Relative performance evaluation in executive compensation : investigating the effects of relative performance bonuses on individual strategies and market dynamics through an experimental approach / by Dmitrii Galkin. Wuppertal, [2024]
Content
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- General Introduction
- Background and Motivation
- Foundational Concepts
- Existing Empirical Evidence
- Research Objective and Methodology
- Thesis Overview and Contributions
- Framework
- Chapter Overview
- RPEs and Executive Compensation
- Introduction
- Theoretical Framework
- Experimental Design
- Experimental Results
- Discussion
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- Tables
- Challenges of Running Online Experiment
- Additional Analyses
- Instructions
- RPEs and Collusion
- Introduction
- Theoretical Background
- One-shot Game: Symmetric and Asymmetric Manager Remuneration
- Repeated Game: Symmetric Manager Remuneration
- Repeated Game: Asymmetric Manager Remuneration
- Stability of Collusive Behaviour
- Implicit and Explicit Collusion
- Experimental Design
- Experimental Results
- Discussion
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- Additional Tables
- Alternating Monopoly
- Experimental Instructions
- RPEs without Competitors
- Introduction
- Framework and Practical Implications
- Formal Model
- Comparative Statics
- Specifications of the RPE Component
- Practical Implications
- Discussion
- Empirical Validation
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- Calculations and Proofs
- Examples of RPE
- RPE Usage and Peer Group Type
- Possible Extension
- Conclusion
- Bibliography