

**On the Interpretation of Perspective-dependent
Expressions in the Complement Clauses of
Propositional Attitude Verbs**

Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der
Philosophie in der Fakultät für Geistes- und
Kulturwissenschaften der Bergischen Universität Wuppertal

vorgelegt von

Christopher Saure

geb. am 10.12.1989

in Remscheid

Wuppertal, den 23. April 2025

Acknowledgments

I would have never been able to complete the long and exhausting process of writing this PhD thesis without the support of many amazing people both in my professional and private life.

First and foremost, I want to express my deep and heartfelt gratitude to my first supervisor Stefan Hinterwimmer for his encouragement and his invaluable guidance throughout. He was always happy to offer me insightful advice and constructive feedback in countless engaging discussions, yet also showed his faith in my abilities by allowing me enough space and freedom to forge my own path. Perhaps most importantly, his calm and reassuring attitude helped me stay optimistic and motivated during even the most stressful of times.

I would also like to thank my second supervisor, Horst Lohnstein, who is primarily responsible for igniting my interest in linguistics in the first place. Throughout my academic career, he has been and continues to be an incredibly inspiring role model and mentor due to his vast knowledge, contagious enthusiasm as a teacher and scholar and sheer human decency.

I want to extend my gratitude to the other members of my dissertation committee, Svetlana Petrova and Nathalie Staratscheck, in general for their interest in my research and their helpful comments during my defense, and Svetlana Petrova specifically for all of her support in furthering my scientific career.

I also thank all my colleagues at the SFB “Prominence in Language” for their valuable advice as well as the many enjoyable and inspiring exchanges we had. I had the incredible luxury of being supported in setting up the experimental studies for my dissertation by the competent members of project C05 “Discourse referents as perspectival centers” – without their help and input, the design and implementation of the experiments would have been vastly inferior. I am especially indebted to Sara Meuser and Anna Pia Jordan-Bertinelli for sharing their knowledge on experimental design with me and for instructing me on how to properly use R for data analysis. I want to give special thanks to Pia Wurm, Carolin Menneke and Maike Biefel for their invaluable help in creating the test items for my experimental studies, for putting up with all my nitpicking without the slightest complaint and, to Maike specifically, for staying with the project a few months longer in order to help me set up my final experiment. It would probably have taken me a year more to finish this dissertation without their support. I also need to thank my a.r.t.e.s. classmates, both for their

helpful and illuminating feedback on my early chapters and for the wonderful and productive time during our writing retreat.

I am thankful to Susanne Uhmann, Katarina Colomo, Antonios Tsiknakis, Sonja Taigel, Birte Kellermeier-Rehbein and Volker Struckmeier for their support and numerous stimulating and interesting conversations.

I am very fortunate to count many of my colleagues among my closest friends: Many thanks to Sarah Pottgießer for brightening up each day at work with her cheerful and friendly attitude and for being the best office mate one could have asked for. Thank you to Dennis Wegerhoff for constantly providing me with insightful advice, engaging discussions and hilarious memes. I am also incredibly grateful to Nathalie Fromm and Nicholas Catasso for the many relaxing and entertaining coffee breaks, their encouragements and their immensely helpful moral support during the final stretch of writing. Thanks to Daniel Teich for being willing to read an earlier draft of this dissertation and offering incredibly useful feedback.

I want to give special thanks to Giannina Jungtow, Patrick Wunder and Sebastian Thiel for being a constant source of emotional and moral strength to me during the last 20 or more years and for helping me grow as a person. Your friendship means the world to me. I also would like to thank my friends Milan Lindau, Diana Wegerhoff, Benny Borgwardt, Johanna Strotmann, Anne Glenk, Daniel Hemsath, Victoria Steffen and Hanna Rumpf for all the words of encouragement, the many distracting and fun activities together as well as for their tremendous help in keeping my sanity intact during this long and arduous process.

Finally, I want to thank my family, in particular my sister and my brother-in-law, Vanessa and Joscha Eckardt, my nephew and my niece, Jannes and Rieke, and especially my parents, Andrea and Michael Saure, to whom I dedicate this book. I would never have been able to complete this journey without their incredible and unrelenting support, patience and love.

Contents

Acknowledgments	I
List of Tables	VI
List of Figures	VII
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Perspective and Indirect Discourse	1
1.2 Assumptions and Research Goals	8
1.3 Structure of the Thesis	12
2 Deixis, Context and Shifts in Perspective	15
2.1 Perspective-dependent Expressions	17
2.1.1 Origo, Deictic Dimensions and Tense	17
2.1.2 Kaplan’s Pure Indexicals and the Context of Use	23
2.1.3 Non-deictic Perspective-dependent Expressions: Epithets, Demonstrative Pronouns and other Evaluative Elements	25
2.2 Perspectivization in Speech and Thought Reports	35
2.3 Perspective Shift in Indirect Discourse	49
2.3.1 Shifty Indexicals and Monstrous Operators	49
2.3.2 Monsters in German?	64
2.3.3 Context Shift in English or German Indirect Discourse	69
3 The Potential for Multiperspectivity in Narration	78
3.1 Narratological Background	80
3.2 Perspectivization in Narration	85
3.2.1 Free Indirect Discourse: The Epitome of Narrative Multiperspectivity?	85
3.2.2 Indirect Discourse in Narrative Contexts	88
3.3 Experiment 1	96
3.3.1 General Description	96
3.3.2 Method	97
3.3.3 Hypotheses	102
3.3.4 Results and Discussion	103

CONTENTS

3.3.5	Effects of Attitude Verbs and Temporal Indexicals	106
4	Perspective Shift in Free Indirect Discourse	110
4.1	The Relationship between Indirect Discourse and Free Indirect Discourse	112
4.2	Analyses of Free Indirect Discourse: Double-context and Mixed Quotation Approaches	116
5	Discourse Prominence	128
5.1	Definition of Prominence	132
5.2	Perspectival Prominence	138
5.2.1	Locally and Globally Prominent Protagonists	138
5.2.2	Prominent Narrators vs. Prominent Protagonists	145
5.3	Experiment 2	155
5.3.1	General Description	155
5.3.2	Method	156
5.3.3	Hypotheses	160
5.3.4	Results and Discussion	162
5.4	Experiment 3	166
5.4.1	General Description	166
5.4.2	Method	168
5.4.3	Hypotheses	172
5.4.4	Results and Discussion	175
5.5	Prominence and Indirect Discourse	178
5.6	Experiment 4	190
5.6.1	General Description	190
5.6.2	Method	192
5.6.3	Hypotheses	199
5.6.4	Results and Discussion	201
5.6.5	Effects of Temporal Indexicals	207
5.7	Narrator Comments and Free Indirect Discourse	210
6	Propositional Attitudes Verbs and Thought Events	220
6.1	Event Semantics	224
6.2	Classification of Propositional Attitude Verbs	229
6.3	Thought Events and the <i>de dicto</i> / <i>de re</i> Ambiguity	245
7	Conclusion	252
	Bibliography	265
	List of Appendices	

A Experimental Items – Experiment 1	285
B Experimental Items – Experiment 2	286
C Experimental Items – Experiment 3	287
D Experimental Items – Experiment 4	289

List of Tables

1	Mean acceptability ratings (model estimate) and 95%-confidence intervals for Experiment 1	103
2	Mean acceptability ratings (model estimate) and 95%-confidence intervals for propositional attitude verbs and temporal indexicals	107
3	Mean continuous scale choice ratings (model estimate) and 95%-confidence intervals for Experiment 2.	162
4	Mean continuous scale choice ratings (model estimate) and 95%-confidence intervals for Experiment 3.	175
5	Mean continuous scale choice ratings (model estimate) and 95%-confidence intervals for Experiment 4.	202
6	Mean continuous scale choice ratings (model estimate) and 95%-confidence intervals for temporal indexicals	207

List of Figures

1	The semiotic triangle (adapted from Ogden & Richards (1923))	18
2	Relation of speech time (S), event time (E) and reference time (R) in the six German tense forms	22
3	Typology of context-shifting operators (Anand 2006: 110)	55
4	Implicational hierarchy of indexical classes: Indexicals of a certain class may shift only if indexicals of classes farther to the left shift as well (cf. Deal 2020: 54, Deal 2017: 8f.).	60
5	Implicational hierarchy of verbs (cf. Deal 2020: 51, Deal 2017: 27). . .	63
6	Example stimulus from Experiment 1 in Anderson (2019: 42)	74
7	Example stimulus from Experiment 1 in Anderson (2019: 42)	95
8	Acceptability ratings on a Likert scale from 1-7 (1 = not acceptable, 7 = completely acceptable) for Experiment 1	104
9	Comparison of acceptability ratings distribution for all conditions in Experiment 1	104
10	Comparison of acceptability ratings distribution for all verbs and in- dexicals	107
11	Interaction plots for conditions & propositional attitude verbs as well as conditions & temporal indexicals	108
12	Example item for Experiment 2, including the subsequent question and the corresponding scale displaying the two possible answers . . .	160
13	Mean continuous scale choice ratings (model estimate) on a scale between 0 and 100 for Experiment 2. A rating between 0 and 49 indicates a tendency to interpret the FID clause from the perspective of the narrator, while a rating between 51 and 100 indicates a ten- dency to interpret the FID clause from the perspective of the locally prominent protagonist.	163

LIST OF FIGURES

14	Mean continuous scale choice ratings (model estimate) on a scale between 0 and 100 for Experiment 3. A rating between 0 and 49 indicates a tendency to interpret the FID clause from the perspective of the narrator, while a rating between 51 and 100 indicates a tendency to interpret the FID clause from the perspective of the prominent protagonist.	176
15	Example item for Experiment 4, including the subsequent question and the corresponding scale displaying the two possible answers . . .	199
16	Mean continuous scale choice ratings (model estimate) on a scale between 0 and 100 for Experiment 4. A rating between 0 and 49 indicates a tendency to interpret temporal indexicals from the perspective of the speaker/narrator, while a rating between 51 and 100 indicates a tendency to interpret temporal indexicals from the perspective of the author.	202
17	Distribution of data points on a scale from 0-100 for the indexicals used in Experiment 4	208
18	Interaction plot for conditions & temporal indexicals	209
19	Implicational hierarchy of verbs (cf. Deal 2020: 51, Deal 2017: 27). . .	222

1 Introduction

1.1 Perspective and Indirect Discourse

Among the many useful and diverse abilities we can utilize due to the properties of the human language system, one of the most intricate and helpful ones is our ability to understand and interpret the perspectives of other people. Not only can we use speech to voice our own opinions or thoughts on people, objects or the current state of the world itself (as well as other possible alternatives to our current world); it also allows us to learn how other members of our society think or feel about the world or the (living and non-living) entities existing in it. Thus, we can gain insight into their point of view, their thought process and their emotional state of mind that general non-verbal communication such as facial expressions or gestures cannot provide to such an extent and with a comparable level of complexity.¹

The benefits of this ability are two-fold: From a purely pragmatic, social standpoint, being aware of the perspectives, attitudes and opinions of others informs our interactions with and affects our feelings about them, and helps us navigate through life by minimizing unnecessary conflict. For example, the very basic knowledge, gained through everyday conversation, that your partner thinks your next-door neighbor Kevin is a creep will most likely impact your plans of inviting Kevin over for dinner. In general, being confronted with other perspectives that may clash with our own view of the world might not only make us rethink our own perspective on things, it can also help us become more open-minded and empathetic individuals. This awareness, gradually developed throughout early childhood, that one's own perception of the world is highly subjective and may strongly differ from other people's perceptions can therefore be regarded as "a precondition for social interaction through language" (Sanders 1994: 3).

From a linguistic standpoint, the ability to interpret a person's perspective through their language use allows us to get a glimpse into their mindset and thought process and thus can help us gain a better understanding of how the human mind works, which is one of the core aims of linguistic research. Similarly, by analyzing

¹It has to be noted that this is not meant to entail the use of facial expressions and gestures as part of sign languages, which are natural languages with their own lexicon and set of grammatical rules. Like any complex natural language, they provide their users with a skill set to interpret perspective through language use. For research on perspective-taking in sign language, please see Cormier et al. (2015), Quer (2005 & 2013) and Herrmann & Steinbach (2012).

exactly which factors of speech steer, constrain and enable us to hear or read a sentence and then correctly understand not just what information the sentence is conveying, but also from whose perspective things are being reported, we can better comprehend how the hearer or reader processes language in their mind to constantly update their knowledge and view of the world. Perspectivization thus needs to be regarded as an essential part of human existence and as a key property of language. Accordingly, perspective-taking has been a popular and intriguing topic of research for linguistic scholars from the fields of syntax, semantics as well as pragmatics for several decades.

This doctoral thesis aims to further explore the properties and boundaries of perspective interpretation by focusing on a specific subclass of syntactic structures in German, namely on indirect discourse clauses containing deictic temporal adverbials as in (1).

- (1) *Martin dachte, dass Sabrina heute sehr nervös wirkte.*

‘Martin thought that Sabrina seemed very nervous today.’

To be more precise, my goal is to investigate if structures like (1), in which the thought of a referent, in this case Martin, is rendered via indirect discourse (ID), allow for deictic expressions to be interpreted from said referent’s perspective instead of the default perspectival center’s point of view, which is the speaker of the overall utterance. As will be shown shortly, the common claim among most approaches focusing on perspective-taking is that ID does not possess the ability to shift to other perspectives, in contrast to other forms of speech and thought representation such as free indirect discourse (FID). My central hypothesis is that this is false and that ID does, in fact, allow perspective shifting away from the point of view of the speaker. By focusing on narration and several key factors influencing the interpretation of ID, such as the prominence of the available discourse referents, it will be shown through a number of experimental studies how perspectivization in ID can be controlled in such a way that the matrix subject of the embedded clause becomes the preferred perspectival center instead of the matrix speaker. I will elaborate on my core hypotheses, the design of my experiments and the structure of the thesis in Sections 1.2 and 1.3. Before I go into further detail about the theories and arguments brought forward in previous works on the topic, I want to provide a first, general description both of the properties of ID as well as of what perspective-taking/perspective interpretation encompasses and how perspective(s) can be introduced, expressed and marked linguistically.

To start with, it should be noted that, while sentences, phrases and texts may differ in how prominently they express a certain perspective, perspectivization is generally ubiquitous in all syntactic structures. Perspectivization thus needs to be viewed as a scalar property of language – the question is not if a given sentence or utterance is filtered through a specific perspective, but how prominently said per-

spective is expressed and how strongly and explicitly it affects the structure and content of the utterance. We can observe how perspective-taking generally works by looking at the interpretation of some simple sentences containing perspective-dependent expressions. Expressions can be called ‘perspective-dependent’ if their interpretation is determined by the point of view or perspective from which the utterance is made. They include, *inter alia*, deictic terms like *ich* (‘I’), *heute* (‘today’) or *hier* (‘here’), evaluative terms or phrases such as epithets as well as verb tense. In everyday conversation, such expressions are automatically and naturally interpreted from the perspective – or, as we may also say, from the *context* – of whoever is currently speaking, i.e., the speaker (cf. Doron 1991: 58, Harris 2012: 98). The examples in (2) illustrate the speaker’s role as the default perspectival center:

- (2) a. I believe that idiot Paul is late again.
 b. That idiot Paul is late again.

Aside from the declaration that the individual named *Paul* is late, the sentences in (2) also contain a negative evaluation of said individual via the epithet *that idiot*. The difference between (2a) and (2b) is that in (2b), the sentence containing the evaluation of Paul’s character is presented at the root level of the clause, while in (2a), it is embedded in a matrix clause containing the propositional attitude verb *believe*. Propositional attitude verbs such as *glauben* (‘believe’), *denken* (‘think’), *sagen* (‘say’) or *hoffen* (‘hope’) are verbs that introduce a complement clause which in turn expresses a thought, belief, opinion or attitude. The proposition denoted by such a complement clause will be intuitively interpreted by the reader/hearer as expressing a thought/belief attributed to the subject of the matrix clause. In (2a), the subject of the matrix clause is the first-person pronoun *I*. As a deictic expression, its specific denotation has to be derived from the context of utterance. Its lexical meaning, however, determines that it denotes whoever is currently uttering the sentence. Thus, (2a) explicitly highlights that the sentence *that idiot Paul is late again* is meant to be interpreted as a belief belonging to the speaker of the sentence, whoever that may be. However, we arrive at exactly the same conclusion when interpreting (2b), despite the fact that the speaker is not even introduced or referenced. Nevertheless, we understand that referring to Paul with the epithet *that idiot* reflects the point of view of whoever is speaking and expresses an opinion that we, if we knew who Paul was, might possibly even strongly disagree with.

What this is meant to demonstrate is that, without any further context given, we interpret a sentence from the perspective of the speaker, regardless of whether the speaker is referenced or even known to us. However, sentences like the one in (2b) are usually not just stated in a vacuum but instead embedded into a larger discourse unit, which creates a context for the utterance. This context can encompass just the prior sentence spoken, but also the whole discourse situation – for example, a conversation between two co-workers – or, if the sentence is part of a written text

1.1 PERSPECTIVE AND INDIRECT DISCOURSE

like a news article or novel, it could encompass the prior paragraph, chapter or even whole book. Whatever the discourse context may be, particularly in narrative texts, it usually introduces at least one but often multiple individuals aside from the speaker (and hearer) who can then not only function as antecedents for referential expressions such as anaphors, but also as potential *perspectival centers*.² In (3a), the sentence from (2b) is provided with a context that introduces a protagonist, Carla, in the preceding sentence:

- (3) a. Carla was sitting at her desk, drinking a cup of coffee. That idiot Paul was late again.
- b. Carla was sitting at her desk, drinking a cup of coffee. She looked over at the empty desk next to her and sighed with frustration. That idiot Paul was late again.

This in turn leads to a reading that is at least ambiguous – do we interpret (3a) to mean that Paul is an idiot from the speaker’s perspective or from Carla’s? Through the introduction of another potential perspectival anchor, we have opened up the possibility of the context shifting from our default perspectival center, the speaker, to that of another referent, namely Carla. While the discourse context in (3a) is sufficient to create an ambiguous interpretation, (3b) showcases that we can further manipulate or control the preferred sentence reading to favor, in this instance, the protagonist instead of the speaker as perspectival center; the additional sentence in (3b) establishes Carla not just as a discourse referent, but as a potent perspective taker. By making her the experiencer of a perception event (= Carla looking at the empty desk) as well as giving the reader insight into her emotional state (= Carla is frustrated), the reader is prompted to understand the text as being filtered through her perspective, and thus to ascribe the evaluative expression *that idiot* in the final sentence to her as well.

As pointed out by Zeman (2020a: 469), however, this shift in perspective away from the speaker is only possible in very specific contexts: Only (fictional) narratives exhibit an inherent potential for multiperspectivity. Indeed, if we imagine (3a) above to be uttered in a real-life discourse situation of someone talking about a woman they know named Carla, the ambiguity regarding the interpretation of the second sentence disappears completely – the evaluative DP *that idiot Paul* can now only be interpreted to definitely reflect the speaker’s and not necessarily Carla’s opinion. The same applies to (3b), despite the fact that it was manipulated to favor Carla as perspectival center. Narratives, on the other hand, “are perspectival structures par excellence” according to Zeman (2017: 12), as they allow for frequent viewpoint

²A salient discourse agent can be said to be the active *perspectival center* of an utterance or stretch of discourse if the hearer/reader identifies perspective-dependent expressions or thoughts as expressing said discourse agent’s point of view (see, e.g., Hinterwimmer 2019: 81, Harris 2012: 98).

switches both between narrator and protagonist as well as between different characters in the story world (see also, e.g., Hinterwimmer 2020: 530, Fleischman 1991: 31).

This in turn enables narratives to frequently feature grammatical and syntactic structures that appear to be more or less unique to narration, such as FID. Due to their high potential for multiperspectivity, narrative structures thus constitute a particularly fruitful ground for any analysis of perspective-taking. Accordingly, I will henceforth primarily focus on syntactic structures that are to be read as occurring in the context of fictional narration, specifically ones that contain a speech or thought report.

Usually, three different ways of expressing a thought or utterance belonging to a discourse referent are distinguished from each other (cf. Sanders 1994: 12f.):³

- (4) Daniel was sitting in class, listening to a lecture about infinite root clauses.
- a. **Indirect Discourse (ID)**: He thought that his professor was especially boring today.
 - b. **Direct Discourse (DD)**: He thought: “Jeez, my professor is especially boring today!”
 - c. **Free Indirect Discourse (FID)**: Jeez, his professor was especially boring today!

All examples in (4) have the same basic structure and content: The first sentence introduces a protagonist named Daniel and establishes the discourse situation, while the second sentence expresses a thought about Daniel’s professor, attributed to Daniel. Yet the way Daniel’s thought is expressed differs: In (4a), Daniel’s thought is expressed through ID and as such, it is embedded in a matrix clause featuring the author of the thought, Daniel, as its subject and containing a propositional attitude verb, in this case *think*. In (4b), on the other hand, Daniel’s thought is expressed through direct discourse (DD). Similarly to (4a), the thought is introduced by an explicit mention of thinker and propositional attitude verb, but in contrast to ID, the thought is not syntactically subordinated by a matrix clause structure. Instead, it is presented as an independent main clause and an ostensibly direct quote of Daniel’s original thought, both in terms of expression and sentence structure.

Finally, Daniel’s thought is expressed through FID in (4c). FID differs from both ID and DD in that it is not made explicit that the clause is to be interpreted as a thought of Daniel, partially due to the absence of a propositional attitude verb.

³Sanders (1994) introduces an additional fourth type of perspectivization which he calls implicit perspective. The term is used by Sanders to describe utterances that represent a character as “an active consciousness” through the use of, *inter alia*, verbs of perception or evaluative referential descriptions but without expressing an actual, conscious thought or utterance of the character (Sanders 1994: 189). Such implicit expressions of a character’s perspective are labelled *Viewpoint Shifting* by Hinterwimmer (2017), whereas Stokke (2013), for example, speaks of *Protagonist Projection*.

1.1 PERSPECTIVE AND INDIRECT DISCOURSE

Instead, this reading has to be inferred from the previous context, the content of the clause itself as well as several linguistic cues such as the use of the interjection *jeez* (see, e.g., Eckardt 2014: 2, Brocher et al. 2020: 1f.).

A further significant difference between all three modes of representation pertains to the perspective from which the thought is expressed. While ID, DD and FID can all be used to report a referent's thought or utterance, it has been pointed out by numerous scholars that they differ with regard to how accurately the actual perspective of said referent is represented, including their exact choice of words and style of speaking, or to which degree the thought or utterance is filtered through the perspective of the narrator instead. According to Sanders (1994: 190), DD marks "the 'purest' way of attributing the point of view to a person in the discourse", as it "gives (the illusion of) a verbatim representation of an utterance or thought of a quoted speaker/character", whereas ID is "more accessible to the narrator's influence."

ID fundamentally does not allow the use of first-person pronouns to refer to its matrix subject, even when the thought includes a direct reference to its author. Any use of the first-person in ID can exclusively be interpreted as referring to the current (matrix) speaker of the overall discourse context. This characteristic of ID reveals that the embedded proposition is filtered at least to some extent through the perspective of the speaker/narrator, which is also indicated by the use of past tense in the subordinated clause – if the embedded thought was expressed completely through the perspective of its author, we would expect it to not only use the author's actual choice of referential expressions, but also to switch to the tense form used in the original thought or utterance, i.e., present tense. These properties of ID stand in stark contrast to DD, in which both pronouns and tense adjust fully to the perspective of the thought's author. Maier (2017: 260) summarizes these differences as follows:

Semantically, pronouns, tenses, and other indexicals in an English indirect discourse complement are interpreted with respect to the actual reporting utterance context. [...] Indexicals in direct discourse, by contrast, are 'shifted', i.e., interpreted with respect to the context of the reported utterance.

Noticeably, Maier extends his description of the difference between ID and DD to other indexicals aside from pronouns and tenses. According to this definition, two different contexts are active simultaneously: the context of the reporting (= matrix) utterance, i.e., the context of the speaker or narrator, and the context of the reported (= embedded) utterance, i.e., the context of the protagonist whose thought or utterance is conveyed. ID and DD then differ with regard to the context determining the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions: In ID, *all* deictic terms, including temporal and spatial indexicals, are interpreted from the narrator's context, while in DD, they are interpreted from the protagonist's context.

The idea that indexicals of all types in ID are bound by the context of the speaker and cannot shift to any other context goes back to Kaplan (1989), who proposed that all elements in a sentence need to be interpreted with respect to the same context. While this restriction has since been disputed to a certain degree, particularly with respect to FID, as will be shown below, it is generally assumed to hold true for ID in English and German in most academic texts focused on perspectivization in language in general and on the differences between DD, ID and FID specifically: Sharvit (2008: 355), for example, states that it is “impossible” to interpret temporal indexicals such as *today* or *tomorrow* as anything else but denoting the time of reference for the speaker/narrator, an assertion that is shared by Doron (1991: 53), Schlenker (2004: 283f.), Sanders (1994: 48f.) and Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019: 179), among many others.

Approaches that allow or include (partial) context shifts from the speaker’s to a protagonist’s context in ID, on the other hand, are sparse: In his work on German indexicals in reported speech, Plank (1986: 290f.) postulates that temporal and spatial indexicals, but not personal ones, can be interpreted with respect to the time and space of the reported speech act instead of the reporting speech act. Rothkegel (2019) attempts to verify these assumptions empirically, while Anderson (2019) similarly conducts experimental studies on the interpretation of the temporal indexical *tomorrow* in English ID clauses. Dirscherl & Pafel (2015: 31) at least soften the restriction for ID somewhat and only state that an interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions from the speaker’s perspective is the “preferred” option in ID, but that it can indeed contain a verbatim representation of the matrix subject’s thought or utterance as well (cf. Dirscherl & Pafel 2015: 34).

Leaving any further discussion on the behavior of indexicals in ID aside for the moment, a strong counterpoint to Kaplan’s analysis of indexicals is provided via the example of FID. While FID features a matrix clause structure akin to DD, it behaves noticeably different and more similar to ID when it comes to the interpretation of pronouns and tense. Not only do FID clauses feature past tense, third-person pronouns have to be used to refer back to the author of the thought or utterance. The perspectival properties of FID thus appear to match those of ID, which would indicate that FID only allows interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions from the reporting utterance context as well. However, as illustrated by Banfield (1982) in her example from *Women in Love* by D. H. Lawrence, repeated here in (5), temporal indexicals are, in fact, and in apparent contrast to ID, interpreted from the reported utterance context in FID:

- (5) Tomorrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week!
 (Lawrence, *Women in Love*, p. 185; as cited in Banfield (1982: 98) and Schlenker (2004: 280), among others)

The default case for FID therefore seems to be that temporal and spatial indexicals

are interpreted with respect to the author’s context, like in DD, while personal indexicals and tense forms are interpreted from the speaker’s context, like in ID. This has led many scholars to define FID as a “mix” or “hybrid” of direct and indirect discourse (see, e.g., Schlenker 2004: 283, Sharvit 2008: 353, Sanders 1994: 55), and as such, a special case of thought/speech report that uniquely integrates and expresses two separate perspectives or deictic centers simultaneously. For Zeman (2020a: 470), FID thereby provides a striking and distinct example of narrative’s potential for multiperspectivity. Consequently, linguistic research on multiperspectivity and speech/thought representation has been primarily focused on the phenomenon of FID in recent years in order to find an explanation for its non-uniform characteristics.

Perhaps the most popular analysis among proponents of formal semantics is a double-context approach, which entails that in addition to the default context of the speaker C , an additional second context c , belonging to a protagonist in the story, can be made accessible under certain conditions so that said protagonist will serve as the perspectival anchor for the FID clause (see, e.g., Eckardt 2014, also Schlenker 2004). Once a protagonist’s context c has become available, all perspective-dependent expressions with the exception of pronouns and tense will be interpreted with regard to c instead of C in FID. As a counterpoint to this prevalent theory, Maier (2015) argues against this clear violation of Kaplan’s theory on indexicals by proposing an analysis of FID as a case of mixed quotation instead.

What all of these approaches have in common, however, is that they single out FID as a unique case of mixed perspectives. DD and ID, on the other hand, are thought to predominantly adhere to Kaplan’s rule against partial context shift, with noted exceptions in languages such as Amharic, Zazaki or Slave (see, e.g., Schlenker 2003, Anand 2006, Deal 2020). While this does hold true for DD, the actual potential for perspective shift in ID has been both underestimated and neglected in previous research. In this doctoral thesis, I seek to rectify this oversight by closely examining the perspectival properties of ID in comparison to those of FID, focusing on three core factors that, I postulate, influence the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions in clauses embedded via propositional attitude verbs. While my research will primarily focus on German ID, its results will be argued to at least partially apply to English ID as well.

In the next section, I will first describe my central assumptions and research goals before detailing the overall outline of this thesis.

1.2 Assumptions and Research Goals

The analysis presented in this doctoral thesis is grounded on two core hypotheses defined as follows:

- (6) a. **H1:** Perspective-dependent expressions in German indirect discourse

clauses can be interpreted from the perspective of the matrix subject (= the author of the subordinated thought or utterance) instead of the matrix speaker given that certain conditions are fulfilled.

- b. **H2:** Free indirect discourse is not a hybrid of indirect and direct discourse, but the root clause equivalent of indirect discourse, as they share the majority of their perspectival characteristics. Accordingly, the two types of speech/thought representation should receive a uniform analysis, whereas direct discourse has to be regarded as a case of pure quotation.

H1 opposes the predominant assumption of perspective shift⁴ being prohibited in ID, which is based on two common miscalculations frequently made when investigating and contrasting the characteristics of ID with those of FID or DD. The first of these miscalculations revolves around not providing an appropriate larger context in which the examined ID clause is embedded. As pointed out in the previous section and following Zeman (2020a), perspective shift away from the speaker is limited to narration and not available in everyday conversation. This does not present an obstacle for an analysis of FID, which is fundamentally “restricted to narrative discourse mode only” (Zeman 2017: 12, cf. Lasersohn 2005: 671, for a similar observation) and thus, readers would naturally have to presuppose a narrational context to arrive at a coherent and acceptable interpretation. The same does not hold true for ID, which is commonly and frequently used in everyday conversation. As real-life conversations do not possess a potential for multiperspectivity, however, ID structures, too, can only exhibit their full potential and their capability to shift to the perspective of their matrix subject when it has clearly been established as part of a fictional narrative through the previous context. Most approaches fail to do so and, at most, provide a single prior sentence as context. Empirical evidence for this theory will be provided in Sections 3.3 and 5.6.

The second frequent error in judgment made when comparing ID with FID concerns the verb(s) used in the matrix clause of ID. In general, the umbrella term *propositional attitude verb* is commonly used to cover a broad selection of verbs that includes verbs of actual speech or thought report but also verbs that report a person’s mental state such as *glauben* (‘believe’), *hoffen* (‘hope’) or *fühlen* (‘feel’). However, while ID therefore ostensibly is able to subsume a wide range of syntactical structures that all have in common that they relate some type of attitude their matrix subject holds with regard to the subordinated proposition, the same cannot be said for either DD or FID. In both cases, what is being reported has to be an actual utterance or thought event and not a potentially subconscious mental state.

FID and DD are thus much more restricted with regard to the content they embed than what is generally identified as ID. As will be discussed in greater de-

⁴The terms *context shift* and *perspective shift* will be used interchangeably throughout this work to describe the same phenomenon.

tail in Chapter 6, this does even pertain to the propositional attitude verb *denken* ('think'), which may be the verb most frequently used in analysis of ID's properties; it will be shown that propositions embedded by *denken*, contrary to what one might naturally expect, do not necessarily correlate to a conscious thought event, but are in actuality ambiguous and may instead contain a report of the matrix subject's doxastic state. I propose that only clauses containing an actual speech or thought report should be identified as ID and be used as a point of comparison between ID, DD and FID. My investigation will show that, when forcing an unambiguous thought event interpretation of ID, it not only positively affects the acceptability of temporal indexicals interpreted from the protagonist's perspective, but also removes one of the reasons presented in Schlenker (2004) why ID and FID should not receive a uniform analysis: the *de dicto* / *de re* ambiguity exhibited by ID but not by FID.

Once the condition is met that the ID clause in question is embedded inside a narrative context, its perspective-dependent expressions – exempting personal indexicals as well as verb tense, as is the case for FID – are free to be interpreted either from the matrix subject's or the narrator's perspective. In that case, several factors may play a role in influencing and guiding the reader's interpretation to either favor the perspective of the protagonist or the narrator. I have identified four possible factors (F1-F4), listed in (7) below, that can potentially impact the reading of perspective-dependent expressions in ID:

- (7) a. **F1:** Prominence⁵ status of discourse referents
 b. **F2:** Choice of propositional attitude verb
 c. **F3:** Verb position in the embedded clause
 d. **F4:** Choice of indexical expression

Over the course of this investigation, I will closely examine the first two of these factors, F1 and F2, and determine if and how they influence perspective-taking in ID. To not exceed the limitations of this doctoral thesis, an investigation of the effects of F3 and F4, though, will be left to future research. F3 takes into consideration the possibility that the position of the verb in the subordinated ID clause may improve or weaken the potential for indexicals to shift to the reported context of the matrix subject. In German, depending on the matrix verb, subordinate clauses may allow both verb second (V2) or verb final (VF) word order. Following the hypothesis brought forth in Gärtner (2002) that V2-clauses possess an assertional proto-force, a plausible assumption would be that ID featuring V2 would facilitate context shift in comparison to otherwise identical VF structures.

F4 additionally brings up the possibility that the interpretation of ID might differ depending on the specific indexical used in the clause, While the potential for

⁵For a definition of prominence in language in general and discourse prominence specifically in accordance with Himmelmann & Primus (2015) and von Heusinger & Schumacher (2019), see Chapter 5.

spatial indexicals to behave differently from temporal ones will be briefly discussed, I will focus my analysis on sentences containing the temporal indexicals *heute* ('today'), *gestern* ('yesterday') and *morgen* ('tomorrow')⁶, and assume for now that my observations apply to other temporal and spatial indexicals as well.

I consider F1, the prominence status of the discourse referents, to be the most relevant factor in determining the preferred perspectival anchor for ID. As investigated and discussed in Hinterwimmer (2019), Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019) as well as Meuser (2022), a protagonist has to be prominent on either a local (= in the immediately preceding sentence) or a global (= in the larger preceding discourse segment) level in order to be available as a suitable perspectival anchor for FID. Moreover, Bimpikou (2020) provides empirical evidence that the prominence status of the narrator can impact the interpretation of FID, especially in first-person narratives. My analysis will show that the interpretation of ID is similarly affected by the prominence status of its potential perspectival centers.

Regarding F2, it was already discussed above that only verbs which unambiguously subordinate an utterance or thought report instead of a mere belief or general attitude of the perspectival center actually constitute structures which can serve as a suitable point of comparison between ID and FID. I will elaborate on this hypothesis by providing a classification of propositional attitude verbs that, in line with Neo-Davidsonian event semantics, specifically factors in if the verb contains an event variable in its argument structure.

Even if one accepts that context shift is theoretically possible in ID if the conditions described above are met, however, there remains a noticeable difference in the perspectival potential of ID and FID that presents a problem for any attempt at a uniform treatment: Whereas the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions in ID is fundamentally ambiguous and ultimately depends on the factors listed in (7), all perspective-dependent expressions aside from pronouns and tense in FID are ostensibly always interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist instead of the narrator. In fact, the simultaneous expression of both the protagonist's and the narrator's active context in the same sentence is universally described as the defining property of FID (see, e.g., Doron 1991: 53, Sanders 1994: 52, Schlenker 2004: 283, Hinterwimmer 2017: 283, Maier 2017: 260). However, what definitions of FID fail to take into account is that there is another type of structure commonly found in narrative texts which shares a lot of its traits with FID, yet does not take any of the story's protagonists but the narrating entity of the story itself as its perspectival anchor. This type of structure is commonly referred to as *narrator comment* and can be found in narratives featuring a prominent instead of a neutral narrator who

⁶The choice to use these temporal indexicals for the analysis in place of the more commonly utilized *jetzt* ('now') is based on the observation made in Eckardt (2014) that *jetzt* as well as *hier* ('here') represent special cases of indexicals that can even shift to the protagonist's perspective outside of FID (or ID) clauses.

actively shares their opinion on the characters in the story world and their actions.

I propose that narrator comments actually represent a special case of FID in which the narrator's perspective is foregrounded due to their high prominence status in the overall discourse context. In the course of my analysis, I will provide empirical evidence that illustrates how sentences constructed as FID can easily be attributed to the narrator by readers if the context or the content of the clause are slightly adjusted. If we thus consider narrator comments as part of FID, this apparent disparity between FID and ID is resolved: In both cases, either a protagonist or the narrator can serve as the preferred perspectival center.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is structured as follows: I will begin by providing a more thorough and detailed explanation of some of the concepts introduced in Section 1.1. Chapter 2 starts off with an introduction to the most fundamental aspects of perspectivization, namely the concept of *origo*, the deictic dimensions first explored in Bühler (1934) as well as Reichenbach's tense system in Section 2.1. The section concludes with a discussion of Kaplan's central theories on context and indexicals and a brief excursus on non-deictic perspective-dependent expressions. Section 2.2 consists of a closer exploration of the characteristics of and differences between DD, ID and FID. Finally, Section 2.3 examines several previous approaches arguing in favor of the potential for context shift in ID in German and English, namely Plank (1986), Rothkegel (2019) and Anderson (2019), or in other languages like Amharic and Nez Perce, such as Schlenker (2003), Anand (2006) and Deal (2020).

Chapter 3 provides a deeper look at the unique potential for multiperspectivity inherent only to narrative contexts, which I consider to be the prerequisite for enabling perspective shift in ID. The chapter will first establish the required narratological background in Section 3.1, specifically the models introduced in Stanzel (1986) and Genette (1980). Next, Section 3.2.1 will discuss how FID has long been regarded as the epitome of narration's inherent ability to shift between the perspectives of narrator and protagonists. For this section, I will focus on previous approaches that base their analysis of FID primarily on its status as a type of syntactic structure that is only found in narration and thus is assumed to obtain its ostensibly unique perspectival properties from its narrative context. This will specifically encompass the works by Ann Banfield and Sonja Zeman. After discussing their theories, I will postulate in Section 3.2.2 that ID, in the same vein as FID, only unlocks its full perspectival potential if embedded in a narrative context.

Afterwards, the first of four experimental studies conducted in the course of this investigation will be presented in Section 3.3. Experiment 1 will consist of an acceptability rating study and provide empirical evidence that ID clauses containing temporal indexicals interpreted from the context of the matrix subject are not deemed

ungrammatical or unnatural by German native speakers. The results of the study will show that such structures did neither receive significantly lower acceptability ratings than equivalent DD and FID structures, nor than ID clauses containing a non-deictic temporal adverbial instead.

Having thus illustrated that perspective shift is generally possible in ID, the rest of the thesis will focus on the relationship between ID and FID and argue for a uniform treatment of the two types of speech and thought representation. In Chapter 4, I will first review some of the arguments that have been brought forth in the past in favor of separate analyses for ID and FID. Next, several of the most relevant previous accounts that investigated context shift in FID will be described. The intent of the chapter is not to provide an extensive comparison of the pros and cons of each approach, but to assess which is best equipped to account for a uniform analysis of ID and FID. The discussion will first cover the double-context analyses proposed in Doron (1991), Schlenker (2004) and Eckardt (2014) as well as Sharvit's (2008) operator-based approach and then the alternative mixed quotation analysis by Maier (2015) in Section 4.2. Ultimately, the double-context approach will be tentatively adopted for this investigation.

I will next provide a comprehensive examination of the effect of discourse prominence, the first, and as I stipulate, most important of the factors defined in (7), on the interpretation of both FID and ID in Chapter 5. First of all, Section 5.1 will provide a closer definition of the concept of prominence in language in general and of discourse prominence in particular. Section 5.2 will then discuss how certain linguistic cues, as specified in Hinterwimmer (2019) as well as Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019), can mark a discourse referent as maximally prominent and thus allow them to be available as perspectival center. This part of the chapter will be solely focused on the role discourse prominence plays in selecting an anchor for FID to serve as a foundation and a measure of comparison for the subsequent analysis of its effect on ID. Several previous experimental studies on the topic will be discussed, specifically those conducted in Meuser (2022) and Bimpikou (2020). While the experiments in Meuser (2022) focused on discourse contexts featuring more than one protagonist and investigated which factors influenced readers to pick one protagonist over the other as the preferred perspectival center for FID, the studies conducted by Bimpikou (2020) instead concentrated on the effect different narrative situations have on the interpretation of FID.

Subsequently, I will present the results of two continuous scale choice studies meant to similarly examine how the interaction of narrator and protagonist prominence affects the available readings of FID in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. The results for Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, which have previously been published in Saure et al. (2023) and Hinterwimmer & Saure (2024), respectively, will not only show that homodiegetic first-person narrators in particular strongly affect the availability

of protagonists as perspectival centers due to their high prominence level, but also demonstrate how FID clauses can be attributed to a prominent narrator instead of a protagonist depending on the prominence status of the available discourse referents. Following these findings, I will first discuss if and how the prominence-lending cues relevant for FID can be applied to the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions in the scope of ID clauses in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 will subsequently test these predictions by conducting a fourth and final experimental study directly based on the designs of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, but focused on ID.

The aims of Experiment 4 are two-fold: For one thing, it will test my predictions regarding the effect of narrator prominence on the interpretation of temporal indexicals in ID by comparing contexts featuring a homodiegetic first-person narrator with contexts featuring a heterodiegetic third-person narrator, as was done in the previous two experiments. Secondly, it also contrasts such narrative contexts with everyday conversational contexts to investigate if, as hypothesized, only the former allow perspective shift away from the speaker's context. Ultimately, Experiment 4 will provide empirical evidence for both of my central hypotheses, demonstrating that the interpretation of ID depends on the prominence of the discourse referents in a similar fashion to FID as well as that its potential for perspective shift is only unlocked in narrative contexts.

The penultimate chapter of this dissertation, Chapter 6, will shift focus to F2 and introduce a preliminary classification of propositional attitude verbs primarily based on whether the verb represents a speech or thought event or a mental state. After providing some theoretical background on Davidsonian event semantics in Section 6.1, Section 6.2 will, in particular, compare ID clauses featuring *dachte* ('thought') with ID clauses containing the alternative phrasing *dachte sich* ('thought to oneself'). I will illustrate that while the former allows and often favors a belief state reading, the alternative version instead forces a thought event reading of the ID clause. My argument entails that only the latter provides a suitable point of comparison to FID, which can similarly only facilitate an interpretation as a report of a speech or thought event, not a mental state. Moreover, this consequently resolves one of the established major arguments brought forth in Schlenker (2004) against a uniform treatment of ID and FID, the so-called *de dicto / de re* ambiguity. It will be shown in Section 6.3 that this ambiguity, long believed to be an inherent property of ID in general, in fact only occurs in ID clauses that allow for a mental state reading. ID clauses that force a thought event reading, however, only allow *de dicto* interpretations of referential expressions in their scope, just like FID. Finally, Chapter 7 serves as the conclusion.

2 Deixis, Context and Shifts in Perspective

Through the general exploration of perspective-taking in Section 1.1, two basic, but vital properties of perspectivization have been established:

1. Only narrative structures possess an inherent potential for multiperspectivity that enables a shift in perspective from that of the speaker/narrator, to the perspectives of other referents, i.e., protagonists in the story.
2. Perspectivization is an ubiquitous part of language and present in all utterances and syntactic structures; utterances only differ to which degree and how prominently they express a certain perspective.

The first point will be elaborated on in greater detail in Section 3; the second point is illustrated in (8):

- (8)
- a.
 - i. It was raining.
 - ii. Oliver gazed out the window. It was raining.
 - b.
 - i. Oliver looked up as his wife Peggy suddenly came into the living room.
 - ii. Oliver looked up as his wife Peggy suddenly went into the living room.
 - c. Peggy had felt nothing but disgust for her lazy moron of a husband for what seemed like eternity. She looked on in silent anger as the useless bum sluggishly got up to get another beer from the fridge.
 - d. Oliver's eyes widened in shock as he opened the fridge. Damn it, was the beer gone already?!

When looking at the examples, at first glimpse, only (8c) and (8d) seem to be filtered through specific perspectives, namely the perspectives of characters Peggy and Oliver, respectively, whereas (8a) and (8b) appear to be completely neutral statements. However, a closer look reveals that, in fact, all sentences in (8) are filtered through the point of view of either the speaker or one of the characters in some form or other, with the prominence of the perspectivization increasing gradually from (8a) to (8d). Without any further context and no other referents established,

(8a-i) can only be interpreted from the point of view of the speaker/narrator; while the sentence does not include any overt material expressing feelings, thoughts or attitudes, it is nevertheless centered around the *origo*⁷ of the speaker, which, as the use of past tense reveals, is temporally situated at a separate, not further specified future point of time from the time of the described situation. This slightly changes in (8a-ii) due to the introduction of the referent Oliver in the preceding sentence, who additionally functions as the experiencer of a perception event. While the narrator's *origo* remains as the central point of time determining the verb tense, the protagonist's perspective nevertheless becomes a focal point as we are prompted to interpret the second sentence as something perceived by Oliver as he gazes out of the window. Accordingly, after reading (8a-ii), we would naturally assume that the proposition that it was raining has been added to Oliver's epistemic system. This might seem like an obvious conclusion, but it is indeed dependent on inferring that the second sentence is to be read from the point of view of the protagonist.

Similarly, (8b) at first appears to be missing any further clues of perspectivization aside from the narrator again functioning as the central *origo* and Oliver as the experiencer of a perception event. Yet, by contrasting the different interpretations of (8b-i) and (8b-ii), it becomes apparent that Oliver is more prominently established as the perspectival center of the utterance than he was in (8a-ii). Not only is the other protagonist, Peggy, only introduced through her relation to Oliver, suggesting that Oliver is the more relevant or prominent character in the story, but the choice of the verb *came* in (8b-i) implicitly reveals that events are filtered through Oliver's perspective. The only possible reading of (8b-i) is that by entering the living room, Peggy is moving closer towards Oliver, who we as readers would most likely locate inside the living room, despite neither being explicitly stated. In other words, Oliver in this instance serves as our focal point from which the story world is viewed and events are described, including, but not limited to, where he is spatially situated in the world. In contrast, replacing *came* with *went* in (8b-ii) instead implies that, from Oliver's perspective, Peggy is moving away from him by entering the living room, thus forcing the opposite interpretation of Oliver being situated outside the living room.

Compared to these rather subtle examples of perspectivization, (8c) and (8d) function as very overt and explicit cases of perspective-taking. (8c), on the one hand, contains a number of evaluative expressions such as *lazy moron*, *useless bum* or *sluggishly*, all referring to Oliver, that would most likely be interpreted as expressing Peggy's and not necessarily the narrator's – and certainly not Oliver's – opinion, and thereby establishes her as a highly potent and distinct perspectival center. The

⁷I use the term *origo* very loosely in this instance to distinguish between the narrator existing as a constant point of reference from which both the tense form and the denotation of first- and second-person pronouns are determined, and the perspectives of (prominent) protagonists in the story world. A more precise definition will be provided in the next section.

second sentence in (8d), on the other hand, consists of a thought, expressed via FID, that is naturally attributed to Oliver, who once again acts as the experiencer of a perception event in the preceding sentence. Notably, while the other examples in (8) may either contain perspective-dependent expressions or at least be filtered through a certain perspective, they also describe some type of action, event or state of the story world and thus, serve to continue the plot of the narrative. The same does not hold true for the FID clause in (8d), as the story is halted to express Oliver's thought. What this illustrates is that the main purpose of reported thoughts in narration is not to filter the described action through a certain point of view – the expression of perspective and representation of the protagonist's mind itself is the purpose of such structures. As such, they may be said to display the highest degree of perspectivization possible in language.

The current chapter is structured as follows: First, Section 2.1 will introduce the different types of perspective-dependent expressions. The section will also provide an introduction to the highly influential analysis of indexicals introduced in Kaplan (1989) that served as the basis for many of the approaches discussed in this thesis. Section 2.2 will next explore the characteristics of the three types of speech and thought representation introduced in Chapter 1, with particular focus placed on the property that is of primary interest for the purposes of this dissertation: the potential for perspective-dependent expressions to shift to a perspective different from that of the speaker when embedded in one of the different types of speech and thought representation. Section 2.3 will discuss a number of previous works on the potential for perspective shift in ID. Accounts focusing on languages other than German and English, such as Schlenker (2003), Anand & Nevins (2004) or Deal (2020), will be covered first in Section 2.3.1. After examining briefly in Section 2.3.2 whether operator-based frameworks might be able to explain perspective shift in German ID as well, the chapter will end with a discussion of the few works arguing in favor of the potential for perspective shift in German or English ID, namely Plank (1986), Rothkegel (2019) and Anderson (2019).

2.1 Perspective-dependent Expressions

2.1.1 Origo, Deictic Dimensions and Tense

In Chapter 1, perspective-dependent expressions were defined as encompassing all lexical terms whose interpretation is dependent on the point of view through which the current utterance is filtered. Deictic terms, commonly also referred to as *indexicals*, constitute a special class of perspective-dependent expressions that, in contrast to solely evaluative phrases such as *that useless jerk*, do not simply express a person's opinion or world view, but rely fully on the current discourse situation to receive their denotation. The current section will introduce some core concepts related to deixis, while evaluative and other types of perspective-dependent expressions will

be the focus of Section 2.1.3.

To start with, the special characteristics of deixis are best explained by comparing how deictic and non-deictic linguistic expressions relate to the extralinguistic entities in the actual (or some other possible) world they are meant to represent. Generally speaking, linguistic expressions are thought of as symbols or signs that do not directly relate to an extralinguistic object, but instead do so indirectly through the mental concept linked to the sign. This triadic relationship between the sign, its concept and its extralinguistic referent was first conceptualized by Charles S. Peirce (see Peirce & Hartshorne 1978) and is commonly illustrated via the model of the semiotic triangle by Charles K. Ogden and Ivor A. Richards (see Ogden & Richards 1923) depicted in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1: The semiotic triangle (adapted from Ogden & Richards (1923))

The mental concept is linked to the linguistic sign by convention and represents the mental image or idea that is evoked through the use of the symbol. It can be said to entail the purely semantic meaning or *intension* of the linguistic expression. Only through the knowledge of its intension can a linguistic sign or expression correctly be used in an actual utterance to refer to an extralinguistic entity. Evoking the mental concept is thus necessary to correctly identify the referent or *extension* of any non-deictic expression in a given discourse context.⁸ Indexicals, in contrast, are directly referential – they do not evoke a mental concept, accessible independently of any concrete discourse situation, to identify their extension. Instead, their extension is solely determined relative to the *extralinguistic* context of the current discourse situation (cf. Anderson & Keenan 1985: 259, Kaplan 1989: 492). This is not to say that indexicals are completely without lexical meaning; however, said meaning

⁸The distinction between the intensional and the extensional meaning of an expression can be traced back to Frege (1892/1962), who distinguished between *Sinn* ('sense') and *Bedeutung* ('meaning'), respectively.

cannot be abstracted or separated from the context of utterance. Thus, the meaning of the indexical *I* may be defined as *the speaker of the current utterance* μ , while the meaning of *here* may be defined as *the current position of the speaker at the point in time at which he or she utters* μ .

Karl Bühler, in his groundbreaking work *Sprachtheorie: Die Darstellungsfunktionen der Sprache*, distinguishes two fields in which the meaning of linguistic elements is specified and ‘fulfilled’, namely the *Symbolfeld* and the *Zeigfeld*, and assigns deictic expressions to the latter (cf. Bühler 1934: 80f.). While lexical expressions carrying descriptive content thus belong to the *Symbolfeld* and are consequently and in accordance with the semiotic triangle described as symbols, indexicals are instead referred to as signals by Bühler and likened to road signs: Their primary use is to ‘point’ to extralinguistic elements, such as entities or events, and determine their (spatial or temporal) position relative to the current referential center and speech situation (cf. Bühler 1934: 79, 107). Bühler (1934: 102) names said referential center the *origo* and defines it as the “coordinate system of subjective orientation”. The *origo* is the position at which the deictic expressions *hier* (‘here’), *jetzt* (‘now’) and *ich* (‘I’) are located; it is generally assumed to be egocentric and thus focused around the speaker of the current utterance, consequently switching between each unique speaker and speech situation (see, *inter alia*, Bühler 1934, Anderson & Keenan 1985, Evans 1982, Sanders & Redeker 1996). Three dimensions of deixis are traditionally distinguished:

1. **Personal deixis:** concerns expressions that identify or make reference to the participants of the current discourse situation, i.e., the current speaker and their addressee.
2. **Spatial deixis:** concerns expressions that identify or make reference either to the current location of the discourse participants or to other places relative to the referential center’s position in space.
3. **Temporal deixis:** concerns expressions that identify or make reference either to the time at which the current discourse situation takes place or to other points in time relative to the time of utterance.

All first- and second-person pronouns are personal deictics, regardless of their specific grammatical type (cf. Anderson & Keenan 1985: 259, Dirscherl & Pafel 2015: 28f.). In German, these include *ich* and *du* (‘you_{SG}’), but also, for example, *wir* (‘we’), *mich* (‘myself’) and *euer* (‘your_{PL}’). First-person pronouns are generally used to refer to the speaker of the utterance and second-person pronouns to refer to their addressee.^{9,10} Third-person pronouns, on the other hand, are commonly coreferential

⁹Also referred to as the sender of the message and its intended recipient, respectively, in Bühler (1934: 79f.) and Fillmore (1997: 62).

¹⁰As pointed out by Fillmore (1997: 113), among others, the first-person plural pronoun allows both an inclusive and an exclusive reading, the former of which refers to both speaker and addressee,

with a referent introduced in the prior discourse context¹¹ by the discourse participants. As the interpretation is thus not dependent on the extralinguistic context, the use of third-person pronouns is non-deictic, but anaphoric instead (cf., e.g., Anderson & Keenan 1985: 261, Dirscherl & Pafel 2015: 29). Anaphors “are treated as blends of the Zeigfeld and Symbolfeld” (Hanks 2011: 318, see also Bühler 1934: 123); while they are distinguishable from deictic expressions, they nevertheless depend on the linguistic (utterance) context for their interpretation and can be utilized to express the speaker’s perspective on the referent in question, particularly in the case of epithets. With regard to third-person pronouns specifically, the speaker’s point of view may also be reflected in their choice to use a demonstrative pronoun instead of a personal pronoun, as German demonstrative pronouns such as *der* (‘he_{DPro}’) may indicate a distant or slightly pejorative attitude. Both epithets and German demonstrative pronouns will be elaborated on in Section 2.1.3.

While third-person pronouns’ primary use is anaphoric, they may also be used deictically when referring to an entity present in the current extralinguistic situation instead of a referent introduced in the prior discourse. Anderson & Keenan (1985: 261) characterize expressions that allow both an anaphoric and a deictic reading as “weak deictics”, which can be distinguished from ‘strict deictics’ such as *ich* that never allow an anaphoric interpretation (cf. also Schlenker 2003: 31, Dirscherl & Pafel 2015: 29). Directly related to personal deixis are linguistic expressions that indicate or specify the speaker’s social relation to their addressee, sometimes subsumed under their own, separate deictic dimension of *social deixis* (see, e.g., Fillmore 1997: 61, Hanks 2011: 315). Social indexicals may reflect the social status and rank of the speaker, showcase their social distance or closeness to their addressee and express information about the social context in which the discourse is taking place (cf. Dirscherl & Pafel 2015: 29, Anderson & Keenan 1985: 261, Fillmore 1997: 111, Levinson 2006: 119f.). In German, for example, the use of the formal form of address *Sie* indicates a rather distant or respectful relationship between speaker and addressee, while the use of the second-person pronoun *du* instead indicates an informal or more familiar relationship between the two discourse participants. Depending on the situation and the difference (or similarity) in social status, the switch from *Sie* to *du* may be perceived as rude or it may reflect a strengthening of the discourse participants’ personal bond.

The dimension of spatial deixis is the category to which Bühler’s comparison of

depending on the context:

- (1) *Du hättest dabei sein sollen, wir hatten soviel Spaß!*
‘You should have been there, we had so much fun!’
- (2) *Lass uns nicht streiten. Wir sollten zusammenhalten.*
‘Let us not fight. We should stick together.’

¹¹Bühler (1934: 148) distinguishes between the discourse *situation*, referring to the extralinguistic context in which the current utterance is produced, and the discourse *context*, referring to the previous linguistic content uttered in the discourse situation.

deictic expressions to road signs applies in the most literal sense, as spatial indexicals' primary use is to identify the location of extralinguistic entities. German spatial indexicals include adverbs of space such as *hier* ('here') and *dort* ('there'), though certain demonstrative pronouns/articles such as *dieser* ('this') and *jener* ('that') can also be used to specify that the object in question is located close to or distant from the position of the speaker, respectively (cf. Anderson & Keenan 1985: 279, Levinson 2006: 116). Verbs of locomotion, such as *kommen* ('come') and *gehen* ('go'), also belong to the category of spatial deixis. Locomotive verbs describe an object's movement "from some point of origin to some destination" (Fillmore 1997: 19), thereby changing its location. The verb reflects if said change in location involves moving, in the case of *kommen*, towards the location of the speaker or, in the case of *gehen*, away from the speaker's location:

- (9) a. *Komm sofort zur Schule!*
 'Come to school immediately!'
- b. *Geh sofort zur Schule!*
 'Go to school immediately!'
- c. *Ich freue mich auf deine Party, aber ich werde ein wenig später kommen.*
 'I look forward to your party, but I'll come a little later.'
- d. *Als ich letzten Samstag mit Anke im Schwimmbad war, wollte sie einfach nicht ins tiefe Becken kommen.*
 'When I was in the swimming pool with Anke last Saturday, she just didn't want to come into the deep end of the pool.'

(9a), on the one hand, only allows a reading in which the speaker is located at the school at the moment of utterance due to the use of *kommen*. *Gehen* in (9b), on the other hand, forces the opposite interpretation that the speaker has to be located at some other place than at school. As (9c) showcases, however, the current location of the addressee can function as the reference place, as Fillmore (1997: 81) names it, for *kommen* as well (cf. Anderson & Keenan 1985: 277, Fillmore 1997: 88). Finally, the time of reference, which in turn identifies the reference place, does not necessarily have to equate to the time of utterance. In (9d), neither the speaker nor the addressee is indicated to still be located at the swimming pool at utterance time. Yet the use of *kommen* is not infelicitous because it is the point in time at which the speaker and Anke were at the swimming pool which functions as the reference time, in turn affecting the interpretation of the deictic expressions. Thus, the reader arrives at the interpretation that the speaker was located in the deep end of the pool at reference time; using *gehen* instead of *kommen* would in turn allow for an interpretation in which the speaker never entered the deep end of the pool himself.

The distinction between reference time and utterance time can be attributed to Reichenbach (1947) and is highly relevant for the dimension of temporal deixis. To be more precise, Reichenbach created a triadic model of time that differentiates

2.1 PERSPECTIVE-DEPENDENT EXPRESSIONS

between the speech time S , which equals the time of utterance,¹² the event time E , which equals the point in time at which the action that is reported through the utterance takes place, and finally, the reference time R , which can be best described as the point in time relative to which E is reported (cf., *inter alia*, Kamp & Rohrer 1983: 255, Ehrich 1992: 66, Fillmore 1997: 57). The tense forms in any given language can then be distinguished according to how the three forms of time relate to each other, as can be seen in Figure 2 with regard to the German tense system.




Figure 2: Relation of speech time (S), event time (E) and reference time (R) in the six German tense forms, according to Reichenbach’s model of time (see also, e.g., Kamp & Rohrer 1983: 255). **Top left:** Präsens; **Top right:** Präteritum; **Center left:** Perfekt; **Center right:** Plusquamperfekt; **Bottom left:** Futur I; **Bottom right:** Futur II

As the figure shows, speech time, event time and reference time can represent separate points across the axis of time but also all occupy the same point in time, as is the case when a speaker uses present tense. While the distinction between speech and event time may be self-explanatory, as we can naturally use language to make reference to events taking place in the past or future relative to our present time, the necessity for the category of reference time becomes more apparent when taking a closer look at either of the two tense forms in which R is situated at a different point in time from both E and S : the past perfect and future perfect forms. In the case of the future perfect clause *Billy wird ein Bier getrunken haben* (‘Billy will have drunk a beer’), the event of Billy drinking a beer is located at a future point in time relative to the speech time. However, the reference time for this clause is located at an even farther point in the future at which Billy has already finished his beer. Thus, in such a clause, E is located somewhere between S and R alongside the temporal axis.

