is accepted to be true.

5.4 Interim Conclusion

This chapter extracted the relevant information that was found in chapters 3 and 4 and set this information in relation to the issues of discourse environment, intonation, frame-setting, the denotation of V1-sentences and the behaviour of V1-sentences towards the common ground. It was found that the single specificities of V1-sentences are not equally relevant to the listed topics: Apart from the repeatedly discussed impact of fronting of finiteness and XP-movement to SpecCP on the syntactic level, the morphological features and prosodic displayed an impact on the position a V1-sentence can take in a discourse, though the distribution of impact was not the same concerning each sentence mood. Intonation also showed to have an effect on the denotation of a V1-sentence, particularly in the comparison

of sentence moods that are turned into questions via a rising tune. Here, the denotation (for example with imperatives that were turned into echo-questions) could be changed from representing an informative object to an inquisitive object. Speaking about inquisitive and informative objects, V1-sentences have shown to be able to belong to either class, depending on their syntactic, morphological, lexical and prosodic features, but they could not be assigned to the class of assertive objects. This is the coherent trait they share. It was traced back to their lack of ability when it comes to presenting truth; this lack of ability was first and foremost (but not solely) missing [-XP]-movement to SpecCP, although discourse anchoring had taken place and therefore the first step to the possibility of proclaiming a judgment had been provided. The step that is not taken by missing out on filling the prefield, is the identification of one single class of situations that is foregrounded and presented as true. The result is that the propositional content of V1-sentences can be placed on the table, alongside V2-declaratives with a falling sentence tune, but that the V1-sentences are put in a different space on the table: the cache. The buffering in this area is synonymous with the addition of the informative propositional content of the non-inquisitive V1-sentence to an area of the common ground that is preserved for knowledge that is not specifically labelled as true knowledge. True knowledge – prototypically transferred via a V2-declarative with falling intonation – is stored in different area of the common ground.

6 Conclusion

The intention in this dissertation was to find out what is special about V1-sentences. The ideas that led up to it were pondered in the beginning of this work (cf. chapter 1). For this purpose, it was established what sentence mood is and which features are relevant concerning the composition of sentence mood (cf. chapter 2). The term *composition* or *compositional* as well as *complex sign* remained important from the beginning to the end, because the discussion attempted to show that no silent material is needed in order to approach sentence mood. Aside from the relevant characteristics assembled by Altmann (1993) that were a huge basis to the overall analysis, the relation between speaker and addressee and its grammatical representation were deemed relevant which is why it was

asked, too, which objects display a *speaking to*-relationship and which ones display a *speaking about*-relationship, for instance. The possibility of speaking about an entity was then considered essential to the proclamation of judgment, because a lack of a full-fledged inflectional paradigm on the verb meant a lack of context index specifications (tense and mood) which only made it possible to attribute properties to an addressee, but blocked the transfer of truth in language. Another aspect closely linked to the matter of truth and judgment was the categorisation of sentences alongside their semantic denotations. The significant categories were: inquisitive, informative and assertive, whereas the latter was discussed as the only category that was related to the proclamation of judgment. The listed categories and features that were sort out to make up the complex sign of a sentence mood were there applied to the different objects, including conditional sentence which would be mentioned separately, because they do not constitute a separate sentence mood (cf. chapter 3). What resulted from this overview was a diverse and complex distribution of the features among the distinct sentence moods; whereas categorial filling turned out to be hugely decisive considering the different types of V1-declaratives (types of verbs, modal particles) and relevant but not as relevant to exclamatory and optative sentences (modal particles and interjections), morphological features, for instance, were more definitory for optative (Konjunktiv II) and imperative sentences (imperative) and somehow relevant to interrogatives (use of Konjunktiv I was problematic). Intonation was shown to have a more significant role than originally assumed. This also showed in the final chapter (cf. chapter 5) which concentrated on V1-sentences separately.

Before entering the final chapter, however, the question about how assertion is brought about through language was tackled. This was important, because assertion is tightly bound to judgment and truth, which is it had to be illustrated what kinds of sentences can actually host assertion. What came across was that two major syntactic transformations are necessary: i. fronting of finiteness, ii. [-wh]-movement to SpecCP. This formalisation based on the three Fregian steps to the proclamation of judgment were slightly tarnished by the influence of intonation in reference to rising declaratives. It was shown that the assertion was shadowed with a touch of bias as soon as the falling tune was changed to a rising tune by a speaker. Furthermore, the rising tune blocked the free use of a V2-declarative concerning the

positioning of the same in the discourse. Initial use was only possible in non-neutral and restricted contexts. Additionally, intonation was shown to bring about a shift in commitment, too. Speaker commitment in canonical V2-declaratives with progredient falling intonation are associated with full commitment on the side of the speaker, whereas the commitment in rising declaratives was split between speaker and addressee, and fully transferred to the addressee in the case of interrogative sentences.

