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Relative performance evaluation in executive compensation : investigating the effects of relative performance bonuses on individual strategies and market dynamics through an experimental approach / by Dmitrii Galkin. Wuppertal, [2024]
Content
List of Figures
List of Tables
General Introduction
Background and Motivation
Foundational Concepts
Existing Empirical Evidence
Research Objective and Methodology
Thesis Overview and Contributions
Framework
General Framework
Thesis-specific Framework
Chapter Overview
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
RPEs and Executive Compensation
Introduction
Theoretical Framework
Experimental Design
Experimental Market
Materials and Procedures
Experimental Sample
Experimental Results
Discussion
Conclusion
Appendices
Tables
Challenges of Running Online Experiment
Additional Analyses
Instructions
RPEs and Collusion
Introduction
Theoretical Background
One-shot Game: Symmetric and Asymmetric Manager Remuneration
Repeated Game: Symmetric Manager Remuneration
Repeated Game: Asymmetric Manager Remuneration
Stability of Collusive Behaviour
Implicit and Explicit Collusion
Experimental Design
Market Setup
Methods
Sample
Experimental Results
First look at the Data
Hypothesis Testing
Discussion
Conclusion
Appendices
Additional Tables
Alternating Monopoly
Experimental Instructions
RPEs without Competitors
Introduction
Framework and Practical Implications
Formal Model
Comparative Statics
Specifications of the RPE Component
Practical Implications
Discussion
Empirical Validation
Experimental Design Proposal
Notes on Practical Implementation
Discussion
Conclusion
Appendices
Calculations and Proofs
Examples of RPE
RPE Usage and Peer Group Type
Possible Extension
Conclusion
Summary
Implications
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
Closing Words
Bibliography