¹²Fillmore (1997) distinguishes further between *coding time*, i.e., the time at which an utterance is produced by the speaker, and *decoding time*, i.e., the time at which the utterance is received (and decoded) by the addressee. The difference is of particular importance in written language, as an utterance may be decoded at a completely different point in time than when it was coded by the author (cf. Fillmore 1997: 67).

Aside from the grammatical category of tense, temporal deixis also constitutes a number of temporal indexicals, most notably adverbs such as *jetzt* ('now') and *dann* ('then'). These temporal adverbs behave quite similarly to their spatial equivalents *hier* and *dort* in that they indicate the level of temporal proximity the event or situation possesses with respect to the reference time (Anderson & Keenan 1985: 297). Additionally, temporal indexicals such as *heute* ('today'), *gestern* ('yesterday') or *morgen* ('tomorrow') are used to place specific units of time, in this case days, in relation to the reference time.

After having now thoroughly examined the general characteristics of all three dimensions of deixis, the next section will discuss the main concepts introduced in Kaplan's (1989) seminal work on the interpretation of indexicals, which served as the foundation for a multitude of the accounts to be discussed in this thesis.

2.1.2 Kaplan's Pure Indexicals and the Context of Use

While the previous section mainly served to provide a definition of deixis and a general overview of deictic categories and expressions, our primary interest lies in their perspectival properties. Specifically, in order to accurately characterize their behavior in speech and thought reports, it is elementary to first determine how clauses containing indexicals arrive at their correct interpretation in the first place. Kaplan (1989) approaches this question by providing a semantic framework that has since served as the basis for most works on the topic. He describes indexicals as context-sensitive elements whose reference is fully determined by linguistic rules provided through their semantic meaning and related to the current *context of use* (cf. Kaplan 1989: 490ff., 506). According to Kaplan (1989: 509), the context of use consists of a tuple of parameters such as speaker, addressee, time of utterance and place of utterance, whose values need to be specified to yield the proposition of an utterance (see Lewis 1980, Stalnaker 1978, Stalnaker 2002, Stalnaker 2014, for alternative definitions of context, and Cresswell 1972, for arguments against defining contexts as tuples of parameters). The truth value of such a proposition is in turn determined by *circumstances of evaluation* and, while the referent of an indexical may differ from context to context, "only a single object will be relevant to the evaluation in all circumstances" (Kaplan 1989: 494). This property of indexicals is illustrated in (10):

- (10) a. *Am Samstag sitzt Barney in einer Kneipe und sagt zu seiner Freundin Robin: „Ich bin heute den ganzen Tag hier.“*
 'On Saturday, Barney is sitting in a pub and says to his girlfriend Robin: "I'm here all day today."
- b. *Am Sonntag kann sich Barney nicht mehr an den Tag zuvor erinnern, woraufhin Robin zu ihm sagt: „Du warst gestern den ganzen Tag dort.“*
 'On Sunday, Barney can't remember the day before, whereupon Robin

says to him: “You were there all day yesterday.”’

- c. *Am Montag sagt Robin auf der Arbeit zu einer Kollegin: „Ich bin heute den ganzen Tag hier.“*

‘On Monday, Robin says to a colleague at work: “I’m here all day today.”’

The utterances made by Barney and Robin in (10a) and (10b) are clearly almost completely different from each other, yet if the entailed propositions were to be judged against a circumstance of evaluation, they would necessarily yield identical truth values. Robin’s utterance in (10c), in contrast, is identical with the one made by Barney in (10a) and yet, we can intuitively and correctly judge their truth values to be completely independent of each other.

Kaplan (1989) resolves this seeming discrepancy by proposing that utterances containing indexical expressions actually encompass two different components of meaning, which he labels the *character* and the *content* of an expression. While the character of non-deictic expressions is constant, an indexical’s character is context-dependent and thus variable. It is defined by the aforementioned linguistic rules conventionalized for each indexical term of a language and, once applied to the current context of use, fixes the indexical’s designation. The content of an utterance, its proposition, is derived once each indexical expression contained in the utterance has been rigidly specified via its character. Due to this, characters are also defined by Kaplan as “functions from possible contexts to contents” (Kaplan 1989: 505). It is not the character of an expression that is evaluated against a circumstance of evaluation, but only its content, which means that an indexical’s character does not directly impact the truth value of the resulting proposition. The interpretation of utterances containing indexicals is thus determined by Kaplan to be a two-step process involving, first, its character – a function from contexts to contents – and, secondly, its content – a function from circumstances to extensions, i.e., in the case of propositions, truth values (cf. Kaplan 1989: 502, 506). As Levinson (2006: 105) summarizes succinctly, indexicals thus “do not contribute directly to the proposition expressed, the content of what is said, or the situation described. Instead, they take us to an individual, a referent, which is then slotted into the proposition expressed or the situation described.”

Applied to our examples in (10), our observations about the different utterances can be explained as follows: The utterances in (10a) and (10c) are identical in the sense that they contain the same Kaplanian characters. However, as the utterance contexts differ, the indexicals receive different designations and thus, two different contents are derived via the character function, which may in turn yield different truth values. The opposite is the case for (10a) and (10b): As the indexicals involved in the two utterances differ, so do their characters, yet applied to each individual utterance context, the same contents are derived. Despite their apparent differences, the utterances made by Barney and Robin in (10a) and (10b), respectively, therefore

entail the same proposition, which is in line with our intuitive judgment about their obligatorily identical truth values.

Perhaps the most controversial part of Kaplan’s framework is his prohibition of operators that attempt to modify character instead of content, which he labels as “monsters” (Kaplan 1989: 511). He argues that indexicals always take primary scope and that it is thus simply impossible for operators to exist that could control their character and consequently determine their reference with regard to a different context than the current context of use (cf. Kaplan 1989: 510). Kaplan’s prohibition of monsters thus also entails a prohibition of context shift, which Schlenker (2003) summarizes in his *Fixity Thesis*:

- (11) **Fixity Thesis:** The semantic value of an indexical is fixed solely by the context of the actual speech act, and cannot be affected by any logical operators (Schlenker 2003: 29).

Kaplan himself only allows one exception to the Fixity Thesis: If indexicals are merely quoted instead of actually used in the current utterance context, Kaplan (1989: 510f.) argues, they can also be operated on. This is the case in DD, in which all indexicals are interpreted with regard to the context of the quoted utterance or thought, as was already illustrated in (4b) in Chapter 1. Context shift in ID, however, is deemed impossible by Kaplan, who states that only the content of an utterance is represented in such structures (cf. Kaplan 1989: 553) – though it needs to be pointed out that Kaplan solely relies on examples featuring personal indexicals, instead of spatial or temporal ones, to illustrate this point.

Kaplan’s prohibition of monsters presents a problem for any approaches that attempt to argue for the possibility of context shift outside of DD environments, be it in ID clauses or any other type of linguistic structure. Consequently, most subsequent works on the topic can be divided into two camps: Those that argue *contra* Kaplan and *pro* the existence of monsters, such as Schlenker (2003) or Anand & Nevins (2004), and those that adhere to Kaplan’s prohibition of monsters and instead attempt to explain apparent examples of context shift as further cases of quotation, most notably Maier (2015). These differing approaches will be discussed in Section 2.3 with regard to ID and Chapter 4 with regard to FID. To conclude this introduction to perspective-dependent expressions, the next section will explore non-deictic elements that nevertheless rely on the point of view of the active perspectival center for their interpretation.

2.1.3 Non-deictic Perspective-dependent Expressions: Epithets, Demonstrative Pronouns and other Evaluative Elements

While the perspectival properties of indexicals are of primary concern for the purposes of this investigation, non-deictic perspective-dependent expressions are nev-

ertheless highly relevant for any analysis of perspective shift in speech and thought reports. As their function is to express opinions, emotions and attitudes about a proposition, event/state or entity, they can serve as potent cues to identify the current perspectival center of a sentence or larger text segment (cf. Eckardt 2014: 5, van Krieken et al. 2017: 6, Harris 2012: 193). Section 2.2 will further illustrate the important role they play for the identification and interpretation of FID in particular. The current section serves to introduce core concepts and characteristics of non-deictic perspective-dependent expressions and to provide an overview of the different types of lexical items that belong to this group. It is, however, not intended to provide an in-depth exploration and discussion of their perspectival properties and their own potential for perspective shift, as such would be well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Comprehensive investigations into their perspectival properties can be found in Eckardt (2014) and Harris (2012): Eckardt (2014), in her thorough analysis of FID, takes a close look at the meaning and behavior of German modal particles such as *ja* or *wohl* when embedded in FID, while Harris (2012) conducts empirical research on perspective shift of evaluative expressions such as epithets and appositives (see also Harris & Potts 2009, Harris 2009). I will refer to and briefly summarize their insights and results in this and future chapters where required.

In general, non-deictic perspective-dependent expressions, which I will henceforth refer to as *expressives*, differ from indexicals in that they do have descriptive meaning and therefore evoke a mental concept as their intension (but see Amaral et al. 2007, Schlenker 2007, Sauerland 2007, for proposals that argue for an analysis of expressives as indexicals; see Harris 2012, for counterarguments). Thus, they are not directly referential. Furthermore, their extension can be anaphoric in nature and is not dependent on the extralinguistic context of the discourse situation. That said, since expressives convey the viewpoint or attitude of the active perspectival center, their meaning is affected by said perspectival center's context (cf. Harris 2012: 54). The difference between indexicals, expressives and perspective-independent expressions is illustrated in (12):

- (12) a. *Die Katze ist hier.*
 'The cat is here.'
 b. *Die Katze ist nervig.*
 'The cat is annoying.'
 c. *Die Katze ist tot.*
 'The cat is dead.'

(12a) contains the spatial indexical *hier* ('here') and thus defines the cat's location as being identical or close to the location of the speaker at the time of utterance. Consequently, the reader is only able to fully decode the meaning of the sentence if they possess the required knowledge about the extralinguistic context of the utterance.

In contrast, neither (12b) nor (12c) is reliant on knowledge about the discourse situation to fully grasp the sentences' meanings; we can decode the information they are meant to convey even if we have no further knowledge about the speaker or the context in which the utterance is made. The difference, however, is that *nervig* ('annoying') in (12b) is a perspective-dependent expression that informs the reader about the speaker's attitude towards the cat, whereas *tot* ('dead') in (12c) is not: The proposition p expressed in (12c) is either objectively true if p accurately describes the speaker's world w at the time of utterance t , i.e., if the cat is actually dead, or it is an objectively false statement if p does *not* accurately describe w at t , i.e., if the cat is, in fact, alive and the speaker is mistaken or lying.

The same cannot be said for the proposition p_n expressed in (12b): As the property ascribed to the cat via the evaluative adjective *nervig* is wholly subjective and dependent on the perspective of whoever is currently speaking, p_n may be a true statement about w at t from the speaker's perspective, but a potentially false statement about w from the perspective of any referent whose attitude towards the cat differs from the speaker's attitude. Thus, in (13a), neither the proposition p uttered by speaker A nor the (contrary) proposition $\neg p$ uttered by speaker B may objectively be ascribed the truth value *false* with respect to the current world w , as either proposition may accurately describe w in the context of their respective speaker. This is clearly not the case in (13b): Either speaker A's or speaker B's proposition accurately describes w ; they cannot be true at the same time.

- (13) a. Speaker A: *Die Katze ist nervig.*
 'The cat is annoying.'
 Speaker B: *Die Katze ist nicht nervig.*
 'The cat is not annoying.'
- b. Speaker A: *Die Katze ist tot.*
 'The cat is dead.'
 Speaker B: *Die Katze ist nicht tot.*
 'The cat is not dead.'

Expressives thus differ from perspective-independent expressions in two essential ways: They give insight into the perspectival center's attitude(s) or emotional state and the truth value assigned to the proposition in which they are embedded is subjective and depends on the context of their perspectival center (cf. Harris 2012: 36f., Lasersohn 2005: 648f., Lasersohn 2007: 223f., Potts 2007b: 173f.). As is the case with deictic expressions, the default perspectival center of expressives appears to be the speaker (cf. Eckardt 2014: 12f., Harris 2012: 36f., Potts 2005: 153). Lasersohn (2005), focusing on predicates of personal taste such as *fun* and *tasty*, discusses – and subsequently dismisses – several options on how to explain the subjectivity of evaluating the truth values of propositions containing expressive elements before finally settling on a solution in which the context of utterance provides “an individual

to be used in evaluating the sentences for truth and falsity, just as it provides a time and world” (Lasersohn 2005: 663). Adhering to Kaplan’s (1989) definition of context as a tuple of parameters consisting of a speaker c_A , a world c_W , a time c_T and a location c_L , this individual is determined via a new parameter c_J added to the contextual tuple which contains the *judge* of the context (cf. Lasersohn 2005: 665, Lasersohn 2007: 225).

Lasersohn (2005) stresses that the denotation of predicates of taste does not vary from context to context as it does for indexicals and is thus not determined by c_J in the same way that, for example, the denotation of first-person pronouns is determined by c_A , as this would consequently result in different semantic contents depending on the current judge of the utterance for propositions containing such expressive elements. If the utterances made by speakers A and B in (13a) would express different contents, however, we would not be able to account for the intuitive reading that speaker B is contradicting speaker A’s proposition and thus disagreeing with them (cf. Lasersohn 2005: 649f., Lasersohn 2007: 225). Instead, propositions containing expressives exhibit “contextual variation in truth value only; the sentence will express the same content relative to both individuals” (Lasersohn 2005: 663); the value for the individual acting as the judge of a proposition is supplied by the context “in the derivation of truth values from content, not in the derivation of content from character” as is the case with indexicals (Lasersohn 2005: 685).

Potts (2007b) similarly uses the concept of a judge parameter to investigate the behavior of expressive elements such as *that bastard* in sentences like (14) below:

(14) That bastard Kresge is famous. (Potts 2007b: 168, ex. 3)

Potts argues that the types of predicates discussed by Lasersohn (2005) differ from such expressives in ways that demand a different approach in which c_J is hardwired “directly into the denotations of expressives”, thus effectively changing the content of an utterance containing an expressive element for each different context and judge (Potts 2007b: 175). His reasons for this are two-fold: Based on examples like (14), he observes that the expressive content of the clause does not impact its descriptive, propositional content and, in turn, its truth evaluation. The speaker’s addressee might thus agree that the proposition that Kresge is famous is true without necessarily also agreeing with the speaker’s assessment of Kresge as a bastard. Potts (2007b: 168) labels this property of expressives the *independence property*. Furthermore, whereas Lasersohn (2005: 660f.) states that in cases like (15a), the evaluations of two different judges are reported in the same utterance, yet the utterance as a whole clearly presents a disagreement between the two judges, which means that the content of the two clauses has to be identical, Potts (2007b: 175) claims that the same does not hold true for expressives as defined by him. In sentences like (15b), he argues, the perspective cannot be shifted ‘mid-computation’ because the judge parameter *does* affect the denotation of expressive elements.

- (15) a. John thinks that roller coasters are fun, but Mary thinks that roller coasters are not fun. (Lasersohn 2005: 660, ex. 37)
- b. Sue believes that that bastard Kresge should be fired. (#I think he’s a good guy.) (Potts 2007b: 175, ex. 19)

Potts does allow for such shifts away from the speaker as default judge in larger text units, however (cf. Potts 2007b: 175f.), though he does not elaborate at what point and under which conditions perspective shift becomes available for expressives.

As Lasersohn (2007) rightfully points out, there are some problems with Potts’ claims. While it appears to be the case that expressive elements of the type Potts discusses neither affect the propositional content of the clause nor allow perspective shift mid-computation, both properties change if the same elements are used in a different way, for example as a predicative like in (16a). Here, the expressive term *damn bastard* certainly adds to the descriptive content of the clause and the evaluation of truth would be up to the subjective views of the judge in the same way as it was the case for the predicates of taste discussed in Lasersohn (2005) (cf. Lasersohn 2007: 226).

- (16) a. Bill is a damn bastard! (Lasersohn 2007: 226, ex. 8)
- b. Sue thinks that Bill is a damn bastard, but Pete thinks that Bill is not a damn bastard.
- c. Sue thinks that this tasty pancake is quite nutritious. (#I think it tastes terrible.)

As (16b) further illustrates, expressives do allow perspective shift mid-computation just like *fun* does in (15a) if used in this function. Finally, even though not brought up by Lasersohn (2007), predicates of personal taste similarly take on the properties described by Potts (2007b) in relation to what he named expressives when they are used in an attributive function instead of a predicative one. Thus, *tasty* in (16c) does not add to the propositional content of the clause and exhibits the same perspectival properties as *damn bastard* did in (15b). What all of this points to is that predicates of taste and expressives as defined by Potts actually behave much more similarly than Potts (2007b) would have us believe, which casts doubt on his proposal that expressive elements demand a different kind of analysis to account for their characteristics. If anything, one might propose that expressives in a broader sense – namely including predicates of taste and other types of non-deictic perspective-dependent expressions as well – have to be interpreted differently if they are used as predicatives as opposed to attributes. Yet even this hypothesis may not be maintainable: Lasersohn (2007: 227) points out that even expressions that are not perspective-dependent display similar behavior when used in the same way as expressives like *damn bastard* were in (14) and (15b):

- (17) Our employee Kresge isn’t late for work. (#He doesn’t work for us.) (Laser-

sohn 2007: 227, ex. 10)

It is thus rather questionable if the properties discussed at length by Potts (2007b) should really be attributed to their nature as perspective-dependent elements at all, as many of them apply to other types of expressions as well.

The proposal of an additional judge parameter c_J brought forth in Lasersohn (2005), Potts (2007b) as well as Anand (2007), among others, brings up some intriguing questions about how the concept of a perspectival center might relate to said judge. In Chapter 1, I defined *perspectival center* somewhat broadly as the referent from whose point of view perspective-dependent expressions are interpreted, and in Section 2.1.1, the concept of *origo*, which Bühler (1934) defined as the referential center relative to which deictic expressions are interpreted, was additionally introduced. Following these definitions, it appears reasonable to assume that *origo* and *perspectival center* should either have identical denotations or, at the very least, be directly related to each other.

The introduction of a judge parameter to evaluate certain perspective-dependent expressions, however, also raises the question if it might be necessary to distinguish more strongly between the two concepts. After all, the contextual judge can certainly not be considered identical to the *origo* since the *origo* *determines* the values for the various parameters in the context of utterance. As c_J is one of the parameters that are part of the context, its value, too, is determined relative to the *origo*. Consequently, the default judge is the speaker, though all approaches incorporating said parameter into their theories agree that it can deviate from this default, something which Kaplan (1989) prohibited for all indexical expressions, at least, outside of DD (though see Anand 2007: 206f., for an argument that ‘judge-shifts’ are actually cases of partial quotation and thus do adhere to Kaplan’s prohibition). Lasersohn (2005) determines the judge to be whoever assesses “an utterance for truth or falsity”, for which people normally “adopt an *autocentric* perspective”, though they may also adopt an “*acentric* perspective, in which no particular individual serves as judge” (Lasersohn 2005: 670). If we instead judge the truth value of a proposition relative to the perspective of somebody else, we assume an *exocentric* perspective, which Lasersohn (2005: 670) argues is the case for FID.

While *origo* and contextual judge are thus to be distinguished, the question remains how the *perspectival center* relates to the latter. Intuitively, and in accordance with how the *perspectival center* has been defined so far, the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions such as *fun* or *damn bastard* should directly reflect the point of view of the *perspectival center*. One might therefore conclude that *perspectival center* and contextual judge always denote the same referent. Though neither approach explicitly uses the term *perspectival center*, in both Lasersohn (2005) and Potts (2007b), a shift in judges is referred to as *context shift* or *shift in perspective*, which, at the very least, conflates the two concepts. However, there are

a number of reasons why the judge parameter and the concept of perspectival center should not be confounded. For one thing, the judge parameter solely relates to expressives – and even then potentially only to certain types of expressives – and does not determine the denotations of indexicals. As one of the central hypotheses of this thesis is that the choice of perspectival center can impact the reference of certain types of indexicals in ID, and as the same has been shown to be the case for FID in numerous works, this is neither a desirable nor accurate property of perspectival centers. One might instead stipulate that the perspectival center is to be regarded separate from the contextual judge but determines its value so that perspectival center and judge always denote the same referent. But this cannot be the case either, at least in the implementation of c_j by Lasersohn (2005) and Potts (2007b). Both claim that the example in (15a), taken from Lasersohn (2005) and repeated in (18) below, contains judgments from two different judges, John and Mary, and thus two different contexts.¹³

- (18) John thinks that roller coasters are fun, but Mary thinks that roller coasters are not fun.

While (18) does provide insight into both John’s and Mary’s perspectives on roller coasters, I would be hesitant to label either referent as the perspectival center of the clause. Every speaker is theoretically able to report on another referent’s perspective without necessarily adopting their perspective or filtering his choice of expressions through that referent’s point of view. A speaker might relate the same propositional content in a way that highlights their own perspective on the two discourse referents:

- (19) My dim-witted cousin John thinks that roller coasters are fun, but his obnoxious wife Mary thinks that roller coasters are not fun.

If one were to follow the analyses postulated by Lasersohn (2005) or Potts (2007b), then (19) should be analyzed as either switching contexts several times or containing three different judges, neither of which accounts for the fact that the perspective of the speaker is clearly the central and most prominent one expressed in that utterance. At the very least, the notion of a *hierarchy* of different judges would be needed to capture this distinction. The reason for these divergent assessments of who the perspectival center and the judge(s) of an utterance are is that Lasersohn (2005)’s definition of judge is tied directly to the evaluation of truth values in a way that the concept of perspectival center is not necessarily. He equates the judge to whoever is assessing the truth of an utterance, which may be the speaker, but may as well also be their addressee, a third party or even some referent that was not even present during the original utterance. Thus, if John utters to himself *Roller coasters are fun* and Paul walks by and involuntarily overhears his statement, Paul may act

¹³An alternative analysis is suggested in Lasersohn (2007: 224f.), according to which (18) does not entail an actual instance of context shift, but instead is attributed to the context possibly containing a whole sequence of judges.

as judge and evaluate John’s statement to be false according to his (= Paul’s) own subjective point of view. That, however, does not change the fact that the original utterance was made by John and can only be correctly interpreted as being filtered through and expressing *his* perspective. In short, even if the concept of a judge parameter can be regarded as a suitable way to explain how the truth values of propositions containing certain expressives are evaluated, it must be considered as separate from the role of perspectival center as the referent who uniquely determines the denotation of certain indexicals and chooses the expressives contained in the utterance to express their point of view.

Perspective-dependent expressions can also be categorized by the type of information they reveal about their perspectival center. Eckardt (2014: 2) distinguishes between an *epistemic* perspective, an *emotional* perspective and an *evaluative* perspective.¹⁴ The latter consists of expressions of opinions, evaluations or moral judgments by the speaker and encompasses, *inter alia*, evaluative adjectives such as *nervig* (‘annoying’) in (12b) as well as epithets like *diese unzuverlässige Schnarchnase* (‘that unreliable slowpoke’) in (20a) below. Epithets are defined by Aoun & Choueiri (2000: 2) as “definite noun phrases (DPs) which consist of either a definite article or a demonstrative with an NP” that “contributes mainly affective meaning, which is typically negative”, though there are also cases with positive connotations such as *der niedliche Wonneproppen* (‘the cute bundle of joy’) (cf. Potts 2007b).

- (20) a. *Nervös wartete ich vor der Konzerthalle auf Olga. Diese unzuverlässige Schnarchnase hatte sich mal wieder verspätet.*
 ‘I waited anxiously for Olga in front of the concert hall. That unreliable slowpoke was late again.’
- b. *Der Zug fährt in einer Minute ab und ich kann einfach mein verdammtes Bahnticket nicht finden!*
 ‘The train leaves in a minute and I just can’t find my damn rail ticket!’
- c. *Leider war auch Laura auf die Party eingeladen.*
 ‘Regrettably, Laura was also invited to the party.’
- d. *Die Leiche muss sofort verschwinden!*
 ‘The body needs to disappear immediately!’
- e. *Omar scheint jetzt in Paris zu leben.*
 ‘Omar seems to be living in Paris now.’
- f. *Carolin hat wohl im Lotto gewonnen.*
 ‘Carolin has apparently won the lottery.’

(20b) at first appears to contain a similarly negatively evaluative adjective with *verdammtes* (‘damn’), but it actually constitutes an expression of the speaker’s

¹⁴Additionally, Eckardt (2014) also mentions a fourth type which she calls *temporal* perspective. The temporal perspective is left out of the discussion of expressives in this section as it relates more to temporal indexicals.

emotional perspective. Our interpretation of (20b) is not that the speaker has a particularly negative attitude towards his rail ticket for some reason; we can instead infer from his use of *verdammst* that the speaker is in an emotionally agitated state at the moment of utterance.

While most of the examples so far indicate a speaker’s attitude towards another entity, there are other expressives that can be used to express the speaker’s attitude towards a proposition as a whole. For example, the modal adverb *leider* (‘regretably’) in (20c) signals the speaker’s negative attitude towards the fact that Laura was invited (cf. Eckardt 2014: 116), whereas the use of the modal verb *muss* (‘must’, ‘needs to’) in (20d) clarifies that the speaker wishes for the expressed proposition *p* to come true, i.e., for the body to disappear, which in turn means that he must have a positive disposition towards *p*.

Though modal verbs like *müssen* can thus be used bouletically, their purpose may often alternatively be to inform the hearer about the speaker’s epistemic or doxastic state, i.e., their knowledge or beliefs. The evidential half-modal *scheinen* (‘seem’) in (20e) conveys to the hearer that the speaker may not be absolutely sure about the information he is reporting being actually true, but that he does have some evidence for its validity (cf. Colomo 2011: 245, Diewald 2004: 238f.). It is thus an expression of the speaker’s epistemic perspective, which Eckardt (2014: 2) defines as giving “clues about what the speaker takes as given or old knowledge, clues about what the speaker does not know and has reason to ask about, as well as clues for the level of certainty of the speaker” (see also Zeman 2017: 10, for a similar observation). German modal particles’ primary function is to provide insight into the speaker’s epistemic perspective (cf. Zimmermann 2012: 2013): *wohl* (roughly ‘apparently’) in (20f) similarly indicates that the speaker is only making an assumption about Carolin winning the lottery that is based on some form of evidence, such as observing that Carolin has been buying a lot of expensive luxury items recently that she normally could not afford, and that could potentially turn out to be wrong. In other words, it indicates a weakened commitment to the validity of the expressed proposition by the speaker (cf. Zimmermann 2012: 2015, Eckardt 2014: 129, 134). This interpretation of (20f) changes accordingly if we replace *wohl* with a modal particle that conveys a different epistemic implication, such as *ja*:

- (21) *Carolin hat ja im Lotto gewonnen. (Jetzt hat sie sich von dem Geld einen Porsche gekauft.)*
 ‘As you know, Carolin won the lottery. (Now she’s bought herself a Porsche with the money).’

In its unstressed modal form, *ja* indicates “the existence of (potential) mutual knowledge in the *Common Ground*¹⁵” between speaker and hearer (Zimmermann 2012:

¹⁵ *Common Ground* refers to the shared knowledge between all participants in a conversation.

2015). In (21), the use of *ja* by the speaker thus implies that they assume the information that Carolin won the lottery to be already familiar to the hearer.

As was briefly addressed in Section 2.1.1, German demonstrative pronouns such as *der/die/das* also exhibit perspective-dependency, as, in contrast to regular personal pronouns, they express an “evaluative attitude toward [their] intended referent” that is “somehow pejorative” (Bosch et al. 2007: 147). As such, they constitute the more natural choice of referential expression in exclamative utterances such as (22) below, in which the speaker’s negative evaluation of the referent Kai, introduced in the preceding sentence, is voiced:

- (22) „*Kai_i hat angeblich sein Auto beim Pokern verspielt.*“ – „*??Er_i/Der_i spinnt doch!*“
 “Kai_i apparently gambled away his car playing poker.” – “??He’s_i/He’s (DPro)_i nuts!”’

Demonstrative pronouns represent the structurally more complex and thus more marked class of pronouns, which in turn limits their distribution (see Kaiser 2011, Kaiser 2013, Kaiser & Trueswell 2008): Whereas personal pronouns are relatively free in their choice of antecedent, DPros appear to “avoid maximally prominent” discourse referents in cases where two or more referents are available as potential antecedents (Brocher et al. 2020: 112, cf. also von Heusinger & Schumacher 2019: 120, Hinterwimmer 2015: 61). The exact nature of said limitation, namely with regard to which is ultimately the deciding factor in identifying the maximally prominent discourse referent, however, has been a topic of discussion among scholars. As will be shown later, determining the distributional properties of DPros is of some interest to the purposes of this investigation as well. I will therefore turn back to the topic of DPros’s distributional characteristics in Chapter 5, which will introduce a definition for discourse prominence and contain a thorough discussion of how it relates to perspectivization.

After having now established the core concepts of perspectivization as well as having thoroughly examined and classified the different types of expressions that can serve to express an individual’s point of view, the next section will build on this knowledge to explore the characteristics of the different types of speech and thought representation.

More precisely, it contains all propositions that the current speaker presupposes to be believed to be true by himself and all other participants of the conversation. Consequently, it serves as the necessary background information and foundation for the current conversation and gets constantly updated as new information is shared between participants (see Stalnaker 2002, for a detailed explanation of the Common Ground)

2.2 Perspectivization in Speech and Thought Reports

(23) reintroduces the three modes of speech and thought representation that are traditionally distinguished in the literature: Direct discourse (DD) (23a), indirect discourse (ID) (23b) and free indirect discourse (FID) (23c). In each example, the same thought of a previously introduced referent different from the speaker is being reported in order to better highlight the similarities and differences between the three modes. I will start by comparing the characteristics of DD and ID.

(23) *Während er seinen neuen Smoking anprobierte, bewunderte sich Tobias im Spiegel.*

‘As he tried on his new tuxedo, Tobias admired himself in the mirror.’

a. *Er dachte: „Ich sehe einfach fantastisch aus.“*

‘He thought: “I look simply amazing.”’

b. *Er dachte, dass er einfach fantastisch aussah.*

‘He thought that he looked simply amazing.’

c. *Er sah einfach fantastisch aus!*

‘He looked simply amazing!’

There is one immediately recognizable similarity between ID and DD, namely that in both cases the reported utterance or thought is explicitly labeled as such via a propositional attitude verb, simultaneously identifying the subject of the matrix clause – Tobias in (23a) and (23b) – as the author of the original thought or utterance. As Banfield (1982: 35) notes, however, DD is restricted to *verba dicendi* such as *sagen* (‘say’) or *erwähnen* (‘mention’), whereas the complement clauses of ID structures may also be subordinated by what Banfield refers to as ‘consciousness’ verbs “of belief, reflection and emotion” such as *glauben* (‘believe’), *fühlen* (‘feel’) or *hoffen* (‘hope’):

(24) a. *Tobias glaubte, dass er einfach fantastisch aussah.*

‘Tobias believed that he looked simply amazing.’

b. **Tobias glaubte: „Ich sehe einfach fantastisch aus.“*

‘*Tobias believed: “I look simply amazing.”’

The verb *denken* (‘think’), which can be used in both DD and ID, is argued to reflect an instance of internal self-communication and is thus to be counted among the class of *verba dicendi* as well (cf. Banfield 1982: 35f.). Fretheim (2010) instead analyzes cases like (23a) as a sort of metarepresentation of a referent’s thought that *could* have taken the form specified in the DD clause if the referent had decided to articulate his thought at the time of thinking (cf. Fretheim 2010: 301).

While ID features structural embedding of the reported thought or utterance due to an actual subordination by the propositional attitude verb used in the ma-

trix clause, DD can instead be argued to consist of two separate, independent clauses (cf. Maier 2015: 351, Partee 1973b: 410, Banfield 1982: 42f.). As such, DD maintains a root clause structure and allows for the expression of not only declarative clauses, but interrogative, imperative and exclamatory ones as well, which in turn enables an exact reproduction of the original utterance, including the choice of referential expressions, word order/sentence structure and style of speech. Due to this, DD is usually regarded as a case of pure quotation and is typographically marked accordingly in written language, typically via quotation marks. ID clauses, in contrast, possess the general properties of subordinate clauses: They lose interrogative or exclamatory force (cf. Banfield 1982: 53, Smith 2003: 160) and are typically introduced by a subordinating conjunction like *dass* ('that'). This difference in syntactic structure can be particularly noticeable in SOV languages such as German, as DD maintains the verb-first or verb-second structure of German interrogative and declarative root clauses, while ID usually contains the verb-final structure most common for subordinate clauses in German, though a verb-second structure is possible if the conjunction is dropped, as (25b) illustrates:

- (25) a. *Meredith sagte, dass sie eine großartige Künstlerin sei.*
 Meredith said, that she an amazing artist was.
 'Meredith said that she was an amazing artist'
- b. *Meredith sagte, sie sei eine großartige Künstlerin.*
 Meredith said, she was an amazing artist.
 'Meredith said she was an amazing artist.'

The fact that ID is thus blocked from accurately reproducing all aspects of the original utterance, such as maintaining the original root clause word order and incorporating certain elements, *inter alia*, interjections like *hey*, has lead many scholars to conclude that ID only reports the *content* of the original speech act, whereas DD reproduces its *form* (cf. Banfield 1982: 41, 62, Bary & Maier 2021: 20, Sanders 1994: 85, Smith 2003: 159). Following Kaplan's (1989) definition of content, ID would thus simply relay the proposition expressed by the original author but interpreted and filtered through the reporting context of the current speaker, and would therefore be open to paraphrasing, replacing certain expressions used in the original utterance (cf. Banfield 1982: 62).

Banfield (1982: 54) further states that subordinated clauses in ID "only express the state and attitude of the reporting speaker" since we have "no access to the reported speaker's state, but only to the content of his speech and the quoter's response to it". This, to her, explains why only in ID, but not in DD, there is a concordance between the grammatical person of pronouns and tense in the matrix and the subordinated clause (cf. Banfield 1973: 4, Banfield 1982: 25). This assessment matches Kaplan's claim that indexicals can only be interpreted from a different context than the current context of use when they are merely quoted, but not used,

which is the case for DD but not for ID.¹⁶ Indeed, if we look at our example in (23a), we see that both the personal pronoun and the tense form of the verb have effectively shifted to the context of Tobias, the original author of the thought. Accordingly, the DD clause switches to present tense, despite the fact that past tense was used in the previous discourse, and the first-person pronoun *ich* ('I') is used by Tobias to refer to himself. The opposite is the case in (23b), as neither the third-person pronoun *er* nor the past tense form of the verb *aussehen* ('look') represent Tobias' original choice of expressions, but instead correspond to the grammatical forms used in the matrix clause. (26) further demonstrates these contrary properties of ID and DD:

- (26) a. *Meredith_i dachte, dass sie_i/*ich_i eine großartige Künstlerin war.*
 'Meredith_i thought that she_i/*I_i was a magnificent artist.'
 b. *Meredith_i dachte: „*Sie_i ist/Ich_i bin eine großartige Künstlerin.“*
 'Meredith_i thought: “*She_i is/I_i am a magnificent artist.”'

As (26a) shows, a reading in which the first-person pronoun *ich* is used to refer back to matrix subject Meredith is entirely inaccessible in ID; a third-person pronoun like *she* has to be used instead to arrive at the intended interpretation of Meredith thinking of herself as a magnificent artist. While third-person pronouns can be used to either refer back to the matrix subject or some other previously introduced antecedent, the only possible denotation for all first-person pronouns is the current speaker. The same holds true for second-person pronouns – they can solely be used in ID to refer to the addressee of the current speaker, not any potential addressees in the reported utterance context, such as Meredith's sister in (27):

- (27) *Meredith sagte zu ihrer Schwester_i, dass sie_i/*du_i eine großartige Künstlerin sei/*seist.*
 'Meredith said to her sister_i that she_i was/*you_i were a magnificent artist.'

In contrast, in the DD version in (26b), third-person pronouns, on the one hand, can *only* be used to refer to some other referent but never to refer to the original author of the thought or utterance (cf. Dirscherl & Pafel 2015: 30). First-person pronouns, on the other hand, cannot be used to refer to anybody else, including the speaker of the current context of use, other than the original author. Thus, *ich* in (26b) can only be interpreted as referring to Meredith herself and not the speaker/narrator, whereas the third-person pronoun *sie* cannot be used to refer to Meredith. Additionally, present tense is used in the DD clause in (26b) since Meredith ascribes to herself the property of being an amazing artist at the exact point in time at which she has this thought. The use of past tense in DD would inevitably invoke the reading that Meredith self-ascribes this property for a point in time situated in the past in relation to the point in time in which she has this thought:

¹⁶See Section 2.1.2 for a summary of Kaplan's (1989) central theories.

- (28) *Meredith dachte: „Ich war eine großartige Künstlerin.“*
 ‘Meredith thought: “I was a magnificent artist.”’

This is not the case for ID, as (26a) can be read as Meredith self-ascribing this property for the same point in time at which she has this thought without problem, despite the use of past tense. Our initial comparison between ID and DD has thus shown that the latter contains an exact imitation of the original thought or utterance and entails a full context shift of its indexical expressions to the reported context (cf. Maier 2017: 260, Sanders 1994: 44), whereas ID deviates from the original form of the utterance/thought both in terms of syntactic structure and choice of expression. Deictic expressions of the personal dimension as well as tense forms, at least, are dictated by the reporting context of the current speaker.

Turning our attention now to the properties of FID, also referred to as *style indirect libre* in French and *erlebte Rede* in German, the example in (23c) illustrates that FID, in contrast to both ID and DD, is not explicitly marked as a report of an utterance or thought by another referent than the speaker: Neither is the clause typographically marked in any particular way that may identify it as a quote, for example, nor does it feature a matrix clause that names the original author and embeds the reported speech/thought event via a propositional attitude verb. Instead, its interpretation as a thought belonging to Tobias is dependent on the propositional content of the clause itself as well as a number of linguistic cues that may be incorporated in the sentence and the preceding discourse unit to disambiguate the clause’s reading.

In (23c), for example, the proposition expressed via FID contains a positive opinion about Tobias’ outer appearance, which necessarily has to be attributed to some perspectival center that holds this opinion. The reading that the clause reports a thought is further underlined by its exclamatory force. While we may theoretically attribute this thought to the speaker, the default perspectival center, there are additional cues in the preceding sentence that mark Tobias as the preferable perspective-taker instead. As it is mentioned that Tobias is admiring himself in the mirror, which constitutes a perception event, the most natural reading of the sentence that follows is as the ‘result’, so to speak, of said event, namely what it is that Tobias perceives and what his reaction to his perception is. Furthermore, the verb *bewundern* (‘admire’) strongly indicates that Tobias holds a positive opinion of himself, which is coherent with the attitude in the FID clause. In contrast, the FID clause would be less likely attributed to Tobias if its propositional content would be incoherent with his previously established attitude, as in (29):

- (29) *Während er seinen neuen Smoking anprobierte, bewunderte sich Tobias im Spiegel. Ach, er sah einfach erbärmlich aus!*
 ‘As he tried on his new tuxedo, Tobias admired himself in the mirror. Oh, he looked simply pathetic!’

A root clause can generally be identified as a speech or thought report in FID mode if its main purpose is to express an opinion or attitude (cf. 30c) instead of simply describing a past, current or future event (cf. 30a) or the state of some entity or the world as a whole (cf. 30b):

- (30) a. *Anke kaufte sich eine elektrische Zahnbürste.*
 ‘Anke bought herself an electric toothbrush.’
 b. *Anke war mit einem Zahnarzt verheiratet.*
 ‘Anke was married to a dentist.’
 c. *Anke war halt eine verdammte Spießerin!*
 ‘Anke was just a damn square!’

An FID clause usually contains a number of perspective-dependent expressions, including both indexicals and expressives (cf. Meuser 2022: 32); (29), for example, contains the interjection *oh* and the evaluative adjective *erbärmlich* (‘pathetic’), while (30c) includes the modal particle *halt* (roughly ‘just’) and the evaluative DP *eine verdammte Spießerin* (‘a damn square’), indicating that the speaker holds a negative opinion of Anke and is agitated at the time of utterance. In a way, (30c) also describes the state of an entity similar to (30b), but as was discussed in the last section, the evaluation of the proposition’s truth value in (30c) is wholly subjective.

Harris (2012: 8f., 24) states that while sentences are interpreted as speaker-oriented by default due to a general pragmatic principle, this default reading can be overturned by (quasi-conventionalized) contextual and presentational cues that signal non-speaker-attribution (also cf. Eckardt 2014: 2). These cues trigger inferential processes which then result in the intended perspective shift from speaker to discourse referent (Harris 2012: 9, 53ff.). He goes on to theorize that readers/hearers store information about both the speaker as well as other referents mentioned in the discourse context in so-called ‘agent profiles’ as part of the common ground. When presented with expressions of perspective, “the [language] processor actively evaluates attitudinal information associated with expressive terms against what it knows about an agent’s beliefs from the common ground” (Harris 2012: 25). If the presented attitude is deemed to contradict the information about the speaker’s beliefs and opinions stored in the speaker’s agent profile or if the attitude is judged to be more in line with the agent profile of another salient discourse agent, a non-speaker-oriented interpretation is derived that features the most suitable discourse agent as the perspectival center. While Harris’ concept of agent profiles is an intriguing approach to capture the process of how one selects a perspectival center for a stretch of discourse, its primary purpose is to explain the interpretation of non-deictic perspective-dependent expressions exclusively. The interpretation of indexicals in FID will be discussed shortly.

In addition to judging expressions of perspective against information from the agent profiles, readers/hearers also take the aforementioned linguistic cues into con-

sideration when choosing a perspectival center, which may appear either in the FID clause itself or in the directly preceding discourse context (see van Krieken 2018, for empirical evidence that the presence or absence of perspectival cues – referred to as ‘viewpoint markers’ by van Krieken – directly affects reader’s preferred choice of perspectival center in narrative texts).¹⁷ Harris himself distinguishes between presentational cues in the surface form of the clause, such as quotation markers, and grammatical cues, such as the use of the reportive subjunctive in German (cf. Harris 2012: 100f.; see also Harris 2021). More extensive lists of perspectival cues have been provided in Smith (2003: 176), Smith (2009: 387) and van Krieken et al. (2017: 5), who develop a Linguistic Cues Framework that differentiates between six dimensions of identification with narrative characters dependent on various cues in the discourse.¹⁸ Aside from the potential inclusion of the different types of expressives to indicate a discourse referent’s viewpoint, the interpretation of a clause as FID may also be triggered by the use of perception verbs (cf. (31a)) or verbs that describe a referent’s mental state (cf. (31b)) in the sentence directly preceding the FID clause (cf. Smith 2003: 167, 170; Bal 1985: 143):

- (31) a. *Justin blickte von seinem Kreuzworträtsel auf, als er ein lautes Summen vernahm. Oh je, eine gigantische Hornisse hatte sich in sein Schlafzimmer verirrt!*
 ‘Justin looked up from his crossword puzzle when he heard a loud buzzing sound. Oh dear, a giant hornet had found its way into his bedroom!’
- b. *Franca dachte zurück an die Feier zum vierten Geburtstag ihrer Tochter Lily. Was hatte die Kleine sich über die köstliche Geburtstagstorte gefreut! Und jetzt war sie schon fast mit der Grundschule fertig – wie doch die Zeit verging...*
 ‘Franca thought back to her daughter Lily’s fourth birthday party. How happy the little girl had been about the delicious birthday cake! And now she was almost finished with elementary school – how time flew by...’
- c. *Gustav trat hinaus auf seine Veranda. Eine angenehme Brise wehte ihm entgegen und trug den Duft von frisch gemähtem Gras mit sich.*
 ‘Gustav stepped out onto his veranda. A pleasant breeze blew towards

¹⁷van Krieken (2018) builds on the concepts of Mental Space theory established in Fauconnier (1994) as well as the Linguistic Cues Framework developed in van Krieken et al. (2017) to conduct a series of empirical studies. In addition to investigating the impact of perspectival cues, he also tests the effect of different tense forms on the interpretation of FID, as, according to Damsteegt (2005), present tense narrations supposedly favor an interpretation from the perspective of a salient protagonist by default (see also Dancygier 2012, for a similar observation). However, van Krieken’s (2018) results do not corroborate this claim: While readers favored the protagonist as perspectival center when the preceding sentence contained perspectival cues, there was no similar significant effect for items narrated in present tense instead of past tense (cf. van Krieken 2018: 778f., 782).

¹⁸van Krieken et al. (2017)’s framework distinguishes the following dimensions: a narrative character’s *spatio-temporal* viewpoint, their *perceptual* viewpoint, their *psychological* viewpoint, their *moral* viewpoint, their *emotional* viewpoint and finally, their *actions and motions*.

him, carrying with it the scent of freshly mown grass.’

There are no indications in (31a) and (31b) that the expressed emotions or thoughts might contradict the established attitude of the speaker, and yet in both cases, the most natural choice for perspectival center is the discourse referent that serves as the subject of the first clause containing a perception verb and a mental state verb, respectively. This underlines that the inclusion of these verbs was sufficient to establish the protagonists as salient perspective-holders. Yet as (31c) demonstrates, even the mere description of a referent’s actions or of their spatio-temporal position may suffice (cf. van Krieken et al. 2017: 9, Smith 2003: 172). While the second clause in (31c) cannot be classified as FID, as it contains neither a speech nor thought report, it would most naturally be interpreted as describing the perceptions of Gustav resulting from the action of stepping out on the veranda.

Furthermore, as illustrated in (31b), once a referent is established as perspectival center, their subjectivity may continue to hold scope over the subsequent stretch of sentences as long as the content remains coherent in terms of attitude and beliefs and is not interrupted by a change of time or place or the introduction of a new, salient discourse agent (cf. Smith 2003: 167, Sanders 1994: 189, van Krieken 2018: 783). Eckardt (2014: 134) notes that lexical elements that express epistemic uncertainty, such as the German modal particle *wohl* (roughly ‘apparently’, ‘probably’) in (32) below, are a particularly strong indicator for perspective shift in narrative texts, which often feature an omniscient narrator who possesses insight into both the mental spaces of all existing individuals in the story world as well as knowledge about all of its past, current and future events. As signals of uncertainty would contradict the narrator’s omniscience, they are instead attributed to a salient protagonist like Robert in (32).

(32) *Robert verzog das Gesicht vor Schmerz, als er auf einen Haufen Legosteine trat. Sein Sohn hatte wohl vergessen, sein Spielzeug wegzuräumen.*

‘Robert grimaced in pain as he stepped on a pile of Lego bricks. His son had apparently forgotten to put his toys away.’

While FID is uniquely dependent on perspectival cues in the discourse context for its interpretation, it does share certain characteristics with the other two modes of speech and thought representation. For one thing, FID has in common with DD that its propositional content is syntactically presented as an independent main clause. As such, it maintains the exclamatory force of the original utterance, can express questions or exclamations and reproduces its original form, including certain expressions such as the interjection *oh je* (‘oh dear’) in (31a) that are barred from the subordinate clause structure of ID sentences (cf. Smith 2003: 162):

(33) *Justin blickte von seinem Kreuzworträtsel auf, als er ein lautes Summen vernahm. *Er dachte, dass oh je, eine gigantische Hornisse sich in sein Schlafzimmer verirrt hatte!*

‘Justin looked up from his crossword puzzle when he heard a loud buzzing sound. *He thought that oh dear, a giant hornet had found its way into his bedroom!’

However, FID diverges from DD when it comes to the interpretation of deictic expressions:

- (34) *Meredith_i betrachtete ihr neuestes Gemälde und lächelte glücklich. Wow, sie_i/*ich_i war echt eine großartige Künstlerin!*
 ‘Meredith_i looked at her newest painting and smiled happily. Wow, she_i/*I_i really was a magnificent artist!’

The most natural reading for (34) is to attribute the thought in the second clause to Meredith and thus, if we were to assume that FID behaved the same as DD when it comes to perspectivization, we should expect the sentence to be phrased in present tense and for first-person pronouns to refer to Meredith, yet neither is the case: Just like in the ID version from (26a), the past tense form used in the previous discourse is maintained without forcing a reading in which Meredith ascribes to herself the property of being a magnificent artist for a point in time preceding the thought event, as it would in DD. Moreover, first-person pronouns in FID can only refer to the speaker, not the original author of the thought/utterance; in order to refer back to Meredith in the FID clause, a third-person pronoun such as *sie* has to be used instead. In short, FID patterns with ID in terms of its perspectival properties insofar that both tense forms and personal pronouns are interpreted from the context of the speaker/narrator, in contrast to DD and despite the fact that some other salient discourse referent than the speaker functions as the original author.

So far, we have exclusively addressed the clear-cut cases of tense and pronouns. The reason that FID is usually singled out as possessing unique perspectival properties, however, stems from the behavior of other perspective-dependent expressions, primarily temporal and spatial indexicals.

- (35) *Hedwig durchblättert ihren Terminkalender, als sie einen Eintrag für den nächsten Morgen bemerkte.*
 ‘Hedwig was flipping through her calendar when she noticed an entry for the next morning.’
- a. **DD:** *Sie dachte: „Oh nein, ich bin ja morgen bei meinen Schwiegereltern zum Brunch eingeladen!“*
 ‘She thought: “Oh no, I’m invited to brunch at my in-law’s tomorrow!”’
 - b. **FID:** *Oh nein, sie war ja morgen bei ihren Schwiegereltern zum Brunch eingeladen!*
 ‘Oh no, she was invited to brunch at her in-law’s tomorrow!’
 - c. **ID:** *Sie dachte, dass sie ja morgen bei ihren Schwiegereltern zum Brunch eingeladen war.*

‘She thought that she was invited to brunch at her in-law’s tomorrow.’

As one would expect, the temporal indexical in the DD clause in (35a) behaves exactly as all other deictic expressions in the clause: (i) The two first-person pronouns *ich* and *meinen* (‘my’) can only refer to Hedwig as the author of the thought and not the speaker of the overall utterance; (ii) the sentence uses present tense – as opposed to the rest of the text, which features past tense – because this reflects the form used by Hedwig; and finally, (iii) the temporal adverb *morgen* (‘tomorrow’) can only be taken to refer to the day after Hedwig has this thought, i.e., be interpreted from Hedwig’s perspective as well. Thus, DD can truly be said to contain a complete shift away from the current speaker’s context of use that is to be attributed to its status as a pure quotation (cf., *inter alia*, Dirscherl & Pafel 2015: 28, Hinterwimmer & Meuser 2019: 179).

(34) has illustrated that personal pronouns and tense are generally interpreted from the speaker’s perspective in FID, and thus, assuming that Kaplan’s (1989) prohibition of monstrous operators that can shift contexts outside of quotational environments is correct, the same should theoretically hold true for all other perspective-dependent expressions. But this is not the case, as (35b) shows. Both personal indexicals as well as tense forms reflect the perspective of the speaker instead of Hedwig’s, just like it has been the case in all other examples of FID we have looked at so far. Thus, third-person pronouns are used instead to refer to Hedwig and the clause maintains the use of past tense from the previous stretch of discourse, indicating that from the point of view of the speaker, these events are taking place in the past. The temporal indexical *morgen*, however, can only be understood as referring to the day after Hedwig has this thought, not tomorrow from the speaker’s perspective, as otherwise the past tense form of the clause and the temporal adverbial referring to a future point in time would contradict each other, which should result in an ungrammatical structure. This is indeed the case for root level clauses for which an interpretation as FID is not available:

(36) *Walter parkte sein neues Auto in einer kleinen Seitenstraße.*

‘Walter parked his new car in a small side street.’

a. **Morgen entdeckte er einen großen Kratzer am linken Kotflügel.*

‘*Tomorrow, he discovered a large scratch on the left fender.’

b. *Am nächsten Tag entdeckte er einen großen Kratzer am linken Kotflügel.*

‘The next day he discovered a large scratch on the left fender.’

The fact that (35b) represents a grammatical sentence in German (as well as English) demonstrates that Kaplan was too strict in his original assessment. While certain deictic elements, like personal indexicals and tense, are obligatorily interpreted from the perspective of the speaker and are thus clearly not affected by shifts in context, other deictic elements do shift to the perspective of the original author of the speech

or thought report (cf. Dirscherl & Pafel 2015: 31f., Fleischman 1991: 34, Doron 1991: 53, Schlenker 2004: 283, Banfield 1982: 98f.). (37) demonstrates that spatial indexicals pattern like temporal ones when it comes to their interpretation; the spatial indexical *hier* ('here') is interpreted as referring to Fatima's location at the reported time and not the speaker's location – wherever that might be – at the reporting time in both the DD and the FID version:

(37) *Entspannt schlenderte Fatima mit einer Freundin vom Hotelpool zur Cocktailbar.*

'Relaxed, Fatima strolled from the hotel pool to the cocktail bar with a friend.'

a. **DD:** *Sie sagte: „Cool, die haben hier ja sogar Bloody Marys!“*

'She said: "Cool, they even serve Bloody Marys here!"'

b. **FID:** *Cool, die hatten hier ja sogar Bloody Marys!*

'Cool, they even served Bloody Marys here!'

c. **ID:** *Sie sagte, dass die hier ja sogar Bloody Marys hatten.*

'She said that they even served Bloody Marys here.'

Since it has also been shown in earlier examples that expressives in FID are preferably interpreted from the protagonist's instead of the speaker's perspective as well, it can thus be generalized that *all* perspective-dependent expressions are shifted to the context of a salient protagonist, with personal indexicals and tense remaining the sole exceptions to this rule (cf. Steube 1985: 394, Maier 2017: 260f., Hinterwimmer & Meuser 2019: 179). The most popular approach to explain this seemingly inconsistent behavior is to postulate that the context of the speaker/narrator and the context of the protagonist are both active simultaneously (cf. Hinterwimmer 2017: 283), though as Zeman (2017) points out, the perspective of the protagonist is foregrounded, whereas the context of the narrator only provides reference points for the grammatical categories of tense and person (cf. Zeman 2017: 13, Zeman 2020a: 479). I will delve deeper into the different available analyses for FID in Chapter 4 once its relationship to ID has been clarified further.

The discussion of the different modes of speech and thought representation has so far been mostly in line with the consensus found in the literature on the topic. It diverges, however, when it comes to the assessment of the potential for perspectival shift, akin to the type of context shift that has been demonstrated for FID, in ID sentences. The prevalent assumption for both English and German is that ID does fundamentally *not* allow perspective shift of any sort and is instead completely and obligatorily interpreted from the perspective of the speaker (cf., *inter alia*, Sharvit 2008: 355, Maier 2017: 260, Sanders 1994: 48f., Ehrich 1992: 11, Hinterwimmer & Meuser 2019: 179, Smith 2003: 160). This extends from the already discussed cases of tense and personal pronouns to all other types of indexicals as well as expressive elements such as epithets. Thus, a structure like the one from (35c), in which the

only coherent reading of *morgen* is as a reference to the day after Hedwig's thought event, would be regarded as infelicitous because it would require a shift to the protagonist's perspective. To arrive at a reading that is both coherent with regard to the prior context as well as grammatically acceptable, these accounts argue, the indexical expression would instead have to be replaced by a semantically equivalent anaphoric expression such as *am nächsten Tag* ('the next day'), just like it is the case for non-FID root clauses like the one in (36). The same would hold true for ID containing spatial indexicals like in (37c) in that the only available interpretation for *hier* should be as referring to the location of the speaker at the time of utterance, which is not specified in the discourse context in this example. This becomes more apparent in contexts where the speaker is explicitly mentioned to be at a location different from that of the author:

(38) *Während ich das Wohnzimmer aufräume, ruft mich mein Sohn von seiner Klassenfahrt in Venedig an.*

'While I'm tidying up the living room, my son calls me from his school trip in Venice.'

a. *Er sagt: „Die Möwen hier sind total aggressiv!“*

'He says: "The seagulls here are totally aggressive!"'

b. *Er sagt, dass die Möwen ??hier/dort total aggressiv sind.*

'He says that the seagulls ??here/there are totally aggressive.'

In the DD version in (38a), *hier* unambiguously refers to the current location of the speaker's son in Venice and the clause as a whole is felicitous. In contrast, it can be argued that the ID version in (38b) is only acceptable either if *hier* is meant to be interpreted as referring to the speaker's and not her son's current location – which, while grammatical, would at least be a little strange in that context – or if the indexical *dort* ('there') is instead inserted to refer to her son's location from the speaker's perspective. It follows from this argument that DD and ID appear as absolute opposites to each other, as the former is interpreted completely from the perspective of the thought's/utterance's author, whereas the latter is interpreted seemingly completely from the perspective of the speaker.

This analysis of ID has a direct effect on the treatment of FID in the literature. For one thing, it marks FID as the only type of speech and thought report that violates Kaplan's prohibition of monsters, as was shown in previous examples, since ID supposedly does not feature context shift and DD constitutes a mere act of quotation, which is exempt from the prohibition. Moreover, FID appears to share some of its characteristics with DD, but others with ID, as it patterns with the latter regarding the interpretation of personal indexicals and tense, but with the former with regard to everything else, including the interpretation of other deictic expressions. For this reason, FID has been widely regarded as both a 'hybrid' between DD and ID (cf. Sanders 1994: 52, Sharvit 2008: 353, Dirscherl & Pafel 2015: 28f., 35) and

as an exemplary case of multiperspectivity in which different perspective-dependent expressions are uniquely interpreted with respect to two different contexts (cf. Doron 1991: 53, Schlenker 2004: 283, Banfield 1982: 98f.). Consequently, FID has been a primary focus of linguistic research in recent years with regard to frameworks attempting to gain a better understanding of context shift and multiperspectivity.

I disagree with this prevalent analysis of ID and its relationship to FID on two accounts. First of all and perhaps most importantly, I do not ascribe to the predominant consensus that temporal and spatial indexicals can only be interpreted from the perspective of the speaker. Intuitively, an interpretation of *morgen* in (35c) and of *hier* in (37c) from the perspective of the matrix subject is not only accessible to me, but may even be regarded as the preferred reading if the discourse context is manipulated in certain ways. This is not to say that an interpretation of such indexicals from the speaker's context is impossible, as is the case for DD; my main hypothesis is that both readings are theoretically available and that, in isolation, ID clauses are generally ambiguous with regard to the interpretation of spatio-temporal indexicals and expressives. Either the speaker or the matrix subject may be perceived as the preferred perspectival center depending on specific factors and properties of the clause itself as well as the overall discourse situation and context. For example, I agree with what I assume would be the general consensus that the only available reading of (38b) is one in which all indexicals are interpreted from the perspective of the speaker and that an interpretation from the matrix subject's perspective would be marked at best.¹⁹ However, it needs to be pointed out that the FID version of the example seems equally marked:

- (39) *Während ich das Wohnzimmer aufräume, ruft mich mein Sohn von seiner Klassenfahrt in Venedig an. Mann, die Möwen ??hier/dort sind total aggressiv!*

‘While I’m tidying up the living room, my son calls me from his school trip in Venice. Man, the seagulls ??here/there are totally aggressive!’

It seems difficult, if not impossible, to interpret *hier* in the FID clause as referring to the current location of the speaker's son – in fact, it appears to be just as unnatural

¹⁹Expressives, however, seem to allow a reading in which they are attributed to the point of view of the matrix subject if such an interpretation appears to be more suitable and coherent with regard to its content and the established information about the available discourse agents:

- (1) *Während ich das Wohnzimmer aufräume, ruft mich mein Sohn von seiner Klassenfahrt in Venedig an. Er sagt, dass diese scheiß Möwen sein Essen geklaut hätten.*
 ‘While I’m tidying up the living room, my son calls me from his school trip in Venice. He says that these shitty seagulls had stolen his food.’