Assertion and the findings from chapter 3 were a major in chapter 5 then: Because the link between assertion, judgment and truth was supported through the discussion in chapter 4 and the tests for assertion (question-answer-pairs, verum-focus, assertive modal particles) that were provided in it, V1-sentences could be excluded from the class of assertive objects. This was furthered with the help of situation semantics through which V1-sentences could be analysed as either inquisitive of informative, but not as assertive, because they could not be associated with the reduction of sets of situations to one single set of situations that is meant to focus the truth of a sentence. The discussed features from chapter 2 and chapter 3 and the results from chapter 4 were then included into the analysis and showed further restrictions on V1-sentences like on the discourse environment and thus discourse positioning, on the behaviour of one group of V1-sentences as frame-setters (particularly V1-declaratives and -conditionals) and the distinct distribution of V1-sentences on Farkas'/Bruce's model of the table and, synonymously, in the common ground. Here, intonation showed surprisingly higher influence on the positioning in the discourse and the analysis with respect to the semantic denotation of sentence and the classification as an inquisitive, informative or assertive object that comes with it. It has to be said though that rising declaratives displayed a higher influence of syntax concerning the overall definition of a sentence as assertive or non-assertive, since the bias that is induced in a V2-declarative through a rising tune does not fully erase a speaker's judgment or commitment to the judgment, but only partially.

The question *What is so special about V1?* received a manifold answer in this dissertation: This answer was mainly construed of the verification of hypotheses i-viii in chapter 3:

i. Concerning the V1-declarative, Declarative sentence mood is evoked through an empty prefinite position in front of a full-fledged finite verb and progredient falling intonation.

ii. Concerning the V1-interrogative, interrogative sentence mood is evoked through a progredient final rising contour and an empty prefinite position.

iii. Imperative sentence mood is evoked through imperative verbal mood. The directive character is produced through person and number of the semi-finite verb.

iv. Optative sentence mood is evoked through *Konjunktiv II* and is supported by modal particles and a reduction to irreality and counterfactuality takes place. Modal particles abolish the negated element of the V1-interrogative sentence.

v. The protasis of conditional adverbial sentences can only be distinguished from V1-interrogatives, -declaratives and -optatives in connection with its apodosis. The apodosis reduces the alternatives that the protasis entails (p v ¬p).

vi. The exclamatory sentence does not represent a sentence mood of its own. This is due to the possibility of imitating every sentence mood as long as the exclamatory accent is present.

vii. Sentence moods are not built on silent operators, but are composed through overt features.

viii. Non-assertiveness is evoked through an empty prefinite position and/or the lack of fronting of finiteness.

The core issue of syntactic ambiguity was resolved in decomposing the single sentence moods into their relevant elements. The argumentation in chapter 3 has shown that sentence moods are distinguishable via overt means: V1-declaratives and -interrogatives contrast in intonation and discourse sequencing, both differ from optative sentences concerning the need of Konjunktiv II in optative sentences and the their affinity towards modal particles or a specific accent; adverbial sentences resemble V1-declaratives, -interrogatives and -optatives, but they always appear in syntactic pairs of protasis and apodosis and can therefore be distinguished through discourse sequencing as well. Imperatives differ from all the other V1-

sentences in that they are the only sentence mood who is essentially defined on the use of a semi-finite verb. Exclamatory sentences have been treated as copies of all the other sentence mood and have thus not been assigned a sentence mood of their own.

The findings of chapter 3 resulted in further realisations: The absence or presence of the listed features has an influence on the denotation of a sentence in reference to the identification of situations. Assertions were declared to identify one specific event or situation which is closely bound to the pronunciation of judgment and the transfer of truth to an addressee. V1-sentences lacked this ability: They could not be categorised as means of communicating judgment or truth; they rather signify a type that represents openness. This circumstance is first and foremost brought about through the empty prefinite position. Other factors like imperative mood and the lack of index realisation that comes with it, are supporting factors, but the sole emptiness in front of the finite verb is sufficient to likewise express a lack of judgment.

To instantiate judgment and truth in a semantic sense independent of a specific context, one therefore needs two essential operations:

1. Fronting of finiteness
2. Movement of [-wh]-phrase to the prefinite position

Thus, the core findings drawn from this dissertation are:

i. Sentence moods differentiated through overt literal material of the categories: categorial filling, verb morphology, intonation and syntax/discourse sequencing. No covert illocutionary operators are necessary concerning the definition and differentiation of sentence moods.

ii. V1-sentences signal openness and therefore a lack of judgment and a lack of the foregrounding of truth which likewise means a lack of assertion. Two operations are needed to instantiate judgment and truth and the identification of one specific situation: 1. Fronting of finiteness; 2. Movement of [-wh]-phrase to the prefinite position

iii.   Propositions can only enter the common ground and be accepted as true as soon as a V2-declarative sentence is uttered. In case a chain of V1-sentences is expressed in a narration, the propositions are dragged along by a V2-declarative sentence and enter the common ground with it.

This, in conclusion, is what is so special about V1-sentences.

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