Not only is the matrix subject of the ID clause in (1) more likely to be emotionally aggravated enough by the seagulls stealing his food to use the negative expressive *scheiß* (‘shitty’) in his description of them, the rather vulgar choice of expression would also more likely be attributed to the discourse referent that has been established as a teenager rather than his mother. This indicates that expressives are more ‘lax’, so to speak, than indexicals when it comes to their interpretation in ID.

to even interpret the clause as a thought belonging to anybody else but the speaker, despite the fact that its content would be more coherent if attributed to the referent who is currently in Venice. What could be the reason that the speaker's son seems to be unavailable to serve as anchor for FID in (39)? As argued in Hinterwimmer (2019: 86) and Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019: 186), in order for a referent to act as the perspectival center of FID, they have to be *prominent* with respect to either the directly preceding sentence or the larger discourse unit. While Chapter 5 will feature an in-depth discussion of the important role that discourse prominence plays in choosing the perspectival anchor for FID, it will suffice for now to say that the speaker in (39) is highly prominent both due to the explicit use of first-person pronouns (see Salem et al. 2017, Brilmayer et al. 2019, Repp 2024, for analyses of the prominence-raising properties of the first-person) and the fact that the first sentence is already implicitly centered around the (spatial) point of view of the speaker. Accordingly, the FID clause in (39) seems much more natural, as well as easier to attribute to the other discourse referent, once we raise his prominence status by, for example, introducing him via first name instead of a descriptive noun phrase and making him the agent of a perception event²⁰, as in (40):

- (40) *Max erzählt mir am Telefon, wie ihm Venedig so gefällt, als ihm plötzlich eine Möwe das Essen aus der Hand stiehlt. Fassungslos schaut Max dem Vogel hinterher. Mann, die Möwen hier sind total aggressiv!*

‘Max is telling me over the phone how much he’s enjoying Venice when suddenly a seagull snatches the food out of his hand. Stunned, Max watches the bird fly away. Man, the seagulls here are totally aggressive!’

The acceptability and interpretative potential of FID is thus directly reliant on its context. What I want to argue is that the same applies to ID. The ID clause in (38b) containing *hier* is infelicitous for exactly the same reasons as the FID version in (39): The matrix subject has simply not been established as a prominent enough discourse referent in the previous context to serve as a suitable perspectival center for ID. Accordingly, using the discourse context from (40) to increase the matrix subject’s prominence should result in the ID clause becoming more acceptable:

- (41) *Max erzählt mir am Telefon, wie ihm Venedig so gefällt, als ihm plötzlich eine Möwe das Essen aus der Hand stiehlt. Fassungslos schaut Max dem Vogel hinterher. Dann sagt er, dass die Möwen hier total aggressiv sind.*

‘Max is telling me over the phone how much he’s enjoying Venice when suddenly a seagull snatches the food out of his hand. Stunned, Max watches the bird fly away. Then he says that the seagulls here are totally aggressive!’

This appears to be the case; I judge (41) to be more felicitous than (38b).

²⁰See Section 5.2.1 for a more detailed exploration of the different ways to increase a discourse agent’s prominence.

The matrix subject's lack of prominence in (38b) is not the only factor leading to an infelicitous structure. Another problem is that the text segment as a whole can easily be read as part of an overall conversational context. According to Zeman (2020b), however, only fictional narrative contexts provide a suitable environment for perspective shift. Since ID can be and regularly is used in normal, everyday conversation, readers may be more inclined to interpret it as such if not given any indications to think otherwise. A discourse referent different from the speaker may thus become accessible as perspectival center for ID and, in turn, enable temporal and spatial indexicals to be interpreted from the reported context if the discourse unit contains signals marking it as narration. Chapter 3 will explore this line of thought further. Based on these observations, I formulate the first of my two central hypotheses as follows:

- (42) **H1:** Perspective-dependent expressions in German indirect discourse clauses can be interpreted from the perspective of the matrix subject (= the author of the subordinated thought or utterance) instead of the matrix speaker given that certain conditions are fulfilled.

H1 inevitably leads to a reevaluation of FID and the relationship between the two modes of speech and thought representation. My other major disagreement with the established consensus in the literature thus directly pertains to the assumed status of FID as a unique example of multiperspectivity and as a hybrid between ID and DD. If ID does indeed allow for most perspective-dependent expressions to be interpreted with regard to the reported context, given that certain conditions are met, – conditions that, as has been shown, affect FID in quite similar fashion – then it follows that ID, too, needs to be regarded as possessing the potential for multiperspectivity, just like FID. In addition, it needs to be reassessed if FID's definition as a hybrid form is truly appropriate. After all, the primary reason it was designated as such is that it only seemed to pattern with ID regarding personal indexicals and tense obligatorily being interpreted from the speaker's perspective and with DD in all other matters.

My central hypotheses instead entail that ID and FID are alike with regard to the behavior of *all* perspective-dependent expressions: Personal indexicals and tense do fundamentally not shift, while all other indexicals as well as expressives may potentially do so. On top of that, FID and ID, on the one hand, both rely on similar conditions being fulfilled to completely unlock their perspectival potential. DD, on the other hand, deviates in both regards, as personal indexicals and tense can and must be interpreted from the perspective of the original author and the interpretation or acceptability of DD clauses are completely unaffected and independent of the properties of the discourse context. My second central hypothesis thus directly follows from H1 and is stated below:

- (43) **H2:** Free indirect discourse is not a hybrid of indirect and direct discourse,

but the root clause equivalent of indirect discourse, as they share the majority of their perspectival characteristics. Accordingly, the two types of speech/thought representation should receive a uniform analysis, whereas direct discourse has to be regarded as a case of pure quotation.

Initial empirical evidence for the intuitions and hypotheses postulated in this section will be provided in Section 3.3, in which the results of the first in a series of experimental studies will be reported.

Though ID fundamentally not allowing context shift is the predominant view in the literature, there do exist a number of works providing counterarguments to this general claim. However, the majority of these approaches solely focus on other, somewhat more exotic languages and tend to otherwise agree with the consensus on ID in English or German. Among these, the most prominent works are Schlenker (2003) on Amharic, Anand & Nevins (2004), Anand (2006) as well as Bittner (2014) on Zazaki and Slave and Deal (2020) on Nez Perce. Accounts that actually argue for the potential of context shift in ID in the languages this investigation is concerned with, in contrast, are quite rare: Plank (1986) remains the only notable approach arguing that spatio-temporal indexicals can be interpreted from the reported utterance context in German ID. For English, Anderson (2019) conducts a number of experimental studies meant to illustrate that ID clauses in which *tomorrow* can only coherently be interpreted from the protagonist's context are indeed deemed acceptable by native speakers. Instead of perceiving her results as evidence for context shift in English ID, however, Anderson (2019) proposes an anaphoric reading of temporal adverbials in such cases.

The next section will discuss the most relevant findings and theories regarding context shift in ID, starting with works investigating other languages than German or English.

2.3 Perspective Shift in Indirect Discourse

2.3.1 Shifty Indexicals and Monstrous Operators

For this section, I will concentrate on works arguing for the potential of context shift/perspective shift in ID primarily on the basis of languages that differ considerably from German or English. However, analyses focusing on FID, such as the double-context account proposed in, *inter alia*, Schlenker (2004) and Eckardt (2014), and the alternative mixed quotation analysis suggested in Maier (2015), for example, will not be included in the discussion as of yet. The reason for this is that, due to the perceived differences between ID and FID, most works propose divergent analyses for the two modes of speech and thought representation. Explanations for perspective shift in FID thus only become relevant to our investigation of ID if it can be shown that the two modes are more similar with regard to their perspectival properties than has otherwise been assumed. Therefore, any discussion of these proposals

for FID will be postponed until the necessary arguments and empirical evidence for reconsideration of ID's potential for perspective shift have been provided.

In the last two decades, empirical research on the potential for perspective shift of indexicals has been quite extensive, covering a large number of languages. The discussion in the current section will have to be limited to only the most prominent works on the topic. Specifically, it will focus on works on Amharic (Schlenker 1999, 2003, 2011 & 2018), Slave (Rice 1986, Bittner 2014, Anand & Nevins 2004, Anand 2006), Zazaki (Anand & Nevins 2004, Anand 2006) and Nez Perce (Deal 2014, 2017 & 2020).²¹

To start with, in his seminal work *A plea for monsters*, Philippe Schlenker opposes Kaplan's strict prohibition of monstrous operators that would enable context shift for indexicals, which he summarizes in his *Fixity Thesis*, originally quoted in (11) and repeated in (44)):

- (44) **Fixity Thesis:** The semantic value of an indexical is fixed solely by the context of the actual speech act, and cannot be affected by any logical operators (Schlenker 2003: 29).

Schlenker (2003) argues in favor of the existence of operators that can quantify over *contexts* instead of *worlds* on the basis of Amharic structures like (45) (cf. Schlenker 2003: 30, 37; Schlenker 1999: 49):

- (45) Situation to be reported: John says: 'I am a hero'.
 a. *Amharic* (lit.): John_i says that I_i am a hero.
 b. *English*: John_i says that he_i is a hero/*John_i says that I_i am a hero.
 (Schlenker 2003: 31, ex. 3)

(45) demonstrates that in contrast to English, in which first and second-person pronouns can, with the exception of DD, never be used to refer to anybody but the current speaker and their addressee, Amharic *I* displays the ability to shift contexts in ID and thus be coreferential with the matrix subject of the clause instead. Based on the observation that Amharic *I* can exclusively be used to refer to the speaker of *some* context, Schlenker (2003) clarifies that it fulfills the criteria to be considered what he refers to as a *strict* indexical – as opposed to expressions such as third-person pronouns which can be used both indexically and anaphorically – and therefore of the type that should technically be covered by the Fixity Thesis. However, as opposed to English first-person pronouns, first-person pronouns in Amharic ID clauses are not obligatorily bound to the current context of utterance, and thus their interpretation is generally ambiguous (cf. Schlenker 1999: 14, 22; Schlenker 2003: 31). Schlenker (2003) further illustrates that similar examples of unexpected context shift in ID

²¹See Deal (2017) for a comprehensive overview of the numerous other works on perspective shift in languages such as, among many others, Japanese (McCready 2007, Sudo 2012), Navajo (Schauber 1979, Speas 2000) or Turkish (Özyıldız 2012), as well as several sign languages (Quer 2005 & 2013, Herrmann & Steinbach 2012).

can also be found in other languages as well, specifically with regard to tense, which has been shown to pattern with personal indexicals in English as well as German. Namely, he discusses examples of Russian ID clauses such as (46a) that maintain the tense form used in the original utterance, usually present tense, whereas in English, the tense form used in the embedded clause is always obligatorily interpreted from the perspective of the current speaker and thus must correspond to the tense form used in the matrix clause, usually past tense.

- (46) a. *petja_i skazal, čto on_i plačet* [Russian]
 Petja_i said that he_i is-crying
 ‘Petja said that he was crying [at the time of his utterance]’
- b. *petja_i vstretil človeka, kotoryj plačet* [Russian]
 Petja_i met person, who is-crying
 ‘Petja met a person who is crying/cries’
 NOT: ‘Petja met a person who was crying [at the time of the meeting].’
 (Schlenker 2003: 70f., ex. 56)

In (46a), the present tense form *plačet* is used to refer to the original time of the speech event being reported, which lies in the past from the perspective of the current speaker and thus must be interpreted from the context of the matrix subject. In short, the tense form has been shifted to present tense to reflect the point of view of the matrix subject, which is only possible in DD in both English and German. Moreover, Schlenker (2003: 71) stresses that context shift of Russian tense forms is only possible if the clause is subordinated via a propositional attitude verb like *say*, but not in other types of subordinate clauses (cf. also Schlenker 1999: 17). This is demonstrated in (46b), which features a relative clause instead. In this case, tense forms are prohibited from shifting to the perspective of the matrix subject and thus, present tense obligatorily refers to the current time of utterance and not the time of the reported speech event. (47) shows that the same holds true for personal indexicals in Amharic: If the subordinated clause is not embedded by a propositional attitude verb, first-person pronouns can solely be interpreted as referring to the current speaker:

- (47) a. [My_k brother]_i found a girl that he_{i,*k} likes.
 b. [My_k brother]_i found a girl that I_{*i,k} like.
 (Schlenker 2003: 69, ex. 55)

Based on these observations, Schlenker not only infers that tense and pronouns require a uniform theory to explain their identical behavior with regard to their perspectival characteristics (cf. Schlenker 1999: 8f.), but also concludes that propositional attitude verbs are, in fact, monstrous operators, and thus uniquely enable context shift for indexicals in their scope (cf. Schlenker 1999: 19, Schlenker 2003: 37). The reason that Kaplan’s prohibition of monstrous operators and, consequently,

context shift does not stand up to closer scrutiny, he argues, is two-fold: First, Kaplan should have not only looked at examples of English ID to form his theory but instead taken examples from other languages such as Amharic into account. Secondly, he should not have generalized from examples such as (48), taken from Kaplan (1989: 510) and cited in Schlenker (2003: 39), in which the supposed context operator fails to shift the interpretation of *I*, that *no* operators exist that are able to shift contexts. Instead, he should have taken attitude operators into consideration as well (cf. Schlenker 2003: 40).

(48) In some contexts it is true that I am not tired now.

Building on theoretical considerations in Israel & Perry (1996), Schlenker (2003) proposes that attitude verbs, which are traditionally analyzed as modal operators that manipulate world parameters, should rather be treated as quantifiers over contexts (but see von Stechow 2003, for an alternative approach that analyzes indexical shift as binding via modal quantifiers that quantify over centered world-time tuples). This endows them with the ability to manipulate the values of the context variables that indexical expressions in their scope take as arguments (cf. Schlenker 2003: 32). To obviate potential claims that the Amharic (or Russian) sentences under discussion might actually be cases of quotation via DD, not marked typographically in the respective languages as is convention in English and German, and therefore be exempt from the Fixity Thesis in the first place, he provides the following example from Amharic (originally presented in Leslau (1995: 779)):

(49) *min amt'-a ind-al-ə-ññ al-səmma-hu-mm*
 what bring.IMPER-2M COMP-say.PF-3M-1sO NEG-hear.PF-1S-NEG
 ‘I didn’t hear what he told me to bring.’
 (lit. I didn’t hear that he said to bring me what.)
 (Schlenker 2003: 68, ex. 54)

In (49), the original Amharic text uses a shifted second-person pronoun to refer to the original addressee of the reported speech event. As Schlenker points out, the ID clause also exhibits an alteration of the original utterance as the current speaker did not hear what object they were told to bring. Thus, *what* is inserted instead of the term used originally, showcasing that the speech report cannot be regarded as a direct quotation.²²

Schlenker’s theory of monstrous attitude operators raises the question why, then, if every propositional attitude verb can theoretically shift context parameters, not all indexicals are able to shift in every language? And why is it that even those indexical expressions that can shift may only do so optionally, as was shown above to be the case for Amharic indexicals? Schlenker’s solution is

²²See Chapter 4, however, for a discussion of the proposition in Maier (2015) that such apparent instances of perspective shifts are actually cases of mixed quotation.

to introduce a feature $\pm c^*$: an indexical expression which carries the feature $+c^*$ must take as argument the distinguished variable c^* , which denotes the context of utterance; an indexical expression which is unspecified for $\pm c^*$ can take as argument any context variable it desires (Schlenker 2011: 1590).

Individual indexicals may thus be lexically specified to either allow or prohibit context shift. Accordingly, one can distinguish between *unshiftable* indexicals “that can only be evaluated with respect to the actual speech act” and *shiftable* indexicals (also referred to as *shifty* indexicals by Deal (2017) and others) “that can be evaluated with respect to any context whatsoever” (Schlenker 2003: 74).

He goes on to explain the differences between English and Amharic personal indexicals by defining English *I* as an unshiftable indexical carrying the feature $+c^*$, whereas Amharic *I* is underspecified for $\pm c^*$ and therefore allows context shift once it is embedded by an attitude operator (cf. Schlenker 2003: 74). From this, it follows that there could technically also be indexicals with a $-c^*$ feature that can *only* be interpreted from a shifted context and thus exclusively appear in attitude reports. As Schlenker (2003: 59, 74f.) points out, personal indexicals that are specified to be read $-c^*$ do exist in Ewe (see Clements 1975, for the original data). Furthermore, he hypothesizes that the German mood form *Konjunktiv 1* (engl. ‘1st subjunctive’) might also be a logophoric form, as it almost exclusively appears subordinated via a propositional attitude verb (cf. (50a)) and, even when it is used on the root clause level, must be interpreted as reflecting the perspective of someone other than the current speaker (cf. (50b)):

- (50) a. *Judy glaubt, er sei in sie verliebt.*
 ‘Judy believes he be in love with her.’
 b. *Judy sagt, er sei jetzt ihr Freund. Er habe sich in sie verliebt.*
 ‘Judy said he be her boyfriend now. He have fallen in love with her.’
 c. *Judy sagt, er sei jetzt ihr Freund. Er hat sich in sie verliebt.*
 ‘Judy said he be her boyfriend now. He has fallen in love with her.’

This effect of *Konjunktiv 1*, originally observed by Jäger (1971), is demonstrated in the different readings available for (50b) and (50c). While the only coherent interpretation of the second clause in (50b) is as a continuation of the first clause, i.e., a speech report of Judy’s utterance, the second clause in (50c), which does not feature *Konjunktiv 1*, can only be read from the perspective of the current speaker.

Schlenker’s valuable work on Amharic indexicals and Russian tense overall provides clear-cut instances of context shift. However, it needs to be pointed out that, despite claims to the contrary, his data does not directly refute Kaplan’s prohibition of monsters. While Schlenker (2003: 30) asserts that Kaplan denied that monstrous operators could exist in natural language in general, this is not so, as the quote from Kaplan (1989) below showcases:

[...] no operator can control the character of the indexicals within its scope, because they will simply leap out of its scope to the front of the operator. I am not saying we could not construct a language with such operators, just that English is not one. And such operators *could not be added to it* (Kaplan 1989: 510 (emphasis in original)).

Kaplan is quite clearly only discussing and concerning himself with the potential for context shift in English and is explicitly *not* discounting the possibility of monstrous operators in other languages. But this is not to say that Schlenker's criticisms on the limitations of Kaplan's examples are without merit; Kaplan did indeed not take special properties of attitude reports into account and, moreover, the examples of English ID he does provide to illustrate that indexicals cannot shift are focused on personal indexicals only. ID clauses containing temporal or spatial indexicals, however, are not touched upon. Instead, Kaplan overgeneralizes and takes his observations about personal indexicals in ID to apply to all perspective-dependent expressions.

Schlenker (2003) does address this particular flaw in Kaplan's reasoning and states that even in English, there exist indexicals that may allow perspective shift when embedded by propositional attitude verbs. To be precise, he points out that certain temporal context-dependent expressions like *two days ago* or *in two days* can be interpreted from a shifted perspective in English ID (cf. Schlenker 2003: 63f., 98). As Rothkegel (2019: 24) rightfully points out, however, Schlenker surprisingly does not even consider that Kaplan might also have been wrong about other types of indexicals in English. Instead, he makes a distinction between shiftable temporal indexicals in English and temporal indexicals like *yesterday*, for which he strictly rules out any potential for perspective shift (cf. Schlenker 2003: 74, Schlenker 2011: 1590).

Anand & Nevins (2004) and Anand (2006) criticize Schlenker's pronoun-centric view of perspective shift, in which the lexical semantics of the individual deictic expression are responsible for the indexical's ability to shift, on the basis of examples from Slave and Zazaki that demonstrate the influence of the type of attitude verb on the behavior of indexicals in ID (cf. Anand & Nevins 2004: 30, Anand 2006: 93). Whereas Schlenker (2003) predicted that all propositional attitude verbs can potentially facilitate context shift due to their definition as quantifiers over contexts, Anand & Nevins (2004) point out that context shift in both Slave and Zazaki – and even Amharic as well, as Schlenker himself admits (cf. Schlenker 2003: 70) – is, in fact, restricted to only a few types of attitude verbs like, for example, SAY²³ in both Amharic and Zazaki. Furthermore, the specific attitude verb subordinating the ID clause may affect perspective shift in two major ways:

1. The attitude verb can impact which of the theoretically shifty indexicals in a

²³Expressions are written in capital letters to indicate when they are used as an umbrella term for corresponding or equivalent expressions from different languages.

language will be able to shift.

2. The attitude verb can impact if indexicals will shift obligatorily or may only do so optionally, leading to potentially ambiguous readings.
(cf. Anand & Nevins 2004: 30f.)

In Slave, the attitude verb TELL induces context shift for *all* personal indexicals in its scope, while in ID sentences featuring SAY or WANT, first-person pronouns may shift but second-person pronouns must still be interpreted from the context of utterance. However, SAY or WANT diverge as well: While the interpretation of first-person pronouns embedded by WANT is generally ambiguous, indicating that context shift is optional, they “can only be used to realize AUTH(c)”, i.e., the author of the reported context, when embedded by SAY (Anand & Nevins 2004: 32). Schlenker’s (2003) proposal cannot account for these differences: If ambiguous interpretations of indexicals in attitude reports resulted solely from lexical underspecification of the indexicals in question with regard to the feature $\pm c^*$, each individual indexical in a specific language would be expected to display identical properties regardless of the attitude verb it is subordinated by. Thus, second-person indexicals in Slave should be able to (optionally) shift in all attitude report contexts and not only when embedded via TELL; neither should context shift be optional for first-person indexicals in some ID clauses but not in others.

Anand & Nevins (2004) conclude from these observations that both crosslinguistic and in-language variation of context shift in attitude reports is determined by the lexical properties of the individual propositional attitude verb, not the indexical itself. According to their theory, certain attitude verbs can – or, in the case of Slave SAY, must – take a context-shifting operator as sister (cf. Anand & Nevins 2004: 27, Anand 2006: 68), which overwrites “coordinates of the context tuple with coordinates from the index tuple” (Anand & Nevins 2004: 27). To be specific, they argue for the existence of a limited set of operators that differ with regard to the context parameters they can overwrite. Based on the varied behavior of verbs in Slave and Zazaki, they differentiate between three potential context-shifting operators – OP_{auth} , OP_{per} and OP_V – and derive the following overview of crosslinguistic variation:

Cross-linguistic variation			
	VERB	LEXICAL ENTRIES	CLASS DESCRIPTION
AMHARIC, AGHEM	SAY	[say (OP_{per})]	optionally shifts 1st/2nd-per indexicals
NAVAJO	SAY	[say (OP_{per})]	optionally shifts 1st/2nd-per indexicals
SLAVE	TELL	[tell (OP_{per})]	optionally shifts 1st/2nd indexicals
	WANT	[want (OP_{auth})]	optionally shifts 1st-per indexicals
ZAZAKI	SAY	[say OP_{auth}]	obligatorily shifts 1st-per indexicals
	SAY	[say (OP_V)]	optionally shifts all indexicals
ENGLISH	ALL	[att-verb]	no indexical shift

Figure 3: Typology of context-shifting operators (Anand 2006: 110)

The possibility of context shift in each individual language is therefore directly dependent on the presence of at least one of these operators; notably, English supposedly does not feature any context-shifting operators according to Anand’s (2006) typology. Furthermore, languages may differ with regard to which combinations of verbs and operators are possible, which has a direct impact on the types of indexical expressions that may or may not be able to shift. In Zazaki, as well as Amharic, SAY is the only attitude verb that displays context shift in its subordinate clauses and thus the only one that may optionally introduce a monstrous operator. Concretely, “Zazaki indexical-shifting is the result of the operator OP_{\forall} , which overwrites all of the coordinates of the context parameter with those of the index parameter, effectively erasing any information of the actual speech act” (Anand & Nevins 2004: 27).

$$(51) \quad \llbracket OP_{\forall} \alpha \rrbracket^{c,j} = \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket^{j,j}.$$

(Anand & Nevins 2004: 27, ex. 25)

In contrast, only personal indexicals may shift in Slave, which Anand & Nevins (2004) take as indication that a different monstrous operator than OP_{\forall} is responsible. As was mentioned above, propositional attitude verbs in Slave also display a greater in-language variety, which necessitates the distinction between OP_{per} and OP_{auth} :

$$(52) \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{a. } \llbracket OP_{\text{auth}} \alpha \rrbracket^{c,i} = \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket^{j,i}, \text{ where } j = \langle \text{AUTH}(i), \text{ADDR}(c), \text{TIME}(c), \text{WORLD}(c) \rangle. \\ \text{b. } \llbracket OP_{\text{per}} \alpha \rrbracket^{c,i} = \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket^{j,i}, \text{ where } j = \langle \text{AUTH}(i), \text{ADDR}(i), \text{TIME}(c), \text{WORLD}(c) \rangle. \end{array}$$

(Anand 2006: 110, ex. 331)

While TELL thus optionally introduces OP_{per} , which shifts the context parameters for author and addressee, i.e., the values of first- and second-person indexicals, SAY and WANT must or can, respectively, introduce OP_{auth} , which can only shift first-person indexicals.

Through their empirical analysis of Slave and Zazaki, Anand & Nevins (2004) and Anand (2006) formulate two fundamental constraints that they take to hold for all languages that allow context shift in ID:

- $$(53) \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{a. } \textit{SHIFT-TOGETHER} \text{ Constraint: All indexicals within a } \textit{speech-context domain} \text{ must pick up reference from the same context. (Anand \& Nevins 2004: 23, also cf. Anand 2006: 100)} \\ \text{b. } \textit{NO INTERVENING BINDER} \text{ Constraint: A shiftable indexical } \textit{ind}_1 \text{ cannot pick up reference from a context } C_A \text{ if there is an intervening context } C_B \text{ **which another indexical } \textit{ind}_2 \text{ picks up reference from. (Anand 2006: 103 (emphasis in original), also cf. Anand \& Nevins 2004: 28)} \end{array}**$$

These constraints restrict context shift in several ways that, they argue, would be unexpected with respect to the pronoun-centric approach proposed in Schlenker

(2003), but which are predicted by an operator-based account (cf. Anand 2006: 68, Anand & Nevins 2004: 25).

The first constraint, *SHIFT-TOGETHER*, is based on observations from Zazaki that show that ID sentences containing two indexical expressions instead of one, which should, according to Schlenker (2003), theoretically be four-ways ambiguous, actually remain two-ways ambiguous:

- (54) *Vizeri Rojda Bill-ra va kε εz to-ra miradiša*
 Yesterday Rojda Bill-to said that I you-to angry.be-PRES
 ‘Yesterday Rojda said to Bill, “I am angry at you.”
 ‘Yesterday Rojda said to Bill, “AUTH(c*) is angry at ADDR(c*).”
 ‘*Yesterday Rojda said to Bill, “AUTH(c*) am angry at you.”
 ‘*Yesterday Rojda said to Bill, ”I am angry at ADDR(c*).”
 (Anand & Nevins 2004: 23, ex. 13)

The Zazaki ID clause in (54) contains both a first-person and a second-person pronoun and should thus theoretically allow for four different readings: one in which both pronouns are shifted to the reported context, one in which both pronouns are interpreted from the current context of utterance, one in which only the second-person pronoun has been shifted and finally, one in which only the first-person pronoun has been shifted. However, as the example shows, the latter two readings are infelicitous; the only two acceptable interpretations of (54) are those in which either both indexicals shift or neither does. Further examples show that this constraint extends to examples in Zazaki that contain temporal or spatial indexicals as well as to personal indexicals in Slave (cf. Anand & Nevins 2004: 23f., Anand 2006: 99f.). As Anand & Nevins (2004) point out, a pronoun-centric analysis cannot account for *SHIFT-TOGETHER*. As context shift is optional in Zazaki, but possible for all indexicals, they should all be lexically underspecified with regard to $\pm c^*$ according to Schlenker (2003) and thus shift or not shift independently of each other. This is not the case if context shift for all indexicals in Zazaki is fully dependent on the presence or absence of the same monstrous operator OP_{\vee} . As OP_{\vee} overwrites *all* context parameters, the values of the utterance context consequently are no longer retrievable; thus, any indexicals in the scope of OP_{\vee} can take their reference solely from the reported context (cf. Anand & Nevins 2004: 27).²⁴

Similarly, *NO INTERVENING BINDER* also follows logically from an operator-based account: Examples from Zazaki like (55) show that in cases of multiple embedding that feature context shift in the intermediate clause, the lowest clause is unable to retrieve the context parameters of the utterance context. Thus, if indexicals in the intermediate clause shift, indexicals in the lowest clause must do so as well.

- (55) Ali to me said [_{CP1} OP_{\vee} Hesen to you said [I am Rojda’s brother]].

²⁴Some counterexamples in which *SHIFT-TOGETHER* fails to hold are reported in Schlenker (2017), who suggests that the constraint might be language-specific.

(Anand 2006: 109, ex. 330)

In (55), the speaker reports a conversation with Ali in which Ali told the speaker that Hesen said to Ali, that he, i.e., the current speaker, is the brother of Rojda. Accordingly, the second-person pronoun in the intermediate clause has to be shifted to arrive at the intended meaning of referring to *Ali's* addressee at the time of the speech event – which is the current speaker – instead of the addressee of the current context of utterance. However, as indexicals in Zazaki obey *SHIFT-TOGETHER* and OP_{\forall} affects all indexicals in its scope, the author parameter is shifted alongside YOU. Thus, I in the lowest clause can either refer to Ali or Hesen himself, but not to the current speaker; instead, a second-person pronoun would have to be used in the lowest clause as well to arrive at the intended reading.

If the intermediate clause does not feature context shift, however, indexicals in the lowest clause are free to be interpreted with regard to the context of utterance (cf. Anand & Nevins 2004: 28, 30). Thus, in an alternative version of (55), in which Ali is instead reporting a conversation he may have overheard between Hesen and whoever the addressee of the current utterance context is, the second-person pronoun in the intermediate clause would not be shifted, and thus, the first-person pronoun in the lowest clause can refer to the current speaker as well. This illustrates that context shift in cases of multiple embedding is only obligatory for the lowest clause if the parameters have been overwritten by OP_{\forall} at a higher place in the clausal structure. While Anand (2006: 118) refers to *NO INTERVENING BINDER* as well as *SHIFT-TOGETHER* as global constraints on context shift, he has to concede that the former, at least, may potentially be language-specific: As several multiple embedding examples from Slave, originally provided in Rice (1986), show, indexicals in the lowest clause can be interpreted from the context of utterance even when the intermediate clause features context shift (cf. Anand 2006: 115). Slave thus violates *NO INTERVENING BINDER*.

Deal (2020) builds on Anand's (2006) observations to present perhaps the most comprehensive theory on context shift in ID to date (see also Deal 2014 & 2017). By covering and comparing a multitude of languages, including Slave, Zazaki and Nez Perce, Deal creates an operator-theoretic model that explains noticeable patterns across languages and accounts for crosslinguistic variation as well, and is thus able to make predictions about context shift in other, as of yet unexplored languages. Deal generally agrees with Anand (2006) and Anand & Nevins (2004) that only an operator-based account can explain both the effect of different propositional attitude verbs on the potential for context shift in ID as well as constraints like *SHIFT-TOGETHER* that strongly suggest that context shift affects the clausal structure as a whole (cf. Deal 2017: 21, Deal 2020: 7). However, her model diverges from the one proposed by Anand (2006) in several major ways, most importantly with regard to the number and types of monstrous operators that may be inserted at the left

periphery of clauses embedded by attitude verbs.

While both operator-based accounts come to the conclusion that a number of different monstrous operators, selected by specific attitude verbs, have to be postulated to account for the variety both in and across languages in indexicals' ability to shift, Anand & Nevins (2004) and Anand (2006) suggest that each attitude verb can select exactly one operator. Thus, Zazaki SAY selects OP_{\vee} , which is why indexicals of all types in its scope may shift, while Slave SAY selects OP_{auth} , which is why only first-person pronouns in its scope may shift. Deal disagrees with this notion primarily on the basis of data from Nez Perce which showcases that, while Nez Perce generally allows for first-person and second-person pronouns as well as spatial indexicals²⁵ to shift, it only partially obeys *SHIFT-TOGETHER*. However, these violations only occur with regard to indexicals of different types; if an ID clause contains two spatial indexicals, for example, it is not possible for one to shift to the reported context and the other one to be interpreted from the context of utterance. The same holds true for two first-person or two second-person pronouns, but not for cases in which the ID clause contains, for example, a first-person pronoun and a spatial indexical. In such cases, the first-person pronoun may be shifted while the spatial indexical remains unshifted, thus violating *SHIFT-TOGETHER* (cf. Deal 2020: 22).

This leads Deal to instead argue in favor of an approach in which multiple operators can be active simultaneously, each impacting different classes of indexicals independently from each other. To be specific, she proposes

that languages allowing shift of multiple types of indexicals (e.g., first person, second person, locative) may allow multiple shifty operators to stack in the left periphery of finite clauses; stacking is regulated by standard syntactic constraints on functional structure in a way that explains several of the crosslinguistic generalizations (Deal 2020: 5).

Her account is thus more restrictive than Schlenker's pronoun-centric approach, which does not predict *SHIFT-TOGETHER* effects, but, in contrast to Anand's single-operator analysis, also allows for violations of *SHIFT-TOGETHER* if it pertains to different types of indexicals. Accordingly, she rephrases *SHIFT-TOGETHER* to only cover indexicals of the same class:

- (56) *SHIFT-TOGETHER* Constraint: If one indexical of class Ψ picks up reference from context c , then all indexicals of class Ψ within the same minimal attitude complement must also pick up reference from context c .

(Deal 2020: 38, also see Deal 2017: 19, 25)

²⁵Regarding temporal indexicals, Deal (2017: 36) notes that Nez Perce equivalents of *yesterday* or *tomorrow* behave "more in line with non-indexical translation[s] 'the next/previous day', in the scope of temporal quantification." She therefore concludes that Nez Perce does not contain actual temporal indexicals and accordingly focuses her analysis primarily on personal and spatial indexicals.

Languages that allow context shift can thus vary with regard to the different operators that exist in each language. For Nez Perce, Deal identifies three operators: OP_{AUTH} , which enables context shift for first-person pronouns, OP_{ADDR} , which enables context shift for second-person pronouns, and OP_{LOC} , which enables context shift for spatial or ‘locative’ indexicals (cf. Deal 2020: 65, Deal 2017: 25). However, Deal (2020) also notes that context shift in Nez Perce is still more restricted than her version of *SHIFT-TOGETHER* would require: While her data shows examples in which personal indexicals shift but spatial indexicals do not, the opposite is not possible – once a spatial indexical in an attitude complement has shifted, personal indexicals can only be interpreted from the perspective of the matrix subject as well (cf. Deal 2020: 58, Deal 2014: 11). Moreover, she observes that all languages for which substantial data on context shift in ID has been provided in the literature follow one of three basic patterns:

1. Languages that allow context shift for first-person, second-person and spatial indexicals such as Zazaki or Nez Perce.
2. Languages that allow context shift for first-person and second-person indexicals but not for spatial indexicals such as Uyghur (cf. Sudo 2012) and Dhaasanac (cf. Nishiguchi 2019).
3. Languages that allow context shift for first-person indexicals but not for second-person or spatial indexicals such as Tamil (cf. Sundaesan 2012) and Slave with regard to the attitude verb SAY (cf. Rice 1986).
(cf. Deal 2020: 52f.)


Languages that break these patterns by, for example, allowing spatial indexicals to shift without also allowing personal indexicals to shift, are not attested in the literature (cf. Deal 2020: 54). Consequently, Deal (2020) assumes a universally valid hierarchy of operators that she predicts to apply to all languages allowing context shift in ID, illustrated in Figure 4 below. Notably, Deal also does not recognize a potential for context shift in English ID.

	Shifty 1st	Shifty 2nd	Shifty Loc
Zazaki	✓	✓	✓
Uyghur, Slave ‘tell’	✓	✓	–
Slave ‘say’	✓	–	–
English	–	–	–

Figure 4: Implicational hierarchy of indexical classes: Indexicals of a certain class may shift only if indexicals of classes farther to the left shift as well (cf. Deal 2020: 54, Deal 2017: 8f.).

As the figure shows, context shift of spatial indexicals always entails context shift of personal indexicals and context shift of second-person indexicals always entails context shift of first-person indexicals. Deal (2020) attributes these entailments to the position of the individual operators in the syntactic structure of embedded clauses in ID. Following the cartographic analyses established in Rizzi (1997) and Cinque (1999), she suggests that monstrous operators, being functional elements, should be expected “to occupy rigid ‘functional sequences’ requiring that one type of element asymmetrically command another type of element” (Deal 2020: 66). The presence of operators positioned higher in the structure would then be directly dependent on the presence of operators positioned lower in the structure (cf. Deal 2020: 68). According to Deal’s hierarchy of indexical classes depicted in Figure 4, it follows that OP_{LOC} occupies the highest possible operator-position in the structure and OP_{AUTH} the lowest. But where do temporal indexicals fit into the hierarchy?

While Deal laments the lack of data on temporal indexical shift across languages, she is able to identify a fourth operator OP_{TIME} and place it in her hierarchy based on Korean data from Park (2016). The data shows that only temporal indexicals but neither personal nor spatial ones can shift when subordinated via Korean THINK. In contrast to spatial indexicals, context shift of temporal indexicals does thus not entail context shift of personal indexicals, which leads Deal to place OP_{TIME} lowest in the hierarchy. The final version of Deal’s hierarchy of monstrous operators in the syntactic structure of subordinate clauses is illustrated in (57) (cf. Deal 2020: 78, Deal 2017: 39).



The hierarchy in (57) would pose a problem for the type of context shift I propose for German ID: If ID possesses identical perspectival properties to FID, the same elements should be able to shift or not shift. For FID, it is generally accepted that both temporal and spatial indexicals are interpreted from the perspective of the thought’s or utterance’s original author, while personal indexicals have to be interpreted from the perspective of the current speaker; therefore, the same should hold true for ID. Deal’s hierarchy, however, predicts that spatial and temporal indexicals stand in contrast to each other: Whereas context shift of temporal indexicals is independent of other indexicals’ shiftability, context shift of spatial indexicals should always entail personal shift. Thus, context shift in German ID, as proposed here,

would stand in violation of Deal’s universal hierarchy of operators.

Fortunately, Deal herself presents a solution to this problem in the form of lexical bundling. She notes that some languages display surprising co-shifting effects between different types of indexicals that are not predicted by her universal hierarchy and seem to vary across languages. In Nez Perce, personal indexicals always obey *SHIFT-TOGETHER*, despite the fact that first-person indexicals should theoretically be able to shift without entailing context shift of second-person indexicals. Similarly, spatial and temporal indexicals seem to always obey *SHIFT-TOGETHER* in Korean, even when personal indexicals remain unshifted, which should not be possible according to the operator-hierarchy. According to Deal (2020: 85), “these observations suggest that crosslinguistic variation in the semantics of shifty operators extends to how many coordinates of context a single operator shifts – that is, the extent of lexical bundling.”

In the case of Nez Perce, OP_{AUTH} and OP_{ADDR} are bundled together into a unified OP_{PERS} operator that affects all personal indexicals, akin to the type of operator suggested by Anand & Nevins (2004) and Anand (2006) (cf. Deal 2020: 84f., Deal 2017: 42). However, Deal points out that the advantage of her operator-stacking approach is that it allows both for languages that only show *SHIFT-TOGETHER* for indexicals of the same class as well as for languages that show *SHIFT-TOGETHER* effects across different classes of indexicals, whereas Anand’s (2006) approach only predicts the latter (cf. Deal 2020: 89). Regarding co-shifting effects between spatial and temporal indexicals, Deal suggests the existence of a bundled operator OP_{ADV} . In languages featuring such a bundle, the operator could theoretically be positioned at either of its components’ original placements in the hierarchy. Thus, OP_{ADV} could either be placed in OP_{LOC} ’s high position, thereby obligatorily entailing context shift of personal indexicals – but not the other way around – or in OP_{TIME} ’s low position, which appears to be the case for Korean (cf. Deal 2020: 87, Deal 2017: 44).

The available combinations of indexical shift therefore result directly from the syntax and the possible sizes of complement clauses that can be subordinated by attitude verbs in a given language. It follows then that ID clauses that allow context shift for all classes of indexicals must be syntactically larger structures than those that, for example, only allow context shift for first-person indexicals, or even none at all, as the former would have to contain positions for all operators. Deal (2020) further argues that this is reflected in the types of attitude verbs that enable context shift and observes a universal hierarchical pattern of verb classes similar to the hierarchy of indexicals depicted in Figure 4. Specifically, she divides languages that allow context shift into three distinct classes, from which she derives the hierarchy of verbs depicted in Figure 5.

1. Languages that allow context shift only when subordinated by verbs of speech such as Zazaki (cf. Anand 2006) and Dhaasanac (cf. Nishiguchi 2019).

2. Languages that allow context shift only when subordinated by verbs of speech or verbs of thought such as Korean (cf. Park 2016) and Slave (cf. Rice 1986).
3. Languages that allow context shift only when subordinated by verbs of speech, verbs of thought or verbs of knowledge such as Nez Perce. (cf. Deal 2020: 49ff.)

	Shift takes place under verbs of:		
	Speech	Thought	Knowledge
Nez Perce	✓	✓	✓
Navajo, Slave, Uyghur	✓	✓	–
Dhaasanac, Zazaki	✓	–	–

Figure 5: Implicational hierarchy of verbs (cf. Deal 2020: 51, Deal 2017: 27).

There is no data on languages not adhering to this pattern, such as a language allowing context shift only under verbs of knowledge, for example. Furthermore, languages from the second or third class are shown to often allow a greater variety of indexical types to shift if subordinated to a verb of speech instead of a verb of thought or knowledge (cf. Deal 2020: 90). Thus, according to Deal’s hierarchy of verbs, “verbs of speech are more likely to allow indexical shift in their complement than are verbs of thought, which in turn are more likely to allow indexical shift in their complement than are verbs of knowledge” (Deal 2020: 51), which she attributes to differences in the respective sizes of their complement clauses. She concludes that verbs of speech are more likely to allow context shift in their complement clauses because their complements are syntactically largest (cf. Deal 2020: 68f.).

Lastly, I want to briefly summarize the approach proposed in Bittner (2014), who also focuses on context shift in Slave but rejects both pronoun-centric as well as operator-based accounts. Instead, Bittner suggests a ‘dynamic view’ of indexicality in which “indexical reference is a species of discourse reference, just like anaphora” and that takes into account “not only context dependence, but also context change” (Bittner 2014: 1). She argues that discourse entities such as individuals or events form a prominence-based hierarchy, with the currently central ‘dref²⁶ entities’ on top of the hierarchy. Shifty indexicals may then reflect the perspective of an attitude holder whose attitude state or speech event has been made central via a propositional attitude verb, as long as they are in its scope (cf. Bittner 2014: 8). The reason that indexicals are usually rigidly bound to the current context of utterance is that the general act of making an utterance automatically and unavoidably draws attention

²⁶Abbreviation of *discourse referent*, as used by Bittner (2014).

to the current speech event, thereby making it the central one, which can, however, be momentarily shifted via the insertion of a direct quote (cf. Bittner 2014: 10f.).

Based on the data presented in Rice (1986), Bittner theorizes that the same holds true for certain propositional attitude verbs in Slave, which control if the personal indexicals in their scope can shift, and differentiates between three classes of attitude verbs:

1. Speaker-centered verbs, whose complement clause is interpreted fully from the perspective of the current speaker. This encompasses most attitude verbs in Slave.
2. Intransitive IV-shift verbs, whose complement clause exhibits optional perspective shift for first-person indexicals (and third-person pronouns) but not second-person indexicals.
3. Transitive TV-shift verbs, which display the same behavior as IV-shift verbs but additionally feature a selected argument in their complement clause that co-refers to the matrix object.

The fact that second-person indexicals do not shift when subordinated by WANT, but are able to do so when subordinated by TELL, is attributed to the semantics of the different verbs. Attitude states are speculated to lack a value for the addressee parameter and thus, second-person indexicals can only make reference to the highest-ranked dref for the addressee value provided via the central speech act. Things are different for TELL because it instead introduces a speech event that contains both an author and an addressee and can therefore provide a reference point for second-person indexicals (cf. Bittner 2014: 18). Bittner further distinguishes between indexical modifiers, i.e., temporal and spatial indexicals, and pronominal arguments, i.e., personal indexicals, and claims that only the latter are lexically specified to always be anchored to the highest-ranking perspectival dref, regardless of whether it constitutes a speech event or an attitude state. The former, in contrast, are lexically specified to always be anchored to the currently central speech event, and are thus unaffected by context shift in Slave (cf. Bittner 2014: 17).

Having now summarized the most prominent works on context shift in ID for languages other than English or German, it seems prudent to briefly review and discuss if and how these approaches might be applied to my proposed analysis of German ID clauses.

2.3.2 Monsters in German?

In general, two conclusions can be drawn from the overview of context shift in various languages provided by Deal (2020) and others: First of all, it is now quite clear that context shift is not only possible, but even a rather common phenomenon in many languages which appears to be directly linked to speech, thought and attitude

reports. This may perhaps seem unremarkable at first, but it is important to note: If a language permits context shift at all, then it should be expected to do so in ID clauses specifically. There is no universal property of ID that prevents indexical expressions to shift; in fact, the opposite is the case.

Secondly, the exact application of context shift, its limitations and scope with regard to which indexicals may shift under which attitude verbs, is highly language-specific. While a comparison of different languages allows Deal (2020), in particular, to recognize patterns that might reflect universal characteristics of context shift, it seems apparent that these patterns have to be taken with a grain of salt when looking at languages not covered by her extensive analysis. They can certainly be used to make predictions about context shift in other languages, but it cannot be taken for granted that they must apply to those languages as well. Deal (2020: 4) herself acknowledges the possibility that the predictions made through her study could be refuted by future research on other languages.

Nevertheless, it is important to take into account if any of the approaches discussed in the previous section provide suitable explanations for context shift in German ID or need to be dismissed outright. To start with, Bittner's (2014) account seems most in line with the analysis I aim to pursue in this investigation due to its focus on prominence as a major factor in initiating a shift in perspective and its differentiation between verbs that reflect attitude states and verbs that reflect speech events. Both are lines of thought that will be of major interest in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. Though Deal (2020) is somewhat dismissive of purely pragmatic accounts, pointing out the importance of syntactic factors (cf. Deal 2020: 23, 27), the experimental studies presented in subsequent chapters will demonstrate the undeniable relevance the overall discourse context and the prominence of the referents therein have with regard to enabling, triggering and governing perspective shift. That said, Bittner also seems too quick to dismiss both Schlenker's (2003) pronoun-centric as well as operator-based accounts (cf. Bittner 2014: 19), as her own focus on the hierarchical prominence of discourse entities is ultimately unable to fully account for all aspects of context shift, both in Slave and crosslinguistically.

For one thing, Bittner's claim that the mere introduction of an attitude state via propositional attitude verb would be sufficient to establish said attitude state as the most salient and central one, thus automatically outranking the current speech event, is much too broad. As the experimental studies presented in Chapter 5 will illustrate, it is less the utilization of an attitude verb and more so the prominence status of discourse referents in the *preceding discourse context* which facilitates perspective shift. While the environment of a speech or thought report provides the necessary means to enable context shift, all of the accounts discussed in the previous section, including Bittner's, mostly ignore the role and impact of the overall discourse context. Even for Slave itself, it is unclear why only so few attitude verbs

should allow context shift if it is solely reliant on a central attitude state being introduced. Bittner (2014: 17) postulates that speaker-centered attitude verbs “pre-suppose that the highest-ranking perspectival dref is the current speech act”, thus ultimately also attributing the behavior of individual attitude verbs to their lexical specification. In fact, Bittner’s account incorporates even more stipulations about the lexical semantics of individual expressions than the other approaches discussed in Section 2.3.1. Whereas Schlenker (2003) attempts to explain the divergent behavior of individual indexicals by arguing that they are either lexically underspecified with regard to a feature $\pm c^*$ or carrying the feature $+c^*$, and both operator-based accounts instead shift their focus to the individual attitude verbs and the type of operators they may introduce into the structure, Bittner’s (2014) analysis involves assumptions about the lexical nature of both indexicals and attitude verbs.

Her theories about indexicals in particular do not fully add up. For one thing, one would expect that her grouping together of spatial and temporal indexicals as indexical modifiers should apply crosslinguistically and not solely to Slave. But as has been shown by Deal (2020), these two classes of indexicals often do not pattern together, as spatial indexical shift usually entails personal indexical shift, while temporal indexical shift usually does not, which lead Deal to place them at opposite ends of her hierarchy (cf. (57)). Moreover, for Slave, too, there is a problem with Bittner’s explanation: She claims that the difference between the two groups is that indexical modifiers are always anchored to the central speech act, while pronominal arguments are instead anchored to the overall highest-ranked perspectival dref, regardless of whether it is a speech act or an attitude state. Therefore, only personal indexicals are affected by verbs that introduce attitude states. But what about verbs such as SAY or TELL that also facilitate context shift but introduce speech acts instead of attitude states? The assumption would be that indexical modifiers should be able to shift when subordinated by these verbs as well, yet this is not the case. While I thus agree with Bittner that the prominence of discourse entities is an important factor affecting perspective shift, it alone cannot fully explain the behavior of individual indexicals as well as attitude verbs in a given language.

Turning our attention to the other accounts, Schlenker’s (2003) pronoun-centric approach can be applied to German ID quite easily – we simply have to analyze spatio-temporal indexicals in German as being underspecified with regard to $\pm c^*$ in the same vein as Amharic *I*, thus enabling them to optionally shift when embedded by an attitude verb. However, both Anand (2006) and Deal (2020) have demonstrated rather convincingly that Schlenker’s model of context shift overgeneralizes and cannot explain why individual indexicals behave differently in some languages depending on which attitude verb they are subordinated by. Any discussion of whether this is the case for German as well will be postponed until Chapter 6. Either way, it appears that an operator-based account, specifically the one proposed

by Deal (2020), which builds on the findings of Anand & Nevins (2004) and Anand (2006), is particularly well-suited to explain the phenomenon of context shift in ID while covering both similarities and variation between languages. The most relevant question then becomes which monstrous operator(s) exist in German.

Compared to the languages discussed by Deal (2020), context shift in German is fairly restricted, as personal indexicals are unable to shift, which, according to the hierarchy in (57), means that German can only contain operators that would be placed below OP_{AUTH} and affect spatial and temporal indexicals. The operators proposed by Anand (2006) cannot account for this since they only affect personal indexicals, aside from OP_{\forall} , which covers *all* types of indexicals.²⁷ Deal's account, on the other hand, does provide suitable analysis for the type of context shift in German in the form of the lexically bundled operator OP_{ADV} , which covers both temporal and spatial indexicals. As OP_{ADV} combines the two individual operators OP_{LOC} and OP_{TIME} , it can optionally take either one's place in the operator-hierarchy, but since OP_{ADV} does not entail personal indexical shift in German, it must take the low position of OP_{TIME} . Regarding the possible sizes of complement clauses suggested by Deal (2020: 67), only two variations appear to be possible in German ID sentences: The propositional attitude verb in the matrix clause subordinates a clausal structure either containing OP_{ADV} or no operators at all.

From this, it follows that ID clauses containing more than one temporal indexical in their scope should obey *SHIFT-TOGETHER*, i.e., either both temporal indexicals shift or neither one does. The same should apply to clauses containing both temporal and spatial indexicals. As they are affected by the same operator OP_{ADV} , they should not be able to shift independently of each other. The examples in (58) confirm these predictions.

- (58) a. *Am Samstag erzählte Maike ihrer Freundin Hanna davon, wie sehr sie sich auf das Konzert von Taylor Swift freute.*
 'On Saturday, Maike told her friend Hanna how much she was looking forward to the Taylor Swift concert.'
 i. *Hanna grinste und sagte, dass sie sich heute ebenfalls Karten für das Konzert morgen gekauft hätte.*
 'Hanna grinned and said that she had also bought tickets today for the concert tomorrow.'
 ii. *Hanna grinste und sagte, dass sie sich heute ebenfalls Karten für das Konzert morgen kaufen würde.*
 'Hanna grinned and said that she would also buy tickets today for the concert tomorrow.'
- b. *Während einer Geschäftsreise nach Paris vor ein paar Wochen besuchte*

²⁷This is not to say that an operator covering only spatial and temporal indexicals – or even just either one of the two types – could not theoretically be added to Anand's (2006) model as well.

ich kurz meinen Onkel Louis.

‘During a business trip to Paris a few weeks ago, I briefly visited my uncle Louis.’

- i. *Als wir seinen beeindruckenden Weinkeller betraten, sagte Louis, dass er hier heute ein Weintasting für seine Nachbarn ausrichten würde.*

‘When we entered his impressive wine cellar, Louis said that he would be hosting a wine tasting for his neighbors here today.’

- ii. *Als wir seinen beeindruckenden Weinkeller betraten, sagte Louis, dass er dort heute ein Weintasting für seine Nachbarn ausrichten würde.*

‘When we entered his impressive wine cellar, Louis said that he would be hosting a wine tasting for his neighbors there today.’

The examples in (58a-i) and (58a-ii) both contain two temporal indexicals in their ID clauses, namely *heute* and *morgen*. In both cases, the previous sentence establishes that the conversation between Maike and Hanna is taking place in the past. As the ID clause in (58a-i) uses the past perfect, its only possible reading is that Hanna has already bought the tickets for the concert at the time of their conversation. Thus, *heute* does not allow an interpretation in which it refers to the present day of the current context of utterance, but must instead be taken to refer to the same day on which Hanna and Maike are having their conversation – in other words, she must have bought the concert tickets earlier that day. As *heute* has shifted to Hanna’s context, *morgen* should not be able to receive an unshifted reading either, even though such a reading would theoretically be coherent for this context since the Taylor Swift concert could also potentially take place a day in the future from the current context of utterance. But such a reading is indeed unavailable for *morgen* in (58a-i), which can only be interpreted from the reported utterance context as well. However, this is not the case for (58a-ii): As this version of the ID clause does allow a reading in which Hanna plans to buy her ticket at a – from her perspective – future date, *heute* is free to be interpreted as referring to the present day of the current speaker, and therefore, *morgen* can be interpreted from the reporting utterance context, too. We can thus conclude that temporal indexicals in German ID do not violate *SHIFT-TOGETHER*.

As (58b-i) and (58b-ii) illustrate, ID clauses containing both temporal and spatial indexicals also adhere to *SHIFT-TOGETHER*. The examples again establish that the conversation between the speaker and his uncle took place in the recent past, but also at a location different from the speaker’s current one, namely, his uncle’s wine cellar in Paris. From the content of the examples, the only coherent reading of the spatial indexicals used in the ID clauses should be one in which they refer to Louis’ wine cellar. Thus, in the case of (58b-i), *hier* needs to receive a shifted interpretation

to refer to Louis' location at the time of the reported utterance, whereas *dort* in (58b-ii) can only receive an unshifted reading from the speaker's perspective instead. Accordingly, *heute* should also be interpreted from the reported context in (58b-i) and from the reporting context in (58b-ii), despite the fact that both readings would be coherent; after all, Louis could theoretically be planning to host his wine tasting on the same day his nephew visits him or on some other specified date that equals the current day of utterance of the speaker. However, once again, the ID clauses only allow readings in which either all shifty indexicals do shift, or in which they remain unshifted; a reading for (58b-i), for example, in which *hier* refers to Louis' location at the reported time, but *heute* refers to the speaker's current time, is unavailable.

It should prove fruitful to test these judgments about *SHIFT-TOGETHER* in German ID empirically in future research. Still, they provide initial evidence that an operator-based approach in which a single operator enables context shift for spatio-temporal indexicals in its scope, such as the operator OP_{ADV} proposed by Deal (2020), is able to account for at least some of the properties of context shift in German ID. However, as the current aim is to strive for a uniform analysis of ID and FID, it remains to be seen if an operator-theoretic model can cover both phenomena.

2.3.3 Context Shift in English or German Indirect Discourse

This section will explore the few works in the literature that deem context shift in German or English ID to be possible. As the discussion of the most prominent works on context shift in ID in Section 2.3.1 has demonstrated, it is common in the literature to deny any potential for context shift in English ID and disregard German ID altogether. Most works centered around indexicals or speech and thought reports in German, such as Ehrich (1992: 11), Steube (1985: 390f.) or Dirscherl & Pafel (2015: 35)²⁸, take it for granted that German, too, only allows context shift of temporal and spatial indexicals in FID. An exception to this consensus can be found in Plank (1986), who, on the basis of examples like the ones in (59a), (59b) and (59c), stipulates that context shift in German ID is possible for spatio-temporal indexicals .

- (59) a. *Vico telegraphierte mir aus Uzwil nach Oberuzwil, daß ich/er am Samstag hier/dort singt.*

‘Vico telegraphed me from Uzwil to Oberuzwil that I am/he is singing here/there on Saturday.’

- b. *Am gestrigen Montag telegraphierte mir Vico, daß ich/er heute/morgen*

²⁸While Dirscherl & Pafel (2015) do consider it possible for spatial and temporal adverbials such as *hier* and *morgen* to reflect the perspective of the reported author instead of the current speaker, they deny that these are instances of actual perspective shift. Instead, they analyze such cases as anaphoric uses of these expressions. However, they neither provide evidence for these claims, nor do they explain why temporal and spatial adverbials in FID, in contrast, need to be treated as actual instances of perspective shift.

singt.

‘On Monday yesterday, Vico telegraphed me that I am/he is singing today/tomorrow.’

- c. *Am gestrigen Montag telegraphierte mir Vico aus Uzwil nach Oberuzwil, daß Hazy Osterwald heute/morgen hier/dort singt.*

‘On Monday yesterday, Vico telegraphed me from Uzwil to Oberuzwil that Hazy Osterwald is singing here/there today/tomorrow.’

(Plank 1986: 289ff., ex. 8, 10 and 11 (slightly abbreviated))

Plank’s central theory is that anchoring the reference point of perspective-dependent expressions does not represent a clear-cut binary choice, but is instead a gradual process in which the decision may sometimes be obvious but, at other times, subtle and open to a lot of variation between individual speakers (cf. Plank 1986: 284). He constructs clauses combining different classes of indexicals such as a personal and a spatial indexical as in (59a), a personal and a temporal indexical as in (59b), or a spatial and a temporal indexical as in (59c), to test their individual context flexibility as well as for potential dependencies between the classes. Specifically, Plank tries to examine whether a shifted interpretation of one type of indexical might facilitate a preference for shifted interpretations of other types of indexicals in the same clause. Based on his own as well as the intuitions of several informants that were handed questionnaires regarding the possible interpretations of indexicals in ID clauses like the ones in (59), he observes that, whereas first-person indexicals can never receive a shifted reading outside of DD, interpretations of spatio-temporal indexicals are much more varied.

While the majority of his informants overall prefer an interpretation of those types of indexicals from the perspective of the speaker, most find an interpretation from the matrix subject’s perspective, i.e., Vico in (59), at least acceptable, with a few even rating both interpretations as equally natural (cf. Plank 1986: 289). The results for spatial and temporal indexicals regarding combinations with a personal indexical were almost identical to each other (cf. Plank 1986: 290f.), which lends credence to the theory that, just like in FID, both types can shift when embedded in an ID clause. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly and contrary to Anand’s (2006) *SHIFT-TOGETHER* constraint, almost none of Plank’s informants allow a reading for clauses like (59c) in which both indexicals are interpreted from the reported context. Interpretations in which either the spatial or the temporal indexical are shifted, however, are deemed acceptable by at least half of his informants (cf. Plank 1986: 291). This is both unexpected and difficult to explain, as it implies not only that a violation of *SHIFT-TOGETHER* is possible in German, but even obligatory. As Plank himself points out, though, these results lack statistical significance due to the small number of informants (n=11) and might therefore not be representative. This might perhaps also be the reason why his attempt to demonstrate the shifta-

bility of spatio-temporal indexicals in German ID has gone largely unnoticed in the literature on the subject.

An attempt to gather stronger empirical evidence for Plank's claim is made in Rothkegel (2019). Rothkegel similarly argues that German spatio-temporal indexicals can receive shifted readings in ID, whereas personal indexicals cannot, and further claims that the choice between the speaker and the matrix subject as the preferred perspectival center might even be random, unless indicated otherwise by the content of the clause (cf. Rothkegel 2019: 28f.). She conducts two empirical studies to test these hypotheses. Her first experiment consisted of a forced-choice study in which participants were presented with short text segments. The final clause always featured ID containing either a personal (60a), a temporal (60b) or a spatial indexical (60c).

- (60) a. *Am Nachmittag sprach Dennis mit mir über die neue Lehrerin. Er behauptete, dass **ich** total in sie verliebt sei.*

‘In the afternoon, Dennis talked to me about the new teacher. He claimed that **I** was totally in love with her.’

- b. *Als ich Lara gestern im Supermarkt an der Kühltheke traf, war sie gerade hektisch auf der Suche nach dem Kaviar. Sie jammerte, dass sie **heute** Gäste bekäme, aber nichts Besonderes im Haus habe.*

‘When I met Lara at the refrigerated counter in the supermarket yesterday, she was frantically searching for caviar. She whined that she was having guests over **today** but had nothing special in the house.’

- c. *Während ich auf die Ostsee hinausschaute, dachte ich an Marc, der an der Nordsee lebte. Er hatte mir mal erzählt, dass das Wasser **hier** sehr kalt sei.*

‘As I looked out over the Baltic Sea, I thought of Marc, who lived at the North Sea. He had once told me that the water **here** was very cold.’

(Rothkegel 2019: 32f. (emphasis in original), English translations provided by author)

Items were created in two conditions that either featured a homodiegetic first-person narrator, as in the versions used for the examples in (60), or a heterodiegetic third-person narrator.²⁹ Participants were asked a question after each item regarding which person, point in time or location the indexical used in the ID clause was referring to, and had to decide between two options reflecting the narrator's or the matrix subject's context, respectively (cf. Rothkegel 2019: 31).

Independently of condition, the results of Rothkegel's (2019) first experimental study show a clear and predicted difference between the potential interpretations of personal indexicals, on the one hand, and spatio-temporal indexicals, on the other

²⁹These narratological terms will be explained in more detail in Chapter 3, which focuses on multiperspectivity in narration.

hand: Whereas the former displayed a strong preference to be interpreted as referring to the narrator (= 88% of participants), the latter were preferably interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist (= 69% for items featuring temporal indexicals and 65% for items featuring spatial indexicals) (cf. Rothkegel 2019: 35). The condition of narrating instance did not show a significant effect on these overall preferences, though for all three indexical classes, the preference for the protagonist as perspectival center was slightly increased if the text segment featured a third-person narrator (cf. Rothkegel 2019: 37). The experiment thus provides first empirical evidence that context shift is not only possible in German ID with respect to spatio-temporal indexicals, contrary to the consensus in the literature, but might even represent the preferred interpretation for native speakers.

Rothkegel (2019) attempts to replicate her results in a follow-up study that differs from her first experiment in several key aspects. Most importantly, the test items were presented to participants as excerpts from users' chat histories, in the style of popular instant messaging services. This enabled the presentation of the speaker's name – as the sender of the message – as well as the time of utterance – as the time code of the sent message – to participants without being forced to incorporate them into the content of the items. The date of the reported utterance was established in each item's first sentence. The condition of narrating instance was removed from the design of the study, with the result that all items contained a first-person pronoun referring to the speaker.

Items containing spatial indexicals were also removed to focus on the differences between personal and temporal indexicals. In order to improve their comparability, all items featured contexts in which the shiftability of both types of indexicals could be tested simultaneously. Rothkegel (2019) created her items in four conditions that differed, on the one hand, with regard to the number of indexicals contained in the ID clause – either just a temporal indexical or both a temporal and a personal indexical – and, on the other hand, with regard to the question participants had to answer, which was either focused on an individual or on a time point mentioned in the ID clause. While the results for questions targeting the referent of personal indexicals were relatively similar to those of her first experiment, with the vast majority of participants selecting the speaker, there was a surprising difference regarding the interpretation of temporal indexicals: In all cases where participants were asked to select the date the temporal indexical in the ID clause was referring to, roughly 80% of participants preferred an interpretation from the perspective of the speaker as well (cf. Rothkegel 2019: 50).

Though the results for Rothkegel's (2019) second experimental study thus also provide mild evidence that temporal indexicals do allow shifted readings, since these were not completely ruled out by participants, the preference for such an interpretation was significantly decreased in comparison to her first experiment's results, as

was the previously apparent difference between personal and temporal indexicals. From the results of this second study, if taken in isolation, one could get the impression that context shift, while not completely impossible, is still strongly dispreferred compared to an unshifted interpretation, and that there is no discernible distinction to be found in the behavior of personal and temporal indexicals.

A possible explanation for these results will be presented shortly after first discussing a similar series of studies, conducted in Anderson (2019), on the potential for context shift of temporal indexicals in English ID. To be precise, Anderson attempts to show that temporal indexicals such as *tomorrow* can be interpreted from a non-utterance context, but argues that this is not due to an actual case of context shift, but instead due to an actually anaphoric reading of *tomorrow*. She presents the results of three acceptability studies that are meant to illustrate, in order, that (i) ID clauses featuring a non-utterance time reading of *tomorrow* are generally acceptable in English; (ii) this is not due to an ‘FID effect’; and (iii) the reading is also not achieved due to indexical shift.³⁰ As the three experiments are all very similar in both design and results, they will not each be discussed separately, like the studies conducted by Rothkegel (2019), but as a whole.

In all three of her studies, Anderson’s participants were presented with comic strips, as in Figure 6, consisting of three panels each, with the panels being labeled as taking place on three subsequent weekdays. The comics always feature two characters and follow the same basic sequence of events: In the first panel, character A promises to do something “tomorrow”; in the second panel, it is shown that character A did not follow through on their promise, and in the final panel, character B is shown to be upset about this. An ID clause reporting character A’s original utterance from the first panel was placed below the comic strips and featured some type of temporal expression referring to the day on which character A originally planned to fulfill their promise. As shown in (61), the ID clause either featured the temporal indexical *tomorrow*, the anaphoric expression *the next day* or directly mentioned either the correct or a false weekday to serve as good and bad control cases, respectively. Participants were asked to rate the acceptability of the ID clause on a Likert scale from 1-7, with 1 signaling a completely unacceptable clause and 7 a completely acceptable one.

³⁰Somewhat confusingly, Anderson (2019) exclusively uses the term ‘indexical shift’ to refer to the type of clauses analyzed in the works discussed in Section 2.3.1. She thus distinguishes it from FID clauses, despite the fact that those also contain cases of context shift for indexicals.



Figure 6: Example stimulus from Experiment 1 in Anderson (2019: 42)

- (61) Kevin is angry because Kate said that she would water his plants $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{tomorrow} \\ \text{the next day} \\ \text{Friday} \\ \text{Saturday} \end{array} \right\}$.

(Anderson 2019: 42)

While this setup was largely the same for the three studies, some alterations with respect to the target clause were made for Anderson's second and third experiments. For her second experiment, she instructed participants to understand the comics as diary entries written by one of the characters. The target sentence instead featured ID from the speaker's perspective. If a non-utterance reading of *tomorrow* would be deemed acceptable in such an environment, Anderson (2019) argues, then its interpretation could not be due to an FID effect, as FID does not allow for narrator-oriented readings (cf. Anderson 2019: 39, 45). An example is given in (62):

- (62) Aidan is angry because I said that I would clean the fridge $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{tomorrow} \\ \text{the next day} \\ \text{Sunday} \\ \text{Monday} \end{array} \right\}$.

(Anderson 2019: 46)

Finally, for her last experiment, Anderson wanted to test if *tomorrow* could receive a non-utterance reading in unembedded contexts, too, which would show that its interpretation is not a case of indexical shift in the form proposed by Schlenker (2003), Anand & Nevins (2004), Deal (2020) and others, according to which indexical shift should only be possible when subordinated to a propositional attitude verb (cf. Anderson 2019: 40, 47). An example for this is given in (63):

- (63) It was such a simple task to clean the fridge $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{tomorrow} \\ \text{the next day} \\ \text{Friday} \\ \text{Saturday} \end{array} \right\}!$

I can't believe I forgot.
(Anderson 2019: 48)

ID clauses featuring *tomorrow* received relatively high mean acceptability ratings of 5.3 in Anderson’s (2019) first experiment, 5.6 in her second experiment and 4.1 in her third experiment, on a scale from 1-7. In contrast, ID clauses mentioning an incorrect weekday received a relatively low rating around 2.2 across all three studies. Sentences either mentioning the correct weekday or featuring the anaphoric adverbial *the next day*, on the other hand, were rated equally high, with mean ratings of around 6.5 across all studies (cf. Anderson 2019: 48). In summary, the results show that shifted interpretations of *tomorrow* were regarded as acceptable, but significantly less so than clauses featuring an anaphoric adverbial instead. Moreover, their acceptability was decreased when featured in unembedded contexts, as the significantly lower result for the third experiment illustrates, though not to the point that it was deemed fully infelicitous.

However, due to the results of her second and third experiments, Anderson (2019) dismisses an analysis of *tomorrow* as a shifted indexical in favor of one that instead regards non-utterance time readings of *tomorrow* as anaphoric uses of the expression. While Deal’s (2020) investigation of ID in Nez Perce, as discussed in Section 2.3.1, demonstrated that temporal adverbs such as *today* and *tomorrow* do indeed behave like anaphoric expressions in some languages, that does not seem to be the case in English, as *tomorrow*, in contrast to *the next day*, cannot be used in quantificational binding contexts:

- (64) a. Whenever I drink too much, I get a headache the next day.
 b. *Whenever I drink too much, I get a headache tomorrow.

Anderson (2019: 53) acknowledges this fact but proposes that *tomorrow* patterns differently from other temporal anaphors like *the next day* in that it can only be anaphoric to salient perspectives. Thus, non-utterance time readings only become available once *tomorrow* has been anchored to the perspective of another discourse referent than the speaker. Whereas in most contexts, the perspective of the speaker is automatically the most salient one, a discourse referent’s perspective may become more salient by, for example, being featured as the subject of a propositional attitude verb.

While I agree with Anderson (2019) regarding the relevance of perspectival salience in order to facilitate interpretations of perspective-dependent expressions from different contexts than the speaker’s, it remains unclear why this should necessitate an anaphoric reading of temporal indexicals. In Chapter 5, further evidence will be provided to demonstrate that the salience – or *prominence* – of discourse referents as potential perspectival centers is a major factor in enabling and governing context shift in both FID and ID; yet in neither case, this entails a necessary reanalysis of temporal indexicals as actually anaphoric expressions.

Moreover, Anderson (2019) dismisses other potential analyses of non-utterance readings of *tomorrow* for reasons that appear to be largely based on misconceptions.

For one thing, she seems to consider ‘FID effects’ and indexical shift with regard to the type of ID clauses investigated by Schlenker (2003), Anand (2006) and Deal (2020) as completely separate phenomena, of which either one or the other must be able to account for *all* instances of non-utterance readings of *tomorrow* in English. But this does not necessarily have to be the case. Regardless of whether one postulates a uniform treatment of context shift in ID and FID or pursues two separate ways of analysis for the two types of speech and thought representation: There is no reason to think that a language could not exhibit context shift in both FID *and* ID. If we consider English to be such a language – and Anderson’s data seems to suggest exactly that – then it follows that, if *tomorrow* allows non-utterance readings when subordinated to a propositional attitude verb, this would be due to the perspectival properties of ID in English, and if it allows non-utterance readings when contained in a root clause level attitude report, this would be due to the perspectival properties of FID in English. It might turn out that these perspectival properties of ID and FID are identical and thus require a uniform treatment, but this is irrelevant for the current discussion.

Thus, the possibility exists that both what Anderson (2019) refers to as FID effects and what she refers to as indexical shift may play a part in facilitating non-utterance time readings of *tomorrow*, depending on the type of structure the indexical is embedded in. Yet Anderson (2019) does not consider this possibility, which is most evident in her third experiment; she rejects indexical shift as an explanation solely based on the acceptability of clauses like (63), as it should be infelicitous in unembedded contexts. While this is true, accounts on indexical shift do have to allow for one exception to this rule, namely, that indexical shift is possible in unembedded contexts if the clause is interpreted as an attitude report in the form of FID. I postulate that this is the case in (63). Anderson (2019) mentions that FID can never be anchored to the narrator (cf. Anderson 2019: 47) and, though not outright stated, likely rules out such an interpretation for (63) based on that, but this point seems debatable; the question of how to handle FID-like attitude reports from the speaker’s perspective will be discussed in Section 5.7.

Regardless of whether one wants to consider clauses like (63) as FID or some other type of syntactical structure, it nevertheless differs from other root level clauses in that it is clearly an attitude report. As the examples in (65) show, a non-utterance time reading of *tomorrow* is only acceptable in root level clauses if the clause is interpretable as a speech or thought report, independently of whether its anchored to the perspective of the speaker or another discourse referent.

- (65) a. After he came home from another horrible day at work, Ted made a decision. Tomorrow, he would definitely tell his jerk of a boss that he was going to resign!
- b. After I came home from another horrible day at work, I made a decision.

Tomorrow, I would definitely tell my jerk of a boss that I was going to resign!

- c. After he came home from another horrible day at work, Ted made a decision. *Tomorrow, he went to his boss and resigned.
- d. After he came home from another horrible day at work, Ted made a decision. The next day, he went to his boss and resigned.

Notably, the perspective of the discourse referent mentioned in the first clause is made equally salient across all four examples, yet this is not enough to anchor *tomorrow* to that perspective and enable a non-utterance time interpretation. For that, it is also necessary to embed the expression in some kind of attitude report as well. Regarding the results from Anderson's (2019) second experiment, I postulate that examples like (62) do entail perspective shift to another context than the current context of utterance: *tomorrow* is shifted to the perspective of a previous version of the speaker at the time of the original speech event. The reason that items featuring *tomorrow* were rated significantly lower in her third experiment might be due to the additional clause inserted into the attitude report that was not included in the first two experiments, i.e., *I can't believe I forgot* in (63). This clause uses present tense and thus establishes that the speech/thought event as a whole is taking place at the current time of utterance, thereby conflicting with any attempts to shift to a previous context.

Based on these considerations, non-utterance time readings of *tomorrow* should not be regarded as anaphoric uses of the expression. The results of Anderson's (2019) experimental studies thus provide crucial and compelling evidence that temporal indexicals in English are shiftable in ID as well as FID. However, I propose that the acceptability of shifted temporal indexicals in ID clauses could be increased significantly by presenting them as part of a fictional narrative. Due to the special properties of narration, embedding ID in an explicitly narrative context will unlock its full potential for perspective shift, thereby closing the gap in acceptability between indexicals like *tomorrow* and anaphoric temporal adverbials like *the next day* that is still noticeable and significant in Anderson's results. The same applies to the experimental studies conducted by Rothkegel (2019): I propose that the difference in results between her two studies is due to the fact that her second experiment establishes an unambiguously conversational context in the form of text messages in an instant messaging service. These arguments will be elaborated on after first establishing the unique potential for multiperspectivity inherent to narration in the next chapter.

3 The Potential for Multiperspectivity in Narration

The previous chapter served as an introduction to the core concepts of perspectivization in language and established the key characteristics of the three types of speech and thought representation, direct discourse (DD), indirect discourse (ID) and free indirect discourse (FID). Moreover, a discussion of several prominent accounts on context shift illustrated that ID is almost universally deemed unable to allow shifts to the perspective of its matrix subject, at least when it comes to German or English. Thus, the general consensus in the literature is that perspective-dependent expressions, particularly indexicals, in the scope of a propositional attitude verb are bound to the perspective of the speaker, who acts as the default perspectival center. In this chapter, I will provide substantial theoretical and empirical evidence against these prevalent assumptions and in support of the first of my two central hypotheses, H1, repeated in (66) below:

- (66) **H1:** Perspective-dependent expressions in German indirect discourse clauses can be interpreted from the perspective of the matrix subject (= the author of the subordinated thought or utterance) instead of the matrix speaker given that certain conditions are fulfilled.

I will now formulate two sub-hypotheses to H1, H1a and H1b, that further specify the predictions I aim to confirm. First of all, H1a, as defined in (67), clarifies the type of perspective-dependent expressions the investigation will be focused on, namely temporal indexicals such as *heute* ('today'), *gestern* ('yesterday') or *morgen* ('tomorrow').

- (67) **H1a:** Indirect discourse clauses featuring temporal indexicals interpreted from the perspective of the matrix subject constitute available and acceptable clauses in German.

This is not to say that I consider temporal indexicals to be the only type of perspective-dependent expression that holds the potential to be interpreted from the reported context. With the exception of personal indexicals and tense forms, which obligatorily have to be interpreted from the speaker's perspective, all perspective-dependent expressions, in particular spatial indexicals like *hier* ('here'), are assumed to behave similar, if not identical, to temporal indexicals in ID. However, the goal of

this dissertation is to demonstrate the potential for context shift in ID in general, based on the example of one type of perspective-dependent expression, and not to compare and contrast individual expressions. Thus, the focus of the investigation is purposefully limited to ID clauses containing temporal indexicals to avoid potential, unwanted side effects caused by differences in behavior that *might* turn out to exist between expressives and indexicals or even between spatial and temporal indexicals.

Secondly, H1b, as defined in (68), identifies what I consider to be the most essential condition that needs to be fulfilled in order to unlock ID's full potential for multiperspectivity: embedding the clause in a narrative context.

- (68) **H1b:** Temporal indexicals in indirect discourse clauses can only be interpreted from the perspective of a discourse referent different from the speaker if the indirect discourse clause is embedded inside a narrative context, due to fictional narratives possessing an inherent potential for multiperspectivity.

The idea that narration is much less constrained than everyday conversational uses of language when it comes to shifts in perspective is not new, as Bühler (1934) already paid special attention to what he referred to as the *Deixis am Phantasma*, which, he argued, uniquely allows for other referents than the speaker to act as the central origo.

Perspective shift has long been a popular topic of research in the field of narratology (see, *inter alia*, Genette 1980, Stanzel 1986, Fludernik 1993, Bal 1985), while recent years have also seen an increase in interest in the unique properties of narration from a linguistic standpoint (see, *inter alia*, Rauh 1978, Banfield 1982, Sanders 1994, Sanders & Redeker 1996, Kuroda 2014a, Zeman 2019b, Zeman 2020a). Zeman, for example, generally agrees with the assessment made in the beginning of Chapter 2 that perspectivization is an ubiquitous part of language and that language use is always to a degree subjective “in that various options on the lexical, grammatical, contextual, and conversational level allow for conceptualizing the same extra-linguistic situation in different manners so that every utterance is based on a set of choices by the speaker” (Zeman 2017: 1). She emphasizes, however, that nevertheless, each individual speaker is limited by and restricted to his or her own origo, i.e., to their own “local-temporal position” in the world and thus, to their own singular viewpoint (Zeman 2020b: 5), whereas narratives “integrate viewpoints of different characters and narrators as alternative viewpoints besides ‘the speaker’ and offer a potential for ‘viewpoint shifts’” (Zeman 2020b: 8).

Yet despite this keen interest and an extensive amount of research regarding perspectivization in narrative contexts, the question of whether and how this potential for multiperspectivity might impact the perspectival properties of ID has, as of now, remained completely unaddressed. Instead, linguistic investigations into the topic have been mainly focused on FID as the epitome of narration's potential for multiperspectivity due to its status as a type of syntactic structure unique to narra-

tive contexts (cf. Zeman 2020a: 471, Dancygier & Vandelanotte 2016: 16). The main goal of the current chapter is to rectify this oversight in the literature by showing that ID's ability to allow temporal indexicals in its scope to shift to a different perspective is directly dependent on the larger discourse context: To be precise, only in narrative contexts, but not in conversational ones, does ID unlock its full potential for multiperspectivity.

The chapter is organized in the following manner: Section 3.1 will first further elaborate on the ability of fictional narratives to switch between different viewpoints and introduce central narratological models, specifically those proposed by Franz K. Stanzel (Stanzel 1986) and Gérard Genette (Genette 1980), to serve as a foundation for the subsequent investigation. Section 3.2.1 will then be focused on discussing previous research on FID as a textbook example of multiperspectivity in narration. Next, Section 3.2.2 will provide first theoretical evidence for H1b by illustrating how embedding ID clauses in an unambiguously narrational context increases the potential for temporal indexicals in their scope to be interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist instead of the narrator.³¹ Section 3.3, finally, will present an acceptability rating study, similar to the ones conducted by Anderson (2019)³², that was designed to test H1a. The results of the study will confirm that, given that the aforementioned condition is fulfilled, ID clauses featuring temporal indexicals with a forced shifted reading are just as acceptable as ID clauses featuring equivalent anaphoric expressions such as *am nächsten Tag* ('on the next day'), and as acceptable as identical DD and FID clauses.

3.1 Narratological Background

Multiperspectivity, the possibility of not only switching between the viewpoint of the entity currently speaking, i.e., the default perspectival center, and the viewpoint(s) of one or various other discourse referents, but even combining the two and filtering events through more than one perspective simultaneously, can be considered as the inherent property of narratives that critically distinguishes them both from everyday communication as well as other types of texts. While it has been a topic of debate whether this applies to all types of narratives or only to contexts of *fictional* narration exclusively (see, for example, Zeman 2020a: 471, who explicitly includes non-literary narrative contexts in her analysis; Dancygier & Vandelanotte 2016: 16, who stipulate that multiperspectivity is not even restricted to narration), literary scholars, in particular, have been adamant that it is precisely the aspect of fictionality that enables a narrating voice to access the perspectives of others:

But a distinctive feature of fictional narration that sets it apart from nonfiction is precisely the cognitive access that the narrator has to the

³¹Empirical evidence for H1b will be provided later on in Section 5.6, after the important factor of discourse prominence has been properly established.

³²See Section 2.3.3.

mental states of other individuals and/or situations that cannot normally be observed; only in constructed narratives (i.e., fiction) that are true in constructed worlds can one individual penetrate – and represent through language – the subjectivity of another. (Fleischman 1990: 233, cf. also Fludernik 2010: 93, Hamburger 1957: 111)

It is important to note that this narrating voice is not to be confused with the actual, real-life author of a novel or short story (cf. Bal 1985: 11, Chatman 1978: 147), who has essentially been purged from literary analysis in modern narratology, and whose own intentions, opinions and perspective are consequently irrelevant for perspectivization in narration.³³ Instead, it is the narrator that serves as the speaker of a narrative text – in a way, a fictional character in his own right. The narrator’s equally fictional time of utterance/narration is usually separate from the story time, i.e., the point in time at which a narrated event or action by the characters takes place, and must also be distinguished from the point in time at which the author is writing the story (cf. Rauh 1978: 15). The exact definition of *narrator* varies somewhat in narratological as well as linguistic classifications of the concept: Sanders (1994: 11) speaks of the narrator as a “conscious entity” who acts as the “discourse’s basic referential center”, while Zeman (2020b: 3) conceptualizes the narrator “as a covert viewpoint potential provided by narrative context that can be actualized to different degrees.” As will be elaborated on in the next section, some approaches, such as Banfield (1982), actively challenge the assumption that narration *always* necessitates the stipulation of a narrating instance.

In contrast to real life, the narrator and the characters can, and often do, exist on different planes of existence, namely the discourse level and the story level, respectively. As Zeman (2020a: 469) points out, it is exactly this separation of several hierarchical levels inherent to narrative structures that accounts for the potential for multiperspectivity in narration: Due to being located on the discourse level, the narrator is able to assume a figurative bird’s eye perspective of the world of the story, and can thus not only potentially report events and information beyond the knowledge or awareness of the characters on the story level, but even access their inner thoughts and mental states. This is, of course, simply impossible for speakers in real life, who can, at best, make estimated guesses about what other people might be thinking or feeling. An essential aspect in which such abstract narrating figures can be differentiated, and which might plausibly have a direct effect on their availability as a perspectival center in their own right, pertains to whether the narrator explicitly makes their presence known or instead merely acts as a neutral observer

³³To avoid potential confusion, it is important to note at this point that whenever the term *author* is used in relation to speech and thought reports in the course of this investigation, it refers to the individual whose utterance or thought is being reported. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, however, the term is not meant to be interpreted as making reference to a creator/writer of some story or text. Following the predominant view in modern narratology, I discount the author, i.e., the person actually creating and writing the story, as being relevant to the analysis of perspectivization in fictional narration.

3.1 NARRATOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

simply describing the actions of the characters – in that case, the narrator’s existence can only be inferred from the fact that somebody other than the characters is telling the story. Chatman (1978: 197, 219) refers to the former as an *overt* narrator and to the latter as a *covert* narrator.

It follows from the above considerations that clarifying the relationship between narrator and protagonists, as well as defining the possible types of narrative situations, has been a major focus of investigation in literary studies. I will now outline the general concepts and ideas of two particular models that have been incremental in shaping modern narratology, starting with the one proposed by Franz K. Stanzel in Stanzel (1986).

Stanzel primarily distinguishes between three prototypical, basic types of narrative situations, each dominated by a specific ‘pole’ of one of three essential, binary elements that are part of what he calls the “mediacy complex” of narration (Stanzel 1986: 5): perspective, person (or identity) and mode. The first of these three narrative situations is defined as the *authorial* narrative situation, which is dominated by an *external perspective* of the story world, in contrast to an *internal* perspective. Stanzel (1986: 111) clarifies that an “external perspective prevails when the point of view from which the narrated world is perceived or represented is located outside the main character or at the periphery of events.” The authorial narrator is identical to the sort of overt, omniscient narrator that was described above – he is not part of the story world and thus exists solely on the discourse level, which enables him to take on an almost God-like point of view. Accordingly, he “has at his disposal unlimited insight into the thoughts and feelings of the characters” (Stanzel 1986: 125).

The second type of narrator is the so-called *first-person* narrator, who, as Stanzel is quick to point out, is not defined by the use of first-person pronouns, which may also occur in authorial narration, but rather by the fact that he is a character existing as part of the story world. In contrast to the authorial narrator, the first-person narrator has an actual physical and existential – though fictional – presence (cf. Stanzel 1986: 90). He is thus a fully personalized narrator, dominated by the element of person/identity, with an internal perspective, which effectively restricts him to his own point of view. Finally, the third and last type that Stanzel defines is the *figural* narrative situation, which is dominated by what he calls the ‘reflector mode’; the mode of narration describes whether the story is actively and noticeably narrated or merely reflected through a character’s consciousness and perspective. The character is thus not a narrating voice like the first-person narrator, but can rather be described as the reader’s unmediated window to witness the fictional reality of the story (cf. Stanzel 1986: 5, 48). Stanzel further emphasizes that these three types of narrative situations are only meant to be viewed as merely ideal, basic types and that his model is intended to cover various possible intermediate configurations

as well (cf. Stanzel 1986: 4).

The second highly influential narratological model I want to introduce in this section is that of Gérard Genette. Genette seeks to distinguish fully between the role of the narrator and the role of the protagonist who serves as the perspectival center of a story or a text passage. To be specific, he differentiates between two narratological categories that he identifies as *mood* and *voice*. *Voice*, on the one hand, solely answers the question of *who speaks?*, and thus directly pertains to the narrator as the one verbalizing the story and communicating it to his (equally fictional) audience (cf. Genette 1980: 186, Sanders 1994: 31, Chatman 1978: 153). For this category, Genette distinguishes between two options: The narrator can either be present as a character in the story world, in which case he is defined as a *homodiegetic* narrator, or he can exist outside of the story world, in which case he is defined as a *heterodiegetic* narrator. Furthermore, if a homodiegetic narrator is also the main protagonist of the story, that variation is referred to as an *autodiegetic* narrator (cf. Genette 1980: 244f.)

Mood, on the other hand, instead answers what Genette considers to be a wholly separate question, namely *who sees?* or, more precisely, “who is the character whose point of view orients the narrative perspective?” (Genette 1980: 186). Genette names that character the *focalizer* of the story, which can be taken to be identical to what we have called the perspectival center. As Bal (1985: 10) puts it, focalizers “are the agents of perception and interpretation”; focalization, in turn, can be defined as “the relationship between the vision, the agent that sees, and that which is seen” (Bal 1985: 135), which renders it “the principal tool for subjectifying the story” (Bal 1985: 66). Genette distinguishes three modes of focalization:

- (69) a. *Zero focalization*: The story is viewed through the lens of an omniscient narrator who possesses and expresses more knowledge about the world and the characters in it than the individual characters themselves do.
- b. *Internal focalization*: The story is filtered through the perspective of one or more protagonists; knowledge of the story world and events therein is therefore limited to what the character who serves as focalizer is aware of.
- c. *External focalization*: The narrator merely describes events in the story, but neither the narrator’s nor any characters’ thoughts or perceptions are reported.

(cf. Genette 1980: 189f.)

These modes – as well as the character acting as the focalizer – do not stay stagnant throughout a specific work of fiction, like a novel, but can switch and shift for individual stretches of discourse (cf. Genette 1980: 191, Bal 1985: 136). Notably, Genette does not explicitly differentiate between covert and overt heterodiegetic – or, in Stanzel’s terms, authorial – narrators, but only observes how the presence, or

3.1 NARRATOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

lack thereof, of the narrator impacts the mode of focalization. From the fact that Genette identifies the mode featuring an authorial narrator as *zero focalization*, it can be inferred that he does not consider the narrator as a potential focalizer as well, in addition to his inherent role as the communicator of the story. Discourse segments that primarily express the narrator's attitudes would consequently have to be regarded as not being focalized through any point of view and thus, if we were to equate the two concepts, as clauses or text segments without a perspectival center.

However, this specific aspect of Genette's dichotomy has been controversial among literary scholars. Bal redefines Genette's concept of focalization to account for both 'character-centric' and 'narrator-centric' stories or discourse segments: She labels the former as *internal* focalization and the latter as *external* focalization (cf. Bal 1985: 136, 143; Jahn 2007: 101). While Bal's account blurs the line between *voice* and *mood* to an extent, it is ultimately better equipped to analyze shifts between the narrator's and the characters' perspectives, as well as structures that appear to combine both viewpoints, like FID. Accordingly, Bal's distinction of internal and external focalization has been mostly accepted (cf. Fludernik 1993: 326, Fleischman 1990: 219, 221), though it has also been met with criticism by, for example, Seymour Chatman, who argues that it "violates the distinction between story and discourse" (Chatman 1986: 194). Yet even Chatman has to concede that the narrator's perspective *does* come into play with regard to the attitudes and opinions they may hold and express about the story and its characters (cf. Chatman 1986: 197).

Whether one allows for narrators to act as potential focalizers or not ultimately seems to depend on how literally one defines focalization: If one considers focalization to specifically mean actually perceiving the world with one's own eyes then, indeed, the abstract figure that constitutes the heterodiegetic narrator cannot be the focalizer of the story, as they do not literally see and observe the events of the story and its characters. If one, however, considers focalization to mean perspective in a more figurative sense, i.e., to also entail attitude, thoughts and emotions, then even an abstract narrating figure can theoretically serve as the focalizer of a story. As the current investigation is primarily concerned with perspectivization in speech, thought and attitude reports, I will adopt this modified version of Genette's model, but otherwise adhere to the terms and concepts established in Genette (1980), particularly with regard to his distinction of heterodiegetic and homodiegetic narrators, which will play an important role for the experimental studies presented in Chapter 5.

3.2 Perspectivization in Narration

3.2.1 Free Indirect Discourse: The Epitome of Narrative Multiperspectivity?

The previous section both served to introduce vital narratological terms and theoretical models as well as to illustrate that multiperspectivity, i.e., the interaction between the viewpoints of the characters on the story level and the narrator on the discourse level, is to be regarded as an inherent and essential property of narration. The current section will explore how FID in particular is perceived as a “textbook example” of this potential for multiperspectivity (Dancygier & Vandelanotte 2016: 16) that has led multiple authors, including Hamburger (1957), Kuroda (2014b) and Banfield (1982), to argue in favor of a strict distinction between narrative contexts and conversational contexts in terms of grammar. While examples of FID in non-narrative contexts have been provided in Fludernik (1993) and van Krieken et al. (2016) with regard to oral language and newspaper reports, respectively, FID is nevertheless primarily regarded as a “purely literary phenomenon” (Brinton 1980: 365) and as a “distinctive feature of fiction whose appearance in literature coincided with the emergence of the modern novel in the nineteenth century” (Fleischman 1990: 230).

As such, the characteristic of FID to simultaneously express the perspectives of character and narrator, which facilitates structures that would otherwise be considered ungrammatical, is taken to be representative of narration’s unique grammatical features as a whole by many scholars. Käte Hamburger points out that only in what she refers to as *Epische Fiktion* (‘epic fiction’) can there exist syntactic structures in which a past tense verb is combined with a temporal indexical denoting a future point in time, as the much cited example in (70) illustrates. This, to Hamburger, confirms that the grammatical rules in narration are fundamentally different from those of what she refers to as *Wirklichkeitsaussage* (‘statement of reality’) (cf. Hamburger 1957: 73, 111).

- (70) Tomorrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week!
(Lawrence, *Women in Love*, p. 185; as cited in Banfield (1982: 98))

Hamburger is far from alone in her assessment, as a multitude of comparable distinctions have been proposed in the literature (see Zeman 2020a: 465, for a comprehensive overview of the various proposals to differentiate narrative discourse from ordinary language). Further evidence of this is provided by Kuroda (2014b: 48f., 52), who shows that in Japanese, certain grammatical structures can only occur in sentences that represent a fictional character’s point of view. He refers to the style of language that such sentences belong to as the *non-reportive* style, and theorizes that it utilizes a different grammar from the *reportive* style, thereby allowing the

3.2 PERSPECTIVIZATION IN NARRATION

narrator to formulate clauses that would be infelicitous in actually communicative uses of language (cf. Kuroda 2014b: 54).

With regard to linguistic analyses of FID, this sentiment is shared and argued for perhaps most ardently by Ann Banfield, whose approach has proven influential for many modern analyses of FID such as Schlenker (2004) and Eckardt (2014), which will be discussed in the next chapter. Banfield posits that only in fictional narration, “language attains the fullest exploitation of its possibilities and reaches their limit” (Banfield 1982: 10). Interestingly enough, however, Banfield does not envision FID, which she refers to as ‘represented speech and thought’, as an example of multiperspectivity, but instead attributes its characteristics to the *absence* of a specific perspective, namely that of the speaker. She claims that narration allows for unique grammatical structures like FID because it can eschew the communicative function of language, which normally necessitates the presupposition of a speaker and an addressee. Contrary to traditional assumptions in narratology, her argument thus entails that not every text segment or sentence in narration must contain a speaker/narrator, and that FID is only possible in sentences that are effectively speakerless (cf. Banfield 1982: 11, 94).

Banfield distinguishes expressions (E) from sentences (S) and clarifies that only the latter can be embedded (see Banfield 1973: 15ff., for a more comprehensive explanation) Moreover, she states that “the expression of subjectivity, of point of view, is a function of the E, not the S” (Banfield 1982: 58), and goes on to formulate the following rule regarding the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions in E:

- (71) 1 E/1 SELF: For every node E, there is at most one referent, called the ‘subject of consciousness’ or SELF, to whom all expressive elements are attributed. That is, all realizations of SELF in an E are coreferential.

(Banfield 1982: 93)

Banfield emphasizes that there can be only one deictic or perspectival center, which she names the SELF, for each E, and that all perspective-dependent expressions must be interpreted with regard to the same SELF. She further states that there is a priority of speaker, whom she also refers to as the *I*, for the selection of the SELF. Thus, if an expression features a speaker, then speaker and SELF must be identical (cf. Banfield 1982: 93f.). Consequently, there are only two options for someone other than the current speaker to become the subject of consciousness: The E must either feature a different speaker than the one from the matrix context or not contain a speaker at all. The first option applies to DD, which, as a fully quoted clause, has to be regarded as a separate E with its own respective speaker and addressee (cf. Banfield 1982: 87f.). Banfield identifies this as the essential difference between DD and ID; the embedded clause in ID, she argues, does not represent its own E, to be distinguished from that of the matrix clause, and therefore, all perspective-

dependent expressions in ID have to be interpreted with regard to the context of utterance (cf. Banfield 1982: 58).

The second option is determined by Banfield to be the case for FID, which, in contrast to both DD and ID, can only occur in the context of a fictional narrative precisely because narration does not carry a communicative purpose and thus allows for syntactic structures that contain neither speaker nor addressee. She claims that ‘consciousness’ in FID is “represented unmediated by any judging point of view. No one speaks in represented Es, although in them speech may be represented” (Banfield 1982: 97). It is this absence of a speaker/narrator, then, that enables third-person pronouns to be interpreted as representing the SELF and past tense forms as representing the NOW of the third-person SELF. Accordingly, Banfield’s model predicts that FID can only occur in narrative contexts that do not feature a first-person narrator, as said narrator would obligatorily be identified as the SELF due to the priority of speaker (cf. Banfield 1982: 171).

While highly influential, Banfield’s concrete methodological implementation of her ideas regarding the characteristics of FID has attracted a lot of criticism and has been largely discarded by modern approaches. Narratologists in particular have taken umbrage with Banfield’s complete dismissal of the popular communication model of narrative, which presupposes that there can be no utterance or language use without a speaker and therefore advocates for an analysis of narration as an act of communication between a fictional narrating entity and a fictional ‘narratee’ (cf. McHale 1983: 21, Bal 1985: 61f.). Though the question whether every type of narration must indeed by necessity feature a narrator continues to be a topic of debate in narratology and linguistic analyses of narrative texts alike, most scholars concede that even in instances of fully covert narration, the narrator, at the very least, exists as a sort of abstract *origo*. In this form, the narrator might not be regarded as a true subject of consciousness, but nevertheless functions as the referential center setting the coordinates for deictic expressions (cf. Dancygier 2012: 64). In cases of overt narration, perspectival cues can be utilized to highlight the narrator’s own point of view and establish them as a conscious and potent perspective-holder in the same way that a protagonist can be established as the perspectival center or focalizer (cf. Zeman 2020b: 23, Zeman 2020a: 478).

Regardless, however, of whether one considers fictional narration to be predicated on the existence of a narrating entity or not, Fludernik (1993) points out an additional problem with Banfield’s approach, namely, that it can only account for a limited range of narrative situations. She argues that narratives featuring an authorial narrator, in particular, pose a problem for Banfield’s theory that FID can only occur in non-communicative clauses, as it is used frequently in novels of that type, despite the presence of a very overt speaker/narrator who, in addition, also often addresses his audience as well (cf. Fludernik 1993: 361f.).

In contrast to Banfield (1982), Sonja Zeman offers an analysis of FID that explicitly takes the omnipresence of a narrating instance in narrative contexts into account, even if said narrating entity may purely reflect a referential center instead of an actual, subjective consciousness. Thus, for Zeman, FID represents an exceptional example of true multiperspectivity that is only possible in, and, in fact, inherent to narration because its characteristics stem directly from the unique structural complexity of narrative texts (cf. Zeman 2020b: 2, 6). To be specific, she ascribes this distinctive property of narration to its natural separation of the protagonists' and the narrator's levels, respectively existing in- and outside of the narrated world. Zeman further notes that FID does not result from a simple mix of equivalent perspectives but is instead predicated on a hierarchical relationship between these individual viewpoints: The narrator, due to his existence on the discourse level, possesses a global or 'meta' perspective that allows him to embed the perspectives of the characters on the story level and therefore gain access to their internal thought processes (cf. Zeman 2020a: 469, Zeman 2020b: 23, Zeman 2019a: 237f.; also see Dancygier & Vandelanotte 2016: 19f.).

Consequently, she distinguishes between the *internal* – with regard to the story world – perspective of the protagonist(s) and the external perspective of the narrator, and declares that the former is foregrounded in FID (cf. Zeman 2017: 12, Zeman 2020b: 10). Furthermore, Zeman rejects that the narrator's perspective could potentially be foregrounded in FID clauses, thereby dismissing the possibility of a perspectivally salient narrator serving as the perspectival center for FID (cf. Zeman 2020a: 472, Zeman 2020b: 17). As I will showcase in Section 5.7, however, FID can be anchored to the narrator instead of a protagonist in contexts in which the former is more prominent.

After having illustrated how FID is commonly regarded and treated as a unique textbook example of narration's inherent potential for multiperspectivity, the next section will present an argument that ID also exhibits FID's multiperspectival properties if properly and unambiguously embedded in a narrative context.

3.2.2 Indirect Discourse in Narrative Contexts

As was demonstrated in the previous section, it is widely acknowledged and undisputed in the literature that narration possesses a potential for perspective shift that is absent from everyday conversational contexts, and that FID can be said to represent the epitome of this inherent potential for multiperspectivity. It is somewhat surprising, then, that none of the numerous linguistic examinations of perspectivization in narration have recognized or even seemed to consider that this potential for multiperspectivity in narration might extend to other types of speech and thought representation and thus endow them with the ability to shift to a different context. I propose that exactly this is the case for ID: If embedded in the context of a fictional narrative, ID clauses benefit from the unique characteristic of narration to allow

insight into the inner thoughts and mental states of individuals different from the speaker, and can thereby unlock their full perspectival potential.

This possibility has either been ignored by previous approaches or, as in the case of Banfield (1982), for example, outright denied: As was briefly mentioned in the last section, Banfield claims that subordinated clauses are non-expressive and therefore do not represent an individual E separate from that of the matrix clause (cf. Banfield 1982: 63). Accordingly, she proclaims that many expressive elements, such as exclamations, interjections or inverted questions, are barred from appearing in ID sentences altogether, whereas those perspective-dependent expressions that *do* appear in ID, such as indexicals or epithets, can only be interpreted with regard to the reporting context (cf. Banfield 1973: 21, Banfield 1982: 54f., 57). While Banfield's assessment of ID's capability for perspective shift has been largely accepted – and adopted – by linguistic scholars in subsequent investigations, narratologists like Fludernik (1993) or McHale (1983) have been more critical with regard to its validity. To be precise, both provide substantial evidence from literary texts that showcases (i) ID clauses containing expressive material which Banfield (1973 & 1982) asserted could not appear in ID; and (ii) ID clauses containing indexicals and expressives with shifted readings. A few of these examples are displayed in (72):

- (72) a. He thought about Gilly's speech, and told himself that, whew, Gilly had talked the leg off of everybody... (Farrell, *Young Lonigan*, p. 37; as cited in McHale (1983: 25))
- b. And to Mrs John Harmon, in confidence, did Mr Eugene Wrayburn impart that, please God, she should see how his wife had changed him! (Dickens, *Our Mutual Friend*, p. 883; as cited in Fludernik (1993: 232))
- c. He said he wuzn't goin' to get hisself hitched up to no one; because you get tired of drivin' away at the same hole all the time. (Dahlberg, *Bottom Dogs*, p. 232; as cited in McHale (1983: 25))
- d. Just then a negro boy entered, and announced that **Mas'r's** room was ready. (Stowe, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, p. 106; as cited in Fludernik (1993: 116) (emphasis in original))
- e. Nevertheless he [Tom] submitted to be kissed willingly enough though Maggie hung on his neck in rather a strangling fashion, while his blue-grey eyes wandered towards the croft and the lambs and the river, where he promised himself that he would begin to fish the first thing **tomorrow** morning. (Eliot, *The Mill on the Floss*, p. 36; as cited in Fludernik (1993: 229) (emphasis in original))

(72a), (72b) and (72c) provide examples from various novels of ID sentences containing expressive material that has been argued to be barred from ID: Both (72a) and (72b) feature an ID clause containing an interjection, namely *whew* and *please God*, respectively; (72b) additionally carries exclamatory force. (72c) illustrates how ID

may fully reproduce the matrix subject's style of speech, including dialectal or sociolectal variation, in fiction. The ID clause in (72d) similarly represents the protagonist's original choice of expression. Moreover, it showcases that expressive elements in ID can indeed be attributed to the matrix subject instead of the speaker/narrator, contrary to Banfield's (1982) claims, as the referential expression *Mas'r's* undoubtedly solely reflects the boy's attitude towards the mentioned characters, and not the narrator's. Finally, (72e) demonstrates that temporal indexicals, too, can be interpreted with regard to the protagonist's rather than the narrator's context. According to Banfield (1982), it should not be possible to use *tomorrow* to refer to the day following the original speech event; to obtain that interpretation, an anaphoric temporal adverbial would have to be used instead. The examples thus effectively illustrate that her proclamations about ID are far too restrictive to accurately capture the full range of acceptable structures in narration.

One could, of course, argue that the examples in (72) do not represent actually grammatically acceptable sentences and must instead be regarded as isolated instances that are attributable to the freedom of fiction to play around with established rules of grammar – which is, in fact, exactly how Banfield handles similar literary examples (cf. Banfield 1982: 169f.). However, that line of argument inevitably leads to the question why FID, on the one hand, should be regarded as a legitimate type of syntactic structure and a worthy subject of linguistic investigation emblematic of narration's unique grammatical properties, while ID clauses displaying similar characteristics, on the other hand, should be discarded as inconsequential derivations? The only plausible argument for this discrepancy in handling perspective shift in FID and in ID would be that examples like the ones shown in (72) were truly dismissible as highly uncommon and rare occurrences even in narrative fiction. Both Fludernik and McHale, however, are adamant that ID clauses containing indexicals and/or expressive material shifted to the perspective of the protagonist are well-attested and very common in actual narrative texts (cf. Fludernik 1995: 100, McHale 2009: 435).

The fundamental difference between FID and ID, and the reason that perspective shift in ID is commonly regarded as impossible, is that FID is exclusive to fictional narration – or, at the very least, primarily appears in narratives – whereas ID is frequently used in both conversational and narrative contexts. The result is that, if given no indication that a narrative reading is warranted or more appropriate, a given ID clause is much more likely to be interpreted with regard to its more common use, namely, as a speech or thought report in a conversational context. Consequently, this renders shifted readings of indexicals contained in the ID clause ungrammatical, as perspective shift is only possible in narration. The same problem does not apply to FID, however, because we are primed to interpret instances of FID as part of a narrative context due to our familiarity with it as a literary device. While FID and

ID are thus equally dependent on being embedded in the context of narration to enable perspective shift, the former automatically facilitates such a reading. Thus, perspective shift in FID is always possible because the typical characteristics of FID themselves serve as our cue to infer a narrative context, even without any further, proper context provided.³⁴ This difference is illustrated in (73).

- (73) a. *Wie wunderbar, morgen war ja die Feier zum 50. Geburtstag ihrer Tante Mathilda!*
 ‘How wonderful, tomorrow was the celebration for her Aunt Mathilda’s 50th birthday!’
- b. *??Sie dachte, dass morgen ja die Feier zum 50. Geburtstag ihrer Tante Mathilda war.*
 ‘??She thought that tomorrow was the celebration for her Aunt Mathilda’s 50th birthday.’

The clause in (73a) can be identified as FID via a number of perspectival cues, such as the inclusion of the interjection *wie wunderbar* (‘how wonderful’) and the modal particle *ja*, as well as its exclamative nature. As such, it is naturally interpreted as reflecting the thought of some (unknown) protagonist and thus, as part of a larger narrative context, despite the fact that neither is explicitly established in (73a). Accordingly, the temporal indexical *morgen* can be shifted to that protagonist’s context, resulting in the clause as a whole being grammatical and unmarked. That FID automatically facilitates a narrative reading can be further demonstrated by comparing (73a) to (74), which instead establishes an unambiguously conversational context due to its more colloquial style of speech and explicit references via first- and second-person pronouns to the current speaker and addressee.

- (74) *Vor so ungefähr einem Monat hab ich übrigens mal wieder die Johanna besucht. Du erinnerst dich doch an Johanna, ne? Sie war richtig gut gelaunt bei unserem Treffen. *Wie wunderbar, morgen war ja die Feier zum 50. Geburtstag ihrer Tante Mathilda!*
 ‘By the way, about a month ago I visited Johanna again. You remember Johanna, don’t you? She was in a really good mood when we met. *How wonderful, tomorrow was the celebration for her Aunt Mathilda’s 50th birthday!’

As a narrative context can no longer be accommodated, an FID reading for the final clause becomes unavailable and therefore, perspective shift is impossible. Consequently, the clause must be deemed infelicitous, thereby confirming that FID inter-

³⁴This is not to say that FID does not depend on the context for interpretation, i.e., with regard to which protagonist’s thought is being expressed. In that regard, FID is much more dependent on the preceding discourse context to receive its intended reading than ID is. However, FID, in contrast to ID, is *not* dependent on the previous context to be interpreted as part of a fictional narration.

pretations are fully reliant on being embedded in fictional narration. The fact that (73a) is *not* infelicitous must thus be due to the postulated inferred narrative reading. In contrast, the ID clause in (73b) is, at best, ambiguous in its interpretation due to its lack of context: It can either be read as part of a conversational situation, in which case the sentence would be infelicitous, or as part of a fictional narration, like a short story or novel, in which case perspective shift would be possible and the clause therefore felicitous. The first interpretation, though, is more natural, as it is the one most speakers/readers can be expected to be more accustomed with, due to ID being an ubiquitous part of everyday language use, more so than either of the other two types of speech and thought representation. Therefore, examples of ID like (73b), which only consist of the ID clause itself but do not feature any additional context, do not allow perspective shift due to their preferred conversational reading. In order to enable perspective shifts in ID, a narrative context must thus be established more explicitly than is necessary with regard to FID. However, accounts that deny the possibility of perspective shift in ID consistently fail to do so, as the example in (75), taken from Schlenker (2004), illustrates:

- (75) #He thought that tomorrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week! (Schlenker 2004: 283, ex. 3)

Schlenker argues on the basis of infelicitous examples like (75), an ID variant of the often quoted FID passage from *Women in Love* (cf. (70)), that ID is obligatorily anchored to the current context of utterance; yet, as the literary examples in (72) have showcased, there are many instances of ID exhibiting perspective shift to be found in narrative texts. The reason for (75)'s ungrammaticality is that there is no further context provided by Schlenker to establish the singular clause as part of a larger narrative context, thus leading to the more common conversational reading, for which perspective shift is indeed unavailable.

The following examples demonstrate how embedding an ID clause in a narrative context enables spatio-temporal indexicals to receive a shifted reading from the protagonist's perspective:

- (76) a. *Am Montag fuhr Ottmar in die Stadt, um einen Tannenbaum zu kaufen. ??Er dachte, dass morgen Weihnachten war.*
 'On Monday, Ottmar drove into town to buy a Christmas tree. ??He thought that tomorrow was Christmas.'
- b. *In einer kleinen Stadt lebte einst ein gutherziger Mann namens Ottmar. Eines Morgens schaute Ottmar aus dem Fenster und freute sich sehr über den Schnee auf den Straßen. Am Montag fuhr er in die Stadt, um einen Tannenbaum zu kaufen. Er dachte, dass morgen Weihnachten war.*
 'In a small town, there once lived a kind-hearted man named Ottmar. One morning, Ottmar glanced out of the window and was delighted to see

snow on the streets. On Monday, he drove into town to buy a Christmas tree. He thought that tomorrow was Christmas.’

- c. *Übrigens, ich hab letzten Montag Nina in der Boulderhalle getroffen. Sie sagte mir, dass sie heute den ganzen Tag hier sein würde.*

‘By the way, I met Nina at the indoor bouldering hall last Monday. She told me that she would be here all day today.’

- d. *An einem sonnigen Montag betrat Nina mit einem fröhlichen Lächeln im Gesicht die Boulderhalle. Sie sagte einer Verkäuferin, dass sie heute den ganzen Tag hier sein würde.*

‘On a sunny Monday, Nina entered the indoor bouldering hall with a cheerful smile on her face. She told a sales clerk that she would be here all day today.’

(76a)’s context is ambiguous – the two sentences could be read as part of a larger narrative text, but they can also easily be interpreted as part of an actual conversation about a person named Ottmar, in which case *morgen* can not refer to Tuesday, the day after Ottmar bought his tree, but only to the day following whichever day the conversation is taking place. For the latter reading, the combination of a past tense form and a temporal adverbial referring to a future point in time from the speaker’s perspective would be ungrammatical. In (76b), the final two sentences are embedded in a larger discourse unit that uses a distinctively narrative style that would be quite uncommon in a typical conversation. Thus, the ID clause is unambiguously established to be part of a fictional story and consequently, a shifted reading of the temporal indexical is significantly less marked in comparison to (76a).

This difference is even more noticeable in the other two examples in (76), which directly contrast an unambiguously narrative context in (76d) with an unambiguously conversational context in (76c). The communicative situation in (76c) is signaled by *übrigens* (‘by the way’), which strongly indicates that the – explicitly mentioned – speaker’s intent is to update his addressee’s information status regarding the speaker’s encounter with Nina. In this context, only unshifted readings for the two indexicals, *heute* and *hier*, contained in the ID clause are available, which thus can only be interpreted as referring to the day on which the conversation is taking place and the speaker’s location at the time of utterance, respectively. The opposite is the case for (76d): Neither does the speaker make himself explicitly known via first-person pronouns, nor does the style of the first clause resemble one that might be used in a typical conversation. The intuitive reading of (76d) is therefore to regard it as – perhaps the start of – a story featuring the protagonist Nina as its main character and narrated by a covert heterodiegetic narrator. As a result, a shifted reading of the ID clause, according to which *heute* refers to the day of Nina’s original speech event, i.e., Monday, and *hier* refers to Nina’s location at the time of the speech event, i.e., the indoor bouldering hall, is not just acceptable, but can

even be considered the more natural and preferable interpretation.

A further example regarding the acceptability of shifted ID readings in narration is given in (77), showcasing a different, perhaps simpler way of facilitating a narrative reading of a text segment.

- (77) *Mit grimmigem Blick stieg der tapfere Ritter Heinrich von seinem Ross ab und betrat die heruntergekommene Schänke. Während der Wirt ihm einen Krug Bier füllte, sagte Heinrich, dass er morgen in die Schlacht ziehen würde.*

‘With a grim look on his face, the brave knight Heinrich dismounted from his steed and entered the run-down tavern. While the innkeeper filled his mug with ale, Heinrich said that tomorrow he would ride into battle.’

Whereas the examples in (76) describe rather mundane events and situations that could thus easily be understood as taking place in everyday life, thereby potentially increasing the likelihood of a conversational interpretation, (77) depicts a setting and situation far removed from what one would normally consider to be the topic of a typical real-life conversation. Consequently, the text segment only allows a reading as fictional narration and is thus expected to enable context shift. Once again, this is the case: The ID clause only allows a reading in which *morgen* is interpreted with regard to Heinrich’s context, which is completely felicitous in this context.

Based on this evidence, I draw the tentative conclusion that being embedded in the context of fictional narration is the condition for unlocking ID’s ability for perspective shift in the same vein as it does for FID. The theoretical considerations in this section will shortly be empirically substantiated by the results of an experimental study. Before I delve into the details of said study, I want to briefly reevaluate the experiments conducted by Rothkegel (2019) and Anderson (2019), discussed in Section 2.3.3, with this newly gained insight in mind. As a reminder, Rothkegel (2019) conducted two forced-choice studies in which participants had to attribute different types of indexicals contained in a German ID clause to either the speaker’s or the matrix subject’s context. Whereas her first study showed a significant preference for spatio-temporal indexicals to be interpreted from the matrix subject’s point of view, her second experiment instead reflected a pronounced speaker preference for temporal indexicals. This difference in results, I postulate, can be fully traced back to whether the design of each study allowed for a narrative context reading or not. In her first experiment, Rothkegel (2019) presented participants with short text segments like the one originally depicted in (60b), repeated in (78) below:

- (78) *Als ich Lara gestern im Supermarkt an der Kühltheke traf, war sie gerade hektisch auf der Suche nach dem Kaviar. Sie jammerte, dass sie **heute** Gäste bekäme, aber nichts Besonderes im Haus habe.*

‘When I met Lara at the refrigerated counter in the supermarket yesterday, she was frantically searching for caviar. She whined that she was having

guests over **today** but had nothing special in the house.’

(Rothkegel 2019: 32f. (emphasis in original), English translation provided by author)

The interpretation of sequences like the one in (78) is generally ambiguous: The text segment could be understood as being part of a narrative context featuring a homodiegetic first-person narrator, or as reflecting a communicative situation between the speaker and some unknown addressee. Depending on their preferred reading, participants could thus either favor a shifted reading of the temporal indexical *heute* or an unshifted one. The fact that the results showed a 69%-preference for the protagonist as perspectival center indicates that the narrative reading was the overall preferred option. However, in her second study, Rothkegel (2019) instead depicted similar test items as excerpts from users’ chat histories in the style of popular instant messaging services. Such a context inevitably prohibits an interpretation as fictional narration, which explains why there was an overall and significant preference for unshifted readings of the temporal indexicals.

Similarly, Anderson (2019) presented her test items as little comic sequences mainly consisting of a dialogue between two characters, followed by an ID clause featuring either the temporal indexical *tomorrow*, the anaphoric temporal adverbial *the next day* or the correct/wrong weekday as control cases. Due to the previous context and the content of the ID clause, a reading in which the temporal expression refers to the day following the original speech event was the only coherent one. An exemplary test item, originally depicted in Figure 6 and (61), is repeated below:



Figure 7: Example stimulus from Experiment 1 in Anderson (2019: 42)

- (79) Kevin is angry because Kate said that she would water his plants $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{tomorrow} \\ \text{the next day} \\ \text{Friday} \\ \text{Saturday} \end{array} \right\}$.

The study’s participants were asked to rate the acceptability of the ID clause on a Likert scale from 1-7. While ID clauses featuring a temporal indexical received relatively acceptable ratings, they were nevertheless rated significantly lower than ID clauses featuring anaphoric adverbials instead. As with Rothkegel’s second study,

this difference can be attributed to the design of the experiment favoring a conversational context interpretation due to its depiction as, primarily, a dialogue sequence. ID clauses containing a shifted temporal indexical can be presumed to be just as acceptable as ones featuring an anaphoric temporal adverbial if the preceding context instead unambiguously establishes a narrative context, as is done for (80).

- (80) On Friday evening, Kate and Kevin stood on their patio and anxiously regarded the plants in their garden. “Don’t worry. I’ll water the plants tomorrow”, said Kate confidently. But two days passed and nothing happened. When Kevin again went out to the patio on Sunday, he discovered to his dismay that all of his plants had dried up. He was incredibly furious that Kate had broken her promise!
- a. Kevin is angry because Kate said that she would water his plants tomorrow.
 - b. Kevin is angry because Kate said that she would water his plants the next day.

The next section will present an attempt to corroborate these predictions in the first experimental study of this investigation. Experiment 1 consists of an acceptability rating study, similar to Anderson’s (2019) experiments in design and setup, but focused on German ID and featuring a distinctly narrative context instead.

3.3 Experiment 1

3.3.1 General Description

Experiment 1 consists of an acceptability rating study that was intended to test the acceptability of ID clauses containing deictic temporal adverbs such as *gestern* (‘yesterday’), *heute* (‘today’) and *morgen* (‘tomorrow’) in discourse contexts which only allow for a coherent reading if interpreted from the perspective of the matrix subject and not from the perspective of the speaker/narrator. As discussed at length in previous chapters, the consensus in the literature is that such a reading should be both unavailable and unacceptable to readers. Thus, whereas temporal indexicals can easily and even obligatorily be interpreted with respect to the author’s context in DD and FID, they would supposedly have to be replaced by an anaphoric temporal expression such as *the next day* in ID to successfully arrive at the intended meaning (see, *inter alia*, Banfield 1973: 4, Schlenker 2003: 63ff., Sharvit 2008: 354). Accordingly, one would expect ID clauses containing shifted temporal indexicals to be judged as unacceptable or, at the very least, as less acceptable than their DD or FID counterparts and, particularly, than ID clauses containing non-deictic temporal adverbials instead.

The main purpose of this experiment is to provide empirical evidence to the

contrary: Following the studies presented in Anderson (2019)³⁵ on the availability of non-utterance time readings of *tomorrow* in English ID, I will similarly show that non-utterance time readings of temporal indexicals are available and acceptable in German ID. In contrast to Anderson, however, whose items consisted of three-panel comic strips, the items for Experiment 1 were designed in the style of short story excerpts. This was done to ensure that participants would interpret and rate the target sentences as part of a larger narrative text, thereby adhering to the hypothesis that only (fictional) narration allows for actual shifts in perspective. All test items were created in four conditions:

- (81) a. Condition A: The target sentence consists of an **ID** clause and contains a **deictic** temporal adverbial, namely *gestern*, *heute* or *morgen*.
- b. Condition B: The target sentence consists of a **DD** clause and contains a **deictic** temporal adverbial, namely *gestern*, *heute* or *morgen*.
- c. Condition C: The target sentence consists of an **FID** clause and contains a **deictic** temporal adverbial, namely *gestern*, *heute* or *morgen*.
- d. Condition D: The target sentence consists of an **ID** clause and contains a **non-deictic** temporal adverbial, such as *an diesem Tag* (‘on this day’) or *am Tag zuvor* (‘the day before’).

I will first give a detailed description of the materials used in the study and the task participants were asked to fulfill in Section 3.3.2, present my hypotheses for the outcome of the experiment in Section 3.3.3, before finally reporting and discussing the results in Section 3.3.4.

3.3.2 Method

3.3.2.1 Design and Materials

32 test items were created for the experiment, with an identical structure and approximately similar length to the exemplary item given in (82).³⁶ The items were presented to the participants in written form. For each item, four variants were constructed according to the conditions specified in (81) above. All items consisted of three sentences, in an attempt to emulate the narrative style of short stories. This was of particular importance, since being embedded into a fictional narrative must be regarded as a prerequisite for multiperspectivity. Furthermore, the stories were intentionally designed in such a way as to establish the protagonist, not the narrator, as the preferred perspectival center for the whole text segment as well as the only available anchor for a coherent interpretation of the temporal indexicals in the target sentence. Three specific factors were taken into consideration when constructing the items to account for this:

³⁵See Section 2.3.3 for a detailed description.

³⁶See Appendix A for additional items used in the experiment.

3.3 EXPERIMENT 1

1. Each story is centered around a specific protagonist, introduced via first name, who is portrayed as the main character of the plot and who takes on the thematic roles of agent or experiencer throughout.
2. Each story is narrated by a covert heterodiegetic third-person narrator.
3. Each test item begins by directly referencing the point of time at which the story takes place via an adverbial such as *two years ago*, *last winter* or *in 1964*, thereby situating the story in the past in relation to the (present) time of narration.

The first two points account for the highly relevant factor of prominence that will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5. As illustrated in Hinterwimmer (2019), Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019) and Meuser (2022), the prominence status of the discourse referents impacts their availability to serve as perspectival center. This not only pertains to the characters referenced in the discourse, but also to the narrator – by increasing or decreasing the prominence of either the narrator or one of the characters in the story, one can steer the reader to attribute perspective-dependent expressions with otherwise ambiguous readings to the more prominent referent. The aim of Experiment 1 was to provide a context in which the protagonist functions as the only viable and coherent perspectival center. By establishing the protagonist as the maximally prominent discourse referent of the text segment as a whole, and by simultaneously backgrounding the narrator, the possibility that participants might interpret the temporal indexicals in the target sentence from the latter’s perspective is greatly reduced.

The third point served a two-fold purpose: First of all, by explicitly distinguishing the story time from the time of narration, potentially ambiguous readings of the temporal indexicals, according to which the *today* of the narrator might be conflated with the *today* of the protagonist, are avoided. Secondly, due to the events of the story taking place far in the past in relation to the time of narration, an interpretation in which the temporal expression might be referring to the day that equals the *today* of the narrator becomes strictly incoherent. Thus, it was ensured that the only plausible reading of the target sentence was one in which the temporal indexicals are anchored to the context of the protagonist. In turn, the ratings provided by the participants can safely be considered to accurately measure the acceptability of shifted interpretations in speech and thought reports.

I will next go over the design of the items in detail, based on the exemplary one in (82):

- (82) *Vor über einem Jahrzehnt arbeitete Marek als Architekt an einem ziemlich komplexen Bauprojekt. Als er gerade über einem neuen Entwurf für den geplanten Freizeitpark grübelte, wurde er in das Büro seiner Chefin gerufen.*

‘Over a decade ago, Marek was working as an architect on a fairly complex

construction project. As he was mulling over a new design for the planned amusement park, he was called into his boss's office.'

- a. ID_{deictic}: *Marek dachte sich, dass ihm heute wohl endlich eine Beförderung von dieser Pedantin angeboten würde.*
'Marek thought to himself that today he would probably finally be offered a promotion by this pedant.'
- b. DD_{deictic}: *„Juhu, heute wird mir wohl endlich eine Beförderung von dieser Pedantin angeboten“, dachte Marek.*
“Yay, today I'll probably finally be offered a promotion by this pedant”, thought Marek.'
- c. FID_{deictic}: *Juhu, heute würde ihm wohl endlich eine Beförderung von dieser Pedantin angeboten!*
'Yay, today he would probably finally be offered a promotion by this pedant!'
- d. ID_{non-deictic}: *Marek dachte sich, dass ihm an diesem Tag wohl endlich eine Beförderung von dieser Pedantin angeboten würde.*
'Marek thought to himself that on this day he would probably finally be offered a promotion by this pedant.'

The first two sentences (= S1 & S2) were identical in each of the four conditions, whereas the final sentence (= S3) functioned as the target sentence and varied according to the features defined in (81). S1 establishes the setting of the story, specifies the point in time in the past at which the events are taking place and introduces the primary protagonist, which, in (82), is Marek. The protagonist was female in half of the items and male in the other half. S2 always contains a subordinate clause and mainly serves to set up the thought or utterance of the protagonist that will be reported in S3. The protagonist is picked up again via a personal pronoun and serves as the subject of the sentence. In half of the items, a second, unnamed protagonist is introduced in S2, in an attempt to make the stories less monotonous for the participants. If the item featured a secondary protagonist, the proposition expressed in S3 would always contain a negatively evaluative DP such as *diese Pedantin* ('this pedant') referring to said protagonist, in order to prevent a possible interpretation from their perspective.

In all versions of S3 aside from the FID condition, the primary protagonist is picked up once more via first name in the matrix clause, acting as its subject, and via personal pronoun in the embedded clause. The speech or thought report is embedded by one of three possible propositional attitude verbs chosen for the experiment: *dachte sich* ('thought to oneself'), *sagte sich* ('said to oneself') or *fragte sich* ('asked oneself'). The choice to use the verb in combination with a reflexive pronoun was made for two reasons: Firstly, in the case of utterance reports, it served to prevent unintended readings of S3 as a conversation between the protagonist

3.3 EXPERIMENT 1

and some addressee. Secondly and more importantly, ID clauses featuring *dachte sich* instead of *dachte* were deemed to be a more suitable and appropriate point of comparison to FID, which always constitutes either a speech or a thought event. As I will elaborate in Chapter 6, *dachte*, also allows an interpretation of its embedded proposition as a report of the protagonist’s doxastic state and is as such ambiguous. *dachte sich*, in contrast, forces a thought event reading; the properties of the resulting clause are thus overall closer to those of FID. Beyond the choice of propositional attitude verb, the rest of S3 featured the characteristics commonly attributed to ID, DD and FID that were explored in Section 2.2. As mentioned above, the clause always contained one of the following three temporal indexicals: *heute*, *gestern* or *morgen*, with the obvious exception of condition D.

Additionally, thirty filler items were created. The fillers consisted of three different types encompassing ten items each:

- (83)
- a. Type 1: Similar to the regular items in condition A. However, the verb tense used in the ID clause clashes with the temporal indexical.
 - b. Type 2: Half of the type 2 fillers contain an FID clause, the other half an ID one. However, a different sentence, containing an evaluative DP referring to the primary protagonist, functions as the actual target sentence participants were asked to rate.
 - c. Type 3: Contains FID in which a personal pronoun is used to refer back to a previously introduced, second protagonist – who does *not* serve as the perspectival center of the FID clause – instead of the more commonly used demonstrative pronoun.³⁷

All fillers overall matched the regular test items in form and length. However, in contrast to the test items, the position of the target sentence varied from filler to filler. The main purpose of the fillers was to distract participants from the actual aim of the experiment. Type 1 fillers additionally served as a sort of control case to check if participants would be able to notice unnatural and unacceptable clauses and accordingly give those items lower ratings. Examples for all types are given in (84):

- (84)
- a. Type 1: *Im Sommer 2007 dachte sich Enrico, dass er gestern mal ins Kino gehen würde. Er wollte sich den Simpsons-Film anschauen, auf den er sich schon lange gefreut hatte. Während er an der Kasse den Eintritt bezahlte und sich im Anschluss Popcorn holte, stieg seine Vorfreude.*
‘In the summer of 2007, Enrico thought to himself that he would go to the movies yesterday. He wanted to see the Simpsons movie he had been looking forward to for a long time. As he paid the entrance fee at the box office and then got some popcorn, his anticipation grew.’

³⁷See Section 2.1.3 as well as Section 5.1 for an explanation of demonstrative pronouns’ characteristics as perspective-dependent expressions.

- b. Type 2: *An Silvester letzten Jahres ging Brigitte zu einer großen Party in einem bekannten Nachtclub. Auf dem Weg zur Location hatte diese durchgeknallte Partymaus bereits zwei Flaschen Sekt intus. Brigitte sagte sich, dass sie mal so richtig die Sau raus lassen würde.*
 ‘On New Year’s Eve last year, Brigitte went to a big party in a well-known nightclub. On the way to the venue, this crazy party girl had already finished two bottles of champagne. Brigitte told herself that she was really going to go hog wild.’
- c. Type 3: *Nora unterhielt sich in der Teeküche mit dem neuen Kollegen, während sie sich Kaffee einschenkte. Aus Versehen rempelte der Kollege sie an, sodass sie sich die Hand am Kaffee verbrühte. Verdammt, er hatte sie doch nicht mehr alle!*
 ‘Nora was chatting with her new colleague in the staff kitchen while she poured herself some coffee. The colleague accidentally bumped into her causing her to scald her hand on the coffee. Damn, he was out of his mind!’

Finally, 18 control questions were included in the study. These questions were displayed after the corresponding filler item and asked about a random detail mentioned in the previous story, in order to check if participants were reading the items carefully. Three of the questions were omitted from the later analysis, however, as they had received an unusually high number of incorrect answers.³⁸

3.3.2.2 Participants

40 test subjects (Gender distribution: female = 17, male = 22, non-binary = 1; age range: 21-61; mean age: 36 years) participated in the study, which was carried out in October 2023. They were recruited via the online research platform Prolific (<https://www.prolific.co/>) for monetary compensation (£3.00). Participants were prescreened so that only German native speakers would take part in the study. Of those 40 participants, seven grew up multilingual; it was decided to include their data in the analysis. One participant had to be excluded from the data analysis due to not correctly answering at least 75% of the included control questions. The results of three more participants were excluded from the data analysis because their responses frequently showed overall high ratings for the type 1 fillers, which were designed to trigger low ratings.

3.3.2.3 Procedure

Due to their length, regular test items were split into two groups so that participants would only be presented with 16 test items each, plus all 30 filler items. Each

³⁸A closer look revealed that participants had overall more trouble answering questions that revolved around remembering a specific number or date mentioned in the story. Such questions were subsequently avoided in the other experiments conducted for this thesis.

group of 16 test items was furthermore divided into four lists so that participants would be presented with each item in only one of its four conditions. To sum up, eight lists were created and distributed evenly to participants, each consisting of four test items per condition and 30 filler items. Items were displayed to participants in randomized order. The lists were created using the platform *Qualtrics* (<https://www.qualtrics.com/>) and distributed to participants online using the research and data collection platform *Prolific*. Their task was to rate how natural the target sentence felt to them in the context of the story on a Likert scale from 1 (completely unnatural) to 7 (completely natural).³⁹ Participants were not told which sentence they were supposed to rate in the initial task assignment, as to not direct their attention towards any specific sentences from the outset. The target sentence was instead specified in a question following each individual item. Two practice items, using the designs of filler types 1 and 3, were presented to participants at the beginning of the experiment.

3.3.3 Hypotheses

In Chapter 1 as well as Section 2.2, the two central hypotheses of this PhD project, H1 and H2, were defined. The main goal of Experiment 1 is to gather empirical evidence in support of H1, repeated in (85) below:

- (85) **H1:** Perspective-dependent expressions in German indirect discourse clauses can be interpreted from the perspective of the matrix subject (= the author of the subordinated thought or utterance) instead of the matrix speaker given that certain conditions are fulfilled.

The conditions mentioned in H1 can be specified as follows: The ID clause needs to be embedded in a narrative context and the propositional attitude verb used in the matrix clause must constitute an actual speech or thought event report, in order to be comparable to FID. Both of these conditions are reflected and fulfilled in the design of the items used in the experiment. Experiment 1 will thus serve to test the following sub-hypothesis of H1, originally formulated at the beginning of the present chapter:

- (86) **H1a:** Indirect discourse clauses featuring temporal indexicals interpreted from the perspective of the matrix subject constitute available and acceptable clauses in German.

With respect to the conditions compared in the current study, H1a predicts that, contrary to the predominant assumptions about ID found in the literature, condition A (= ID_{deictic}) will receive generally high acceptability ratings, illustrating that the ID clauses with shifted readings are not perceived as unnatural or unacceptable by German native speakers. Moreover, it predicts that condition A will also not be rated

³⁹Displayed as star ratings to participants.

significantly worse than the other types of speech and thought representation tested in conditions B (= DD_{deictic}) and C (= FID_{deictic}) or, at least, that potentially lower acceptability ratings for ID clauses will not be due to the inclusion of a temporal indexical interpreted from the protagonist’s perspective. This will be shown through a comparison between conditions A and D (= ID_{non-deictic}): H1a implicitly states that temporal indexicals do not have to be replaced by equivalent, anaphoric adverbials such as *the next day* in ID in order to arrive at the intended meaning of referring to the protagonist’s rather than the speaker’s temporal position, as has often been claimed. Accordingly, the results of the experiment are expected to demonstrate that conditions A and D are rated equally acceptable. Thus, even if condition A does receive significantly different ratings than conditions B or C, H1a predicts that so should condition D, as well. This, in turn, would show that said difference in acceptability ratings represented an overall divergent evaluation of ID clauses by the participants that cannot be attributed to the interpretation of the shifted indexical.

3.3.4 Results and Discussion

3.3.4.1 Results

The results of 36 remaining participants were included in the analysis. For all 32 items, the mean values for each condition were calculated using the freely available statistics software R (<https://www.r-project.org/>) with the function `lme4` (Bates et al. 2015). The significance was checked via a linear mixed-effects model.⁴⁰ The mean acceptability ratings estimated by the model for each of the four conditions are displayed in Table 1⁴¹ and illustrated graphically in Figure 8.⁴²

Condition	Mean Value (Model Estimate)	CI
Condition A: ID _{deictic}	5.43	[5.03 ; 5.83]
Condition B: DD _{deictic}	5.67	[5.27 ; 6.07]
Condition C: FID _{deictic}	5.26	[4.86 ; 5.66]
Condition D: ID _{non-deictic}	5.52	[5.13 ; 5.92]

Table 1: Mean acceptability ratings (model estimate) and 95%-confidence intervals for Experiment 1

As can be seen in Table 1, all conditions received overall high mean ratings of above five. Moreover, the mean ratings are very close to each other; there was no significant difference between condition A and condition B (estimate = 0.24, SE =

⁴⁰The model was specified using the following formula: `Answer ~ Condition + (1 | Subjects) + (1 | Items)`. It has to be noted that the model did not converge until random slope effects were taken out of the equation; the calculated p-values are therefore not 100% reliable. T-tests were calculated using the Satterthwaite’s method of the `lmerTest` packages.

⁴¹Rounded to the second decimal place.

⁴²Short explanation of Figure 8: The red dot marks the mean value, while the bold horizontal line represents the median for each condition. The boxes display where the bulk of the data, namely the 25% below and above the median, is located.

3.3 EXPERIMENT 1

0.15, $p = 0.11$), nor between conditions A and C (estimate = -0.17, SE = 0.15, $p = 0.25$). The difference between condition B and condition C, however, was estimated to be significant by the model (estimate = -0.41, SE = 0.15, $p = 0.006$). Finally, there was also no significant difference between conditions A and D (estimate = 0.09, SE = 0.15, $p = 0.54$), nor between condition D and the other two conditions (condition B: estimate = 0.15, SE = 0.15, $p = 0.32$; condition C: estimate = -0.26, SE = 0.15, $p = 0.08$).




Figure 8: Acceptability ratings on a Likert scale from 1-7 (1 = not acceptable, 7 = completely acceptable) for Experiment 1




Figure 9: Comparison of acceptability ratings distribution for all conditions in Experiment 1

In addition to these model estimates, Figure 8 shows that the mean values were overall close to the median values in each condition. The distribution of the data was also similar across conditions: Figure 9 illustrates that the items most frequently received high acceptability ratings of six and seven, regardless of condition. Regarding the results for the filler items, as expected, type 1 fillers received a low mean rating of 2.03 on a scale from 1-7, with 58.89% of the fillers in this group receiving a 1-star rating. Type 2 and type 3 fillers received mean acceptability ratings of 4.69 and 5.32, respectively.

3.3.4.2 Discussion

The results for Experiment 1 confirm hypothesis H1a as defined in (86). There was no indication in the data that participants regarded the ID clauses in condition A as unnatural, as they received a high mean acceptability rating of above five on a scale from 1-7. Moreover, a comparison between the results for conditions A and D reveals that participants showed no preference for clauses involving anaphoric adverbials instead of shifted temporal indexicals, as there was no discernible significant difference. This indicates that the common claim that temporal indexicals such as *heute* need to be replaced by a non-deictic adverbial such as *an diesem Tag* to arrive at the intended meaning does not accurately reflect native speakers' linguistic intuition. In the same vein, the consensus with regard to the characteristics of ID, DD and FID would lead one to predict that both condition B and condition C should receive significantly higher ratings than condition A, as DD and FID clauses featuring shifted temporal indexicals should supposedly be perceived as more natural in comparison. However, this was not the case; the mean values estimated by the model show that participants discerned no significant difference in terms of acceptability and naturalness for items featuring ID in combination with shifted indexicals.

While neither condition involving ID displayed significant differences to any of the other conditions, items in condition C surprisingly received significantly lower acceptability ratings than in condition B. In addition, condition C stands out as the only condition that received fewer seven-star ratings than six-star ratings (see Figure 9). Nevertheless, these results do not reflect a generally low acceptability of FID clauses, as condition C still received overall high ratings and the difference between its and the other conditions' mean values is quite low. The slightly lower rating can perhaps be attributed to the fact that FID is simply a comparatively more infrequently encountered type of speech report than ID or DD, and thus might have been perceived as somewhat less natural by some participants in a direct comparison. However, in light of the marginal differences between all of the conditions, any further conclusions about a potentially lower acceptability status of FID would be drawn prematurely.

There is one aspect that has not been considered so far in the analysis of the results due to not being the central focus of the study: The possibility exists that the

ratings of the participants might have been impacted by the choice of propositional attitude verb or temporal indexical. In both cases, the verbs/indexicals were not equally distributed across items but instead used according to what felt most natural when creating the individual texts. As a consequence, certain verbs and adverbs were used disproportionately more frequently; for example, *denken* was used in roughly 75% of the items while *fragen* was only used in approximately 6%. Not only should it thus be unlikely to find any significant differences between items that are attributable to the verb or indexical chosen and which might potentially have distorted the overall results, it also means that even if there were notable differences, the statistical reliability of these results would be highly doubtful. Still, a thorough further analysis of the data was conducted to check for potential uncontrolled effects of these two factors. The results of this analysis are briefly summarized in the next section.

3.3.5 Effects of Attitude Verbs and Temporal Indexicals

3.3.5.1 Distribution of Data

Propositional Attitude Verbs All ID and DD clauses were subordinated either by *dachte sich*, *sagte sich* or *fragte sich*; *dachte sich* was used in 75% of the regular items, *sagte sich* in 19% and *fragte sich* only in 6%. The large majority of items across conditions thus featured thought reports introduced via *dachte sich*.

Temporal Indexicals All regular items – with the exception of items in condition D – featured a temporal indexical in their target sentence; *heute* was used in 50%, *gestern* in 15% and *morgen* in 35% of the items. The discrepancy in distribution was thus not as big as in the case of the propositional attitude verbs. Still, almost half of the items featured *heute*. The rest of the items primarily featured *morgen*, whereas *gestern* was used considerably more infrequently.

3.3.5.2 Results and Discussion

For all 32 items, the mean values for each verb as well as each temporal indexical were calculated using the same method as in the previous analysis for the conditions, described in Section 3.3.4.1 above. The significance was again checked via a linear mixed-effects model in each case.⁴³ The mean acceptability ratings for each of the verbs and indexicals along with their confidence intervals are depicted in Table 2.⁴⁴ Their distribution is illustrated in Figure 10. In contrast to Figure 9, the frequencies are given in percent, as they would otherwise have not been comparable due to some of the verbs' and indexicals' low quantity of data points.

⁴³For the model checking the effect of the propositional attitude verbs on the acceptability ratings, the following formula was used: Answer ~ Verb + (1 | Subjects) + (1 | Items); a similar formula was used to check the effect of the temporal indexicals: Answer ~ Indexical + (1 | Subjects) + (1 | Items). In both cases, the models did not converge until random slope effects were taken out of the equation – the calculated p-values are therefore once again not 100% reliable. T-tests were calculated using the Satterthwaite's method of the lmerTest packages.

⁴⁴Rounded to the second decimal place.

Verb/Indexical	Mean Value (Model Estimate)	CI
<i>denken</i>	5.42	[5.04 ; 5.80]
<i>sagen</i>	5.70	[5.15 ; 6.25]
<i>fragen</i>	5.46	[4.60 ; 6.32]
<i>heute</i>	5.51	[5.10 ; 5.93]
<i>gestern</i>	5.45	[4.85 ; 6.04]
<i>morgen</i>	5.43	[4.97 ; 5.89]

Table 2: Mean acceptability ratings (model estimate) and 95%-confidence intervals for propositional attitude verbs and temporal indexicals




Figure 10: Comparison of acceptability ratings distribution for all verbs and indexicals

Figure 10 shows that the three propositional attitude verbs patterned quite similarly to each other. In all three cases, the frequency of distribution rises steadily from one-star to seven-star ratings; some of the differences, such as *fragen* receiving more six-star than seven-star ratings, in contrast to the other two verbs, may potentially be attributed to the overall low number of data points for this verb not being representative; for example, *fragen* did not even receive any four-star ratings at all. The same holds true for the indexicals: While the distribution of *heute* and *morgen* is very close similar, *gestern* deviates to a degree, as it received a higher percent of five- and seven-star ratings than the other two indexicals, yet comparatively few six-star ratings. Again, this somewhat irregular behavior can most likely be chalked up to its lower overall frequency in the data.

The results of the mixed-effects model for the propositional attitude verbs show that there was no significant difference between *denken* and *sagen* (estimate = 0.28,

3.3 EXPERIMENT 1

SE = 0.26, $p = 0.29$), *denken* and *fragen* (estimate = 0.04, SE = 0.41, $p = 0.92$), or *sagen* and *fragen* (estimate = -0.24, SE = 0.46, $p = 0.61$). The choice of propositional attitude verb did thus not affect participants' acceptability ratings for the test items. Similarly, the results of the mixed-effects model for the temporal indexicals showed that there was also no significant difference between *heute* and *gestern* (estimate = -0.06, SE = 0.29, $p = 0.83$), *heute* and *morgen* (estimate = -0.08, SE = 0.22, $p = 0.72$), or *morgen* and *gestern* (estimate = 0.02, SE = 0.31, $p = 0.96$). As the results indicate, the choice of indexical in the subordinate clause did also not affect participants' acceptability ratings. Finally, the results were checked for interaction effects between propositional attitude verbs and conditions as well as temporal indexicals and conditions. As can be gauged from the graphs depicted in Figure 11, neither variable affected the impact of the conditions on the acceptability ratings.




Figure 11: Interaction plots for conditions & propositional attitude verbs as well as conditions & temporal indexicals

This brief complementary analysis of the data confirmed that neither the choice of propositional attitude verb nor the choice of temporal indexical had any effect on the results of the study. A more extensive exploration of the potential impact of

propositional attitude verbs on perspectivization in ID is carried out in Chapter 6.

All in all, the results for Experiment 1 provide substantial empirical evidence that temporal indexicals in ID can be interpreted from a protagonist's instead of the speaker's perspective without decreasing the acceptability of the clause as a whole, provided that the sentence is embedded in a narrative context. The prevalent characterization of ID as not allowing context shift of any indexicals in its scope has thus successfully been confirmed to be a misconception. Consequently, I will next examine the different factors, as specified in (7) back in Chapter 1, that can potentially affect the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions in ID.

4 Perspective Shift in Free Indirect Discourse

The purpose of the previous chapter was to provide evidence for the first of my two central hypotheses. The results for Experiment 1, in particular, confirmed that shifted readings of temporal indexicals in indirect discourse (ID) are generally regarded as equally acceptable to otherwise identical ID clauses featuring an anaphoric temporal adverbial by German native speakers, provided they are embedded in an explicitly narrative context. I therefore consider the prevailing consensus in the literature, namely, that ID must obligatorily be interpreted from the context of utterance and does not allow perspective shift whatsoever, to be empirically refuted – temporal indexicals, at least, *can* be shifted to the perspective of the matrix subject. Moreover, the results of the experimental study also showed that ID clauses containing shifted temporal indexicals were not rated to be less natural than either direct discourse (DD) or free indirect discourse (FID) structures featuring the same indexicals. These results therefore call into question the commonly presumed relationship between the three types of speech and thought representation, and between ID and FID in particular. As was discussed at length in Section 2.2, FID is both regarded as a unique example of multiperspectivity in language, effectively expressing the contexts of narrator and protagonist simultaneously – though to different degrees –, as well as a hybrid of ID and DD due to ostensibly sharing some of its properties with the former but other characteristics with the latter.

However, the new insights gained in Chapter 3 challenge both of these assumptions. First of all, FID can no longer be identified as the only type of speech and thought report that is able to combine two separate perspectives, as ID has now also been shown to exhibit a potential for multiperspectivity. Secondly, exactly the same types of perspective-dependent expressions are affected by context shift in FID and ID. To be specific, spatio-temporal indexicals and expressives can shift, whereas personal indexicals and tense have to remain anchored to the default context of the speaker or narrator under any circumstances. In DD, in contrast, *all* perspective-dependent expressions only allow a reading from the perspective of the speech or thought event’s author. FID’s widespread definition as a hybrid of ID and DD, though, is specifically based on the observation that in FID, personal indexicals and tense are anchored to the perspective of the speaker, as in ID, while all

other perspective-dependent expressions are anchored to the author, as in DD. As I have demonstrated, certain perspective-dependent expressions *can* be anchored to the author in ID as well, which indicates that it is much more similar to FID than has previously been assumed. Furthermore, the previous chapter also illustrated that FID and ID additionally have in common that they both are dependent on a narrative context to unlock their potential for multiperspectivity.⁴⁵ This, too, is a property not shared by DD. Indexicals in DD are interpreted from the reported context as long as the clause is properly marked as an instance of DD, regardless of whether it is embedded in the context of a fictional narration or in the context of a communicative discourse situation – a conversation via text messages on some kind of instant messaging service, for example. As the last chapter has shown and as Chapter 5 will illustrate further, ID and FID are both highly reliant on the larger context for their interpretation, while DD is fundamentally unaffected by contextual factors.

The preliminary results of this investigation into ID's perspectival properties therefore necessitate a reevaluation of FID as well and, in addition, suggest that FID is more closely linked to ID than it is to DD. These observations are captured in my second central hypothesis, H2.

- (87) **H2:** Free indirect discourse is not a hybrid of indirect and direct discourse, but the root clause equivalent of indirect discourse, as they share the majority of their perspectival characteristics. Accordingly, the two types of speech/thought representation should receive a uniform analysis, whereas direct discourse has to be regarded as a case of pure quotation.

The second half of the investigation will be primarily focused on providing further evidence for H2. Specifically, Chapters 5 and 6 will discuss two major factors that I consider to be highly relevant in governing perspective shift in speech and thought reports. Beforehand, however, it is crucial to examine in more detail how perspective shift in FID has been analyzed in the past, in order to assess if the various approaches that have been proposed could feasibly account for the properties of ID as well and thus, in turn, allow for a uniform treatment of FID and ID as suggested. The current chapter therefore serves to provide an overview of the primary methods of analysis of FID suggested to date. Perhaps the most popular of these approaches among proponents of formal semantics is the so-called double-context analysis, which, based on Kaplan's definition of context⁴⁶, argues that more than one context is available for the interpretation of clauses: In addition to the default context of the speaker, a protagonist's context may be activated and, consequently, FID is interpreted with regard to both contexts. Different implementations of this general idea have been proposed in Doron (1991), Schlenker (2004) and Eckardt

⁴⁵See Section 3.2.

⁴⁶See Section 2.1.2.

4.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIRECT DISCOURSE AND FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE

(2014). Sharvit (2008) presents a variation of the double-context approach that entails a covert operator facilitating context shift in FID, in a similar fashion to the attitude operator analyses of ID by Anand (2006) and Deal (2020), as discussed in Section 2.3.1. A fundamentally different approach that seeks to preserve Kaplan’s prohibition of monstrous operators and, effectively, true context shift, is suggested by Maier (2015). Maier proposes a mixed quotation analysis of FID, according to which the FID clause represents a quote of the original thought or utterance – in the same vein as DD – but in which certain elements, such as personal indexicals, are systematically ‘unquoted’ and thus reflect the reporting context of the speaker (cf. Maier 2015: 350). These attempted analyses of FID will be discussed in Section 4.2.

It needs to be emphasized that the aim of this chapter is *not* to provide an extensive and comprehensive argument regarding the advantages and drawbacks of the individual proposals, and to thus arrive at a definitive conclusion as to which is the ideal method of analysis to accurately explain the properties of FID. Such an endeavor would require a much more detailed critical examination of each individual approach that would by far exceed the limitations of this doctoral thesis. As the primary interest of this investigation lies in the perspectival properties of ID and therefore, inevitably, also in ID’s relationship with FID, the discussion of the various proposals will also only entail whether the given approach might be suited for a uniform treatment of ID and FID or not. Additionally, it is also of relevance whether the individual proposals take into consideration – or are at least theoretically able to account for – the contextual factors determined in the course of this investigation to be of major importance for enabling perspective shift in both ID and FID – namely, a narrative context and the availability of a maximally prominent discourse referent to serve as perspectival anchor.

Before I further describe each of the aforementioned approaches, I will first address some of the arguments *against* a uniform analysis of ID and FID that have been brought up in previous works on the topic.

4.1 The Relationship between Indirect Discourse and Free Indirect Discourse

In this section, I will offer a brief discussion of some of the points that have, in the past, been argued to be evidence that FID requires a substantially different analysis from ID, specifically those posited in Schlenker (2004). Based primarily on the observations made in Banfield (1982), he lists four points, summarized in (88), that are meant to showcase how fundamentally differently FID ostensibly behaves from ID:

- (88) i. Indexicals that can be interpreted with respect to the reported context in FID can only be interpreted with respect to the reporting context in

ID.

- ii. FID behaves like a syntactically unembedded clause: FID clauses cannot be introduced by a complementizer, but they can incorporate expressive elements that are barred from subordinated ID clauses.
- iii. Direct questions can be expressed via FID but not via ID.
- iv. FID does not allow for any *de dicto* / *de re* ambiguity, whereas ID does. (cf. Schlenker 2004: 283f.; Schlenker 2011: 1597f.)

Several of Schlenker's arguments, however, have already been shown in the last chapter to not accurately represent the properties of ID: For one thing, the results of Experiment 1 have confirmed that a shifted reading is available for the same indexicals that can shift in FID, as long as the condition is met that the clause is embedded in the context of fictional narration. Further empirical evidence of this will be provided in Experiment 4.⁴⁷ Moreover, the literary examples provided by Fludernik (1993) and McHale (1983) that were presented in Section 3.2.2 (cf. (72)) provide partial counter-evidence against Schlenker's (2004) second point regarding the claim that certain expressive elements can only appear in FID, but not in ID. These excerpts from actual narrative texts demonstrate that, at least in narration, it is indeed possible and well-attested that ID clauses may contain the very same expressive elements, such as interjections, that Schlenker – as well as Banfield – claim to be barred from ID (cf. Fludernik 1993: 227f.). One of these examples, (72a), is repeated below in (89a) for illustration.

- (89) a. He thought about Gilly's speech, and told himself that, whew, Gilly had talked the leg off of everybody... (Farrell, *Young Lonigan*, p. 37; as cited in McHale (1983: 25))
- b. He then [...] asked if he had been so unhappy as to offend me? 'No, indeed!' cried I: and then [...] I desired to know if he had seen the young lady who had been conversing with me? No;– but would I honour him with my commands to see her? (Burney, *Evelina, or the History of a Young Lady's Entrance into the World*, p. 31; as cited in Fludernik (1993: 232) (slightly abbreviated))

The literary example provided in (89b) pertains to Schlenker's third point (88-iii) and showcases that ID sentences can be used to express direct questions in fictional narration, as well. One may be tempted to dismiss such examples on the basis of not properly reflecting grammatical structures in normal language use; however, as was already pointed out in Section 3.2.2, that would inevitably raise the question why FID should then not be similarly dismissed, as it corresponds to a syntactic structure that is also ungrammatical outside of narrative contexts. Schlenker is correct,

⁴⁷See Section 5.6.

4.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIRECT DISCOURSE AND FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE

though, in stating that FID sentences behave as syntactically unembedded clauses that, therefore, cannot be introduced by a complementizer like *that*; yet, out of all Schlenker’s arguments, this is the only one not directly related to perspectivization as such. It thus only were to pose a problem for H2, if the proposal entailed that FID’s and ID’s syntactical structures need to be identical in order for them to possess identical perspectival characteristics, and if it further hinged on FID, in actuality, consisting of a subordinated clause. Effectively, this specifically calls into question the validity of operator-based accounts which postulate that FID clauses are subordinated by a covert operator that facilitates context shift, in similar fashion to the analyses of ID suggested in Anand (2006) and Deal (2020). The issue will be discussed further in the next section.

This leaves (88-iv) as Schlenker’s (2004) fourth and final argument, which addresses the *de dicto* / *de re* ambiguity that has been shown to exist for ID, but to be absent from FID. The distinction between a *de re* and a *de dicto* reading mainly pertains to the designation of individuals or objects in propositional attitude reports. It was first observed by Quine (1956) that ID clauses like the one in (90) are generally ambiguous and allow both what Reinhart (1983: 170f.) refers to as a *transparent* (90a) and an *opaque* (90b) reading.

- (90) J. Jonah Jameson believes that Peter Parker is a menace to society.
- a. $\exists x(x \text{ is Peter Parker and J. Jonah Jameson believes that } x \text{ is a menace to society})$
 - b. J. Jonah Jameson believes that $\exists x(x \text{ is Peter Parker and } x \text{ is a menace to society})$

The transparent reading of (90) only entails that Jameson holds the belief that a specific individual *x* is a menace to society. That individual *x* happens to be Peter Parker, but this information is not part of Jameson’s belief; Jameson may have been exclusively thinking about Peter Parker’s secret alter-ego Spider-Man, whom Jameson considers to be a dangerous criminal, without being aware that *Spider-Man* and *Peter Park* actually denote the same individual. Thus, the transparent interpretation theoretically allows for (90) and (91) to be true simultaneously.

- (91) J. Jonah Jameson believes that Peter Parker is an upstanding citizen.

(90a) represents the *de re* interpretation of (90). As Maier (2009: 433) describes it, “a *de re* belief is a belief about an individual, the *res*, independent of the particular description used by the believer or reporter.” As such, the actual description or designation used in the attitude report does not affect the truth value of the clause (cf. Anand 2006: 18). Consequently, the speaker is able to insert his own referential expression of choice into the clause, which prompts Reinhart (1983: 171) to state that it reflects “the speaker’s point of view with respect to designation.” As (92) illustrates, ID also allows *de re* readings with regard to other types of referential

expressions than proper names, such as noun phrases:

- (92) Milan believed that the bloodthirsty axe murderer was a harmless salesman.

From the contradictory properties assigned to the individual Milan's reported belief is centered around – an axe murderer is certainly anything but harmless, even if he was also a salesman – it is apparent that they cannot both express Milan's original choice of expression; the DP *the bloodthirsty axe murderer* must thus receive a *de re* interpretation, reflecting that only the speaker, but not Milan, is aware of the 'salesman's' true nature.

The opaque reading illustrated in (90b), in contrast, also entails the specific designation as part of the belief report. Thus, it is precisely the individual that Jameson refers to as *Peter Parker* whom he believes to be a menace to society. This represents the *de dicto* interpretation of (90), which reflects the original choice of expression of the author and can thus be said to be representative of their perspective (cf. Reinhart 1983: 171). In a *de dicto* reading of both (90) and (91), the two reported beliefs would therefore stand in contradiction to each other. As can be inferred from the semantic transcriptions of (90), the different readings are commonly attributed to a difference in scope of the existential quantifier. Depending on whether the quantifier takes scope over the propositional attitude operator or is instead situated inside the scope of the attitude operator, the clause receives a *de re* or a *de dicto* reading, respectively (cf. Quine 1956: 178, Reinhart 1983: 170, Haas 1990: 217, Maier 2009: 433). However, based on the example in (93), Reinhart (1983) demonstrates that FID clauses do not exhibit this ambiguity, but instead *only* allow for a *de dicto* interpretation.

- (93) a. Oedipus believed that his mother wasn't his mother.
b. #His mother was not his mother, Oedipus believed.

(Reinhart 1983: 173, ex. 6 & 7, also cited in, *inter alia*, Schlenker 2004: 284, ex. 8)

While the ID clause theoretically again allows both a *de dicto* and a *de re* reading, the former is ruled out due to being contradictory, as it would mean that Oedipus simultaneously assigns a specific individual x the property of being his mother *and* of not being his mother. As (93b) showcases, the FID equivalent is infelicitous because it does not allow the *de re* reading, i.e., the only non-contradictory interpretation. Though Reinhart (1983) only discusses FID clauses featuring a parenthetical, like the one in (93b), (94), which features an FID version of (90), illustrates that her observations also apply to more typical instances of FID.

- (94) J. Jonah Jameson was furious as he watched Spider-Man swing around between New York's skyscrapers. For God's sake, Peter Parker was a menace to society!

Even though (94) establishes a context in which a *de re* reading of the FID sentence, according to which Jameson, in actuality, expressed a belief about the individual he knows as Spider-Man, would be more plausible, the FID clause can only receive a *de dicto* reading: Either Jameson is consciously equating Spider-Man and Peter Parker or, in his mind, the individual he believes to be a menace to society, Peter Parker, is unrelated to the individual he is currently watching, Spider-Man. The interpretation that the FID clause expresses a belief about Spider-Man without making conscious reference to Peter Parker, however, is unavailable.

Following Reinhart (1983), the notion that FID only allows for *de dicto* readings, whereas ID is generally ambiguous with regard to *de dicto* and *de re* interpretations, has been largely adopted in the literature as further confirmation that the two fundamentally differ with regard to their perspectival properties (cf. Schlenker 2004: 283f., Sharvit 2008: 367, Bary & Maier 2014: 82). As I will elaborate in more detail in Chapter 6, however, the *de dicto* / *de re* ambiguity in ID is dependent on the ID clause representing a report of the protagonist's mental *state*. The ambiguity can be resolved by forcing a thought *event* reading, in which case only a *de dicto* interpretation remains available. Consequently, this will reveal a further similarity between FID and ID, as FID always and exclusively constitutes speech or thought event reports.

The remaining chapter will be focused on describing the different approaches to explain perspective shift in FID, starting with the popular double-context analysis.

4.2 Analyses of Free Indirect Discourse: Double-context and Mixed Quotation Approaches

The double-context analysis of FID represents the most popular approach among formal semanticists and was first proposed by Doron (1991). Doron (1991) adapts the narratological dual voice hypothesis (see Pascal 1977) into the framework of situation semantics and argues that the meaning of a clause needs to be determined relative to both a discourse situation *d* and a point of view *p* in order to explain the multiperspectivity of FID (cf. Doron 1991: 57). The point of view, which can be taken to be identical to what I have called the perspectival center, is defined as the 'focus of consciousness' by Doron, who goes on to state that the speaker of *d* and the focus of consciousness are typically identical in everyday discourse, but may differ in narrative contexts (cf. Doron 1991: 57f.). This is supposedly the case for FID. Doron (1991: 60) stipulates that *d* is the domain of the narrator – thereby effectively countering Banfield's (1982) claim that FID clauses do not have a narrator – whereas *p* expresses the 'voice' of a character in FID. Whether the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions in FID depends on the discourse situation or the point of view is then determined by the specific type of expression: Doron states that "first and second person pronouns, for example, are discourse-situation sensitive

but point-of-view insensitive” and can therefore only be interpreted with regard to the narrator’s context (Doron 1991: 58). Other perspective-dependent expressions, such as temporal indexicals, instead fully rely on *p* for their interpretation, which explains their discrepancy with the past tense verb forms used in FID clauses (cf. Doron 1991: 60f.).

Doron’s (1991) observations and conclusions form the basis for all subsequent double-context analyses of FID, which all have in common the general distinction between the narrator’s and the protagonist’s context as well as the basic hypothesis that in FID, some elements are interpreted with respect to the narrator’s context and others with respect to the protagonist’s context. The individual approaches differ, however, with regard to the specific implementation of these concepts and ideas. Schlenker (2004) differentiates between the Context of Utterance *v*, which represents the point at which a thought is expressed, and the Context of Thought Θ , which instead represents the point at which the expressed thought originates (cf. Schlenker 2004: 279). According to Schlenker (2004), every sentence is interpreted with regard to both *v* and Θ ; in normal discourse situations, they are both identical to the actual context *c* ($c=v=\Theta$). In FID, however, *v* and Θ diverge, as the former reflects the actual ‘physical’ context of the speaker/narrator, while the latter is distinct from it, reflecting the perspective of whichever protagonist’s thought is being expressed ($c=v \neq \Theta$) (cf. Schlenker 2004: 299). This, Schlenker argues, effectively captures the feeling that FID evokes in readers: a thought attributed to a character is uttered through someone else’s ‘mouth’ (cf. Schlenker 2004: 293).⁴⁸

Based on his arguments against a uniform treatment of ID and FID (cf. (88)), Schlenker (2004) postulates that FID is closer to DD in nature and goes so far as to conceptualize FID as a form of quotation “whose ‘grammatical skeleton’ (=the tenses and pronouns) had been modified to match the perspective of the narrator” (Schlenker 2004: 285) – though he nevertheless analyzes FID as an instance of *using* words rather than simply *mentioning* them, which is the case in DD and the reason that Kaplan (1989) exempted DD from his prohibition of monsters. Thus, Schlenker (2004: 300) does regard FID as a case of actual context shift. In contrast to Doron (1991), Schlenker (2004) provides a more comprehensive explanation regarding the question why only certain perspective-dependent expressions are interpreted with respect to the Context of Thought in FID. His argument entails that personal in-

⁴⁸Schlenker (2004) further identifies another type of syntactic structure commonly found in narration, the Historical Present, as the counterpoint to FID:

- (1) Fifty eight years ago to this day, on January 22, 1944, just as the Americans are about to invade Europe, the Germans attack Vercors. (Schlenker 2004: 281, ex. 2)

In the Historical Present, present tense forms are used despite the fact that the described event clearly lies in the past with respect to the actual context of the narrator. Schlenker (2004) determines that this is due to the Context of Thought being identical to the actual context, whereas it is the Context of Utterance that is distinct ($c=\Theta \neq v$), which he takes as confirmation that both *v* and Θ need to be generally distinguished from the actual context (cf. Schlenker 2004: 281).

dexicals and tense, i.e., perspective-dependent expressions that are *not* shiftable, form a natural class of sorted variables that “receive their denotation from an assignment function” (Schlenker 2004: 286), and whose “grammatical features serve as a system of classification whose referential is the utterance itself”, i.e., the Context of Utterance (Schlenker 2004: 280). In other words, the denotations of indexicals that belong to this class of variables are determined with respect to the Context of Utterance, whereas the denotations of all other perspective-dependent expressions are determined with respect to the Context of Thought, and therefore reflect the protagonist’s perspective in FID.

A different variation of the double-context approach is proposed by Eckardt (2014), who similarly stipulates that shiftable indexicals as well as expressives are interpreted with regard to a different context in FID than what she refers to as ‘rigid’ indexicals (cf. Eckardt 2014: 20). Eckardt (2014) deviates from Schlenker (2004), however, when it comes to the circumstances under which this second context becomes available. Whereas Schlenker (2004) assumed that all sentences are interpreted both with regard to the Context of Utterance and the Context of Thought, which are normally both identical to the actual context, Eckardt (2014) determines that sentences are interpreted relative to one single context C in everyday language use, which represents the context of the current speaker. In narration, an additional context c , which represents the context of a salient protagonist, can optionally be introduced in a sentence featuring such a protagonist and preceding an FID clause. The introduction of this second context subsequently enables context shift in FID, which is thus interpreted relative to $\langle C, c \rangle$ (cf. Eckardt 2014: 30, 188).

Her approach takes into account that FID depends on a suitable discourse referent to be available as a perspectival anchor for its interpretation; the question of how, exactly, a protagonist can become suitable as FID’s perspectival anchor will be the focus of Chapter 5. Eckardt (2014: 40, 60) further defines C as the *external* context and c as the *internal* context. Like Doron (1991) and Schlenker (2004), Eckardt (2014) attributes a perspective-dependent expression’s ability to shift to c to its lexical specifications: Whereas personal indexicals and verbal tense are lexically specified to always be interpreted with regard to C , spatio-temporal indexicals and expressives are lexically specified to be interpreted with regard to c , if c has been introduced, and otherwise with regard to C , as well.

Schlenker’s (2004) analysis of context shift in FID is not too dissimilar from the analysis of context shift in ID he proposed in Schlenker (2003) with regard to languages like Amharic.⁴⁹ While Schlenker (2003) did not explicitly differentiate between Context of Utterance and Context of Thought, he also argued that tense and personal indexicals form a uniform class that is lexically specified to be obligatorily bound to the current context of use. However, the analyses of ID and FID differ in

⁴⁹See Section 2.3.1.

two major ways: First of all, Schlenker strictly rules out context shift for most shifty indexicals, such as temporal adverbials like *tomorrow*, in English ID. Secondly, he attributes context shift in Amharic ID to being subordinated via a propositional attitude verb, which he regards as monstrous operators, and illustrates that other forms of subordination cannot facilitate context shift. In contrast, he rejects that context shift in FID could similarly be enabled by being embedded by a (covert) attitude operator and instead attributes its multiperspectivity to the narrative context FID is commonly embedded in, in accordance with Banfield (1982). At least with regard to German ID, however, the theoretical considerations in Section 3.2.2 as well as the results from Experiment 1, as reported in Section 3.3, have clarified that temporal indexicals *can* shift in ID and, furthermore, that context shift in ID is dependent not solely on being subordinated to a propositional attitude verb, but also, in similar fashion to FID, on being embedded in an unambiguously narrative context. This raises two questions, namely, if a separate treatment of the two modes of speech and thought representation is truly warranted, and if context shift in ID should indeed be primarily attributed to the propositional attitude verb in the matrix clause.

Sharvit (2008) proposes an analysis of FID that combines the double-context approach with an operator-based one, according to which shifting to a protagonist's context is facilitated by a covert FID operator that is similar in nature to a propositional attitude verb (cf. Sharvit 2008: 379). She primarily disagrees with Schlenker (2004) on the notion that FID is a form of quotation; based on the observation that languages that obey Sequence of Tense (SOT) in ID consistently also do so in FID, Sharvit (2008: 364f.) argues that FID clauses must instead be analyzed as attitude reports. (95) showcases the differences between an SOT language like English and a non-SOT language like Hebrew for both ID and FID:

- (95) a. i. John found out that Mary is pregnant.
 ii. John found out that Mary was pregnant.
 iii. *Yosef gila Se Miriam ohevet et Dan*
 Yosef find-out-PAST that Miriam love-PRES ACC Dan
 b. i. #Yes, she is definitely pregnant(,thought Mary).
 ii. Yes, she was definitely pregnant(,thought Mary).
 iii. *Ken, hi le-lo safek ohevet et Dan(, xaSva Meri)*
 Yes, she definitely love-PRES ACC Dan think-PAST Mary.
 (Sharvit 2008: 355ff., ex. 5, 6, 9, 10 & 12)

(95a-i) only allows for a reading in which Mary is still pregnant at the time of utterance, i.e., the present tense form must be taken to reflect the present time of the speaker. In order to arrive at an interpretation in which Mary was pregnant simultaneously to the time at which John found out about it, but is not pregnant anymore at the time of utterance, SOT must be obeyed, i.e., the verb in the embedded clause must also feature past tense like the matrix verb, which is the case

in (95a-ii). The ID clause in (95a-iii) illustrates that the same does not hold true for Hebrew: Despite the present tense form in the embedded clause, the sentence can be interpreted as Miriam loving Dan at the point in time at which Yosef found out about it, but not anymore at the current time of utterance. Sharvit (2008) uses these and similar examples from French and Russian to establish that ID in English and French obeys SOT, whereas ID in Hebrew and Russian does not. The examples in (95b-i)–(95b-iii) demonstrate that only languages which show SOT effects in ID also show SOT effects in FID (with parentheticals). Sharvit (2008) thus formulates the SOT Generalization in (96), which, to her, is a major indicator that FID is to be treated akin to ID rather than DD, which does not display SOT effects in general.

(96) The SOT Generalization⁵⁰

A language is SOT with respect to FID if and only if it is SOT with respect to SID.⁵¹ (Sharvit 2008: 358)

Consequently, she proposes “that the syntax of FID involves an operator that does the same kind of work as an attitude verb: they both license Feature Deletion under agreement (FDUA)” (Sharvit 2008: 359). Verbs and pronouns embedded by such an operator thus lose their tense and person features, which allows them to be interpreted relative to the ‘now’ and first-person values of the author. Sharvit (2008) attributes the supposed differences between ID and FID – namely, that FID allows context shift for spatio-temporal indexicals but ID does not – to a difference in semantics between the two types of operators. While an attitude verb operator is taken to only quantify over worlds, as is traditionally assumed in the literature, the FID operator is stipulated to quantify over contexts instead and therefore facilitate context shift for shiftable indexicals in its scope (cf. Sharvit 2008: 379). Sharvit’s account is otherwise in line with other double-context approaches: She assumes that there are two types of contexts, the narrator’s and the protagonist’s, as well as two types of indexicals, shiftable and unshiftable ones, and that personal indexicals and tense exclusively belong to the latter (cf. Sharvit 2008: 379).

Perhaps most relevant for the purposes of this investigation is the additional evidence that Sharvit (2008) provides with regard to the shared properties of ID and FID. Though she distinguishes the proposed FID operator from the attitude verb operator with regard to their scope, this is solely based on the mistaken assumption that ID clauses do not allow context shift. Thus, given the evidence that German ID – and presumably, English ID as well – does enable context shift under certain conditions, one could theoretically modify Sharvit’s (2008) proposal to incorporate a conceptualization of the FID and the attitude verb operators that is even more

⁵⁰Sharvit (2008) additionally formulates a similar generalization for a Sequence of Pronouns (SOP) in ID and FID. However, as she does not possess data of FID in languages that do not obey SOP in ID, her conclusions regarding SOP remain only speculative.

⁵¹Sharvit (2008) uses the abbreviation *SID* to refer to ‘standard indirect discourse’, i.e., what is commonly referred to as just ID, to emphasize its relation to FID.

closely aligned, if not identical. As the extensive discussion⁵² of the operator-based analyses of context shift in ID for languages such as Zazaki or Nez Perce has shown, frameworks that incorporate multiple operators selected by individual propositional attitude verbs are able to account both for crosslinguistic variation and, potentially, for German ID's perspectival properties as well. The proposal by Deal (2020) in particular, which postulates a structural hierarchy⁵³ of operators that are stacked in the left periphery of the subordinated ID clause, was deemed well-suited to capture context shift in German ID: Her approach entails multiple operators, listed in (97), that affect specific indexicals in attitude reports.

- (97) a. OP_{AUTH}: facilitates context shift for first-person pronouns
 b. OP_{ADDR}: facilitates context shift for second-person pronouns
 c. OP_{LOC}: facilitates context shift for spatial indexicals
 d. OP_{TIME}: facilitates context shift for temporal indexicals
 (cf. Deal 2020: 78, Deal 2017: 39)

Furthermore, Deal also allows for lexical bundling of individual operators, to account for potential co-shifting effects between different types of indexicals – for example, OP_{LOC} and OP_{TIME} may be bundled into OP_{ADV}, which consequently affects both spatial and temporal indexicals. I argued that this would have to be the case in German if we were to adapt Deal's (2020) model, as spatio-temporal indexicals can shift in German ID but personal indexicals cannot. As Deal's hierarchy encompasses that OP_{LOC} entails both OP_{AUTH} and OP_{ADDR}, i.e., that languages which feature context shift of spatial indexicals must also feature context shift of personal indexicals, stipulating the existence of OP_{LOC} for German would, in effect, violate the proposed operator hierarchy. The bundled operator OP_{ADV}, however, can optionally take either OP_{LOC}'s or OP_{TIME}'s position in the hierarchy; thus, we can assume for German that it would need to be placed at OP_{TIME}'s position, which is lowest in the hierarchy. Moreover, the examples in (58) illustrated that spatio-temporal indexicals in German ID obey *SHIFT-TOGETHER*.

If we were to follow Sharvit (2008) in assuming that context shift in FID is due to a covert FID operator and, furthermore, additionally posit that it is basically identical to the proposed attitude verb operator in ID, then it seems prudent to consider whether Deal's comprehensive, ID-centric model could account for context shift in FID as well, thereby effectively combining the two as of now separate strings of operator-based accounts for speech and thought reports. In general, the prerequisite for such a theory is to forego the general assumption that *only* propositional attitude verbs can select the operators in (97). As FID displays precisely the same characteristics as ID with regard to the types of indexicals that are shiftable, the

⁵²See Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.

⁵³See Figure 4.

4.2 ANALYSES OF FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE: DOUBLE-CONTEXT AND MIXED QUOTATION APPROACHES

covert FID operator proposed by Sharvit (2008) would have to be identical specifically to OP_{ADV} . Thus, it follows that spatio-temporal indexicals in FID should obey *SHIFT-TOGETHER*. The examples in (98), which are FID variants of (58a-i) and (58b-i), show this to be the case.

- (98) a. *Am Samstag erzählte Maike ihrer Freundin Hanna davon, wie sehr sie sich auf das Konzert von Taylor Swift freute. Hanna grinste vergnügt. Spitze, sie hatte sich heute ebenfalls Karten für das Konzert morgen gekauft!*

‘On Saturday, Maike told her friend Hanna how much she was looking forward to the Taylor Swift concert. Hanna grinned cheerfully. Awesome, she had also bought some tickets today for the concert tomorrow!’

- b. *Während einer Geschäftsreise nach Paris vor ein paar Wochen besuchte ich kurz meinen Onkel Louis. Voller Stolz zeigte Louis mir seinen beeindruckenden Weinkeller. Oh ja, er würde hier heute sogar ein Weintasting für seine Nachbarn ausrichten!*

‘During a business trip to Paris a few weeks ago, I briefly visited my uncle Louis. Louis proudly showed me his impressive wine cellar. Oh yes, he was even going to host a wine tasting for his neighbors here today!’

The FID clause in (98a) contains two temporal indexicals, *heute* (‘today’) and *morgen* (‘tomorrow’). With regard to the previous discourse segment, *morgen* could potentially be interpreted as referring to the day after Maike’s and Hanna’s conversation or as referring to the day following the current time of utterance, since the Taylor Swift concert could theoretically take place on either day. However, due to the use of the past perfect, *heute* only allows a reading in which Hanna bought the tickets before her conversation with Maike. In other words, *heute* cannot refer to the day of utterance, which lies in the future with regard to the reported thought event, and therefore must be shifted to the reported context. In turn, *morgen* in (98a) must also be shifted to the protagonist’s context, thereby rendering an interpretation from the reporting context infelicitous. Thus, temporal indexicals in FID obey *SHIFT-TOGETHER*. Moreover, (98b) illustrates that spatial and temporal indexicals obey *SHIFT-TOGETHER* as well: Due to the previous context, the only plausible reading of *hier* (‘here’) is one in which Louis is referring to his wine cellar, i.e., Louis’ location at the time of the speech event. Accordingly, *heute* must also shift to the reported context; an interpretation of (98b) in which the wine tasting is planned to take place at the day of utterance is not available, despite being theoretically also feasible. The fact that FID adheres to *SHIFT-TOGETHER* indicates that context shift in FID might indeed be facilitated by a covert OP_{ADV} .

A major drawback of any of the proposed operator-based approaches, though, is that they solely operate on the sentence-level. Neither any of the ID-centric accounts discussed at length in Section 2.3.1, nor the FID-centric one by Sharvit (2008) take

the relevance and effect of the larger discourse context into consideration – Sharvit, for example, assumes that the second context is only introduced via the FID operator within the syntactic structure of the FID clause (cf. Sharvit 2008: 379). It is a well-known property of FID, however, that it heavily relies on contextual cues for its interpretation. Moreover, as I have argued for in Chapter 3 and will continue to demonstrate in Chapter 5, ID, too, is dependent on its discourse context to unlock the ability for perspective shift. In both cases, the condition for context shift is to be embedded in a narrative instead of a conversational context. Thus, any operator-based approach for ID or FID necessarily would have to entail the stipulation that context-shifting operators solely exist in the language of narration. In addition, the next chapter will showcase that a prominent protagonist has to be introduced in the preceding discourse unit in order to act as a perspectival center for speech and thought reports and thus enable shifted readings, and, furthermore, that in cases where several protagonists are theoretically available, the speech or thought report will be attributed to the one that is maximally prominent (cf. Hinterwimmer 2019: 90). However, if context shift was indeed facilitated by an attitude operator situated in the left periphery of the FID or ID clause, its effect should be expected to be wholly independent of such contextual factors.

Double-context approaches that do not postulate the existence of an operator do not run into this problem, as their accounts do, at least implicitly, allow for the possibility that context shift might not be solely reliant on elements contained in the syntax of the FID or ID clause. Eckardt (2014) in particular determines that the protagonist's context *c* must be introduced in the text segment preceding FID. Though she remains relatively vague about how and under which circumstances exactly *c* is established, as she is primarily concerned with how *c*, once introduced, enables context shift in FID, this is not necessarily a disadvantage: In fact, Eckardt's (2014) account can quite easily be expanded to specify the contextual factors that both govern *when c* can be introduced in addition to *C* – namely, in fictional narration – and *which c*, given a situation in which more discourse referents than the speaker and one single protagonist are theoretically available, is selected as the one to which perspective-dependent expressions in FID/ID are shifted – namely, the context *c* of the protagonist who has been established as maximally prominent.

As the goal is to allow for a uniform analysis of ID and FID, the consequence is that the operator-based approaches by Anand (2006) and Deal (2020), despite their ability to account for crosslinguistic variation, must be tentatively dismissed as well. Instead, I postulate that context shift in ID, too, is dependent on the prior introduction of a protagonist's context *c* and, in addition, since context shift in ID is also heavily dependent on contextual factors, that it is not facilitated by an operator selected by the propositional attitude verb in the matrix clause. Naturally, this raises

the question why, as Schlenker (2003) has convincingly shown⁵⁴, only subordinated clauses embedded via a propositional attitude verb enable context shift, and not, for example, relative clauses. However, the fact that FID, too, features context shift despite not being subordinated to an attitude verb, illustrates that this cannot be taken as the primary condition for indexicals to be interpreted with respect to another viewpoint, unless one wants to assume that context shift in FID and ID is solicited by completely separate causes and that they just arbitrarily happen to share the majority of their perspectival characteristics.

Rather than ignore the similarities between ID and FID, I hypothesize that it is precisely a trait they both share which is the reason why only these, but not other syntactical structures, allow perspective shift of indexicals: In order for a clause to feature context shift, it must constitute a report of a speech or thought event. A clause can be signaled to be understood as a speech or thought report either explicitly, which is the case for ID, or implicitly, which is the case for FID. Clauses that do not contain such signals and are thus not interpreted by the reader to represent a speech or thought report, such as neutral stretches of narration or other types of subordinated clauses, fundamentally do not allow shifts in perspective, at least not with regard to deictic expressions. Thus, being embedded by a propositional attitude verb is the necessary, explicit signal that allows a subordinated clause to feature context shift, but the verb does not *trigger* context shift in and of itself.

An alternative approach to the double-context analysis is proposed by Emar Maier, who considers FID to be a case of mixed quotation instead. Mixed quotation is distinguished from other forms of quotation in that some elements constitute a verbatim representation of the specific language used by the author, while other elements are “adjusted to the quoting environment” (Maier 2014: 2). Mixed quotation clauses are thus simultaneously *opaque*, i.e., they have to adhere to the original choice of expressions, and *transparent*, since they nevertheless allow for the speaker to influence the clause’s structure and form to a certain degree (cf. Maier 2014: 13f.). This, he argues, is the case in FID: According to Maier (2015), FID does not truly feature context shift, but instead is to be regarded as a variation of DD in which certain elements are unquoted, which he likens to systematically puncturing holes into the FID quotation (cf. Maier 2015: 346f.).

Maier postulates that an FID clause like the one in (99a) roughly possesses the logical form in (99b), in which the clause as a whole is typographically marked as a quote. However, the square brackets around some of the elements, specifically the past tense verb and the third-person pronoun referring to the author, signal “a temporary suspension of the verbatimness requirement of direct or mixed quotation”, thereby allowing “adjustment to the surrounding text”, i.e., to the speaker’s context (Maier 2015: 350).

⁵⁴See Section 2.3.1.

4.2 ANALYSES OF FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE: DOUBLE-CONTEXT
AND MIXED QUOTATION APPROACHES

- (99) a. *Nathalie hatte sich eigentlich auf die Betriebsfeier gefreut, doch leider hatten bis auf ihren Chef alle Kollegen kurzfristig abgesagt. Oh Gott, jetzt musste sie den ganzen Abend lang mit diesem alten Sack reden!*
'Nathalie had actually been looking forward to the office party, but unfortunately, all her colleagues except her boss had canceled at short notice. Oh God, now she had to spend the whole evening talking to this old fart!'
- b. *'Oh Gott, jetzt [musste] [sie] den ganzen Abend lang mit diesem alten Sack reden!'*
'Oh God, now [she] [had] to spend the whole evening talking to this old fart!'

Furthermore, Maier (2015) disagrees with the common notion of double-context approaches that the differences in behavior between personal indexicals and tense, on the one hand, and spatio-temporal indexicals, on the other hand, is due to a hard-coded grammatical distinction; instead, he hypothesizes that unquotation in FID is purely driven by pragmatic factors (cf. Maier 2015: 350, 360). However, Maier not only remains entirely vague about the exact nature of these pragmatic factors that cause personal indexicals and tense forms specifically to be consistently unquoted, he also reduces what appears to be a strict grammatical rule to a merely strong pragmatic bias (cf. Maier 2015: 365, 371). Based on examples like (100), Maier (2015) aims to demonstrate that personal pronouns can also reflect the perspective of the protagonist: If it was lexically specified that personal pronouns remain unshifted, he argues, then such cases should be infelicitous. A mixed quotation approach, in contrast, that assumes that it is merely a bias, not a rule, that pronouns are unquoted, is able to account for instances in which the pronoun is part of the quotation as well.

- (100) [Mary wrongly believed that Robin was male. In fact, Robin was a woman.]
'Where [was] he this morning, for instance?' Mary wondered. (Maier 2015: 369, ex. 55)

In (100), the speaker, but not Mary, the author of the thought, is aware that Robin is a woman. Thus, the masculine third-person pronoun unambiguously reflects the perspective of Mary, as the speaker would use female pronouns in reference to Robin instead. The problem with such examples is that third-person pronouns are what Anderson & Keenan (1985: 261) refer to as 'weak deictics', i.e., elements that can be used deictically but primarily have anaphoric use. While anaphoric elements, such as demonstrative pronouns, can be utilized to express a specific individual's point of view, they, like all expressives, are not prohibited from shifting in FID. Maier (2015) is not able to provide similar examples in which strict indexicals, i.e., first- and second-person pronouns are not unquoted – for example, an FID clause in which the first-person pronoun refers to the author instead of the speaker. According

4.2 ANALYSES OF FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE: DOUBLE-CONTEXT AND MIXED QUOTATION APPROACHES

to Maier's (2015) analysis, such readings should be possible, even if they are not the preferred interpretation; the fact that they systematically do not occur points to stricter restrictions than the mixed quotation approach allows for. Moreover, as is pointed out by Anand (2006: 86), it can neither explain why certain indexicals should obey *SHIFT-TOGETHER*, as was shown to be the case for spatio-temporal indexicals in (98). If the decision to unquote individual elements in FID was solely determined by pragmatic preferences, there would be no ascertainable reason why some temporal or spatial indexicals could not reflect the narrator's perspective, while others remain quoted and thus reflect the protagonist's perspective.

An upside to the mixed quotation approach is that it easily allows for a uniform explanation of apparent perspective shifts in ID and FID; in fact, Maier (2016) attempts to extend his analysis of FID to the examples from languages such as Amharic or Slave provided by, *inter alia*, Schlenker (2003), Anand & Nevins (2004) or Deal (2020). Though Schlenker (2003) demonstrated that indexical shift in Amharic cannot be regarded as an unmarked instance of DD, i.e., quotation, Maier (2016) argues that his examples merely rule out pure quotation but not the more flexible mixed quotation (cf. Maier 2016: 374). Nevertheless, he is forced to admit that mixed quotation, in contrast to approaches that postulate a monstrous operator facilitating context shift, cannot account for indexicals in ID, as mentioned above, adhering to *SHIFT-TOGETHER*, or why context shift should only occur in the embedded clauses of specific propositional attitude verbs – Zazaki, for example, only allows context shift when subordinated to a verb of speech, but not for ID sentences featuring a verb of thought in their matrix clause (cf. Maier 2016: 375).

As Maier does not determine which specific pragmatic factors might facilitate mixed quotation or unquotation of individual elements, his account theoretically allows for the stipulation that contextual properties which have been identified as enabling perspective shift, such as being embedded in a narrative context, could be of relevance. However, this connection would be arbitrarily motivated at best. In contrast, in approaches that posit actual context shift, the dependence on a narrative context follows quite naturally from the unique structural complexity of narration: As has been argued by Zeman (2020a), it is precisely the inherent characteristic of narration that narrator and characters in the story world exist on different levels, i.e., planes of existence, which allows the narrator to possess insight into the characters' consciousness, and thereby enables multiperspectivity. The separation of the protagonists' and the narrator's level, though, can be considered as an incremental aspect of fictional narration independently of speech and thought reports as well. An omniscient narrating voice is evidently not part of the world of the story in the same vein as the characters are. Thus, while the potential for context shift follows naturally from the separation of narrator and character level, it is not the sole reason to accommodate such a separation.

4.2 ANALYSES OF FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE: DOUBLE-CONTEXT AND MIXED QUOTATION APPROACHES

In contrast to context shift, neither mixed quotation nor unquotation are exclusive to narrative contexts: As Maier (2015: 364f.) himself illustrates, both occur quite frequently in other types of written texts, albeit typographically marked via quotation marks and square brackets, respectively. Yet, for some reason, the type of unmarked combination of mixed quotation and unquotation of certain indexicals that Maier claims constitutes FID *is* exclusive to narration. It is not apparent why only an abstract narrating figure should be able to produce such a syntactical structure, nor why narrators should consistently forego conventions of typographic marking with regard to FID, but not with regard to DD.

Another potential problem that only pertains to the mixed quotation account will be introduced in Section 5.5: Based on the observations made in Hinterwimmer (2019) and Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019) that FID can only be anchored to a maximally prominent discourse referent, I will raise the question if the same applies to ID. If so, this could mean that a discourse referent who is maximally prominent, but who is neither the speaker nor the actual author of the ID clause, might nevertheless be considered as the perspectival center of the ID clause; in that case, shifty indexicals and expressives would consequently reflect the context of this referent. This does not necessarily pose a problem for the double-context approach, at least in its implementation by Eckardt (2014), as theoretically, *any* protagonist's context *c* could be introduced in the text segment preceding the speech/thought report and thus provide the parameters for the indexicals contained in it. The mixed quotation analysis, on the other hand, only allows for the content of the clause to be either part of the quotation, and thus to reflect the perspective of the original author, or for certain parts to be unquoted. As only the speaker/narrator has the ability to unquote an expression, the possibility that any other discourse referent's perspective might be of relevance for the interpretation is effectively ruled out.

Due to these drawbacks of the mixed quotation approach, I will tentatively adopt Eckardt's (2014) version of the double-context account for the reasons stated above, and thus continue to regard both FID and ID as capable of actual context shift.

5 Discourse Prominence

The investigation thus far has shown that certain perspective-dependent expressions, specifically temporal indexicals, can receive a shifted reading in indirect discourse (ID) without negatively affecting the acceptability of the ID sentence, contrary to the consensus in the literature. This shift in perspective, however, is only enabled if the sentence in question is embedded in the context of a fictional narrative. This condition for multiperspectivity not only serves to explain why ID is commonly mistaken to only allow interpretations from the current context of utterance, which is indeed the case for everyday conversational contexts, but moreover, it also underlines how similar ID in actuality is to free indirect discourse (FID). The fact that both ID's and FID's potential for context shift is directly linked to the presence of a narrative context, whereas direct discourse (DD) obligatorily represents the point of view of the original author, regardless of any contextual factors, strongly indicates that ID and FID are connected to each other more closely than what has commonly been assumed. This observation is captured in the second of my two central hypotheses, H2:

- (101) **H2:** Free indirect discourse is not a hybrid of indirect discourse and direct discourse, but the root clause equivalent of indirect discourse, as they share the majority of their perspectival characteristics. Accordingly, the two types of speech/thought representation should receive a uniform analysis, whereas direct discourse has to be regarded as a case of pure quotation.

The idea that FID and ID share their perspectival characteristics is not just meant to reflect that, in both cases, only pronouns and tenses are prohibited from shifting to the perspective of the author, but also extends to the factors that govern and influence their possible and preferred reading(s). The current chapter will elaborate on this hypothesis by focusing on what I consider to be one of the major factors in selecting a perspectival center for both FID and ID: the prominence of the available discourse referents.

While a narrative context is the prerequisite for *enabling* multiperspectivity, it would be presumptuous to assume that ID clauses in narration *have* to be interpreted from the perspective of the matrix subject. Narration merely allows for this possibility due to its unique properties, but it does not enforce it; whether perspective-dependent expressions in ID are actually shifted to a protagonist's per-

spective instead relies on certain contextual factors. To be precise, I postulate that such an interpretation is only preferred by readers if the protagonist has previously been established as the most *prominent* discourse referent. From this, it follows that, even given a narrative context, ID clauses may be interpreted from the current context of utterance if the matrix subject of the ID clause is deemed less prominent than the narrator in the preceding discourse segment. The narrative mode and type of narrator therefore plays a central role in determining the preferred and available reading(s) of temporal indexicals in ID: Accordingly, stories featuring a narrator that is made prominent as a discourse referent via the use of first-person pronouns, for example, or via the inclusion of evaluative elements revealing the narrator's own feelings and opinions, might facilitate an interpretation of ID from the narrator's context. In contrast, if the narrator stays completely in the background, while a protagonist is established as a highly prominent referent, readers are predicted to prefer a reading in which said protagonist acts as the perspectival center.

This line of thought has been pursued with increasing interest in recent years with regard to FID: As FID, in contrast to both ID and DD, is neither explicitly introduced as a thought or speech report, nor explicitly attributed to a specific referent, its interpretation is largely dependent on the prior context. While its interpretation as a speech or thought report can in general be triggered through the inclusion of certain perspectival cues such as, for example, interjections or modal particles⁵⁵, the question remains based on which factors readers determine whose thought it is that is being reported. Barring cases in which the expressed proposition by itself can unambiguously be attributed to a specific protagonist, as in (102a), or to the narrator, as in (102b), its interpretation must solely rely on linguistic cues in the preceding discourse context that reveal which discourse referent is the most suitable perspectival center. This process is complicated by the fact that in narrative texts, commonly, not only one protagonist and the narrator are available as potential anchors for FID, but a whole plethora of characters, like in the example in (102c).

- (102) a. Harper, bored out of her mind, looked at her watch again. Oh no, there were still two whole hours left before her shift at the library would finally be over!
- b. After bringing a gun to school, my nephew Duncan was finally expelled. That lousy punk truly was a menace to society!
- c. Marcy greeted Bob with a handshake and sat down at the table as the waiter handed them the menu. Hopefully, this date would be less of a letdown than the last one!

In (102a), the proposition expressed in the FID clause fits well together with the

⁵⁵See Section 2.2 for a more detailed identification of potential perspectival cues.

attitude ascribed to the sole protagonist Harper in the preceding sentence and follows naturally as a result of Harper looking at her watch. In contrast, the thought expressed in (102b) would be regarded as incoherent if anchored to the protagonist Duncan, as he would be unlikely to refer to himself as a ‘lousy punk’, and hold such a negative opinion about himself in general. It is thus more likely to be interpreted as a comment by the narrator, who is also explicitly established as a discourse referent by the inclusion of a first-person pronoun. In (102c), however, the interpretation is less clear, as the reported thought could theoretically be attributed to the narrator, Marcy, Bob or even the waiter.

Hinterwimmer (2019) and Meuser (2022) argue that in cases in which several discourse referents could technically act as anchors for FID, the most prominent discourse referent is chosen as the perspectival center. In the example in (102c), this would be Marcy, as she acts as the subject of the preceding clause, while Bob only functions as its object. Moreover, she is introduced via first name, in contrast to the waiter, who is only referenced via DP. In a number of experimental studies reported in Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019) as well as Meuser (2022), empirical evidence is provided to showcase which properties of a discourse referent serve to increase their prominence status, as well as to test how these prominence-lending cues potentially interact with each other. While these works focus on text segments in which perspective shift is presupposed, but more than one protagonist is available as potential anchor for FID, Bimpikou (2020) conducts several experiments specifically investigating the interplay between the narrator’s and the protagonists’ prominence and their respective effects on the interpretation of FID.

Though there thus has been an increasing number of fruitful investigations into the importance of discourse prominence for the interpretation of FID, no similar attempts have been made, as of yet, to assess whether prominence also plays a role in facilitating perspective shift in ID. This can undoubtedly be attributed to the prevalent misconception that such a shift would not be possible in the first place. As the results for Experiment 1 have shown, however, perspective shift is both possible and acceptable in ID, which inevitably leads to the question under which circumstances a shifted reading becomes the preferred one. If prominence is the primary factor in selecting a perspectival center for FID, which previous studies strongly indicate, then it stands to reason that the same should apply to ID. This prediction is captured in H2a, which, as an extension of H2, further specifies how ID and FID resemble each other with regard to the factors determining their interpretation.

- (103) **H2a:** Discourse prominence plays a vital role in selecting a perspectival center for both indirect discourse and free indirect discourse and has a similar effect on the interpretation of both types of speech and thought representation.

To be specific, I postulate that in both types of speech and thought representation, the most prominent discourse referent acts as the perspectival center. In this regard, FID and ID both differ once again from DD: Perspective-dependent expressions, including all indexicals, are obligatorily interpreted from the context of whoever is identified as the author of the DD clause, regardless of their prominence status in the overall discourse context. One concession has to be made with regard to H2a, however: Only for FID, but not for ID, does the most prominent discourse referent also act as the clause's anchor to whom the expressed proposition is attributed. This is not possible in ID, as the author of the reported speech or thought event is obligatorily and explicitly identified in its matrix clause; the effect of discourse prominence can thus only extend to the interpretation of shifty indexicals – and expressives – in the scope of the propositional attitude verb. This is not due to a lack of importance with regard to the factor of prominence, but due to a general limitation of the influence of the perspectival center in ID.

The first half of this chapter will exclusively focus on the effect of discourse prominence on FID, in order to build a foundation for the subsequent analysis of the relation between prominence and ID. It will start by providing a definition of prominence in general and discourse prominence specifically in Section 5.1. Next, Section 5.2 will establish how FID is anchored to the most prominent discourse referent available by discussing previous research on the topic. First, the difference between local and global prominence as defined in Hinterwimmer (2019) will be explained, followed by a summary of the experimental studies conducted in Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019) and Meuser (2022). Afterwards, the focus will shift to the interaction between narrator and protagonist prominence: To this end, the research in Hinterwimmer (2020) on evaluative narrators and the experiments in Bimpikou (2020) will be discussed.

Finally, the results of two empirical studies, Experiment 2 and 3, which were first published in Saure et al. (2023) and Hinterwimmer & Saure (2024), respectively, will be reported in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. These experiments directly build on the ones conducted by Bimpikou (2020) and focus on the impact of different types of narrators on the interpretation of FID. Overall, the results will reveal that first-person narrators in general, regardless of whether they are homodiegetic or heterodiegetic, act as the preferred perspectival center for FID due to their increase in prominence via the inclusion of first-person pronouns. Experiment 2 in particular, though, will show that even first-person narrators are outranked by locally prominent protagonists, which is in line with the results from Bimpikou (2020).

In the second part of the chapter, I will then turn my attention to ID. On the basis of the results from the chapter's first half, Section 5.5 discusses how perspective shift in ID, too, is reliant on the presence of a prominent discourse referent other than the narrator to instead act as the perspectival center. Section 5.6 will then

present the results of the fourth and final experimental study conducted for this investigation. Experiment 4 uses a similar design and setup as the ones used in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, but, in addition to comparing the impact of different narrative situations, also contrasts the interpretation of temporal indexicals in ID in narrative contexts with their preferred interpretation in conversational contexts. As illustrated in Chapter 3, it has often been theorized in the literature that fictional narration possesses a unique potential for multiperspectivity, yet rarely have such theoretical considerations been supported by empirical evidence. The results for Experiment 4, however, will provide substantial experimental evidence illustrating how narrative contexts enable readings of perspective-dependent expressions in ID that are inaccessible in conversational contexts. Moreover, the results will demonstrate that the effect of the different types of narrators tested in the experiment mirror the effects on the interpretation of FID.

In the final section of the chapter, Section 5.7, I will present an argument that narrator comments like the one in (102b) should be analyzed as cases of FID in which the narrator was deemed to be the most prominent discourse referent and, in turn, selected as the perspectival anchor for the FID clause. Ultimately, this will serve to showcase a further similarity between ID and FID: In both cases, either the narrator or a protagonist can act as the perspectival center of the speech/thought report; the interpretation is thus fully reliant on the discourse context.

5.1 Definition of Prominence

The concept of prominence is founded on the general idea that linguistic units of equal type stand in an asymmetrical, hierarchical relationship with each other, in which one particular element stands out from the others. While this notion has often been tied to prosodic units, such as syllables, in particular in terms of, *inter alia*, sonority, pitch accent, stress or loudness (cf. Trask 1996: 291), Himmelmann & Primus (2015: 38) argue that prominence is, in fact, “a basic organizing principle in language” that applies to and manifests itself “on all levels of language structure and language use.” They further define the following three central criteria for linguistic prominence (cf. Himmelmann & Primus 2015: 52f.; see also von Heusinger & Schumacher 2019: 118):

- (104)
- a. Prominence is a relational notion: Linguistic units compete with other units of equal type to be selected as the most prominent one.
 - b. Prominence is not fixed, but dynamic: The prominence status of linguistic units may change and shift.
 - c. Prominent entities serve as structural attractors in their linguistic domain.

These criteria can be applied directly to discourse structures, in which prominence can be regarded as a “central notion for the characterization of referential manage-

ment, temporal relations, coherence relations, and the relations between the content of propositional units” (von Heusinger & Schumacher 2019: 117). Criterion 1 in (104a) establishes that different types of discourse entities, such as referents and events, stand in hierarchical relation to each other (see Becker & Egetenmeyer 2018, for an exploration of how prominence-based hierarchy rankings can be applied to different time points in a text segment as well). As argued in Jasinskaja et al. (2015: 134), prominent discourse referents are more apt to be picked up by referential expressions such as pronouns, which, in accordance with criterion 3, showcases that they function as structural attractors that impact “the progression of the discourse as a whole” (von Heusinger & Schumacher 2019: 120). This is illustrated in the example in (105): The personal pronoun *er* (‘he’) in the second clause can only be taken to refer to Patrick, but not the janitor, due to the former being more prominent in the preceding clause.

(105) *Patrick_i bat den Hausmeister_j, die Heizung im Büro zu reparieren. Er_{i/*j} war müde und frustriert.*

‘Patrick_i asked the janitor_j to fix the radiator in the office. He_{i/*j} was tired and frustrated.’

Yet as proclaimed in criterion 2 in (104b), the prominence ranking is not fixed, but may be shifted and updated as the discourse progresses, as can be seen in (106):

(106) *Patrick_i bat den Hausmeister_j, die Heizung im Büro zu reparieren. Der Hausmeister_j starrte Patrick_i wortlos an. Er_{*i/j} war müde und frustriert.*

‘Patrick_i asked the janitor_j to fix the radiator in the office. The janitor_j stared at Patrick_i wordlessly. He_{*i/j} was tired and frustrated.’

While these examples demonstrate that subjecthood plays an important role in marking a discourse referent as prominent, von Heusinger & Schumacher (2019) point out that there are a number of prominence-lending cues that interact with each other to increase their respective referent’s prominence status. Aside from grammatical function, these include, among others, topicality, givenness, syntactic position and agentivity (cf. von Heusinger & Schumacher 2019: 119, Jasinskaja et al. 2015: 138, 140). As the interaction between these prominence-lending cues will be of major importance in the next section, it is crucial to gain a better understanding of their relevance in highlighting a referent as the most prominent one in a discourse unit beforehand. For this reason, the rest of the current section will be focused on briefly summarizing the different views expressed in the literature with regard to the distributional properties of demonstrative pronouns (DPros). As was mentioned in Section 2.1.3, DPros are perspective-dependent expressions that often express a pejorative attitude towards their referent and, in contrast to personal pronouns, are limited in their distribution due to being a marked class of pronouns. As such, it is argued in the literature that they are not able to make reference to a maximally

prominent discourse referent (cf. Comrie 1997: 53, von Heusinger & Schumacher 2019: 120, Hinterwimmer 2020: 556). However, the specific attribute that makes a discourse referent maximally prominent and thus unavailable as antecedent for DPros has been an ongoing topic of discussion among scholars. A summary of this discussion is thus well-fit to give an overview of the different prominence-lending cues in discourse prominence, since many of them have been argued in the past to be directly responsible for the distributional limitations of DPros.

To start with, Bosch et al. (2007: 5) point out that DPros display a strong “non-subject bias”: If two referents serve as the subject and as an object (or as part of an adverbial), respectively, of the sentence directly preceding the clause containing the DPro, the DPro can only take the latter as its antecedent, but not the previous subject, which is illustrated in (107a) (see also Brocher & Hinterwimmer 2018: 17f., for empirical evidence):

- (107) a. *Nils_i möchte Timon_j beim Aufbau einer Kommode unterstützen. Er_{i/j} / Der*_{i/j} kann jedoch die komplizierte Anleitung nicht entziffern.*
 ‘Nils_i wants to help Timon_j assemble a sideboard. However, he_{i/j} / he (DPro)*_{i/j} cannot decipher the complicated instructions.’
- b. *Dem Polizisten_i fiel plötzlich der verdächtige Mann_j vor der Bank auf. Der*_{i/j} eröffnete sofort das Feuer.*
 ‘The police officer_{DATi} suddenly noticed the suspicious man_{NOMj} in front of the bank. He (DPro)*_{i/j} immediately opened fire.’
- c. *Timon_j ist vor kurzem in eine neue Wohnung umgezogen. Nils_i hat ihm dann beim Aufbau der neuen Möbel geholfen. Der_{i/??j} konnte jedoch die komplizierte Anleitung nicht entziffern.*
 ‘Timon_j recently moved into a new apartment. Nils_i then helped him assemble the new furniture. However, he (DPro)_{i/??j} couldn’t decipher the complicated instructions.’

Schumacher et al. (2016) build on these findings to empirically test and compare the influence of other prominence-lending cues, such as thematic role, on reference resolution in DPros to that of grammatical function. Their results indicate that “thematic role is a guiding principle during the resolution of personal and d-pronouns and outranks grammatical function” (Schumacher et al. 2016: 227, further empirical evidence is provided in Schumacher et al. 2017). Thus, in cases where the agent⁵⁶ diverges from the subject of the clause, the subject referent may be picked up by a DPro instead, as is the case in clauses featuring dative experiencer verbs, such as *auffallen* (‘notice’) in (107b). Schumacher et al. (2016) come to the conclusion,

⁵⁶Schumacher et al. (2016: 216) adopt the idea of proto-roles introduced in Dowty (1991), according to which there only exist two general theta-roles, proto-agents and proto-patients, which comprise other, more specific theta-roles. The experiencer in (107b) is thus subsumed under the thematic role of agent.

however, that thematic roles do not constitute the only or even primary factor in guiding pronoun resolution, but that it should instead be regarded as an accumulative process to which multiple prominence-lending cues contribute. The effect would therefore be strongest when all prominence-lending cues align and weaker if they diverge (cf. Schumacher et al. 2016: 236).

Bosch & Umbach (2007) as well as Hinterwimmer (2015) argue, in accordance with Comrie (1997), who made similar observations about Dutch DPros, that even though DPros often avoid subjects as antecedents, it is not the grammatical role of the referent which is the essential factor, but their information-structural properties instead (cf. Bosch & Umbach 2007: 47). To be specific, DPros seem to be able to pick up the subject of the preceding sentence if it does not correspond to the discourse topic of the larger discourse context, as illustrated in (107c) (see, *inter alia*, van Dijk 1977, Reinhart 1981, Roberts 2012, for definitions of topichood and the distinctions between *sentence topic*, *discourse topic* and *aboutness topic*). In both (107a) and (107c), Nils functions as the subject of the sentence preceding the DPro clause, yet in (107a), he cannot be picked up via DPro, whereas in (107c), he can. The difference is that only in (107c), the other available antecedent, Timon, is established as the discourse topic of the overall text segment in the first sentence, and thus, as the more prominent discourse referent. Bosch & Umbach (2007: 50) and Hinterwimmer (2015: 89) thus propose that DPros avoid discourse topics, not subjects, as antecedents. The apparent non-subject bias discussed in Bosch et al. (2007) is attributed to the tendency of discourse topics to be realized as subjects (though see Crawley & Stevenson 1990, for empirical evidence that suggests that grammatical function may actually outrank topichood as a prominence-lending cue).

However, it is pointed out in Hinterwimmer & Bosch (2017) and Brocher et al. (2020) that even discourse topics may serve as antecedents for DPros under the right circumstances:

This is possible whenever the speaker or narrator is clearly present as perspectival center, i.e. whenever the sentence containing the DPro is interpreted as the content of a thought expressing the narrator's stance. If the discourse referent functioning as subject, topic and/or proto-agent is the perspectival center, in contrast, such an interpretation is not available (Brocher et al. 2020: 111).

This is illustrated in (108b) below; in contrast to (108a), in which the second clause is intuitively interpreted as a case of FID and thus as a thought of Timon, the DPro in (108b) can indeed refer to Timon despite him acting both as subject and topic of the previous discourse.

- (108) a. *Eigentlich hatte sich Timon_i bei seinem Umzug auf die Hilfe seiner Freunde verlassen, aber niemand war gekommen. Das würde er_i/*der_i diesen Nichtsnutzen noch heimzahlen!*

5.1 DEFINITION OF PROMINENCE

‘Originally, Timon_i had relied on his friends to help him move, but nobody had shown up. He_i/*He (DPro)_i would make these useless bums pay for this!’

- b. *Eigentlich hatte sich Timon_i bei seinem Umzug auf die Hilfe seiner Freunde verlassen, aber niemand war gekommen. Er_i/Der_i war aber auch immer echt viel zu gutgläubig!*

‘Originally, Timon_i had relied on his friends to help him move, but nobody had shown up. He_i/He (DPro)_i was simply far too gullible!’

The difference is that the more natural reading of the second sentence in (108b) is one in which the narrator is expressing his opinion of Timon being gullible, thereby establishing the narrator, not Timon, as the active perspectival center of the clause. Similarly, the only possible reading of (108a) that would allow the DPro to be used to refer back to Timon, is one in which the second clause is not interpreted as a thought of Timon at all, but of the narrator, as well. Maintaining Timon as perspectival center of the clause while referring to him via DPro, however, is not possible.

These observations motivate Hinterwimmer & Bosch (2017: 140) to categorize DPros as *anti-logophoric* pronouns: In contrast to logophoric pronouns, which can only be interpreted as referring to the current perspectival center of a sentence, anti-logophoric pronouns avoid the current perspectival center as their antecedent and may only pick up referents whose perspective is not in focus (see Sells 1987, for a definition and overview of logophoric pronouns). Accordingly, the fact that both discourse topics and subjects can often not be picked up by DPros is attributed to them often also serving as the perspectival center of the text segment or clause (cf. Hinterwimmer & Bosch 2017: 119, Brocher et al. 2020: 116). This may even be the case when the discourse topic’s perspective is not expressed or focused on in any overt way, especially in narrative texts featuring a covert heterodiegetic narrator, i.e., a narrator that does not act as a character in the story, stays fully in the background and does not voice any opinions, attitudes or thoughts of their own. In such cases, discourse topics are left as the default perspectival centers of the text (cf. Brocher et al. 2020: 112). Thus, they only become available as antecedents for DPros once the narrator’s or some other protagonist’s perspective is foregrounded (cf. Hinterwimmer 2020: 554). More evidence for this theory will be provided in Section 5.2.2, which focuses specifically on the interplay between the narrator’s and the protagonists’ prominence.

Consequently, this suggests a direct correlation between prominence and perspectivalization: If the discourse context provides perspectival cues to ascribe a discourse referent, be it the speaker/narrator or a protagonist in a fictional story world, the status as perspectival center, said discourse referent automatically also becomes the most prominent discourse referent, outranking other referents whose prominence

status might have been increased via prominence-lending cues such as agentivity or topicality. In other words, perspectivization is proposed to be the most potent prominence-lending cue. Becker & Egetenmeyer (2018) extend this proposal to their prominence-based ranking of time points in discourse: Building on the concept of a ‘perspective time’⁵⁷, as proposed in Kamp & Reyle (1993) and Kamp (2013), they state that “perspective and the phenomenon of perspective taking [...] have a strong text structuring potential that interacts with the times and has an effect on the prominence of time points and time spans” (Becker & Egetenmeyer 2018: 41).

Moreover, the relation between the most prominent discourse referent and the perspectival center is not asymmetrical. Namely, in cases where there are no overt perspectival cues, the identification of the perspectival center of, for example, an otherwise ambiguous FID clause will rely on prominence-lending cues instead. As showcased above, a discourse topic may thus act as the default perspectival center, even if the respective referent’s perspective is not explicitly expressed in any way, solely due to their status as the most prominent referent in the discourse context. The relationship between prominence and perspectivization can therefore be defined as in (109):

(109) **Definition of the correlation between prominence and perspectivization:**

- a. If a discourse referent can be identified as the perspectival center of a sentence or larger text segment via various perspectival cues, he also functions as the most prominent referent of that discourse unit.
- b. If a discourse referent can be identified as the most prominent discourse referent through the interaction of various prominence-lending cues in a sentence or larger text segment, he also functions as the perspectival center of that discourse unit.
- c. From (109a) and (109b), it follows that, for each possible discourse context, the same individual that is the most prominent discourse referent must also be the perspectival center and vice versa.

Having thus clarified the connection between discourse prominence and perspectivization, the next section will discuss a number of previous experimental studies that investigate how individual prominence-lending cues affect the acceptability and interpretation of FID.

⁵⁷Defined in Becker & Egetenmeyer (2018) as follows: The perspective time “marks a time point from which a certain eventuality or a sequence of eventualities are seen. It acts as a typical vantage point to which a series of time points introduced via eventualities may be related” (Becker & Egetenmeyer 2018: 51).

5.2 Perspectival Prominence

5.2.1 Locally and Globally Prominent Protagonists

The previous section illustrated how closely prominence and perspectivization are related to each other: Not only do DPros avoid the perspectival center of a discourse unit as antecedent due to its high prominence status, but the most prominent discourse referent also automatically serves as perspectival center. Their prominence status thus directly impacts discourse referents' ability to act as the anchor for FID: In cases where there are no other perspectival cues and the proposition is ambiguous with regard to whose thought or utterance is being reported, FID is interpreted from the perspective of the discourse referent who is deemed most prominent due to the available prominence-lending cues. Moreover, Hinterwimmer (2019: 81) postulates that *only* a discourse referent who is maximally prominent is available as a perspectival anchor for FID. Consequently, even in cases where the content of the FID clause can only be coherently interpreted from the perspective of a specific referent, such a reading should be infelicitous if said referent is not prominent, thus making the clause as a whole unacceptable or, at least, unnatural (cf. Hinterwimmer 2019: 89, Hinterwimmer & Meuser 2019: 176, 186).

As is pointed out in Hinterwimmer (2019: 83) and Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019: 175), most analyses of FID in the literature solely discuss examples which only consist of one or two sentences and feature a single protagonist, thus rendering the identification of both the maximally prominent referent as well as the perspectival center rather obvious.⁵⁸ However, the question of how the perspectival anchor for FID is chosen becomes a lot more pressing in discourse contexts that feature more than one protagonist, which is much more common in narrative texts. The following examples demonstrate that not every discourse referent in a given context is equally available to serve as anchor for FID:

- (110) a. Susan looked at George hatefully. The dumb jerk had managed to make her look like an idiot at the meeting yesterday.
- b. Susan looked at George hatefully. #The mean old hag had managed to make him look like an idiot at the meeting yesterday.
- (Hinterwimmer 2019: 84, ex. 8)

In (110a), the FID clause can only be coherently attributed to Susan due to the inclusion of the epithet *the dumb jerk*, which clearly refers to George. In contrast, the interpretation is reversed in (110b) due to the inclusion of the epithet *the mean old hag*, which instead clearly refers to Susan. However, anchoring FID to George, Hinterwimmer (2019) argues, is infelicitous as Susan, not George, is the maximally

⁵⁸See Section 5.2.2, however, for a discussion of how, even in contexts featuring a singular protagonist, the anchoring of FID may be impeded by the presence of a maximally prominent narrator.

prominent referent. For one thing, Susan outranks George with regard to their respective grammatical functions, as subjects are generally taken to be “the most prominent DPs within their clauses” (Hinterwimmer 2019: 84, cf. also Meuser 2022: 47). Secondly, in terms of their thematic roles, Susan is established as the experiencer of a perception event. Following Dowty (1991) and Schumacher et al. (2016), Hinterwimmer (2019: 84) argues that agentivity features such as sentience⁵⁹ increase their referent’s prominence as well. Susan is thus more prominent than George in (110) because of her subjecthood as well as her agentivity features. However, as the example in (111) showcases, a discourse referent’s overall prominence status is not solely dependent on the sentence immediately preceding the FID clause:

- (111) George entered the room and looked around cautiously. Susan was sitting at a table in the corner with her best friend. Susan looked at George hatefully.
- a. The dumb jerk had managed to make her look like an idiot at the meeting yesterday.
 - b. The mean old hag had managed to make him look like an idiot at the meeting yesterday.
- (Hinterwimmer 2019: 85, ex. 11)

While the two alternative FID clauses, as well as the second-to-last sentence, are identical to (110), two additional sentences have been added to the beginning of the text which serve to establish George as the discourse topic of the whole text segment. In contrast to (110), Hinterwimmer (2019) judges both FID continuations in (111) as felicitous and natural. This leads him to generally distinguish between *local* and *global* prominence: A character may be selected as perspectival anchor for FID by being locally prominent, i.e., with regard to the sentence immediately preceding the FID clause. This is the case for Susan in both (110) and (111). However, a referent may also act as perspectival center if they are globally prominent, i.e., with respect to the larger discourse context. This is the case for George in (111), but not in (110), which does not provide a larger discourse context, thus leading to the unnaturalness of an FID thought anchored to George instead of Susan.

Hinterwimmer (2019: 90) therefore postulates that the only way for discourse referents to act as perspectival centers, and thus be available as anchors for FID, is to either be locally or globally prominent. This proposed interplay between local and global cues is also observed by van Krieken (2018: 783) in her discussion of viewpoint markers. In particular, van Krieken (2018) focuses on the importance of the choice of referential expression, noting that referents that are referred to via proper name or pronoun are more likely to be chosen as perspectival centers than those that are only

⁵⁹Dowty (1991) clarifies that sentience in this sense is not simply referring to the presupposition that a discourse referent is a sentient being, which would, of course, apply to both Susan and George in (110), but specifically means “sentience with respect to the event or state denoted by the verb” (Dowty 1991: 573).

referred to via nouns or indefinite descriptions (cf. van Krieken 2018: 774.). Barr & Keysar (2006: 913) suggest that this is due to the givenness status of the individual referents, as given referents are more accessible as perspectival centers; since proper names and pronouns imply familiarity to the reader, the referent's prominence is increased, thereby also increasing the potential of serving as perspectival anchor for FID.

Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019) and Meuser (2022) conduct a number of acceptability rating studies to test the predictions made in Hinterwimmer (2019), three of which I will now briefly describe. The first one was meant to gather initial empirical evidence that readers generally find FID more acceptable when it is anchored to the maximally prominent protagonist. The test items used in the study consisted of short text segments like the one in (112), featuring two protagonists, one of which is made both globally and locally more prominent than the other.

- (112) *Als die Hochzeit von Prinz William und Kate im Fernsehen übertragen wurde, konnte Robert seine eigene Hochzeit kaum erwarten. Auch er hatte seiner Freundin einen Antrag gemacht.*

‘When Prince William and Kate’s wedding was broadcast on television, Robert could hardly wait for his own wedding. He too had proposed to his girlfriend.’

- a. *Schon morgen würde er mit seiner Liebsten vor den Altar treten.*

‘Tomorrow already, he would walk down the aisle with his beloved.’

- b. *Schon morgen würde sie mit ihrem Schatz vor den Altar treten.*

‘Tomorrow already, she would walk down the aisle with her sweetheart.’

- c. *Sie wollte mit ihm vor den Altar treten.*

‘She wanted to walk down the aisle with him.’

(Hinterwimmer & Meuser 2019: 186, ex. 11, Meuser 2022: 74, ex. 135)

Three versions of each item were created. In the first condition, items ended on an FID clause unambiguously reporting the thought of the globally and locally more prominent protagonist (112a). In (112), for example, Robert is more prominent than his girlfriend due to being the subject and agent/experiencer of both the first and second clause, as well as being referred to with his proper name. In the second condition, the FID clause instead unambiguously reported the thought of the less prominent protagonist, i.e., Robert’s girlfriend (112b). Finally, in the third condition, the final clause did not entail a speech or thought report, but a neutral stretch of narration, of which the less prominent protagonist functioned as subject (112c). This was meant to serve as a control case to show that a potential lower acceptability rating of the second condition would be the result of the unnatural perspectivization and not merely stem from a switch in subjects in general. Participants were asked to rate how natural they found the final clause in the context of the story on a Likert scale from 1-7. Items in the second condition were rated significantly lower

than items in the first condition, with mean ratings of 3.63 and 4.64, respectively, whereas the final condition received a mean rating of 5.04 (cf. Hinterwimmer & Meuser 2019: 189, Meuser 2022: 78f.). The results of the experiment thus confirmed that FID is indeed deemed more natural when anchored to a discourse referent that is maximally prominent, though less prominent referents do not seem to be completely unavailable as perspectival centers, as items in the second condition overall still received relatively acceptable ratings.

A follow-up study was conducted to test the effects of the various prominence-lending cues on the acceptability of FID, as reported in Meuser (2022). Specifically, the experiment focused on the relevance and interaction of the factors grammatical function and referential expression. To avoid interference by global factors, the items for this second acceptability rating study only consisted of two sentences each: an introductory clause featuring two protagonists and an FID clause that was completely identical and unambiguously anchored to the same discourse referent across all conditions. For each of the two protagonists, a version of each item was created in which the individual protagonist was either more or less prominent with respect to their grammatical function – acting as either the subject or the object of the introductory clause – and/or with respect to the type of referential expression used – being introduced either via proper name or via indefinite description. This made for eight conditions in total.

Due to this relatively large number of conditions, not all versions of the exemplary item in (113) are depicted here: I opted to only include the following conditions used in the study to give an impression of its design: (i) the condition in which the protagonist intended to be perceived as the perspectival center is maximally prominent by both acting as the subject and being introduced via first name (113a); (ii) the condition in which said protagonist is prominent with regard to their grammatical function but not their referential expression (113b); and (iii) the condition in which said protagonist is prominent with regard to their referential expression but not their grammatical function (113c).

- (113) a. *Lynn sprach Pablo auf den nächsten Zug an, als eine Durchsage Verspätungen aller Züge aufgrund starken Schneefalls verkündete.*
 ‘Lynn asked Pablo about the next train when an announcement proclaimed that all trains were delayed due to heavy snowfall.’
- b. *Eine Reisende sprach Pablo auf den nächsten Zug an, als eine Durchsage Verspätungen aller Züge aufgrund starken Schneefalls verkündete.*
 ‘A traveller_f asked Pablo about the next train when an announcement proclaimed that all trains were delayed due to heavy snowfall.’
- c. *Ein Reisender sprach Lynn auf den nächsten Zug an, als eine Durchsage Verspätungen aller Züge aufgrund starken Schneefalls verkündete.*
 ‘A traveller_m asked Lynn about the next train when an announcement

proclaimed that all trains were delayed due to heavy snowfall.’

FID: *Oh Mann, jetzt würde sie bestimmt ihren Anschlusszug verpassen.*

‘Oh man, now she would definitely miss her connecting train!’

(Meuser 2022: 81f., ex. 140 (abbreviated))

As before, participants’ task consisted of rating the final clause on a Likert scale from 1-7. Overall, all eight conditions received mean ratings between 4 and 6 (cf. Meuser 2022: 86). The results of the follow-up study confirmed that both types of prominence-lending cues have a significant effect on a discourse referent’s availability as perspectival center and, in turn, on the acceptability of FID clauses anchored to them: Items were rated highest in conditions that increased the perspectival center’s local prominence, either by featuring them as the subject of the preceding clause or by referring to them via proper name. Moreover, the results also showed an interaction effect between grammatical function and referential expression, as items received the highest ratings in the conditions in which the perspectival center was maximally prominent in both regards.

Interestingly, the acceptability of the FID clause was also affected by the prominence status of the other protagonist, who, due to the content of the FID clause, would have been incoherent as perspectival center. Items generally received lower ratings in conditions in which the other protagonist was made either somewhat or maximally locally prominent. For example, items in the condition from (113b), in which Pablo is more prominent than Lynn with regard to their referential expressions, received a mean acceptability rating of 4.55, whereas items in the condition in which neither protagonist was prominent with regard to their referential expression, i.e., in which both were introduced via indefinite descriptions, received a significantly higher mean rating of 5.16. The results therefore underline one of the central criteria of prominence as defined in (104), namely, that prominence is not an isolated, but a relational property. The prominence of one discourse referent can thus only be measured in relation the relative prominence of the other referents in the discourse context. This notion will be essential for subsequent sections, which focus on the question of how an increased narrator prominence may affect the protagonists’ prominence and, in turn, their availability as perspectival center.

Meuser (2022: 89) thus surmises that “prominence-lending cues may not be seen in isolation; they all contribute to a referent’s availability as the perspectival center.” However, the two studies discussed so far only focused on the local prominence of protagonists. In the third and final study that I want to briefly discuss, the goal was to investigate the individual effects and interaction of global and local prominence (cf. Meuser 2022: 93). To this end, larger test items consisting of six sentences each were created. As before, participants had to rate the final clause, which again was an FID clause unambiguously anchored to the same protagonist across all six conditions, on a Likert scale from 1-7. The six conditions differed in the following ways:

In the first two conditions (114a), the overall context was completely neutral, as both protagonists were only introduced in the penultimate sentence. Therefore, the acceptability of the FID clause should be fully dependent on their respective local prominence status, which differed between the two conditions. In the other four conditions, the overall context was manipulated to feature one of the two protagonists as the globally most prominent discourse referent. I will disregard two of these conditions, as they neither differed much from the two conditions exemplified in (114b) and (114c), respectively, in design nor in their eventual results. In the condition illustrated in (114b), the protagonist established as the only coherent perspectival anchor for the FID clause was locally prominent, while the other protagonist, i.e., Caroline in (114), was made globally prominent by acting as the discourse topic in the preceding text segment. In the condition showcased in (114c), it was the other way around. In none of the six conditions, the same protagonist was both globally and locally prominent.

(114) a. **Kein Feierabend in Sicht**

Im Büro gehörten Überstunden zum Alltag. Da musste ein ruhiger Kopf bewahrt werden. Eine gute Arbeitsteilung war notwendig, um alles zu erledigen. Trotz des hohen Zeitdrucks duldeten das Management keine Verzögerungen.

‘More work to do’

‘In the office, working overtime was not unusual. Keeping a clear head was important. Also dividing work was crucial to get everything done. Despite the tremendous time pressure, the management did not tolerate delays.’

i. *Fred gab Caroline die Akten. Wehe, wenn die ihn heute hängen lassen würde.*

‘Fred handed Caroline the papers. She better not let him down today.’

ii. *Caroline gab Fred die Akten. Wehe, wenn die ihn heute hängen lassen würde.*

‘Caroline handed Fred the papers. She better not let him down today.’

b. **Kein Feierabend für Caroline**

Caroline hatte einen langen Arbeitstag vor sich. Sie atmete einmal tief durch. In der Frühstückspause hatte sie Fred um Unterstützung gebeten. Sie wusste, dass das Management keine weiteren Verzögerungen mehr tolerieren würde. Fred gab Caroline die Akten. Wehe, wenn die ihn heute hängen lassen würde.

‘No end of work for Caroline’

‘Caroline was facing a long day at work. She took a deep breath. Dur-

ing the morning break she had asked Fred for help. She knew that the management did not tolerate delays. Fred handed Caroline the papers. She better not let him down today.’

c. **Kein Feierabend für Fred**

Fred hatte einen langen Arbeitstag vor sich. Er atmete einmal tief durch. In der Frühstückspause hatte er Caroline um Unterstützung gebeten. Er wusste, dass das Management keine weiteren Verzögerungen mehr tolerieren würde. Caroline gab Fred die Akten. Wehe, wenn die ihn heute hängen lassen würde.

‘**No end of work for Fred**’

‘Fred was facing a long day at work. He took a deep breath. During the morning break he had asked Caroline for help. He knew that the management did not tolerate delays. Caroline handed Fred the papers. She better not let him down today.’

(Meuser 2022: 105f., ex. 169 (abbreviated))

The results for the two conditions illustrated in (114a-i) and (114a-ii) replicated those from the previous experimental study with regard to the importance of local prominence: FID was deemed significantly more acceptable when its perspectival center was locally prominent. Moreover, the results also provide empirical evidence for the effect of global prominence. Items in the condition illustrated in (114c), in which the perspectival center was not locally, but globally prominent, received an even higher mean acceptability rating than when the perspectival center was only locally prominent, though not by much (cf. Meuser 2022: 109). This confirms Hinterwimmer’s (2019) theory that a protagonist can serve as perspectival center if they are either globally or locally prominent. Finally, items in the condition displayed in (114b) were not rated significantly lower, thereby showing that a protagonist’s local prominence is not necessarily offset by another protagonist’s global prominence.

While the empirical data provided by Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019) and Meuser (2022) thus presents crucial evidence for the relevance of discourse prominence as a major factor in selecting a perspectival anchor for FID, these works notably do not concern themselves with perspective shifts between the default perspectival center, i.e., the speaker, and other discourse referents. Instead, only text segments are investigated and discussed for which such a shift in perspective away from the speaker/narrator is already presupposed. In other words, the narrator is neither considered as a potential perspectival center nor as an (implicit) discourse referent whose own prominence – or lack thereof – might influence the availability of the protagonists as perspectival anchors. The next section will hence focus on previous investigations that specifically examine the interaction between narrator and protagonist prominence, in particular the ones conducted in Hinterwimmer (2018 & 2020) and Bimpikou (2020).

5.2.2 Prominent Narrators vs. Prominent Protagonists

As detailed in Chapter 3, fictional narratives can differ both with regard to the narrative *voice* verbalizing the story and the discourse referent that acts as the focalizer, i.e., the individual through whose point of view story events are filtered and depicted (see, *inter alia*, Chatman 1978, Genette 1980, Bal 1985). Genette, in particular, distinguishes between three types of focalization:

- (115) a. *Zero focalization*: The story is viewed through the lens of an omniscient narrator who possesses and expresses more knowledge about the world and the characters in it than the individual characters themselves do.
- b. *Internal focalization*: The story is filtered through the perspective of one or more protagonists; knowledge of the story world and events therein is therefore limited to what the character who serves as focalizer is aware of.
- c. *External focalization*: The narrator merely describes events in the story, but neither the narrator's nor any characters' thoughts or perceptions are reported.

(cf. Genette 1980: 189f.)

Furthermore, he differentiates between heterodiegetic narrators and homodiegetic narrators, the latter of which appear as actual characters in the story. Linking these narratological models to the concept of discourse prominence and based on the observations in the previous section, one can surmise that the narrator's own prominence status should be increased in stories featuring zero focalization, as the narrator's knowledge, opinions and general attitude towards the events in the story world are foregrounded instead of any of the characters'. While the term implies that the text contains no focalizers, Bal (1985: 136) argues that the narrator serves as the focalizer, i.e., the perspectival center, in such cases. In accordance with (109), the narrator would then automatically also be the most prominent discourse referent.

With regard to FID, two predictions can be made: First, since otherwise ambiguous FID clauses are attributed to the most prominent discourse referent, one would expect the narrator to be the preferred perspectival anchor in such contexts. Secondly, since prominence is a relative property, and as the results for the second study from Meuser (2022) have shown, increasing the prominence of one discourse referent directly affects the prominence status of other potential perspectival centers as well. An FID clause unambiguously anchored to a protagonist should thus be expected to be less acceptable and natural in a context in which the narrator is a highly prominent discourse referent. An exception to this, however, might be cases in which the protagonist in question is made locally prominent: As the results for the final acceptability rating study in Meuser (2022) discussed in the last section have shown, another discourse referent's global prominence does not necessarily override

a locally prominent protagonist's availability as perspectival center. FID in narrative texts featuring internal focalization, in contrast, should be expected to be preferably interpreted from the perspective of whichever protagonist functions as the focalizer of the story, as said protagonist should also be the most prominent discourse referent available in the context, including the narrator. Stories featuring external focalization, finally, do not figure into these considerations in general, as they, by definition, do not give insight into any discourse referent's mind and, therefore, do not feature FID.

While narrative texts offer a myriad of potential prominence constellations, the analysis in this and subsequent sections will be limited to only three types of narrative situations that differ both with regard to their narrator's prominence status as well as to the way in which the narrator is established as a prominent referent. These are exemplified in (116):

- (116) a. *Nach einem kurzem Nickerchen machte sich Lisa fertig, um Matt draußen bei der Gartenarbeit zu helfen. Als sie das Gras, das Matt zusammen geharkt hatte, mit der Schubkarre abtransportierte, stolperte Lisa und verschüttete es über der gesamten Terrasse. Warum war sie nur immer so verdammt tollpatschig?!*

'After a short nap, Lisa got ready to help Matt with the gardening outside. As she was transporting the grass that Matt had raked together away using the wheelbarrow, Lisa tripped and spilled it all over the patio. Why was she always so damn clumsy?!'

- b. *Nach einem kurzem Nickerchen machte sich Lisa fertig, um mir draußen bei der Gartenarbeit zu helfen. Als sie das Gras, das ich zusammen geharkt hatte, mit der Schubkarre abtransportierte, stolperte Lisa und verschüttete es über der gesamten Terrasse. Warum war sie nur immer so verdammt tollpatschig?!*

'After a short nap, Lisa got ready to help me with the gardening outside. As she was transporting the grass that I had raked together away using the wheelbarrow, Lisa tripped and spilled it all over the patio. Why was she always so damn clumsy?!'

- c. *Nach einem viel zu langen Nickerchen machte sich Lisa, dieser schnar-chige Faulpelz, fertig, um ihrem asozialen Verlobten Matt draußen bei der Gartenarbeit zu helfen. Als sie im Schneckentempo das Gras, das Matt penibel zusammen geharkt hatte, mit der Schubkarre abtransportierte, stolperte diese Trantüte auch noch und verschüttete es über der gesamten Terrasse. Warum war sie nur immer so verdammt tollpatschig?!*

'After a far too long nap, Lisa, that sluggish slacker, got ready to help her degenerate fiancé Matt with the gardening outside. As she transported the grass, which Matt had raked together pedantically, away with the

wheelbarrow at a snail’s pace, that slowpoke tripped and spilled it all over the patio. Why was she always so damn clumsy?’

In (116a), the events are narrated by a covert heterodiegetic third-person narrator. In such a narrative context, the narrator is minimally prominent due to their implicit nature, and thus would most likely not be regarded as a viable perspectival center. As the stretch of text, prior to the FID clause at the end, does not contain any overt perspectival cues, FID is anchored to the discourse referent that is made most prominent via various prominence-lending cues. Due to serving as the discourse topic of the whole text segment as well as the subject and agent of the clause immediately preceding the FID sentence, Lisa is both globally and locally more prominent than Matt, and is thus the only available and most natural perspectival anchor for FID in this context.

In contrast, the story is narrated by a homodiegetic first-person narrator in (116b). Notably, the rest of the text is otherwise identical and therefore, one could make the assumption that Lisa remains the globally and locally most prominent discourse referent. However, an interpretation of the FID clause from the perspective of the narrator seems much more natural in this context. When compared directly to (116a), this difference appears to result solely from the inclusion of first-person pronouns to make explicit reference to the narrator. According to Brilmayer et al. (2019: 4), first-person pronouns “serve as cues for self-relevance which elicit automatic attentional (re-)orienting.” They are thus more salient than second- or third-person pronouns and “immediately draw a hearer’s attention”, thereby increasing their referent’s prominence status (Brilmayer et al. 2019: 16, see also Salem et al. 2017, Repp 2024, cf. also the discussion of potential differences between first- and third-person ‘characters’ in van Krieken et al. 2017: 12f.). It hence stands to reason that homodiegetic first-person narrators are generally more prominent than heterodiegetic third-person narrators and that a comparison of these two types of narrative contexts should provide valuable insights into the interaction between narrator and protagonist prominence and perspectivization.

The example in (116c), finally, showcases another way to increase the narrator’s prominence status. In this context, the story is also narrated by a heterodiegetic third-person narrator, as in (116a), yet one that is not covert, but instead draws attention to him- or herself by commenting on the characters and their actions, thereby establishing him- or herself as a potent perspectival center. As a result, this type of narrator is highly prominent as well and, in turn, is available as an anchor for FID. Such prominent, evaluative narrators and their effect on perspective interpretation are the focus of the linguistic examination of the *Brenner* novels by Wolf Haas in Hinterwimmer (2018 & 2020). The *Brenner* novels, which center around the cases of private eye Simon Brenner, are characterized by their distinctive narrative

voice: While the narrator does not appear as an actual character in the story⁶⁰, he constantly voices his opinions and thoughts, often even directly addressing his presumed audience. The events are thus filtered through this evaluative heterodiegetic narrator's point of view, which is reflected in the novels' striking colloquial style (cf. Hinterwimmer 2018: 123, Hinterwimmer 2020: 532).

Though the narrator thus acts as a globally highly prominent discourse referent and perspective taker, Hinterwimmer (2020: 533) points out that Simon Brenner simultaneously also functions as a prominent protagonist in many segments of the story: Neither are any scenes depicted that Brenner is not present for, nor are the perceptions or thoughts of any of the other characters that appear in the story described. The novels can therefore be said to mix zero and internal focalization to constantly switch between two perspectives, that of the narrator and that of the story's main protagonist. Hinterwimmer's primary interest lies in the linguistic cues and methods that indicate or facilitate these shifts in perspective, specifically with respect to the utilization of DPros in reference to Brenner. Based on the assumption that DPros are anti-logophoric pronouns, as postulated in Hinterwimmer & Bosch (2017) and discussed in Section 5.1, he observes that DPros can only be used to refer to Brenner in segments or sentences that constitute comments and evaluations by the narrator, such as the one in (117) (cf. Hinterwimmer 2020: 555, Hinterwimmer 2018: 139).

- (117) *Jetzt hat es sich zufällig ergeben, dass der Polizist Simon Brenner, Kriminalinspektor oder welchen Rang der gehabt hat, bei der Polizei gekündigt hat. Jetzt muss man wissen, dass der 19 Jahre bei der Kripo gewesen ist [...] Aber er hat es nie richtig weit gebracht bei der Kripo. Das war aber nicht der eigentliche Grund für seine Kündigung, weil der nie besonders ehrgeizig gewesen ist. Mehr so ein ruhigerer Typ, eigentlich ein netter Mensch, muss ich ehrlich sagen.*

(Haas, *Auferstehung der Toten*, p. 13; as cited in Hinterwimmer (2018: 131) and Hinterwimmer (2020: 547); see also Saure et al. (2023: 352))

'It just so happened that the police officer Simon Brenner, an inspector or whatever rank he_{DPro} had, resigned from the police. Now, one has to know that he_{DPro} had been with the criminal investigation department for 19 years [...] But he never really made it very far at the criminal investigation department. But that wasn't the real reason for his resignation, because he_{DPro} was never particularly ambitious. More of a quiet type, actually a nice person, I have to be honest.'

In (117), Simon Brenner functions as the discourse topic of the whole text segment,

⁶⁰It should be mentioned, though, that the narrator in the *Brenner* novels actually is revealed as homodiegetic later on in the series. That does not change the fact, however, that, for all intents and purposes, and without additional knowledge about the series, the narrator *is* depicted as heterodiegetic in the first few novels.

as every single sentence revolves around him and he serves as the subject of almost all of the individual clauses. Theoretically, this should make him maximally globally prominent and, therefore, unavailable to be picked up by DPros, yet instead, he is referred to via DPro several times in the short segment. Hinterwimmer (2018: 131) argues that this is due to the fact that almost all of the sentences are comments by the narrator, informing the reader about Brenner's background while making an assessment of his personality. The narrator, not Brenner, is the perspectival center of the whole text segment and thus also the most prominent discourse referent, which in turn enables the use of DPros to refer to Brenner. The fact that the third clause uses a personal pronoun instead is irrelevant for this argument, as personal pronouns are not restricted with regard to their antecedent and can freely pick up both prominent and non-prominent referents (cf. Hinterwimmer 2018: 124, Hinterwimmer 2020: 547). In contrast, aside from one singular DPro in the first sentence's subordinate clause, the text segment in (118) only refers to Brenner via personal pronouns, which Hinterwimmer (2018: 133) attributes to the preferred interpretation of the sentences as a depiction of Brenner's inner thought process (cf. also Hinterwimmer 2020: 556f.).

- (118) *Jetzt hat er natürlich wieder nicht gewusst, kommt es vom Rauchenaufhören, praktisch Entzug, weil der hat 40 am Tag geraucht. Oder hat es mit der beruflichen Veränderung zu tun, dass er von den Sorgen Kopfweh kriegt, öfter als früher. Oder, dritte Möglichkeit, ist es das Klima in Zell, das er nicht verträgt, besonders jetzt, diese unnatürliche Hitze im September.*

(Haas, *Auferstehung der Toten*, p. 17; as cited in Hinterwimmer (2018: 133f.) and Hinterwimmer (2020: 549); see also Saure et al. (2023: 353))

'Now, of course, he again didn't know whether it was from quitting smoking, practically withdrawal, because he_{DPro} used to smoke 40 a day. Or is it to do with the change in his job, that he gets headaches from worrying, more often than before. Or, third possibility, is it the climate in Zell that he can't handle, especially now, this unnatural heat in September.'

The subordinate clause featuring a DPro is the exception, as it features a brief shift to the narrator's perspective to inform his audience about Brenner's previous smoking habits. The other clauses, however, consist of a row of questions that Brenner is asking himself. Hinterwimmer additionally notes that replacing the personal pronouns with DPros would either decrease the clauses' overall acceptability or, alternatively, lead to a preferred interpretation as further evaluative comments from the narrator (cf. Hinterwimmer 2020: 549). Additional examples provided in Hinterwimmer (2018 & 2020) demonstrate that the same holds true for neutral text passages, in which neither the narrator's nor Brenner's perspectives are overtly expressed: Making reference to Brenner via a DPro automatically forces a reading of the clause as an evaluation by the narrator. Thus, Hinterwimmer concludes that

in such contexts, the referent who functions as the discourse topic also serves as the perspectival center due to their high prominent status, which is in accordance with (109b) (cf. Hinterwimmer 2018: 139, Hinterwimmer 2020: 557; though see van Krieken 2018: 783, for empirical evidence that in absence of viewpoint markers – i.e., perspectival cues – readers preferably attribute perceptions to the narrator rather than the protagonist).

The differences in prominence between covert heterodiegetic third-person narrators and homodiegetic first-person narrators are investigated in a number of experimental studies conducted by Bimpikou (2020). Bimpikou examines whether the use of first-person pronouns in and of itself truly increases the salience of the narrator to such a degree that the narrator becomes the preferred perspectival anchor for FID (cf. Bimpikou 2020: 10f.). Moreover, following Hinterwimmer's (2019) distinction between local and global prominence, she simultaneously tests if globally or locally prominent protagonists are able to override the presumed preference for first-person narrators (cf. Bimpikou 2020: 13). This focus on narrator vs. protagonist prominence, and their respective effects on FID, sets Bimpikou's (2020) empirical research apart from similar types of experiments interested in perspective shifts between narrators and protagonists, which were carried out in Kaiser (2015 & 2021) and van Krieken (2018): While Kaiser (2015) is also interested in examining how the presence or absence of first-person pronouns increases or decreases, respectively, a narrator's prominence status, thereby making the narrator more or less available as perspectival center, she solely focuses on the interpretation of expressives, specifically epithets and appositives (cf. Kaiser 2015: 350f.).

The results of these experiments, which replicated the items and study design used in Harris & Potts (2009), indicated a strong speaker-preference regardless of whether first-person pronouns were used or not (cf. Kaiser 2015: 353f.). However, Kaiser (2015: 358f.) herself points out that this might be due to the items allowing for a reading as part of a conversational context instead of the context of a fictional narrative, which is essential for perspective shift. Kaiser (2015) does not, however, extend this line of investigation to the interpretation of FID, as her experiments on FID are only concerned with the question whether the presence of perspectival cues, such as epistemic adverbials, increases the potential of a clause to be read from the perspective of a protagonist (cf. Kaiser 2015: 359). The same applies to van Krieken (2018), who investigates whether perspectivally ambiguous perceptions are more likely to be attributed to a protagonist instead of the narrator if the preceding sentence contains a verb of perception as a viewpoint marker (cf. van Krieken 2018: 776). In a similar fashion, Kaiser (2021: 8) tests if various types of sensory modalities, like vision, smell and taste, differ in their facilitation of perspective shift.

While the results of all of these studies provide valuable insights into the machinations of perspectival attribution, they do not aim to clarify the effect of narrator

prominence itself, as test items did not differ with regard to narrative situation. Bimpikou (2020), in contrast, offers a direct comparison between first- and third-person narrators as potential perspectival centers in a series of forced-choice studies. While she focuses on the effect of discourse prominence on the interpretation of FID in all of her experiments, she notably also investigates if FID is affected differently by factors of discourse prominence than another “level of representation” which, similar to FID, is “ubiquitous in narratives” and also depends on its context for interpretation (Bimpikou 2020: 2). To be precise, Bimpikou (2020) is also interested in structures that constitute implicit reports of characters’ mental states or perceptions instead of conscious thought or speech events. These structures have been the topic of numerous previous investigations of perspective shift, often in direct comparison with FID. In the literature, they have been referred to as *represented perception* (cf. Brinton 1980), *non-reflective consciousness* (cf. Banfield 1982), *Protagonist Projection* (cf. Holton 1997, Stokke 2013, Abrusán 2020) and *Viewpoint Shifting* (cf. Hinterwimmer 2017). As I do not aim to delve deeper into the different arguments and analyses of these individual approaches, I will simply use the term Protagonist Projection/Viewpoint Shifting (PP/VS) henceforth. Bimpikou (2020), however, instead opts to use the alternative expression *free perception reports* in order to not, by definition, preclude the possibility of such clauses being anchored to the narrator and not a protagonist (cf. Bimpikou 2020: 6). An example for PP/VS, taken from Hinterwimmer (2017), is given in (119).

- (119) When Mary stepped out of the boat, the ground was shaking beneath her feet for a couple of seconds. (Hinterwimmer 2017: 291, ex. 14)

PP/VS has in common with FID that in both cases, it is not made overt that the sentence in question is to be read as expressing a certain protagonist’s perception – instead, this interpretation relies on perspectival cues in the context and the content of the clause itself (cf. Abrusán 2020: 25). Thus, in (119), the reader must infer that the ground is not actually shaking, but that the subordinate clause only conveys what the protagonist Mary is feeling at that particular moment. However, the clause is not indicative of an actual speech or thought act by Mary, i.e., it does *not* convey that Mary is actively and consciously thinking about the ground shaking beneath her feet, while she is stepping out of the boat. Rather, instances of PP/VS describe a situation “as it is perceived by a salient protagonist or in a way that reflects the doxastic state of such a protagonist at the relevant time” (Hinterwimmer 2017: 283). A further difference between FID and PP/VS is pointed out by Hinterwimmer (2017) with respect to their distribution: He observes that, whereas FID is restricted to root level clauses, PP/VS is also available sentence-internally, as is illustrated in (119) (cf. Hinterwimmer 2017: 291). As the relationship between FID and PP/VS and the question whether they should receive a uniform analysis are only indirectly related to this investigation’s focus on the perspectival properties of ID, however, I

will refrain from a more extensive discussion of the topic. Moreover, as none of the experimental studies conducted by Bimpikou (2020) that I aim to describe in this section showed significant differences in the results for FID and PP/VS, I will also completely omit this aspect of her experiments from my summary, for the sake of brevity.

In the first of three forced-choice studies I want to briefly discuss, Bimpikou (2020) directly contrasts the interpretation of FID in short text segments which either featured a heterodiegetic third-person narrator or a homodiegetic first-person narrator, but which were otherwise identical. The item design is illustrated in (120).

(120) The whole house was empty and silent.

a. **First-person:** Fred and I stepped into the kitchen.

b. **Third-person:** Fred and Sally stepped into the kitchen.

Fred looked at the food that was left on the tables.

Free Thought: Ugh, it looked disgusting! How many days had it been there?

(Bimpikou 2020: 15, ex. 12)

The final clause consisted of a thought expressed in FID mode and centered around some kind of perception, in order to allow for both FID and PP/VS continuations, the latter of which has been omitted from (120). One of the two protagonists, Fred in (120), was made locally prominent via his role as the experiencer of a perception event in the clause directly preceding FID. The participants' task consisted of selecting either the narrator or the locally prominent protagonist as the perspectival anchor for FID. As predicted, the results showed a significant difference between items featuring a first-person narrator and ones featuring a third-person narrator: The latter showed a strong overall preference for the locally prominent protagonist as perspectival center, who was selected 95% of the time. While items being narrated by a homodiegetic first-person narrator also showed an overall preference for the protagonist, the effect was much more subdued in comparison, with approximately 70% of the results for this condition reflecting a choice for the protagonist (cf. Bimpikou 2020: 17). As Bimpikou (2020: 18) surmises, this indicates that local prominence trumps first-person narration as a prominence-lending cue and imbues its respective discourse referent with a comparatively higher prominence status.

To gain better insight into the interaction between first-person pronouns and local prominence as prominence-lending cues, Bimpikou (2020) conducted a follow-up study with mostly identical items to the one in (120). However, items this time did not differ with regard to their narrative voice, as all item versions were narrated by a homodiegetic first-person narrator, but with regard to the presence or absence of a locally prominent protagonist: In one version, only Fred acts as the experiencer of the perception event, while in the other version, a first-person plural pronoun is used instead to indicate that the narrator and Fred both function as experiencers (cf. Bimpikou 2020: 19). As a result, the two are equally locally prominent in this version,

which, in turn, should facilitate a higher preference for the first-person narrator. This turned out to be the case: The results for Bimpikou’s (2020) second forced-choice study showed a preference of 95% for the narrator as perspectival center for items in which the protagonist was not more locally prominent. In contrast, the results were almost evenly distributed for items in which only the protagonist was locally prominent, with a slight preference of approximately 55% for the protagonist as perspectival anchor (cf. Bimpikou 2020: 20). While the follow-up study thus again demonstrated the effect of local prominence, the preference for the protagonist was also somewhat decreased in comparison to the first study’s results. Bimpikou (2020) attributes these diverging results both to a high degree of variation in participants’ individual preferences in the follow-up study, as well as to various differences between the two experiments’ designs. She theorizes that, for example, the fact that the first study only featured items in which the protagonist was locally prominent might have helped to increase the overall tendency to choose the protagonist, and not the narrator, as perspectival center.

After having thus clarified in her first two forced-choice experiments that local prominence outranks the use of first-person pronouns but that the latter is incremental in selecting a perspectival center in the absence of local prominence cues, Bimpikou (2020) next turns her attention towards “the effect of global prominence on perspectivisation in first-person narratives” (Bimpikou 2020: 22). For her third experiment, the last one that will be discussed in this section, she designed longer test items that either featured a globally prominent narrator or a globally prominent protagonist. An example is given in (121).⁶¹

- (121) a. **Global Narrator:** I woke up very early that day. I hadn’t slept well all night, I had been very stressed during the whole week and couldn’t rest. I woke up Dina as I wanted some company to take my breakfast.
- b. **Global Character:** Dina woke up very early that day. She hadn’t slept well all night, she had been very stressed during the whole week and couldn’t rest. She woke me up as she wanted some company to take her breakfast.

There was a strong smell in the kitchen. We looked at the sink and the floor.
Free Thought: What a disgusting sight... Those kids, they had again left a lot of unwashed dishes, glasses and leftovers from the previous night! On top of that, the tap was running and the water had reached the floor.
 (Bimpikou 2020: 23f., 14)

For this experimental study, there was no difference between item versions with regard to local prominence; in all items, the narrator and the protagonist together act as the experiencers of a perception event in the clause directly preceding FID.

⁶¹The items for the experiment were originally created and presented in Greek. (121) only includes the English translation that was provided by Bimpikou (2020).

However, several sentences were added to the beginning of each story to establish a more elaborate discourse context. In one version of the items, the homodiegetic first-person narrator functions as the discourse topic, and thus as the globally more prominent referent, due to being introduced first, being mentioned more often and serving in a more prominent role throughout. In the other version of the items, the protagonist, Dina in (121), takes on that role, whereas the narrator is only explicitly introduced later on in the text, and only in the less prominent grammatical function of object. In contrast to the previous two experiments, there were no significant differences between conditions: The first-person narrator was selected as the perspectival anchor for FID 93-95% of the time, regardless of whether the protagonist was more or less globally prominent (cf. Bimpikou 2020: 24f.). These results imply that the use of first-person pronouns outranks global prominence-lending cues, which leads Bimpikou (2020) to formulate the following tentative hierarchy regarding the preference for discourse referents as perspectival centers:

- (122) locally prominent character (experiencer) > narrator > globally prominent character (Bimpikou 2020: 30)

The forced-choice studies conducted by Bimpikou (2020) thus provide first empirical findings on the interplay between narrator and protagonist prominence. However, as illustrated in (116c) above, homodiegetic first-person narrators are not the only type of narrator with an increased prominence status; a narrator may also be established as a prominent discourse referent via the inclusion of evaluative and other expressive elements which give insight into the narrator's opinions and thoughts, like the narrating figure in the *Brenner* novels. It remains as of yet unclear whether that type of prominent narrator is overall preferred as perspectival anchor for FID over locally or globally prominent protagonists or not, as the investigations in Hinterwimmer (2018 & 2020) were preoccupied with the distribution of DPros in such narrative environments. Moreover, a comparison between evaluative heterodiegetic narrators and homodiegetic first-person narrators should also prove to be instructive – are the two types of narrators equally prominent or does one have a more pronounced effect on the interpretation of FID?

In order to further explore the dynamics between prominent narrators and prominent protagonists, I conducted two continuous scale choice studies meant to test and compare the effects of various narrative situations on the selection of a perspectival anchor for FID. The first of these two studies, Experiment 2, was originally published in Saure et al. (2023). It serves both as an attempt to replicate the results of Bimpikou's (2020) studies in German with regard to the impact of homodiegetic first-person narrators, as well as to directly compare it to that of other types of prominent narrators. The following section details the design of the materials used in Experiment 2, followed by an in-depth discussion of its results.

5.3 Experiment 2

5.3.1 General Description

This section will present the first of two continuous scale choice studies meant to examine the impact of different narrator types on the interpretation of FID. The results of Experiment 2, which was designed in collaboration with Stefan Hinterwimmer and Anna Pia Jordan-Bertinelli, were originally published in Saure et al. (2023) alongside an acceptability rating study testing the availability of FID in different narrative contexts. As the latter study is not directly relevant for the purposes of this investigation, it will not be discussed in detail, though its results will be addressed briefly in Section 5.3.4. It should be noted, however, that this acceptability rating study and Experiment 2 used an identical item design and setup, which will be described shortly, and only differed in the type of task participants were asked to fulfill.

Building on the empirical studies conducted by Bimpikou (2020) and the observations made in Hinterwimmer (2018 & 2020) regarding the interplay between prominent narrators and protagonists, as discussed in the previous section, Experiment 2 investigates if an increased global prominence of the narrator affects the interpretation of FID in contexts in which the protagonist should otherwise be the preferred perspectival center. To be specific, the goal was to compare the effects of homodiegetic first-person narrators and the type of perspectively prominent narrators found in works like Wolf Haas' *Auferstehung der Toten*, who are primarily salient due to their evaluative comments about the story and its characters. Accordingly, test items were created in three conditions that differed with regard to the type of narrating entity:

- (123)
- a. Condition A: The text segment is narrated by a neutral heterodiegetic third-person narrator.
 - b. Condition B: The text segment is narrated by a homodiegetic first-person narrator.
 - c. Condition C: The text segment is narrated by an evaluative heterodiegetic third-person narrator.

The results of Experiment 2, as well as those of Experiment 3⁶², will provide the necessary foundation for the subsequent investigation of discourse prominence's role in selecting the perspectival center for ID: By first clarifying how the narrator's increased or decreased prominence affects the interpretation of FID, the insights thus gained will inform my hypotheses regarding its effect on ID and serve as a measure of comparison.

⁶²See Section 5.4.

The section is structured as follows: It will start with a detailed description of the materials used in the experiment, as well as the task that was given to the participants, in Section 5.3.2. Next, the central hypotheses for the outcome of the study will be presented in Section 5.3.3. The chapter concludes with the presentation and subsequent discussion of the results in Section 5.3.4.

5.3.2 Method

5.3.2.1 Design and Materials

All in all, 36 test items were created for Experiment 2 in three variants each, according to the conditions described in (123). All items consist of four sentences and were designed to be read as excerpts from short stories. The final clause (= S4) always features FID and functions as the target sentence, whereas the first three clauses serve to introduce the setting and characters, and to establish the narrative situation. Each item features two protagonists (= P1 & P2) introduced via first name. In order to avoid ambiguous interpretations of pronouns, P1 and P2 were always of opposite gender, with either character being male in half of the items and female in the other half.

As can be recognized from the exemplary item provided in (124)⁶³, items were mostly identical in conditions A and B. The major difference between the two conditions is that P2, who is a named character in condition A (= Wiebke in (124a)), actually serves as the homodiegetic first-person narrator in condition B.

(124) a. *Als Felix in die neue Wohnung kam, gemütlich die Tür aufschloss und seine Jacke an die Garderobe hängte, war Wiebke schon dort und hatte begonnen, das Wohnzimmer in einem warmen Weiß zu streichen. Sie hatte das Radio auf volle Lautstärke aufgedreht und sang laut mit. Er schaute sie überrascht an, dann wanderte sein Blick nach unten.*

‘When Felix came into the new apartment, comfortably unlocked the door and hung his jacket on the coat rack, Wiebke was already there and had started to paint the living room a warm white. She had turned the radio up to full volume and was singing along loudly. He looked at her in surprise, then his eyes wandered downstairs.’

b. *Als Felix in die neue Wohnung kam, gemütlich die Tür aufschloss und seine Jacke an die Garderobe hängte, war ich schon dort und hatte begonnen, das Wohnzimmer in einem warmen Weiß zu streichen. Ich hatte das Radio auf volle Lautstärke aufgedreht und sang laut mit. Er schaute mich überrascht an, dann wanderte sein Blick nach unten.*

‘When Felix came into the new apartment, comfortably unlocked the door and hung his jacket on the coat rack, I was already there and had started to paint the living room a warm white. I had turned the radio up

⁶³See Appendix B for additional items used in Experiment 2.

to full volume and was singing along loudly. He looked at me in surprise, then his eyes wandered downstairs.’

- c. *Als Felix in die neue Wohnung kam — wie immer völlig tiefenentspannt, das muss man ihm lassen — war Wiebke, die ja von Natur aus ein eher unruhiges Gemüt hatte, schon dort und hatte begonnen, das Wohnzimmer zu streichen. Sie hatte das Radio aufgedreht und sang laut und schief mit. Er glotzte sie überrascht an, dann wanderte sein Blick nach unten.* ‘When Felix arrived at the new apartment – as always, completely relaxed, one has to give him that – Wiebke, who had a rather restless temperament by nature, was already there and had started painting the living room. She had turned up the radio and was singing along loudly and off-key. He gawked at her in surprise, then looked down.’

FID: *Ach du Scheiße, diese Amateurin hatte vergessen, den Boden abzuleben!*

‘Holy crap, this amateur had forgotten to tape the floor!’

The items were constructed to establish P1 (= Felix in (124)) as the more prominent protagonist, and thus, as the most likely anchor for FID, in several ways: First of all, P1 is always introduced first and acts as the subject and the agent of the first sentence, whereas P2 is always introduced second. Secondly, the sentence immediately preceding FID (= S3) features a perception event from P1’s perspective, thus making P1 locally prominent as well. In most test items, S3 describes a *visual* perception of P1, though other types of perception events/verbs were featured as well on an irregular basis, if it fit well into the overall story. Finally, the thought expressed in the FID clause was designed to always follow naturally as a consequence of P1’s perception in S3; in (124), for example, Felix first looks at Wiebke and then downwards. The subsequent thought should thus most likely be interpreted as Felix’s reaction at what he sees, i.e., that Wiebke has not taped the floor. Additionally, the FID clause always contains a negatively evaluative DP such as *diese Amateurin* (‘that amateur’) which can only be taken to refer to P2, both due to the context of the story as well as its gender, which always matches that of P2.

While the item variants for condition C also generally adhere to this structure, several major changes had to be made to the content of the individual clauses to establish the prominent, evaluative third-person narrator. Specifically, a number of elements reflecting the perspective and attitude of the narrator were added to the text. These included evaluative adjectives and verbs, epithets and meta-comments, which were considered to be particularly effective in marking the narrator as a viable perspectival center due to their switch to present tense. S4, however, was not affected by these changes and thus identical across conditions. In order to avoid a significant difference in length between the item versions, which would otherwise have resulted from the additional material in condition C, superfluous details were subsequently

5.3 EXPERIMENT 2

added to the item versions in conditions A and B to pad out the text.

In addition to the regular items, 36 filler items were created that matched the test items in length and form. Two filler types, containing 18 items each, were designed:

- (125) a. Type 1: Only feature one named protagonist instead of two like the test items. The final sentence contains an FID clause designed to come across as strange and unexpected in the context of the story.
- b. Type 2: Only feature one named protagonist instead of two as well. Instead of an FID clause anchored to the perspective of the protagonist, type 2 fillers contain an obvious narrator comment giving an evaluation of the protagonist's personality, usually via epithet, as the target clause. In contrast to the other items, the position of the target clause varies from item to item.

Examples for each filler type are given in (126).

- (126) a. Type 1: *Tina war zum Einkaufen in einem Biosupermarkt. Sie ging durch die Gänge und packte Zutaten für ein Gemüsecurry ein. An der Kasse suchte sie lange nach ihrem Portemonnaie ohne es zu finden. Verdammt, mit einem Kreuzbandriss war eine Karriere als Fußballprofi einfach ausgeschlossen!*

'Tina was shopping at an organic supermarket. She went through the aisles and picked up ingredients for a vegetable curry. At the checkout, she searched for her wallet for a long time without finding it. Damn it, a career as a professional soccer player was simply impossible with a cruciate ligament rupture!'

- b. Type 2: *Dimitri war ein echter Schnösel! Er besuchte jede Woche ein nobles Restaurant in der Stadt. Dort bestellte er sich dann immer das teuerste Gericht, das auf der Karte stand, und dazu einen edlen Wein. Und obwohl er so reich war, gab er einfach nie Trinkgeld.*

'Dimitri was a real snob! He visited a fancy restaurant in town every week. There, he would always order the most expensive dish on the menu, along with a fine wine. And even though he was so rich, he just never tipped.'

Type 1 fillers were primarily included to act as a control case for the acceptability rating study conducted alongside Experiment 2, as such unexpected cases of FID were likely to receive low ratings. The purpose of the type 2 fillers was two-fold: For one thing, they were meant to check the participants' general ability to select a perspectival center in cases where only one of the two choices should be coherent. Secondly, switching the position of the target sentence should prevent participants from adopting a reading strategy in which they learn to only focus on the final clause and skip the rest of the text. This was necessary to ensure that the results would

accurately reflect the effect – or lack thereof – of the narrative context. Additionally, 18 control questions were also included in the study to check if participants were reading the stories carefully. The questions were displayed after specific filler items and focused on some detail mentioned in the text.

5.3.2.2 Participants

30 German native-speakers (Gender distribution: female = 24, male = 4, non-binary = 2; age range: 18-51; mean age: 23 years) participated in Experiment 2, which was conducted in August 2021. They were recruited via Prolific for monetary compensation (£3.75). Four participants grew up multilingual. Their data was nevertheless included in the analysis. However, the data of two participants had to be excluded from the analysis due to not being able to correctly answer at least 75% of the control questions.

5.3.2.3 Procedure

Experiment 2 was created using Qualtrics (<https://www.qualtrics.com/>) and distributed to participants via the research platform Prolific (<https://www.prolific.co/>). The items were presented to the participants in written form and in semi-randomized order. Due to the large number of test and filler items, and in an attempt to decrease the length of the study, the 36 test items were split into two groups of 18 items each. Items in each group were then divided into three lists per group, so that each individual item would only appear in one of the three conditions per list, making for six lists in total. The six lists all thus contained six items per condition, all 36 filler items as well as all 18 control questions. The lists were distributed evenly to participants.

The participants' task consisted of deciding for the target sentence in each item if the reported thought belonged to P1 or to the narrator. The setup was thus similar to the experimental studies conducted by Bimpikou (2020), but particularly inspired by the design used in van Krieken (2018): Instead of designing the experiment as a forced-choice study, the two options of protagonist and narrator were presented as opposite sides on a scale, as illustrated in Figure 12. The left side of the scale was always labeled with *der Erzähler* ('the narrator'), while the right side was labeled with the name of P1. P2 was thus only available as a possible choice in condition B, in which P2 served as the first-person narrator. After reading an item, participants were asked a question in the vein of *Who thinks/believes/comments that...* with regard to the thought expressed in the target sentence. They could indicate their preferred choice of perspectival center by moving the slider from its starting point in the middle of the scale to either the left, i.e., the 'narrator side', or to the right, i.e., the 'protagonist side'. This method was chosen to gather more fine-grained data than would be possible with a simple forced-choice design: As participants were able to choose freely how far they wanted to move the slider in a certain direction,

5.3 EXPERIMENT 2

the results would accordingly reflect how strong the tendency to select a certain perspectival center was for each condition.

Als Felix in die neue Wohnung kam, gemütlich die Tür aufschloss und seine Jacke an die Garderobe hängte, war Wiebke schon dort und hatte begonnen, das Wohnzimmer in einem warmen Weiß zu streichen. Sie hatte das Radio auf volle Lautstärke aufgedreht und sang laut mit. Er schaute sie überrascht an, dann wanderte sein Blick nach unten. Ach du Scheiße, diese Amateurin hatte vergessen, den Boden abzukleben!

Wer kommentiert, dass "diese Amateurin" vergessen hat, den Boden abzukleben?

der Erzähler Felix




Figure 12: Example item for Experiment 2, including the subsequent question and the corresponding scale displaying the two possible answers

With regard to the forthcoming analysis of the results in Section 5.3.4, it is important to note that individual points on the scale corresponded to ordinal values between 0 and 100, though this was not displayed to participants. As the option of narrator was positioned on the far left side of the scale, it corresponded to the value 0, whereas the option of protagonist, being placed on the far right side of the scale, corresponded to the value 100. Therefore, if items were to receive ratings significantly below 50, it would reflect a preference for the narrator as perspectival center, and if they were to receive ratings significantly higher than 50, it would instead reflect a preference for the protagonist.

5.3.3 Hypotheses

At the start of this chapter, I formulated the following sub-hypothesis H2a of the second of my two central hypotheses, H2:

- (127) **H2a:** Discourse prominence plays a vital role in selecting a perspectival center for both indirect discourse and free indirect discourse and has a similar effect on the interpretation of both types of speech and thought representation.

The current study serves to provide the foundation for this intended comparison between ID and FID with regard to the factor of discourse prominence; in order to be able to assess if, and how similarly to FID, the reading of ID clauses is affected by the prominence of the available discourse referents, the concrete effect on the interpretation of FID must be determined first. As previous works on the topic by Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019), Hinterwimmer (2019) and Meuser (2022) have

shown, prominence plays a major role in anchoring FID to a specific discourse referent in cases where more than one protagonist is technically available to function as perspectival center: The maximally prominent referent on either a local or global level is generally preferred as perspectival center. For this investigation, however, the interplay between narrator and protagonist perspective is of central interest.

With regard to the design of Experiment 2 and, specifically, conditions A and B, the results from Bimpikou (2020) suggest that the protagonist should be perceived as the preferred anchor for FID in items featuring a heterodiegetic third-person narrator, due to the narrator’s lack of prominence. In contrast, her data also shows that FID clauses are preferably interpreted from the perspective of the narrator in homodiegetic first-person narration. However, this effect was expected to be decreased in Experiment 2 for two reasons: First, P1 is established as highly prominent in both condition A and B on a global level, by being introduced first and acting as the subject and discourse topic in the first clause of each item, as well as, more importantly, on a local level, by acting as the experiencer of a perception event in the clause immediately preceding FID. Secondly, the FID clause always contained a negatively evaluative epithet unambiguously referring to P2. With regard to condition B, attributing the thought to the homodiegetic first-person narrator, who was identical to P2, would require interpreting the thought as the narrator evaluating themselves negatively and using an epithet for self-reference. As such a reading should be highly unlikely, the expectation was that the presence of the first-person narrator would not affect the interpretation of FID in a significant way.

Based on these considerations, the following two hypotheses, H3a and H3b, were formulated for Experiment 2:

- (128) a. **H3a:** The results for Experiment 2 will show an overall preference for the protagonist due to their high prominence status.
- b. **H3b:** There will be no significant difference between conditions A and B, i.e., items featuring a heterodiegetic third-person narrator and items featuring a homodiegetic first-person narrator.

Regarding condition C, the expectation was that the increased prominence of the narrator as a potent perspective-holder, via the inclusion of expressive elements such as evaluative terms and meta-comments, would result in a significant impact on the interpretation of FID. While this effect might not be strong enough to completely offset the overall preference for the protagonist as perspectival center, it was predicted to, at the very least, increase the tendency to attribute the thought in the target clause to the narrator. This is reflected in the third hypothesis for Experiment 2:

- (129) **H3c:** There will be a significantly higher tendency to choose the narrator as perspectival center in condition C than in the other two conditions, due to the narrator’s increased prominence.

In summary, and with regard to the scale from 0-100 described in the last section, the overall prediction for the results of Experiment 2 was that conditions A and B would both receive similarly high ratings reflecting an overall preference for the protagonist as perspectival center, and that condition C would receive significantly lower ratings, reflecting a higher tendency to select the narrator as perspectival center than in the other two conditions.

5.3.4 Results and Discussion

5.3.4.1 Results

As mentioned in Section 5.3.2.3, the continuous scale ratings were measured on a scale from 0-100. As the option of the narrator was always placed on the left edge of the scale, a low rating (between 0 and 49) would indicate a preference for the narrator as perspectival center, whereas a high rating (between 51 and 100) would instead reflect a tendency to choose the locally prominent protagonist as perspectival center, due to their placement on the right edge of the scale. Furthermore, a particularly low or high rating would imply an especially strong preference for a specific discourse referent. The results of 28 participants were included in the analysis. The free statistics software R was used to analyze the data (<https://www.r-project.org/>). The results for the experiment were first reported in Saure et al. (2023). The mean values for each condition for all of the 36 test items, as depicted in Table 3⁶⁴, were calculated using the lme4 function (Bates et al. 2015) and their significance was checked via a linear mixed-effects model.⁶⁵

Condition	Mean Value (Model Estimate)	CI
Condition A: 3rd person _{neutral}	90.12	[85.03 ; 95.22]
Condition B: 1st person	82.63	[77.54 ; 87.73]
Condition C: 3rd person _{evaluative}	90.53	[85.43 ; 95.62]

Table 3: Mean continuous scale choice ratings (model estimate) and 95%-confidence intervals for Experiment 2.

The results are further illustrated graphically in Figure 13.⁶⁶ The results show that items received overall high ratings, which is reflected by the fact that, for all three conditions, the mean ratings are at least above 80 on a scale from 0-100. As can be seen in Figure 13, the data points are mostly clustered around the upper end of the scale, though they are spread slightly further apart in condition B.

⁶⁴Rounded to the second decimal place.

⁶⁵The model was specified using the same formula as in Experiment 1: Answer ~ Condition + (1 | Subjects) + (1 | Items). The model did not converge until random slope effects were taken out of the equation; the calculated p-values are therefore not 100% reliable. T-tests were calculated using the Satterthwaite’s method of the lmerTest packages.

⁶⁶Short explanation of Figure 13: the red dot marks the mean value while the bold horizontal line signifies the median for each condition. The boxes display where the bulk of the data, namely the 25% of data below and above the median, is located.




Figure 13: Mean continuous scale choice ratings (model estimate) on a scale between 0 and 100 for Experiment 2. A rating between 0 and 49 indicates a tendency to interpret the FID clause from the perspective of the narrator, while a rating between 51 and 100 indicates a tendency to interpret the FID clause from the perspective of the locally prominent protagonist.

The mixed-effects model indicated a significant difference between condition A and condition B (estimate = -7.49, SE = 2.36, $p = 0.0016$), as well as between condition B and condition C (estimate = 7.89, SE = 2.35, $p < 0.001$). There was no significant difference between conditions A and C, however (estimate = 0.4, SE = 2.36, $p = 0.87$).

Regarding the results for the filler items, type 1 fillers, which featured an FID clause that should be perceived as strange and unexpected with regard to the context of the story, received a mean rating of 55.13, indicating a balanced distribution of data points. This showcases that participants were unsure whom to pick as perspectival center when the expressed thought did not follow naturally from the context and could not be coherently attributed to the protagonist. In contrast, type 2 fillers, which featured an obvious narrator comment instead of a thought attributable to the protagonist, accordingly received a low mean rating of 8.86. This result was as expected and demonstrated that participants were able to accurately pick out the correct perspectival center in unambiguous cases.

5.3.4.2 Discussion

The overall high mean ratings for all three conditions, indicating a strong preference for the protagonist as perspectival center, show that P1’s global and local prominence had a major positive effect on his availability as an anchor for FID. This is also reflected in the results for the aforementioned acceptability rating study that was conducted alongside Experiment 2 and used the same setup and materials: FID clauses received mean acceptability ratings of 4.88 for condition A, 3.46 for condition

B and 4.84 for condition C, on a Likert scale from 1-7 (cf. Saure et al. 2023: 359). The results thus not only showcase that FID clauses were deemed as overall acceptable in the contexts provided by the items, but also mirror those of Experiment 2, as they also only displayed significant differences between condition B, on the one hand, and the other two conditions, on the other hand.

The results for Experiment 2 thus confirm H3a as defined in (128a): The prominent protagonist was the overall preferred perspectival center regardless of condition. However, both the results for condition B and for condition C went against expectations. Regarding the homodiegetic first-person narrator in condition B, H3b, as defined in (128b), predicted that there would be no significant difference to condition A. While the studies in Bimpikou (2020) previously demonstrated that first-person narration significantly increases the likelihood of the narrator being chosen as perspectival center for FID, we expected this effect to be weakened both due to the overall high local and global prominence of the protagonist as well as the inclusion of a negatively evaluative epithet referring to P2, i.e., the homodiegetic narrator in condition B, in the FID clause. This turned out to be only partially correct. The effect of the first-person narrator was indeed weakened in Experiment 2, as the difference in interpretation of FID between first- and third-person narrators is not nearly as striking as it was in Bimpikou’s experiments; yet it is still noticeable and significant, thus contradicting H3b.

It is surprising and, at first glance, difficult to explain that participants displayed a higher tendency to select the narrator as perspectival center in condition B despite the fact that such an interpretation should be incoherent with the content of the FID clause, as it necessitates a reading in which the narrator is negatively evaluating themselves and using an epithet for self-reference. As discussed in Saure et al. (2023: 365), two potential explanations come to mind: For one thing, participants might have been inclined to interpret the evaluative DP in the FID clause as referring to some other, third character not mentioned previously. While this strategy would resolve the incoherence issue and facilitate anchoring the FID clause to the first-person narrator, it would also require for participants to ignore the perception event in the sentence directly preceding the FID clause, which always revolved around P1 perceiving something which P2 does or did, and thus sets up a subsequent thought about P2. The second possibility is that participants actually interpreted the FID clause as the narrator imagining what P1 might be thinking about them. In either case, the results underline that the mere presence of a homodiegetic first-person narrator suffices to affect both the acceptability and the interpretation of FID to a significant degree, even in contexts in which another discourse referent is locally and globally prominent *and* would be the more suitable attitude holder of the reported thought.

The results of Experiment 2 also deviate from the predictions made in H3c,

defined in (129), with regard to condition C. The expectation was that the evaluative third-person narrator would significantly affect the interpretation of FID, due to the narrator's increased prominence. This was not the case, as there is no significant difference between conditions A and C; in fact, they patterned exactly alike, which is illustrated by the near identical distribution of data points in Figure 13. The implication is that increasing the narrator's global prominence as a perspective-holder via evaluative elements and comments does not suffice to override readers' preference to select the protagonist as perspectival center, at least not in contexts in which the protagonist is made locally prominent. Accordingly, the investigation on the influence of prominence on the selection of perspectival centers for FID and ID in this chapter will henceforth exclusively focus on the empirically confirmed effect of first-person narrators.

Overall, Experiment 2 has yielded the following conclusions with regard to the different types of narrators tested in the study and their effect on the interpretation of FID: In cases where the story is narrated by a homodiegetic first-person narrator, the prominence of the narrator is increased to such a degree that it significantly impacts the interpretation. This holds true even for contexts in which such a reading should theoretically be rendered incoherent due to the content of the reported thought as well as the overall high local and global prominence of the protagonist. In contrast, stories narrated by a heterodiegetic third-person narrator do not significantly affect the interpretation of FID clauses, at least not in contexts in which a protagonist is available as an anchor for FID due to their local prominence. This seems to be the case regardless of whether the third-person narrator's global prominence is increased by establishing their perspective and attitude via evaluative elements or not.

It remains unclear, however, which characteristic of homodiegetic first-person narrators is responsible for marking them as viable perspectival centers. Is it indeed the case that the explicit use of first-person pronouns imbues the narrator with a high prominence status, thereby also increasing the likelihood of them being chosen as perspectival anchors for FID? Or does perhaps the fact that they themselves are characters in the story world – instead of omniscient, abstract narrating instances – prohibit them from accessing other characters' inner thoughts, thus decreasing the availability of other protagonists as perspectival centers? In order to gain a better understanding of the interplay between first-person narrators and protagonists as perspective-holders and to confirm that it is indeed the inherently high prominence of first-person narrators which is the deciding factor in selecting a perspectival center, a follow-up study to Experiment 2 was conducted, the details of which will be discussed in the next section. The results of this follow-up study were previously reported in Hinterwimmer & Saure (2024).

5.4 Experiment 3

5.4.1 General Description

Experiment 3 served as a follow-up study to Experiment 2; its primary purpose was to answer the following question: Which property of homodiegetic first-person narrators is the deciding factor that makes them more preferable as perspectival center than heterodiegetic third-person narrators, as has been demonstrated in Bimpikou (2020) and in Experiment 2. One possible explanation is that the use of first-person pronouns attracts readers' attention and thereby increases the salience/prominence of the discourse referent using these pronouns, namely the speaker/narrator. As previous studies by Brilmayer et al. (2019), Salem et al. (2017) as well as Repp (2024) have illustrated, first-person pronouns differ from second- and third-person pronouns in that they act as "highly salient social cues that [...] serve as a 'fixation point' in an otherwise dynamic communicative environment" (Brilmayer et al. 2019: 16). If the use of first-person pronouns would thus be the reason that homodiegetic first-person narrators are more likely to be selected as perspectival center for FID, it would further underline the relevance of prominence in governing perspective interpretation.

However, another option exists that could potentially explain the results of Experiment 2: Perhaps the reason that only homodiegetic first-person narrators seem to affect the interpretation of FID is that they are simply not able to access the inner thoughts of other protagonists, due to their status as characters in the story world. Since heterodiegetic narrators exist outside of the fictional story world, they may often act as omniscient beings that possess knowledge and insight about everything that happens or exists in that world, including all of its characters. This, in turn, allows them to freely report on characters' emotions, attitudes and thought processes, without raising questions about the reliability or validity of their reports in the reader's mind.⁶⁷ It follows, then, that a homodiegetic narrator, i.e., one who is ultimately also just a character existing inside the fictional world of the story, should, in contrast, *not* be privy to such information. Instead, it stands to reason that homodiegetic narrators are restricted solely to their own point of view and limited accordingly regarding their knowledge of other people's thoughts and feelings, similar to speakers in everyday conversational contexts. With regard to the interpretation of FID, it therefore might be the case that readers generally have greater difficulty anchoring FID to a (prominent) protagonist in homodiegetic than in heterodiegetic narration.

The current study, which was first reported in Hinterwimmer & Saure (2024), aims to determine which of these two factors is the deciding one in affecting the

⁶⁷See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of the unique potential for multiperspectivity in fictional narration.

interpretation of FID by contrasting homodiegetic first-person narrators with *heterodiegetic* first-person narrators. Several examples from narrative literature, such as *The Hobbit* by J. R. R. Tolkien or the aforementioned *Brenner* novels by Wolf Haas⁶⁸, showcase that, even though it might be the norm that first-person narrators are also homodiegetic, this does not necessarily have to be the case. The narrator in *The Hobbit* does not appear as an actual character in the fictional world of Middle-Earth, yet as the text passages in (130) illustrate, he frequently expresses his own thoughts and feelings about characters like Gandalf or Bilbo Baggins, the actual main protagonist. Moreover, the narrator consistently uses first-person pronouns to refer to himself, occasionally also making reference to his addressee(s) via second-person pronouns.

- (130) a. Hobbits have no beards. There is little or no magic about them, except the ordinary everyday sort which helps them to disappear quietly and quickly when large stupid folk like you and me come blundering along, making a noise like elephants which they can hear a mile off. (Tolkien, *The Hobbit or There and Back Again*, p. 4)
- b. Gandalf! If you had heard only a quarter of what I have heard about him, and I have only heard very little of all there is to hear, you would be prepared for any sort of remarkable tale. (Tolkien, *The Hobbit or There and Back Again*, p. 5)
- c. You will notice already that Mr. Baggins was not quite so prosy as he liked to believe, also that he was very fond of flowers. (Tolkien, *The Hobbit or There and Back Again*, p. 8)

This type of narrator is thus an example of a first-person narrator that is also heterodiegetic. Heterodiegetic first-person narrators are quite similar to the prominent third-person narrators investigated in Experiment 2, with the key difference being the explicit self-reference via first-person pronouns, which was deliberately avoided in the previous experimental study.

Experiment 3 mirrors Experiment 2 in design, method and even conditions, with one major exception: The evaluative third-person narrator in condition C was replaced with a heterodiegetic first-person narrator, resulting in the following three conditions:

- (131) a. Condition A: The text segment is narrated by a heterodiegetic third-person narrator.
- b. Condition B: The text segment is narrated by a homodiegetic first-person narrator.
- c. Condition C: The text segment is narrated by a heterodiegetic first-person narrator.

⁶⁸See Section 5.2.2.

If the narrator's diegetic properties are the deciding factor in marking the narrator as the preferable perspectival center, then only *homodiegetic* first-person narrators should significantly affect the interpretation of FID. *Heterodiegetic* first-person narrators, on the other hand, would be expected to behave identical to the prominent third-person narrator investigated in Experiment 2, and thus to similarly pattern with the heterodiegetic third-person narrator in condition A. If, however, the use of first-person pronouns automatically increases the narrator's prominence, thereby making them more susceptible to be selected as perspectival center, then it should make no difference whether a first-person narrator is homodiegetic or heterodiegetic, and thus conditions B and C should pattern together instead.

The section is structured the same as Section 5.3: First, the materials designed for Experiment 3 will be described in Section 5.4.2, followed by a discussion of my central hypotheses for the experiment in Section 5.4.3. Finally, the results will be presented and subsequently analyzed in Section 5.4.4.

5.4.2 Method

5.4.2.1 Design and Materials

The 36 items designed for Experiment 2 were reused for Experiment 3, with their content and general structure mostly kept intact: The items consisted of four sentences and featured two protagonists, P1 and P2, introduced via first names. As before, P1 and P2 were of opposite gender, with each character being male in half of the items and female in the other half, to avoid ambiguous pronoun readings. The final sentence always contained FID and was identical across all three conditions. In general, items in conditions A and B only differed with regard to P2, who once again acted as the homodiegetic first-person narrator in condition B. Accordingly, all references to P2 were replaced with first-person pronouns. However, several noteworthy changes were made to each of the items' four sentences that will now be discussed in greater detail on the basis of the exemplary item in (132).⁶⁹

- (132) a. *Es war ein sonniger Nachmittag, als Felix auf Wiebkes Geheiß das Wohnzimmer in einem warmen Weiß strich. Vor einer Woche hatte Felix, ein gelernter Malergeselle, Wiebke seine Hilfe beim Streichen der neuen Wohnung angeboten. Sie nahmen sich zwei Pinsel und begannen mit der Arbeit.*

'It was a sunny afternoon when Felix painted the living room a warm white at Wiebke's behest. A week ago, Felix, a trained apprentice painter, had offered Wiebke his help in painting the new apartment. They took two paintbrushes and got to work.'

- b. *Es war ein sonniger Nachmittag, als Felix auf mein Geheiß das Wohnzimmer in einem warmen Weiß strich. Vor einer Woche hatte Felix, ein*

⁶⁹See Appendix C for further examples of items used in the experiment.

gelernter Malergeselle, mir seine Hilfe beim Streichen der neuen Wohnung angeboten. Wir nahmen uns zwei Pinsel und begannen mit der Arbeit.

‘It was a sunny afternoon when Felix painted the living room a warm white at my behest. A week ago, Felix, a trained apprentice painter, had offered me his help in painting the new apartment. We took two paintbrushes and got to work.’

- c. *Unsere Geschichte beginnt damit, dass Felix auf Wiebkes Geheiß das Wohnzimmer in einem warmen Weiß strich. Voller Hochmut hatte Felix, ein wirklich unfähiger Aufschneider, das kannst du mir glauben, Wiebke seine Hilfe beim Streichen der Wohnung angeboten. Sie nahmen sich zwei Pinsel und begannen mit der Arbeit.*

‘Our story begins with Felix painting the living room a warm white at Wiebke’s behest. Filled with hubris, Felix, a truly incompetent blowhard, believe me, had offered Wiebke his help in painting the apartment. They took two brushes and got to work.’

FID: *Moment mal, der Boden war doch noch gar nicht abgeklebt!*

‘Wait a minute, the floor hadn’t even been taped up yet!’

Regarding the first two clauses, S1 and S2, changes were primarily made to accommodate the new condition C featuring a heterodiegetic first-person narrator instead of a prominent third-person narrator. To make sure that participants would comprehend as intended that the first-person narrator is *not* a character in the story world, S1 starts out with a phrase such as *unsere Geschichte beginnt...* (‘our story begins...’). This not only serves to establish the narrator as just a storyteller, so to speak, and not a protagonist participating in the events of the story, but also makes direct reference to the narrator via first-person pronouns. In an attempt to keep the design of the three versions of the test items as similar to each other as possible, including the relative length of the items, extra material was added to S1 in conditions A and B. As P1 was intended to be regarded as the globally most prominent discourse referent, they are introduced first and act as the subject and agent of S1, whereas P2 is introduced second and only via a prepositional phrase.

As in Experiment 2, evaluative elements as well as meta-comments were added to S2 in condition C to further establish the first-person narrator; in contrast to condition C in Experiment 2, the comment always contained a first-person pronoun, as can be seen in (132c). In addition, an epithet such as *ein wirklich unfähiger Aufschneider* (‘a truly incompetent blowhard’) was added to evaluate P1 from the narrator’s perspective. The epithet expressed a negative evaluation in half of the items and a positive evaluation in the other half. In conditions A and B, a neutral DP was included instead. P1 again acted as the subject of the clause in order to remain the globally more prominent referent, whereas P2 functioned as the clause’s

object.

S3 and S4, too, were redesigned for Experiment 3, though not to accommodate the heterodiegetic first-person narrator, but as a reaction to the results of the previous study. As was discussed in Section 5.3.4, P1 was strongly preferred as the perspectival anchor for FID in all three conditions, which was attributed to their local prominence as well as to the presence of a negatively evaluative epithet referring to P2, i.e., the narrator in condition B, in the FID clause. For Experiment 3, an attempt was made to create a more ambiguous interpretation of FID instead of one clearly geared towards the protagonist as perspectival center. Thus, the epithet was removed from S4 in order to make the homodiegetic first-person narrator more accessible as the thought's potential author. Moreover, P1's local prominence was greatly decreased: Whereas the preceding sentence contained a perception event specifically from P1's point of view in Experiment 2, thereby making them maximally locally prominent, S3 in Experiment 3 instead features P1 and P2 as the joint subject of the clause. Neither S3 nor S4 were modified for condition C.

Additionally, two types of filler items were included in Experiment 3, which both matched the regular items in style and length. Ten type 1 fillers and twenty type 2 fillers were created, resulting in thirty filler items in total. The two filler types are described in more detail in (133); examples for each type are given in (134).

- (133) a. Type 1: Just like for the test items, participants had to decide if an FID clause featured in the text segment expressed a thought of the narrator or of a character in the story. In contrast to the test items, the position of the target clause varies from item to item. Two sub-types of type 1 fillers, type 1a and type 1b, were designed for the experiment.
- i. Type 1a: Feature an obvious comment by the narrator evaluating the sole protagonist of the story.
 - ii. Type 1b: Feature an FID clause clearly anchored to one of two characters in the story; the expressed thought always matches an emotion attributed to one of the protagonists in one of the other three clauses.
- b. Type 2: In contrast to the test items as well as the type 1 fillers, participants were not asked to select a perspectival center, but instead had to answer a question about a random detail implied, though not outright stated, in the story. The question always resolved around attributing a certain characteristic or action to one of the two protagonists mentioned in the story. Half of the type 2 fillers also contained an FID clause, while the other half did not. However, the FID clause was never relevant to the question.
- (134) a. Type 1a: *Alex war einfach ein richtig blöder Sack! Nachdem er die ganze Pause lang hilflose Erstklässler verprügelt hatte, verließ er einfach ohne Erlaubnis den Schulhof. Er ging zielstrebig zu ein paar angeketteten*

Fahrrädern in der Nähe. Lächelnd nahm Alex einen Bolzenschneider aus seinem Rucksack.

‘Alex was simply a really stupid prick! After spending all of recess beating up helpless first graders, he just left the schoolyard without permission. He walked purposefully to a couple of chained bikes nearby. Smiling, Alex took a bolt cutter out of his backpack.’

- b. Type 1b: *Sarah war stinksauer. Obwohl er geschworen hatte, heute pünktlich zu sein, wartete sie nun schon zwei Stunden auf Dieter. Mann, wo steckte dieser Mistkerl denn schon wieder?! Der mühsam vorbereitete Hackbraten war inzwischen eiskalt.*

‘Sarah was furious. Although he had sworn to be on time today, she had been waiting for Dieter for two hours. Man, where was that scumbag again? The painstakingly prepared meatloaf was now ice cold.’

- c. Type 2: *Lukas eilte unter großem Zeitdruck zum Hörsaal. Als er im Raum ankam, saßen bereits alle Studierenden auf ihren Plätzen. Annette hatte ihm netterweise einen Platz frei gehalten. In diesem Moment begann die Vorlesung.*

‘Lukas hurried to the lecture hall under great time pressure. When he arrived in the room, all the students already sat in their seats. Annette had kindly saved him a seat. At that moment, the lecture began.’

The purpose of the type 2 fillers was to distract participants from the actual purpose of the study. FID was included in half of the type 2 fillers so that participants would not develop a reading strategy according to which they would know to only focus on the FID clause whenever one was featured in the story. Furthermore, the questions for type 2 fillers doubled as control questions to check if participants were carefully reading the texts. Type 1 fillers were meant to test if participants were able to correctly identify the perspectival center in contexts in which the choice should be unambiguous. The target sentence in type 1 fillers changed position across items in order to dissuade participants from learning to only focus on the final sentence of each story. 24 control questions, focusing on random details in the stories, were also included to check if participants were paying attention while reading.

5.4.2.2 Participants

40 people (Gender distribution: female = 16, male = 24; age range: 20-67; mean age: 35) participated in Experiment 3, all of them native speakers of German. Two participants grew up multilingual; it was decided to include their data in the analysis. The study was conducted in March 2023. Participants were recruited via Prolific for monetary compensation (£4), though the results for one participant had to be excluded due to not answering at least 75% of the control questions correctly, leaving 39 participants.

5.4.2.3 Procedure

The setup for Experiment 3 was identical to that of Experiment 2: The 36 test items were split into two groups of 18 items each and then distributed across six lists so that participants would see individual items in only of the three conditions. All 30 filler items as well 15⁷⁰ out of the 24 control questions were also added to each list. The lists were once again created via Qualtrics and distributed via Prolific. The task for participants was also the same as in Experiment 2: After each item, they were asked a question about the item and presented with a continuous scale to make a choice. For the test items as well as type 1 fillers, the question always revolved around selecting a perspectival anchor for a thought expressed via FID. Of the two possible answer options, the narrator was always positioned on the left edge of the scale and the name of the protagonist P1 on the right edge. As before, participants were free to move the slider as far in one of the two directions as they felt appropriate, in order to indicate how strong their preference for that option was. Individual points on the scale again corresponded with numeral values from 0 to 100 for the subsequent data analysis, meaning that lower values would indicate a choice for the narrator as perspectival center, while higher values would indicate a choice for the protagonist instead.

Type 2 fillers differed in that participants instead had to answer a question not related to the interpretation of an FID clause, but instead to some random characteristic or action implied in the story to apply to one of the two named protagonists. With regard to the example filler in (134c), for example, participants were asked which of the two protagonists, Lukas or Annette, had arrived at the lecture hall first. While this information is not stated explicitly in the text itself, the correct answer is still made obvious, as it mentions that Annette had saved Lukas a seat and thus would have to have arrived there first. Accordingly, instead of the narrator and P1, the two options depicted on the scale corresponded with the names of the two protagonists. The type 2 fillers were designed to favor P1 in half of the items and P2 in the other half.

5.4.3 Hypotheses

As a follow-up study to Experiment 2, the primary aim of Experiment 3 was to continue building a strong empirical foundation for the intended comparison between FID and ID with regard to the influence of discourse prominence on their interpretation. Experiment 3, too, is thus ultimately in service of providing evidence for H2a (see 127). To be precise, it was intended to further our understanding of the significant effect of homodiegetic first-person narrators on the interpretation of FID. First of all, with regard to conditions A and B, which were identical to Ex-

⁷⁰Not all 24 control questions could be included in each of the six lists, as some were related to specific test items. Naturally, only questions corresponding to items actually featured in a specific list were also added to that list.

periment 2 and featured a heterodiegetic third-person narrator and a homodiegetic first-person narrator, respectively, the expectation nevertheless was that the results would differ somewhat from the previous study. This is due to a change in the item design meant to lessen the apparent overarching preference for the protagonist as perspectival center that was evident in Experiment 2's results. In the test items for Experiment 3, P1, while globally prominent, no longer acts as the experiencer of a perception event in the clause directly preceding FID; instead, P1 and P2/the homodiegetic first-person narrator share subjecthood. Furthermore, FID clauses in Experiment 2 featured a negatively evaluative DP referring to P2/the narrator in condition B, thereby making the first-person narrator less accessible as the perspectival center. This was removed from the FID clauses in Experiment 3. As a result, the interpretation of FID should be more ambiguous and wholly dependent on the relative prominence of the narrator. Consequently, the expectation was for there to be a significant difference in interpretation of FID between condition A and condition B, more pronounced than the one found in Experiment 2, which is outlined in the following two hypotheses, H4a and H4b:

- (135) a. **H4a:** The results for condition A will show an overall preference for the protagonist due to their global prominence, though not as strong as in Experiment 2.
- b. **H4b:** The results for condition B will show an overall preference for the homodiegetic first-person narrator, in accordance with the results of previous studies.

The results for condition C, however, are of primary interest, as they should shed light on whether the homodiegetic first-person narrator's noticeable effect on perspective interpretation is indeed due to their increased prominence via the use of first-person pronouns. There are three plausible options⁷¹ with regard to what the results of the heterodiegetic first-person narrator might possibly show and what this would respectively indicate:

- (136) a. Option 1: Condition C patterns with condition B and thus receives significantly different results from condition A.
- b. Option 2: Condition C patterns with condition A and thus receives significantly different results from condition B.
- c. Option 3: The results for condition C are somewhere in between those of conditions A and B and differ significantly from both.

Option 1 would show that the interpretation of FID is significantly affected by first-person narrators in general, regardless of whether the narrator is a character in the story or not. For the purposes of this investigation, this would represent the

⁷¹Barring completely unexpected results, such as items in condition C showing an even greater preference for the narrator than items in condition B.

5.4 EXPERIMENT 3

most desirable outcome, as it would provide substantial evidence that it is indeed the *prominence* of the narrator, increased through the use of first-person pronouns, which has a major influence on the interpretation of speech and thought reports. In contrast, option 2 represents the least desirable outcome, as it would strongly imply that only *homodiegetic* narrators are able to influence the interpretation of FID, whereas the use of first-person pronouns in and of itself has no significant effect. As it is unclear whether the narrator's diegetic nature is in any way related to or affects their prominence, this would consequently call into question if the established effect of homodiegetic first-person narrators is truly attributable to the factor of discourse prominence.

Finally, option 3 allows for a potential interaction of the two factors: It might be the case that both the use of first-person pronouns and the narrator being part of the story world influence the interpretation of FID in favor of the narrator. Accordingly, a first-person narrator who is *not* also a character in the story does significantly affect the interpretation of FID, but not as much as a first-person narrator that is also homodiegetic. As a result, items narrated by a heterodiegetic first-person narrator should show a stronger tendency for participants to choose the narrator over the protagonist as perspectival center than items narrated by a third-person narrator. Items narrated by a homodiegetic first-person narrator, however, should then show the strongest preference for the narrator, as they provide the ideal context for the narrator to act as perspectival center. This would represent an adequate outcome with regard to the goals of this investigations as well, as it would also demonstrate that the prominence of the narrator is a deciding factor in affecting the interpretation of FID. The possibility that other properties of the narrator, namely their diegetic nature, might also play a role does not discredit that notion.

While all of the options described in (136) seem like plausible results for condition C, I will tentatively formulate the following hypothesis H4c, which, in line with previous considerations on the important role of discourse prominence, favors option 1:

- (137) **H4c:** The results for condition C will show an overall preference for the narrator and pattern with those of condition B, thereby demonstrating that the overall prominence of first-person narrators, in general, is the deciding factor in marking the narrator as a potent perspectival center.

To summarize, my overall hypothesis for the results of Experiment 3 is that condition A will receive relatively high ratings on a scale from 0-100 – albeit less so than the ratings for condition A in Experiment 2, due to the protagonist's decreased local prominence – reflecting a preference for the protagonist as perspectival center. In contrast, both conditions B and C will receive relatively low ratings, indicating an overall preference to select the narrator as perspectival center. Furthermore, I predict there to be no significant difference between the ratings for condition B and

for condition C.

5.4.4 Results and Discussion

5.4.4.1 Results

For Experiment 3, the results of 39 remaining participants were analyzed using the statistics software R. They were first reported in Hinterwimmer & Saure (2024). Just like in Experiment 2, the continuous scale ratings were measured on a scale from 0-100, with low ratings between 0 and 49 indicating a preference for the narrator and high ratings between 51 and 100 indicating a preference for the protagonist. The mean values for each of the three conditions for all 36 items were calculated using the `lme4` function (Bates et al. 2015). Their significance was checked via a linear mixed-effects model.⁷² The mean values are depicted in Table 4.⁷³ Figure 14 additionally illustrates the distribution of the data.⁷⁴

Condition	Mean Value (Model Estimate)	CI
Condition A: Heterodiegetic _{3rd person}	30.65	[25.12 ; 36.18]
Condition B: Homodiegetic _{1st person}	15.82	[10.29 ; 21.35]
Condition C: Heterodiegetic _{1st person}	19.51	[13.98 ; 25.05]

Table 4: Mean continuous scale choice ratings (model estimate) and 95%-confidence intervals for Experiment 3.

As expected, both conditions B and C received low mean ratings of below twenty, thus displaying an overall strong preference for the narrator as perspectival center. Surprisingly, however, this extends to condition A as well: Condition A's mean rating of 30.65 is far below fifty and, therefore, also reflects a preference for the narrator, even for items in which the narrator should not have been perceived as a prominent discourse referent. Nevertheless, there was a higher significant difference between the mean values of condition A and condition B (estimate = -14.83, SE = 2.4, $p < 0.001$) than for Experiment 2; moreover, in contrast to Experiment 2, there was also a significant difference between condition A and condition C (estimate = -11.13, SE = 2.4, $p < 0.001$). Figure 14 further showcases that the data points for items in condition A are distributed quite differently from those in the other two conditions, as they are spread much further across the scale. Finally, there was no significant difference between condition B and condition C (estimate = 3.69, SE = 2.39, $p = 0.124$).

⁷²The model was specified using the same formula as in the previous two experimental studies: $\text{Answer} \sim \text{Condition} + (1 \mid \text{Subjects}) + (1 \mid \text{Items})$. The model did not converge until random slope effects were taken out of the equation; the calculated p-values are therefore not 100% reliable. T-tests were calculated using the Satterthwaite's method of the `lmerTest` packages.

⁷³Rounded to the second decimal place.

⁷⁴Short explanation of Figure 14: The red dot marks the mean value while the bold horizontal line signifies the median for each condition. The boxes display where the bulk of the data, namely the 25% of data below and above the median, is located.




Figure 14: Mean continuous scale choice ratings (model estimate) on a scale between 0 and 100 for Experiment 3. A rating between 0 and 49 indicates a tendency to interpret the FID clause from the perspective of the narrator, while a rating between 51 and 100 indicates a tendency to interpret the FID clause from the perspective of the prominent protagonist.

With regard to the fillers, type 1a fillers, i.e., fillers featuring an unambiguous narrator comment, accordingly received a very low mean rating of 3.27. In contrast, type 1b fillers, which instead feature an FID clause clearly reflecting the point of view of one of the protagonists, received an overall high mean rating of 77.35, reflecting a strong preference for the protagonist as perspectival center.⁷⁵ These results demonstrate that participants were generally capable of choosing the correct perspectival center in contexts in which the choice should be obvious. Type 2 fillers were designed to feature P1 as the correct answer in half of the items and P2 as the correct answer in the other half. This is reflected in an even distribution of data points and a mean rating of 41.51.

5.4.4.2 Discussion

Overall, the results for Experiment 3 stand in stark contrast to those of Experiment 2: Whereas the latter reflected an overarching preference for the protagonist as perspectival center across conditions, the opposite is the case for Experiment 3. These results illustrate that significantly decreasing P1’s local prominence worked even more effectively than expected: The original prediction made in H4a, as defined in (135a), was that the results for condition A would still show a preference for the protagonist, albeit to a lesser degree than in Experiment 2. Evidently, removing the protagonist’s local prominence impacted their potential to be selected as perspecti-

⁷⁵Incidentally, the mean rating for type 1b fillers differs significantly from their even higher median value of 90, indicating that it might have been distorted by individual, particularly low values in the data.

val center much more than anticipated. While this calls into question the assumed relevance of global prominence as argued for in, *inter alia*, Hinterwimmer (2019) and Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019), it also once more provides substantial evidence for the importance of local prominence and its effect on perspective interpretation. In fact, these results appear to confirm the tentative hierarchy of perspectival centers in narrative discourse proposed by Bimpikou (2020) and illustrated again in (138):

(138) locally prominent character (experiencer) > narrator > globally prominent character (Bimpikou 2020: 30)

Presumably, then, the overall preference for the protagonist as perspectival anchor for FID in Experiment 2 can be primarily attributed to their local prominence. It must thus be due to the content of the FID clause favoring an interpretation from the perspective of the protagonist that the (still significant) difference between stories narrated by a homodiegetic first-person narrator and stories narrated by a heterodiegetic third-person narrator was not quite as striking as in Bimpikou's results. Accordingly, the expectation is that a study design similar to Experiment 3, with respect to the removal of the evaluative DP referring to the homodiegetic narrator from the FID clause, but keeping P1's local prominence intact by featuring them as the experiencer of a perception event in the directly preceding sentence, as was done for Experiment 2, should receive identical results to those of Bimpikou's (2020) first experimental study.⁷⁶ However, due to the limitations of this thesis, experimental attempts to confirm this tentative prediction will have to be left to future investigations.

In contrast to H4a, my two other hypotheses H4b and H4c, as defined in (135b) and (137), respectively, correctly predicted the outcomes for conditions B and C. As expected, condition B received overall low ratings, reflecting a clear preference for the narrator as perspectival center. This, too, is in line with Bimpikou's hierarchy, which states that only locally prominent protagonists outrank narrators as perspectival centers, and further demonstrates the impact of homodiegetic first-person narrators, as the difference between conditions A and B was highly significant. More importantly, the results for condition C confirm that this effect must indeed be due to the use of first-person pronouns by the narrator. As predicted by H4c, the first of the three options described in (136) proved to be the correct one: Conditions B and C patterned together, as their results did not differ significantly from each other; however, for both conditions, the results showed a significant difference from those of condition A.

Figure 14 shows that there was a difference in the distribution of data between conditions B and C that hints at a potential interaction between the use of first-person pronouns and the diegetic properties of the narrator, the possibility of which was acknowledged in option 3 in (136c). However, the evidence for such an effect

⁷⁶See Section 5.2.2 for a description of the study design and results.

is inconclusive with regards to the results of the current study. Ultimately, the results for Experiment 3 validate that the differences between heterodiegetic third-person narrators and homodiegetic first-person narrators, as evidenced in this and the previous study, are primarily due to the latter's increased prominence via first-person pronouns.

This concludes the analysis of the interplay between narrator and protagonist prominence and its effect on the interpretation of FID specifically. The collected data will be used as a baseline for the investigation of discourse prominence as a major factor in governing the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions in ID in the next sections. While other factors, such as global prominence or the establishment of the narrator as an evaluative perspective-holder, should not be dismissed as inconsequential, the combined results of Experiments 2 and 3 have provided substantial empirical evidence that local prominence and the use of first-person pronouns are especially relevant when selecting the perspectival center: If a protagonist is made locally prominent, they are the overall preferred perspectival center independently of narrative situation. However, if either a homodiegetic or a heterodiegetic narrator uses first-person pronouns for self-reference, it significantly improves their potential to become the preferred perspectival center instead. In general, the narrator appears to be the preferred perspectival center in contexts in which no protagonist is locally prominent. The next section will examine if these findings hold true for ID as well.

5.5 Prominence and Indirect Discourse

The primary purpose of the previous sections was to establish the relevance of discourse prominence as a major factor in marking a discourse referent as the perspectival center of a clause or larger discourse unit. Specifically, it was discussed how certain prominence-lending cues may affect the interpretation of FID, both with regard to the interaction of various protagonists introduced in the prior context, as well as the interplay between the protagonists and the narrator. As the overview provided in Section 5.2 illustrated, the correlation between perspectivization and prominence or salience has been an increasingly popular topic of research in recent years: A large number of both theoretical and empirical investigations, such as the ones by Hinterwimmer (2019), Meuser (2022) or Bimpikou (2020), have been conducted with the goal of providing new and valuable insights into the properties a referent has to possess in order to be available as perspectival anchor of FID. To date, however, previous works on the topic have mostly ignored the question of whether the interpretation of ID clauses may similarly be affected by prominence-lending cues.

The most plausible explanation for this lack of interest is that it stems from the overall consensus in the literature that ID does not allow perspective shift in

general, and thus, the question of which discourse referent may potentially act as its perspectival center does not arise either. As the results for Experiment 1 in Section 3.3 have demonstrated, though, this assumption is incorrect and based primarily on examples which easily allow for the accommodation of an everyday conversational context. Provided that it is clearly and unambiguously established that an ID clause is part of a narrative context, its potential for multiperspectivity is unlocked and other discourse referents than the speaker/narrator become available as perspectival centers. Therefore, in narrative contexts, at least, the question of how, exactly, a discourse referent is selected as the perspectival anchor of ID becomes just as relevant as it is for FID, with one major concession: Only in FID, but not in ID, is the interpretation of the reported thought as a whole and its anchoring to a discourse referent, to be regarded as the thought's author, dependent on the available referents' prominence. In ID, in contrast, the identity of the thought's or utterance's author is made explicit and is thus unambiguous and not at all reliant on contextual cues. The role of ID's perspectival center thus only extends to determining the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions in its scope. What this means, in turn, for the factor of discourse prominence with regard to ID is that the prominence status of discourse referents, too, can only affect the reading of expressives and shifty indexicals.

The importance of discourse prominence also factored into the design of the test items used in Experiment 1, which deliberately provided an ideal context for perspective shift. As the exemplary test item first illustrated in (82) and repeated below in (139) shows, this encompassed establishing a narrative context, but also making the matrix subject of the ID clause maximally prominent.

(139) *Vor über einem Jahrzehnt arbeitete Marek als Architekt an einem ziemlich komplexen Bauprojekt. Als er gerade über einem neuen Entwurf für den geplanten Freizeitpark grübelte, wurde er in das Büro seiner Chefin gerufen. Marek dachte sich, dass ihm heute wohl endlich eine Beförderung von dieser Pedantin angeboten würde.*

'Over a decade ago, Marek was working as an architect on a fairly complex clause project. As he was mulling over a new design for the planned amusement park, he was called into his boss's office. Marek thought to himself that today he would probably finally be offered a promotion by this pedant.'

This was accomplished by featuring the protagonist, Marek in (139), as the subject of the sentence directly preceding the ID clause, thereby making him locally prominent. In addition, another sentence was purposefully inserted at the beginning of the text to provide the ID clause with a more elaborate discourse context, which established Marek as the discourse topic, thus making him globally prominent as well. In contrast, the prominence status of the narrator was kept as low as possible by having the stories be narrated by a covert heterodiegetic third-person narrator;

as the studies by Bimpikou (2020) have illustrated, prominent protagonists are especially preferred as perspectival centers in contexts that feature this type of narrator. As the results of Experiment 1 demonstrated, a shifted interpretation of temporal indexicals in the scope of an ID clause – the only available coherent reading with respect to the items’ context – was deemed to be fully acceptable and natural by readers under these conditions, even in direct comparison with identical FID and DD clauses, as well as ID clauses featuring an anaphoric temporal adverbial instead.

This leaves open the possibility, however, that instances of perspective shift in ID might be regarded as less acceptable given a context in which the matrix subject is not established as the maximally prominent discourse referent. Alternatively, if an interpretation from the narrator’s perspective would, in contrast to the items constructed for Experiment 1, also be coherent with regard to the clause’s content, one could expect that readers might be more inclined to choose the narrator as the perspectival center if the narrator was deemed to be more prominent – for example, in stories narrated by a homodiegetic first-person narrator. In fact, this would be the predicted outcome if we expect ID to behave similarly to FID, which is what I propose.

As the studies in Meuser (2022) and Bimpikou (2020), as well as the results for Experiments 2 and 3, have confirmed, FID, if otherwise ambiguous with regard to its interpretation, is anchored to the maximally prominent discourse referent. Thus, with regard to ID, the prediction is that perspective-dependent expressions are also interpreted from the context of the discourse referent who is regarded as most prominent. While the factors governing perspective shifts between the speaker and the matrix subject of an ID sentence are of primary interest for this investigation, the experimental evidence presented in Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019) and Meuser (2022) raise an interesting possibility that has not been considered so far: If whichever discourse referent that is maximally prominent in relation to the other available referents automatically serves as perspectival center, then, in theory, perspective-dependent expressions in ID could also be interpreted from the perspective of some other protagonist as well – i.e., a discourse referent who is neither the speaker nor the matrix subject of the ID clause. This indeed seems to be the case if we regard examples like (140), in which the protagonist that serves as the author of the ID clause is established as much less prominent, both with regard to grammatical function and referential expression, than the other protagonist introduced in the prior context.

- (140) *Voller Zorn betrachtete Sebastian die unfähige Kellnerin, mit der er sich beim Besuch seiner Stammkneipe vor zwei Wochen kurz unterhalten hatte. Sie hatte gesagt, dass es heute ein Biertasting mit bayrischem Exportbier geben würde. Doch tatsächlich würde das Biertasting erst im November stattfinden.*
 ‘Full of anger, Sebastian looked at the incompetent waitress with whom he

had briefly spoken during a visit to his favorite pub two weeks ago. She had said that there would be a beer tasting with Bavarian export beer today. But the beer tasting would actually not take place until November.’

(140) features two protagonists, Sebastian and an unnamed waitress, the latter of which serves as the author of a speech event reported via ID. The context clarifies that the original utterance of the waitress took place two weeks prior to Sebastian’s time of reference, which, due to the use of past tense, must lie in the past in relation to the time of narration. Thus, (140) can be said to feature three distinct time points reflecting, respectively, the context of each of the three discourse referents. Theoretically, each of these points in time could act as reference points for the temporal indexical *heute* (‘today’) contained in the ID clause. If we were to only consider the speaker/narrator and the author of the reported utterance as potential perspectival centers, than an interpretation from Sebastian’s point of view should not be an option. However, to the contrary, the most intuitive, natural reading of *heute* is the one in which it refers to the day on which Sebastian is looking at the waitress, i.e., Sebastian’s ‘today’.

The reason that Sebastian acts as the preferred perspectival center in (140) is that he is the most prominent discourse referent in terms of grammatical function, thematic role and referential expression: He is the subject of the directly preceding clause, is the experiencer of a perception event and is introduced via proper name. In contrast, the waitress is the object of the preceding clause and is only introduced via definite description. Furthermore, the story is also narrated by a covert heterodiegetic third-person narrator, i.e., a narrator with a comparatively low prominence. As the results from Experiment 2 as well as the empirical studies conducted in Bimpikou (2020) have demonstrated, locally prominent protagonists are preferred as perspectival centers for FID over this type of narrator. The fact that the same seems to hold true for ID indicates that hypothesis H2a (cf. (103)) is indeed correct. Further evidence of this will be provided shortly.

As mentioned earlier, the relevance of discourse prominence for the interpretation of ID has, as of yet, not been a topic of research in previous works interested in the relation between prominence and perspectivization. An indication that ID is also affected by prominence-lending cues is given in Hinterwimmer (2018): In his examination of the distribution of DPros in the *Brenner* novels by Wolf Haas, he observes that DPros cannot be used to refer to main character Simon Brenner whenever Brenner functions as either the perspectival center of a sentence or segment of text or as its most prominent discourse referent. If, however, the sentence or text segment consists of a comment by the evaluative narrator, said narrator becomes the most prominent referent instead, and thus, Brenner is free to be picked up by a DPro in these contexts (cf. Hinterwimmer 2018: 139; see Section 5.2.2 for a more extensive description of the central argument). Hinterwimmer (2018) notices that

DPros can similarly also not be used to refer to Brenner in instances of ID which feature Brenner as their matrix subject.

- (141) a. *Da ist der Brenner wieder der Richtige gewesen. [...] Obwohl – der war kein Geheimdetektiv. Hat es jedem gesagt, der es wissen wollte, dass er wegen der Liftgeschichte da ist.* (Haas, *Auferstehung der Toten*, p. 15; as cited in Hinterwimmer (2018: 132)).
 ‘So Brenner was the right man again. [...] Although - he_{DPro} wasn’t a secret detective. Told everyone who wanted to know that he was there because of the elevator story.’
- b. *#Hat es jedem gesagt, der es wissen wollte, dass der wegen der Liftgeschichte da ist.* (Hinterwimmer 2018: 133)
 ‘#Told everyone who wanted to know that he_{DPro} was there because of the elevator story.’

The example in (141a) displays the original segment from *Auferstehung der Toten*, the first part of which consists of a narrator comment about Simon Brenner. The second clause in particular could be regarded as a completely neutral description of Brenner’s occupation, but gains an evaluative reading due to the use of a DPro in reference to Brenner. The final clause, however, consists of an ID clause from Brenner’s perspective and instead uses a personal pronoun for reference. While the use of personal pronouns in and of itself cannot serve as an indicator of Brenner’s prominence status, as personal pronouns are free to pick up any discourse referent regardless of prominence, Hinterwimmer (2018) illustrates via the altered version of the sentence displayed in (141b) that using a DPro in this context would be infelicitous. He further argues that this is in line with his observation that protagonists cannot be picked up via DPro in sentences or stretches of text for which they function as the perspectival center, such as instances of FID; in (141), Brenner is supposedly the perspectival center of the ID clause (cf. Hinterwimmer 2018: 133). Thus, he can only be referred to via DPro in the preceding two clauses, for which the narrator acts as perspectival center instead.

Meuser (2022), in particular, has provided ample empirical evidence for the claim that in contexts featuring two or more discourse referents, only the locally most prominent referent is available to act as perspectival anchor for FID.⁷⁷ While she focuses on the acceptability of FID clauses that are unambiguously anchored to a specific protagonist, the examples in (142) illustrate that the protagonists’ prominence also governs the *interpretation* of FID clauses which are otherwise ambiguous.

- (142) a. *Benny betrat den Bus und setzte sich neben eine ältere Frau. Unglaublich, wie voll es um diese Uhrzeit schon war!*

⁷⁷See Section 5.2.1 for a discussion of Meuser’s (2022) experimental studies.

‘Benny entered the bus and sat down next to an older woman. Unbelievable how crowded it was at this time of day already!’

- b. *Ein junger Mann betrat den Bus und setzte sich neben Helga. Unglaublich, wie voll es um diese Uhrzeit schon war!*

‘A young man entered the bus and sat down next to Helga. Unbelievable how crowded it was at this time of day already!’

In (142a), two discourse referents, Benny and the older woman, are introduced in the first sentence. Of the two, Benny is the more prominent referent both in terms of grammatical function and referential expression, two prominence-lending cues that Meuser’s studies have confirmed to impact the acceptability of FID. The FID clause in the examples in (142), however, does not favor either of the two protagonists with regard to its content, as both could theoretically be surprised at how crowded the bus is. Nevertheless, the only felicitous reading of (142a) is one in which the FID clause is anchored to Benny, i.e., the locally prominent protagonist. In (142b), on the other hand, the interpretation of the FID clause is much more ambiguous. While the male discourse referent is still more prominent with regard to grammatical function, he is only referred to via an indefinite DP, whereas the female discourse referent is now introduced via proper name and is therefore more prominent with regard to referential expression. This effectively makes both protagonists more or less equally prominent and thereby complicates the selection of a perspectival center for the FID clause.

(143) showcases the effect of global prominence, as Helga is now additionally established as the discourse topic of the larger text segment. While the two protagonists maintain their equal local prominence status from (142b) due to the conflicting prominence-lending cues, Helga’s increased global prominence serves to facilitate a reading of the FID clause from her perspective.

- (143) *Nachdem sich Helga am Kiosk einen Kaffee und eine Zeitung gekauft hatte, eilte sie zur Bushaltestelle. Etwas außer Atem stieg Helga ein und suchte sich einen Platz ganz hinten im Bus. Ein junger Mann betrat den Bus und setzte sich neben Helga. Unglaublich, wie voll es um diese Uhrzeit schon war!*

‘After Helga had bought a coffee and a newspaper at the kiosk, she hurried to the bus stop. A little out of breath, Helga got on and looked for a seat at the very back of the bus. A young man entered the bus and sat down next to Helga. Unbelievable how crowded it was at this time of day already!’

The example in (140) indicated that the same applies to ID: The most prominent discourse referent serves as perspectival center, which in turn affects the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions in the scope of the propositional attitude verb. From the examples in (142a), (142b) and (143), all of which are informed by the results of the investigations in Meuser (2022) as well as Hinterwimmer (2019) and Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019), three predictions for ID can be derived:

- (144)
- i. Perspective-dependent expressions in ID will be preferably interpreted from the context of the protagonist which is locally most prominent, even if said protagonist is not the author of the reported utterance.
 - ii. The interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions in ID will be left ambiguous if the available discourse referents are equally prominent on a local level.
 - iii. Perspective-dependent expressions in ID will be preferably interpreted from the context of the protagonist that is maximally prominent on a global level, given a situation in which no protagonist is more prominent than the other on a local level.

Generally, all of these predictions are made under the prerequisite of a narrative context, as is the case for all instances of perspective shift. However, an additional condition must be formulated which specifically pertains to and restricts shifts between the contexts of individual protagonists: In order to be available as the perspectival center of a speech or thought report, a discourse referent must be aware of both the existence and the content of the original speech or thought event that is being reported. While this may perhaps appear as an obvious requirement, it effectively limits the types of ID clauses under consideration to speech reports only. This is due to the fact that characters in a story, as opposed to narrators, will usually be assumed to possess the same cognitive abilities as human beings do in real life. Whereas a narrating figure can believably give insight into any character's thought processes, feelings or state of mind, a character who acts as the focalizer of a given text segment, or even a story as a whole, can still only be expected to possess knowledge about events he or she perceives (or has perceived) directly or is informed about. This includes utterances made by other protagonists, but should preclude their inner thoughts, unless it can be inferred that the thought event was actively communicated to the focalizer.

In short, the predictions made in (144), which focus on perspective shifts between individual protagonists, can only be tested with regard to speech reports. The validity of the predictions is tested in the examples below. First, (145) showcases if protagonists that are maximally locally prominent are indeed preferred as perspectival centers over the actual author of a speech event.

(145) **Der Überfall**

Anne spazierte durch die Straßen New Yorks und rief ihren Cousin an, da sie ihn seit ihrem Umzug aus ihrer kleinen Heimatstadt in Maine nicht mehr gesehen hatte.

'The robbery'

'Anne walked through the streets of New York and called her cousin, because she hadn't seen him since moving away from their small hometown in Maine.'

- a. *Er sagte ihr, dass sie hier bestimmt schneller einen Job finden würde.*
 ‘He told her that she would certainly find a job here more quickly.’
- b. *Er sagte ihr, dass sie dort bestimmt schneller einen Job finden würde.*
 ‘He told her that she would certainly find a job there more quickly.’

The first clause introduces two protagonists, Anne and her unnamed cousin, and establishes that the two are situated at different locations at the time of their conversation: Anne is in New York, while her cousin is in their hometown in Maine. The subsequent ID sentence contains a spatial indexical, alternatively either *hier* (‘here’) in (145a) or *dort* (‘there’) in (145b). The short text segment is headed by a story title to facilitate a narrative reading.

The proposition expressed in the ID clause is deliberately left open to theoretically allow both a reading in which Anne’s cousin is stating that Anne will have better luck finding a job in New York or would have found one quicker if she had stayed in their hometown. Accordingly, the interpretation of the spatial indexicals depends on the choice of perspectival center: If interpreted from the matrix subject’s, i.e., Anne’s cousin’s context, on the one hand, then *hier* in (145a) would refer to their hometown and *dort* in (145b) to New York; if interpreted from Anne’s context, who is the maximally locally prominent protagonist in terms of both grammatical function and referential expression, on the other hand, then it would be the other way around. Intuitively, an interpretation from Anne’s perspective is more natural, especially with respect to (145b). While (145a) seems to allow both readings – though the one from Anne’s context is preferable by my estimation – (145b) is infelicitous if forcefully read from the cousin’s perspective. In other words, the only available reading of *dort* in (145b) is the one in which it refers to Anne’s hometown, i.e., not the place where *she* is at the time of utterance.

The example is altered slightly for (146) in order to test the prediction formulated in (144-ii): In cases where neither protagonist can be said to be more locally prominent than the other, the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions in ID should be left ambiguous. Similarly to the FID example in (142b), one protagonist acts as the subject and is therefore more prominent with regard to grammatical function, while the other is referred to via proper name and is thus more prominent with regard to referential expression.

(146) **Der Überfall**

Neds Cousine spazierte durch die Straßen New Yorks und rief ihn an, da sie ihn seit ihrem Umzug aus ihrer kleinen Heimatstadt in Maine nicht mehr gesehen hatte.

‘The robbery’

‘Ned’s cousin walked through the streets of New York and called him, because she hadn’t seen him since moving away from their small hometown in Maine.’

- a. *Er sagte ihr, dass sie hier bestimmt schneller einen Job finden würde.*

‘He told her that she would certainly find a job here more quickly.’

- b. *Er sagte ihr, dass sie dort bestimmt schneller einen Job finden würde.*

‘He told her that she would certainly find a job there more quickly.’

Interestingly enough, the text segment as a whole is slightly less natural in this modified version, which actually is another indication that the selection of a perspectival center heavily relies on prominence-lending cues: In neutral narration, a “character’s physical location in time and space” is adopted “as a vantage point from which to interpret temporal and spatial information” (van Krieken et al. 2017: 5f.; also cf. Fillmore 1997: 99). To be more precise, it is the character who acts as the current focalizer of a sentence or text segment whose vantage point is adopted. In (145), Anne is marked as the perspectival center due to being locally prominent and thus, the reader naturally adopts her vantage point. In (146), however, the two protagonists are equally prominent, which, as predicted, renders the selection of a perspectival center inconclusive. As the protagonists additionally differ with regard to their physical locations, the reader is left unsure which vantage point he is supposed to adopt, thereby impeding their processing of the story.

Regarding the interpretation of the spatial indexicals in (146a) and (146b), however, the interpretation is less ambiguous than expected: In contrast to the FID clause in (142b), which could be anchored to either one of the two equally prominent protagonists, the protagonist introduced via proper name, i.e., Ned, seems to me to be the preferable perspectival center in (146). I do not regard this as an indicator that referential expression might outrank grammatical function as a prominence-lending cue, which has not been attested by Meuser’s (2022) experimental studies, but rather attribute it to the key difference between FID and ID: ID, contrary to FID, explicitly names the author of the reported speech or thought event in its matrix clause, which could plausibly further increase the prominence status of said protagonist. Thus, given a context like the one in (146), in which no discourse referent can be said to be maximally locally prominent, readers might automatically interpret ID from the perspective of its matrix subject.

The prediction made in (144-iii), regarding the effect of global prominence, is examined in (147) below, which contains a version of the example in which the matrix subject of the ID clause is globally prominent, but both protagonists are equally prominent with regard to the sentence immediately preceding ID, as in (146).

(147) **Der Überfall**

Ned spazierte für ein paar Stunden durch seine kleine Heimatstadt in Maine, um das schöne Wetter zu genießen. Der Herbst war schon immer Neds Lieblingsjahreszeit gewesen. Als er schließlich wieder zuhause war, erhielt er einen Anruf seiner Cousine. Seine Cousine saß in einem Café in New York und wollte mit Ned sprechen, da sie ihn seit ihrem Umzug nicht mehr

gesehen hatte.

‘The robbery’

‘Ned walked around his small hometown in Maine for a few hours to enjoy the beautiful weather. Autumn had always been Ned’s favorite season. When he was finally back home, he received a call from his cousin. His cousin was sitting in a café in New York and wanted to talk to Ned, as she hadn’t seen him since she moved away.’

a. *Er sagte ihr, dass sie hier bestimmt schneller einen Job finden würde.*

‘He told her that she would certainly find a job here more quickly.’

b. *Er sagte ihr, dass sie dort bestimmt schneller einen Job finden würde.*

‘He told her that she would certainly find a job there more quickly.’

As expected, the preference for the matrix subject, i.e., Ned, as the perspectival center of the ID clause is strongest in this context: Due to Ned being established as the discourse topic of the text segment as a whole, the spatial indexicals in the ID sentence can only be understood as reflecting his point of view; thus, *hier* in (147a) refers to Ned’s location at reference time and *dort* in (147b) must be taken to refer to a place different from Ned’s location, i.e., in this context the location of his cousin.

Based on these examples, one can conclude that the interpretation of ID, like FID, is dependent on the prominence of the available discourse referents, which is in line with H2a: In both cases, the discourse referent who is deemed most prominent with regard to the prior context is preferred as perspectival center. Differences between the two modes of speech and thought representation with regard to how strongly their interpretation is affected by prominence-lending cues stem from the fact that only ID explicitly names the author of the reported utterance or thought. For one thing, this enables FID to be fully anchored to the perspectival center, i.e., the most prominent discourse referent, whereas for ID, it is only the case that perspective-dependent expressions in the clause are shifted to the context of the preferred perspectival center. Moreover, the author’s prominence status may potentially be increased by additionally functioning as the matrix subject of the ID clause, thereby increasing their likelihood of being selected as perspectival center.

Regarding the interaction between narrator and protagonist prominence, the combined results of Experiments 2 and 3 have demonstrated that only narrators who use first-person pronouns for explicit self-reference are prominent enough to significantly impact the acceptability and interpretation of FID clauses. This applies regardless of whether the first-person narrator is homodiegetic or heterodiegetic. For this reason, the analysis, as well as the subsequent experimental investigation in Section 5.6, with respect to the effect of the narrator’s prominence on the interpretation of ID will only concentrate on and compare and contrast the following two narrative situations: narrative contexts featuring a covert heterodiegetic third-

person narrator, i.e., a narrator with low prominence, and narrative contexts featuring a homodiegetic first-person narrator, i.e., a narrator with high prominence. Other types of narrators, such as the type of evaluative heterodiegetic first-person narrator featured in the *Brenner* novels and investigated in Experiment 3, will be left out of the discussion, as there is no evidence that their effect on perspective interpretation differs from that of homodiegetic ones.

The expectation is that, in this case, too, the effect on perspective shift in ID will mirror the effect that has been ascertained for FID: In general, there should be a stronger preference for the narrator as perspectival center in stories narrated by a homodiegetic first-person narrator than in stories narrated by a heterodiegetic third-person narrator, due to the former's increased prominence. However, in accordance with Bimpikou's (2020) proposed hierarchy of perspectival centers (cf. 122) and the results for Experiment 2, it should also be expected that locally prominent protagonists are preferred over first-person narrators. Thus, if the ID clause is preceded by a sentence in which the protagonist is maximally prominent, perspective-dependent expressions should receive a shifted reading. If the protagonist does not outrank the homodiegetic first-person narrator in terms of local prominence, though, perspective-dependent expressions contained in the ID clause should receive an unshifted interpretation.

The examples in (148), which are inspired by the design of the test items Bimpikou (2020) used in her first two experimental studies, represent a first attempt at testing these predictions with regard to the interpretation of expressives. Expressives are tested instead of spatial or temporal indexicals because an examination of the latter's behavior requires a more elaborate discourse context which establishes a different location or reference time, respectively, for the narrator and the protagonist. This is particularly difficult to achieve with regard to contexts featuring a covert third-person narrator, as the narrator's prominence will inevitably be increased to a certain degree by explicitly mentioning their location or the time of narration.

(148) *Am Strand herrschte große Aufregung, da ein toter Hai angespült worden war.*

‘There was a lot of commotion on the beach as a dead shark had washed up.’

a. *Jason und Martha spazierten zufällig gerade den Strand entlang. Jason blieb stehen und starrte den Hai an.*

‘Jason and Martha happened to be strolling along the beach. Jason stopped and stared at the shark.’

b. *Jason und ich spazierten zufällig gerade den Strand entlang. Jason blieb stehen und starrte den Hai an.*

‘Jason and I happened to be strolling along the beach. Jason stopped and stared at the shark.’

c. *Jason und ich spazierten zufällig gerade den Strand entlang. Wir blieben stehen und starrten den Hai an.*

‘Jason and I happened to be strolling along the beach. We stopped and stared at the shark.’

Er sagte, dass die abscheuliche Kreatur schon vor einigen Tagen gestorben sein musste.

‘He said that the vile creature must have died a few days ago.’

(148a) features a heterodiegetic third-person narrator and a locally prominent protagonist in Jason, who is the experiencer of a perception event in the sentence directly preceding the ID clause. Accordingly, a reading in which the evaluative description of the dead shark as a vile creature is attributed to the narrator is rather unnatural. Instead, Jason is preferred as the perspectival center for the ID clause, which thus receives a *de dicto* reading. In contrast, the story is narrated by a homodiegetic first-person narrator in both (148b) and (148c), which differ with regard to the local prominence of the protagonist.

In (148b), Jason is again maximally locally prominent. However, the narrator’s prominence is increased on a global level due to the use of first-person pronouns. According to Bimpikou’s hierarchy, the locally prominent protagonist should nevertheless be preferred as perspectival center, yet the interpretation of the epithet in the ID clause appears to be more or less ambiguous, perhaps with a slight preference for the protagonist. However, this assessment is not far off from the results of Bimpikou’s (2020) second experiment, which only showed a preference of 54% for the protagonist as the perspectival anchor of FID in similar contexts. Finally, the prediction for examples like (148c) is that the homodiegetic first-person narrator should be the strongly preferred perspectival center for the ID clause, as the protagonist is no longer more prominent on a local level. While it does intuitively seem more natural to ascribe the evaluative epithet in the ID clause to the narrator in this instance and thus derive a *de re* reading, the choice is not as clear as it was demonstrated to be for FID in Bimpikou (2020): Bimpikou’s second experimental study showed a preference of 95% for the narrator as perspectival center in such discourse contexts. Potentially, this preference for the first-person narrator is slightly decreased for ID due to the protagonist additionally functioning as the subject of its matrix clause, which has been noted earlier to possibly increase the protagonist’s prominence status.

To gain empirical insight into the effect of the narrator’s prominence on the interpretation of ID, as well as to gather evidence for H2a, a fourth experimental study was conducted. The experiment implements a similar design and method to the ones used in Experiments 2 and 3, in order to obtain data that is suitable for comparative analyses. Experiment 4 thus also consists of a continuous scale choice study, which, however, focuses on temporal indexicals in ID specifically, in

the same vein as the acceptability ratings study in Experiment 1 did. In addition, the experiment was also designed to simultaneously test the hypothesis that only (fictional) narratives possess a potential for multiperspectivity. While this has been a popular and largely unanimously accepted view in the literature, it has rarely been investigated experimentally. One of the aims of Experiment 4 is to provide this missing empirical evidence by directly contrasting narrative with conversational contexts in order to confirm that only the former allows for non-speaker readings of indexicals.

5.6 Experiment 4

5.6.1 General Description

Experiment 4 builds on the results of Experiments 2 and 3 and uses a similar setup, namely a continuous scale choice study containing test items which consisted of four sentences each. The purpose of the experiment was two-fold, focusing on both of the two primary factors that I have argued so far to have a major impact on the possible interpretations of indexicals in ID. The first major goal of Experiment 4 was to investigate the factor of discourse prominence, specifically how the prominence status of the narrator may affect the interpretation of temporal indexicals such as *heute* ('today') and *morgen* ('tomorrow') in German ID clauses. As the previous experimental studies have demonstrated, the interpretation of FID can be influenced by manipulating the prominence of the narrator. While a locally prominent protagonist is considered as the overall preferred perspectival anchor for FID in stories featuring a heterodiegetic third-person narrator, the narrator serves as a notable perspectival 'rival' in contexts that instead feature a homodiegetic first-person narrator.

One of the primary aims of Experiment 4 was to empirically test the hypothesis that the discourse referents' prominence – particularly with respect to the role of the narrating instance – not only influences the choice of perspectival center in FID, but in ID clauses as well, and in a similar fashion. While the goal was thus to create a study as similar as possible to Experiments 2 and 3 in terms of item design and setup, in order to allow for a comparison between the results of the individual studies, certain changes had to be implemented due to the distinct characteristics of ID: Whereas FID clauses do not make explicit mention of the actual author of the reported thought or utterance, ID clauses do and are therefore less open in their interpretation. The thought as a whole may be potentially attributed to either any of the previously introduced protagonists or the narrator when expressed via FID, but only to whoever acts as the matrix subject of the subordinated clause in ID. Consequently, it would not be feasible to simply ask participants who they would rather attribute the reported thought or utterance to – as was done in the experimental studies on FID – since the matrix subject would be the obvious and only viable answer. Instead, it was decided to again focus on temporal indexicals

specifically, and examine whether participants prefer to interpret the deictic term from either the perspective of the narrator or from the perspective of a protagonist, depending on both referents' relative prominence in the preceding discourse context.

The second major goal of Experiment 4 was to investigate the effect of embedding the ID clause in the context of a fictional narrative. As detailed in Chapter 3, it has often been proposed, *inter alia*, by Rauh (1978), Banfield (1982), Sanders (1994) and Zeman (2020a), that only narrative contexts allow perspective shift away from the speaker, i.e., the default perspectival center. FID, in particular, is widely regarded as a prime example of this potential for multiperspectivity in narration. While these observations intuitively appear quite plausible and convincing, they have, to my knowledge, been rarely, if ever, tested empirically in an experimental setting. Moreover, they have also never been applied to other modes of speech and thought representation, specifically ID. As argued in Section 3.2, I postulate that ID also cannot unlock its full perspectival potential unless it is embedded in a fictional narrative instead of a conversational context. The present study directly contrasts narrative with conversational contexts and tests their respective effect on the interpretation of temporal indexicals in ID. If it should turn out to be the case that narrative contexts allow for locally prominent protagonists to serve as perspectival centers for the indexicals contained in the ID clause, while conversational contexts do not, it would provide crucial empirical evidence both for the unique potential for multiperspectivity inherent to fictional narratives in general, as well as with respect to perspective shift in ID in particular.

In order to achieve these goals, test items were created in three conditions:

- (149)
- a. Condition A: The text is presented as an excerpt from a short story narrated by a covert heterodiegetic third-person narrator; a protagonist is established as a prominent perspective-holder.
 - b. Condition B: The text is presented as an excerpt from a short story narrated by a homodiegetic first-person narrator who acts as a prominent perspective-holder.
 - c. Condition C: The text is presented as a short dialogue sequence between two people, in which one person reports on an experience they had with another individual, who is identical to the prominent protagonist from condition A.

The section is structured the same as the sections for the previous three experiments: I will start with a detailed description of materials designed for the study and the task which participants were asked to perform in Section 5.6.2. Next, I will present my hypotheses for the outcome of the study in Section 5.6.3 and finally report and discuss the results of the experiment in Section 5.6.4.

5.6.2 Method

5.6.2.1 Design and Materials

In total, 24 test items were created for Experiment 4 and presented to participants in written form. Three variants were produced for each individual item according to the three conditions detailed in (149). Each item was constructed in identical fashion to the exemplary one depicted in (150) below.⁷⁸ I will now provide a detailed description of the design for the test items. The description will first focus on the concept for the item variants of conditions A and B only, which were quite similar in content and design, whereas the items had to be restructured and modified considerably for condition C, in order to account for the intended conversational context. All items in conditions A and B featured two protagonists, P1 and P2, of opposite gender to avoid ambiguous interpretations of pronouns, who were introduced via first name. Their genders were switched across items so that either protagonist would be male in half of the items and female in the other half. In condition B, P2 functions as the homodiegetic narrator of the story. The items consisted of four sentences each in order to imitate the style of short stories and establish the text segments as part of a fictional narrative. To increase this effect, each test item in conditions A and B was headed by a short story title, which was put in bold to set it apart from the rest of the text.

(150) a. **Dienstag, der 20.07.2004 – Sonjas toller Urlaub**

Am Samstag war Sonja mit ihrem besten Freund Fritz unterwegs. Da sie Fritz sehr mochte, wollte sie schon länger mal mit ihm zusammen Urlaub machen. Doch als sie gerade auf die Autobahn Richtung Spanien gefahren waren, trat plötzlich Qualm aus dem Motorraum hervor.

‘Tuesday, July 20, 2004 – Sonjas great vacation

On Saturday, Sonja was out and about with her best friend Fritz. Since she really liked Fritz, she had wanted to go on vacation with him for some time. But just as they were driving onto the highway towards Spain, smoke suddenly suddenly started coming from the engine.’

b. **Dienstag, der 20.07.2004 – Mein toller Urlaub**

Am Samstag war ich mit meiner besten Freundin Sonja unterwegs. Da ich Sonja sehr mochte, wollte ich schon länger mal mit ihr zusammen Urlaub machen. Doch als wir gerade auf die Autobahn Richtung Spanien gefahren waren, trat plötzlich Qualm aus dem Motorraum hervor.

‘Tuesday, July 20, 2004 – My great vacation

On Saturday, I was out and about with my best friend Sonja. Since I really liked Sonja, I had wanted to go on vacation with her for some time. But just as we were driving onto the highway towards Spain, smoke

⁷⁸See Appendix D for additional items used in the experiment.

suddenly started coming from the engine.’

- c. *Dienstag, der 20.07.2004 – Zwei Arbeitskollegen, Fritz und Otto, sitzen gemeinsam in der Cafeteria und unterhalten sich.*

Fritz: Sag mal, du kennst doch meine beste Freundin, die Sonja – mit der war ich am Samstag unterwegs.

Otto: Ja richtig, ihr wolltet doch eigentlich zusammen in Urlaub fahren, oder?

Fritz: Genau, doch als wir gerade auf die Autobahn Richtung Spanien gefahren waren, trat plötzlich Qualm aus dem Motorraum hervor.

‘Tuesday, July 20, 2004 – Two colleagues, Fritz and Otto, are sitting in the cafeteria together and chatting.

Fritz: By the way, you know my best friend, Sonja – I was out and about with her on Saturday.

Otto: Right, you were supposed to go on vacation together, weren’t you?

Fritz: Exactly, but just as we were driving onto the highway towards Spain, smoke suddenly started coming from the engine.’

ID: *Sonja sagte, dass sie den Wagen unbedingt heute in die Werkstatt bringen müsste.*

‘Sonja said that she absolutely had to take the car to the workshop today.’

For the purposes of the experiment, it was necessary to establish two definite and distinct points in time, specified as different weekdays, in every item in order to explicitly distinguish between the time at which the story events are taking place and the time of narration. The latter proved particularly challenging to introduce. While the weekday at which the story is taking place could simply be named in the text itself, directly referencing the time of narration in the same way would have been problematic, as it would require the narrator to make direct mention of his own existence outside of the story. This would inevitably raise the narrator’s prominence, which needed to be avoided for condition A in order to sustain a covert narration as intended. The weekday – as well as an exact date and year – was instead named alongside the title of the story. Participants were instructed to interpret this date as the day at which the story is being narrated. While this solution was not ideal, as it is rather unnatural to name the date of narration in such a fashion, it was nevertheless deemed as the best possible way, given the restraints of the study design, to introduce the second timepoint without increasing the narrator’s prominence.

In the example item in (150), Tuesday is named as the day of narration, while Saturday is established as the weekday at which the events of the story take place. This day is always identified in the first sentence (= S1), which also introduces the two protagonists, Sonja (= P1) and Fritz (= P2). The first three sentences of each

5.6 EXPERIMENT 4

item primarily serve to establish the setting of the story and to build up to the final sentence (= S4), which functions as the target sentence and is the only clause that is completely identical across all three conditions. S4 always contains a speech report via ID for which P1 serves as author. Thought reports were not used in order to not jeopardize the naturalness of condition C: Due to its everyday conversational context, P2 would not be expected to possess knowledge of P1's inner thoughts, like an omniscient narrator. Thus, ID clauses were embedded by the propositional attitude verb *sagen* ('say') without exception.

Additionally, S4 always contains a temporal indexical in the form of either *heute* ('today') or *morgen* ('tomorrow'). In contrast to Experiment 1, the two types of temporal indexicals were distributed evenly so that half of the items featured *heute* and the other half *morgen*. The stories were deliberately crafted in such a fashion that both an interpretation of the indexical from the narrator's or the protagonist's perspective could theoretically be felicitous without invoking an incoherent reading. Thus, in (150), *heute* refers to the day at which Sonja plans on taking her car to the workshop. Just from the content of the clause and the preceding context alone, Sonja could mean the Saturday at which her and Fritz noticed something was wrong with the car, i.e., Sonja's 'today' at the time she makes that statement, but she might also have named Tuesday, i.e., the 'today' of the narrator, as the day she wants to take her car to the workshop instead. The latter would reflect an interpretation from the narrator's point of view, as it would require them to replace Sonja's original choice of expression with their own referential term. Either reading is viable, as Sonja bringing the car to the workshop on the same day or a couple of days later are both completely plausible options. It was decided to not also use the temporal adverbial *gestern* ('yesterday'), like in Experiment 1, for similar reasons: Since the ID clause always entails a proposition in which the matrix subject details something they plan on doing in the near future, an interpretation from the protagonist's perspective would be infelicitous for *gestern*, which would instead be referring to the past from the protagonist's context.

Therefore, the difference in prominence between the two potential perspectival centers in conditions A and B should constitute the sole deciding factor for readers when selecting their preferred interpretation. Accordingly, aside from replacing all mentions of P2, i.e., Fritz in (150a), with first-person pronouns in condition B, the roles of the two protagonists were also reversed between the two conditions, in order to effectively switch their prominence status. In condition A, P1, i.e., Sonja in (150a), is established as the most prominent protagonist in several ways. For one, P1's name is always mentioned in the title of the story, indicating that P1 is the main character. P1 is also always introduced first in S1, whereas P2 is only introduced via their relation to P1; for example, Fritz is introduced to the reader as Sonja's best friend. Furthermore, the second clause always describes P1's feelings about P2 – it

is mentioned that P1 feels positively towards P2 in half of the items, and negatively in the other half. As can be seen in (150b), the opposite is the case in condition B: Instead of P1's name, a first-person pronoun referring to P2 is mentioned in the title of the story, which is otherwise identical. In addition, P2 now effectively serves as the main character of the story, whereas P1 takes on the role P2 had in condition A. The final two clauses were not affected by this role switch, however. S4, as was mentioned before, stayed the same across conditions, which means that P1 is the author of the ID clause in condition B as well. While S3 does differ somewhat due to the use of first-person pronouns in condition B, the referent's prominence in this clause is not changed between the two conditions, as both jointly function as its subject.

Regarding condition C, as depicted in (150c), several major adjustments had to be made with regard to the item's structure and content in order to effectively establish a conversational discourse context instead of the fictional narrative one in conditions A and B. First of all, a third protagonist, P3, i.e., Otto in the exemplary item, is introduced in order to serve as P2's interlocutor. In general, the story is framed and stylistically depicted as a short dialogue between P2 and P3, in which P2 recounts some event she/he experienced together with P1. P1 only appears in the recounted story, but does not participate in and is not present for the dialogue between P2 and P3. P3's gender was deemed irrelevant for the purposes and results of the study and chosen at random.

Secondly, instead of a story title, the item is headed by a clause introducing the discourse situation and the two dialogue partners by name, as well as their relation to each other – in (150c), for example, Fritz and Otto are introduced as colleagues and it is established that they are sitting in a cafeteria and having a conversation. The sentence was put in italics to set it apart from the rest of the text. Just like in conditions A and B, the clause also served to introduce a weekday as the reporting time, in condition C the day on which the conversation takes place. The weekday on which the reported events take place is mentioned by P2 in S1.

In general, the item variant produced for condition B served as the basis for the variant in condition C. Thus, P1 retains their secondary role in the story, whereas P2 acts both as the 'main character', so to speak, as well as the first-person narrator, though in the sense of an actual person narrating some previous event in their life. Moreover, S1-S4 were distributed as lines of dialogue between P2 and P3. The dialogue always starts with P2 uttering a modified version of S1, P3 responding with a modified version of S2 and finally, P2 uttering S3 and S4 in response. While S4 was not altered for condition C, the other three clauses were modified to allow for the more colloquial style common to everyday language use. In an attempt to replicate the natural flow of a conversation, additional elements and segments were added to the clauses; in (150c), for example, Fritz starts off the conversation with

5.6 EXPERIMENT 4

sag mal (roughly ‘by the way/say’), while S2 is framed as a question by Otto, to which Fritz then responds with *genau* (‘exactly’) before uttering S3 and S4.

In addition to the regular test items, four different types of filler items consisting of six items each were created, making for 24 fillers in total. In general, all fillers were similar to the regular items in conditions A and B in terms of style and length: They consisted of four sentences each, featured two named protagonists, and contained a speech report via ID. In contrast to the test items, the ID clause changed position across fillers in order to avoid participants being primed to only focus on the final sentence while reading. Furthermore, the fillers also contained mentions of two different weekdays; the day on which the events are narrated is mentioned in the title of each short story – which, in the case of the fillers, could, but did not always, include the name of one of the protagonists – and the day on which the story takes place is mentioned in one of the four sentences. (151) describes the differences between the four types of fillers. (152) contains an exemplary item for each filler type.

- (151)
- a. Type 1: Similar to the regular items in condition A. However, the temporal adverb *sofort* (‘immediately’) is used in the ID clause instead of *heute* or *morgen*, thus unambiguously referring to the weekday on which the story takes place.
 - b. Type 2: Similar to the regular items in condition A. However, instead of temporal adverbs such as *heute* or *morgen*, the ID clause directly mentions the date introduced alongside the title of the short story, thus unambiguously referring to the weekday on which the narration takes place.
 - c. Type 3: Similar to the regular items in condition B. However, instead of any temporal expression, the ID clause contains a third-person pronoun unambiguously referring to the protagonist acting as the matrix subject.
 - d. Type 4: Similar to the regular items in condition B. However, instead of any temporal expression, the ID clause contains a first-person pronoun unambiguously referring to the homodiegetic narrator of the short story.

Type 1 and type 2 fillers also served as a control case to check whether participants were able to correctly identify and select the referenced time point in cases where only one option should be viable.

- (152)
- a. Type 1: **Mittwoch, der 06.09.2006 – Im falschen Film**
Am Freitag fuhr Dennis mit Maike ins Autokino, um dort gemeinsam eine Aufführung ihres Lieblingsfilms „Harry Potter und der Feuerkelch“ zu schauen. Als sie etwas verspätet ankamen, lief zu ihrer Überraschung jedoch stattdessen „Planet der Affen“. Dennis sagte, dass er sofort online das Kinoprogramm überprüfen würde. Doch Maike stieg bereits mit

beleidigter Miene aus dem Wagen aus.

‘Wednesday, September 6, 2006 – The wrong movie

On Friday, Dennis drove to the drive-in cinema with Maike to watch a screening of her favorite film “Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire” together. However, when they arrived a little late, to their surprise, “Planet of the Apes” was showing instead. Dennis said that he would check the movie program online immediately. But Maike was already getting out of the car with an indignant look on her face.’

b. Type 2: **Donnerstag, der 14.07.2022 – Der Dino Day**

Mit zitternden Händen packte der kleine Joris die riesige Velociraptor-Figur aus, die ihm seine Tante Frieda gerade zum Geburtstag geschenkt hatte. Frieda sagte, dass sie außerdem am 14. Juli den „Dino Day“ in Mainleus besuchen würden. Freudestrahlend sprang ihr Joris in die Arme. Dann gingen die beiden zu den anderen Gästen in den Garten, um das tolle Wetter an diesem wunderschönen Sonntag zu genießen.

‘Thursday, July 14, 2022 – Dino Day

With trembling hands, little Joris unwrapped the giant Velociraptor figurine that his aunt Frieda had just given him for his birthday. Frieda said that they would also be visiting the “Dino Day” in Mainleus on July 14. Joris jumped into her arms, beaming with joy. The two of them then joined the other guests in the garden to enjoy the great weather on this beautiful Sunday.’

c. Type 3: **Samstag, der 24.11.2018 – Kathis Entscheidung**

Kathi sagte, dass sie sich keine gemeinsame Zukunft mit mir vorstellen könnte. Mit diesen Worten gab sie mir den Ring zurück, mit dem ich ihr gerade einen Antrag gemacht hatte. Sprachlos und mit Tränen in den Augen rief ich ihren Namen, doch sie drehte sich um und ging einfach davon. An diesem Montag sah ich Kathi, mit der ich ganze fünf Jahre lang zusammen gewesen war, zum letzten Mal.

‘Saturday, November 24, 2018 – Kathi’s choice

Kathi said that she couldn’t imagine a future with me. With these words, she gave me back the ring I had just used to propose to her. Speechless and with tears in my eyes, I called her name, but she turned around and simply walked away. That Monday was the last time I saw Kathi, with whom I had been together for five whole years.’

d. Type 4: **Mittwoch, der 11.09.2013 – Der Beginn einer glanzvollen Karriere**

Am Donnerstag betrat ich aufgeregt für ein Casting das Atelier der bekannten Modedesignerin Dupont. Nachdem ich mich vorgestellt hatte, posierte ich für einige Probe-Fotos vor der Kamera. Dupont sagte, dass ich per-

fekt für die Kampagne geeignet sei. Begeistert nahm ich den Job an und berichtete in den sozialen Netzwerken von meinem Durchbruch.

‘Wednesday, September 11, 2013 – The beginning of a glamorous career

On Thursday, I excitedly entered the studio of the well-known fashion designer Dupont for a casting. After introducing myself, I posed for some sample photos in front of the camera. Dupont said that I was perfect for the campaign. I enthusiastically accepted the job and posted about my breakthrough on social media.’

As before, 16 control questions were included in the study and displayed to participants after both filler and regular items. The questions were centered around random details mentioned in the preceding item, in order to check if participants were reading the texts carefully.

5.6.2.2 Participants

42 participants (Gender distribution: female = 16, male = 25, non-binary = 1; age range: 21-67; mean age: 34 years) participated in Experiment 4. They were recruited via Prolific for monetary compensation (£4.50) and prescreened so that only German native speakers would be viable for participation. The data of participants who grew up multilingual, of which there were two, was included for analysis. The study was carried out in June 2024. The data of one participant had to be excluded from the analysis due to not answering at least 75% of the control questions included in the experiment correctly. Moreover, three participants either always selected the time of narration or always the story time with regard to both regular and filler items. However, as detailed in the previous section, Type 1 fillers were constructed as to unambiguously favor the protagonist’s temporal perspective as the only correct choice, and Type 2 fillers to unambiguously refer to the date of narration. As will be shown in Section 5.6.4, this effect was achieved as intended for the majority of participants. It was thus deemed that the problem did not stem from a flaw in the filler design and that instead, the data of the three participants in question was not reliable and should therefore be excluded from the analysis as well.

5.6.2.3 Procedure

Three lists of items were created via Qualtrics and distributed to participants via Prolific. The 24 test items were distributed across lists so that each item would appear on each list in exactly one of its three conditions. The lists thus contained eight items per condition. Additionally, all 24 filler items as well as the aforementioned 16 control questions were included on all three lists. Filler and test items were displayed to the participants in semi-randomized order. After each item, participants were asked a question about the temporal expression contained in the ID clause, namely, which weekday P1 was referring to in their utterance. Participants were

presented with two options: the weekday mentioned alongside the title of the short story (= i.e., the day on which the story is being narrated) and the weekday mentioned in the text itself (= i.e., the day on which the events of the story take place and P1’s speech act occurs). They were asked to indicate their preferred choice on a scale in the vein of the ones used in Experiments 2 and 3. This setup is illustrated in Figure (15), which displays the question and scale that were presented alongside the test item from (150a). In (150), Sonja states that she would have to bring her car into the workshop “today”. The corresponding question asks participants to clarify the weekday they think Sonja intends to have her car repaired by using the scale:

Dienstag, der 20.07.2004 - Sonjas toller Urlaub

Am Samstag war Sonja mit ihrem besten Freund Fritz unterwegs. Da sie Fritz sehr mochte, wollte sie schon länger mal mit ihm zusammen Urlaub machen. Doch als sie gerade auf die Autobahn Richtung Spanien gefahren waren, trat plötzlich Qualm aus dem Motorraum hervor. Sonja sagte, dass sie den Wagen unbedingt heute in die Werkstatt bringen müsste.

An welchem Tag will Sonja ihren Wagen in die Werkstatt bringen?

Dienstag Samstag

—————●—————

Figure 15: Example item for Experiment 4, including the subsequent question and the corresponding scale displaying the two possible answers

For each item, the left side of the scale was labeled with the weekday on which the story is being narrated, whereas the right side was labeled with the weekday on which the story takes place. As in Experiments 2 and 3, the points on the scale represented ordinal values from 0 to 100 and the starting point of the slider was positioned in the middle of the scale, representing the value 50. Participants were free to move the slider as far as they wanted to either side of the scale. The setup was identical for type 1 and 2 fillers, but slightly different for type 3 and 4 fillers, as the corresponding questions were focused not on a specific point in time, but rather about which previously introduced referent – the matrix subject or the homodiegetic first-person narrator – the pronoun used in the ID clause was meant to refer to. Accordingly, the choices on the scale were labeled as *der Erzähler* (‘the narrator’) on the left side and the name of the protagonist on the right side.

5.6.3 Hypotheses

The main goal of Experiment 4 was to provide empirical evidence for both of the two core hypotheses of this investigation, repeated in (153) below:

- (153) a. **H1:** Perspective-dependent expressions in German indirect discourse clauses can be interpreted from the perspective of the matrix subject (= the author of the subordinated thought or utterance) instead of the matrix speaker given that certain conditions are fulfilled.

- b. **H2**: Free indirect discourse is not a hybrid of indirect and direct discourse, but the root clause equivalent of indirect discourse, as they share the majority of their perspectival characteristics. Accordingly, the two types of speech/thought representation should receive a uniform analysis, whereas direct discourse has to be regarded as a case of pure quotation.

While the results of Experiment 1 already successfully demonstrated that H1 aptly describes the perspectival properties of ID, Experiment 4 focuses specifically on one of the conditions alluded to in H1, in order to test its actual impact on ID's potential for perspective shift. To be precise, Experiment 4 serves to test H1's sub-hypothesis H1b, which was defined in Chapter 3 as follows:

- (154) **H1b**: Temporal indexicals in indirect discourse clauses can only be interpreted from the perspective of a discourse referent different from the speaker if the indirect discourse clause is embedded inside a narrative context, due to fictional narratives possessing an inherent potential for multiperspectivity.

H1b predicts that, on the one hand, only the conditions that present the ID clause as part of a fictional narrative, i.e., conditions A and B, will allow for its temporal indexicals to be interpreted from the perspective of the author and thus, potentially display a tendency to choose the protagonist over the narrator as perspectival center. Condition C, on the other hand, which features a conversational context instead, is predicted to only allow an interpretation from the speaker's perspective, which should be reflected by a clear tendency for participants to choose the weekday corresponding with the time of narration.

Furthermore, Experiment 4 also empirically tests the impact of one of the proposed primary factors in influencing readers' interpretation of ID. As shown in Section 5.2, a given protagonist has to be established as prominent in the previous context in order to serve as perspectival anchor for FID. Both the acceptability and the interpretation of FID can thus be affected if the narrator is perceived as prominent themselves, which the studies in Bimpikou (2020), as well as the results for Experiments 2 and 3, have shown to be the case in texts featuring a homodiegetic first-person narrator. As formulated in sub-hypothesis H2a, I expect similar results for ID in Experiment 4:

- (155) **H2a**: Discourse prominence plays a vital role in selecting a perspectival center for both indirect discourse and free indirect discourse and has a similar effect on the interpretation of both types of speech and thought representation.

H2a is directly related to H2, as it predicts similarities between FID and ID in terms of how the prominence of narrator and protagonist(s) may affect their interpretation. Since previous studies on FID have shown that texts featuring first-person narrators display a stronger tendency to choose the narrator than texts featuring third-person

narrators, it follows from H2a that the same should hold true for ID. Thus, with regard to the conditions that are being tested and compared in Experiment 4, while both condition A and B provide the necessary context of a fictional narrative to allow temporal indexicals in ID to shift, H2a additionally predicts that participants will be more inclined to choose the weekday which reflects the protagonist’s perspective in condition A. This is due to the protagonist being established as highly prominent in condition A, but not in condition B. Instead, the presence of a homodiegetic first-person narrator in condition B should result in participants displaying a stronger tendency to choose the narrator over the protagonist as perspectival center than in condition A.

To summarize, the predictions for Experiment 4 are as follows: There will be a significant difference between the results for conditions A and B, on the one hand, and condition C, on the other hand. For the latter, the conversational context will prohibit perspective shift away from the speaker, which will be reflected in a strong tendency to interpret temporal indexicals from the speaker’s context. As their narrative context does allow perspective shift, the results for both condition A and for condition B will display a significantly higher tendency to choose the protagonist as perspectival center than in condition C. However, due to the difference in prominence status between the narrator and the protagonist in conditions A and B, condition A will additionally display a significantly higher tendency to choose the protagonist over the narrator than condition B.

5.6.4 Results and Discussion

5.6.4.1 Results

The results of 38 remaining participants were included in the analysis. In order to be able to analyze the results, the scale ratings were measured on a scale from 0 to 100. Due to the placement of the weekday corresponding with the reporting time on the left end of the scale, a lower rating (between 0 and 49) reflects a tendency to interpret the temporal indexical in the ID clause from the speaker’s/narrator’s perspective. As the weekday corresponding with the reported time was always placed at the right end of the scale, a higher rating (between 51 and 100) reflects a tendency to interpret the temporal indexical from the protagonist’s perspective instead. The mean values for each of the three conditions for all 24 test items were calculated using R with the function `lme4` (Bates et al. 2015). The significance was checked via a linear mixed-effects model.⁷⁹ The mean values are displayed in Table 5⁸⁰ and

⁷⁹The model was specified using the same formula as in previous experiments: `Answer ~ Condition + (1 | Subjects) + (1 | Items)`. The model did not converge until random slope effects were taken out of the equation; the calculated p-values are therefore not 100% reliable. T-tests were calculated using the Satterthwaite’s method of the `lmerTest` packages.

⁸⁰Rounded to the second decimal place.

5.6 EXPERIMENT 4

illustrated graphically in Figure 16.⁸¹

Condition	Mean Value (Model Estimate)	CI
Condition A: Narrative _{3rd pers.}	70.86	[63.53 ; 78.18]
Condition B: Narrative _{1st pers.}	64.57	[57.24 ; 71.89]
Condition C: Conversational	22.92	[15.59 ; 30.25]

Table 5: Mean continuous scale choice ratings (model estimate) and 95%-confidence intervals for Experiment 4.

As the mean values in Table 5 illustrate, there was a stark contrast between the results for conditions A and B and the results for condition C. On the one hand, both condition A and condition B received mean scale ratings of above 60 on a scale from 0-100. While their mean values are relatively close to each other, the model nevertheless indicated that the difference is significant (estimate = -6.29, SE = 2.75, $p = 0.0225$). On the other hand, condition C received a relatively low mean scale rating of 22.92, which corresponds with significant differences between conditions A and C (estimate = -47.94, SE = 2.75, $p < 0.001$) as well as between condition B and condition C (estimate = -41.65, SE = 2.75, $p < 0.001$).




Figure 16: Mean continuous scale choice ratings (model estimate) on a scale between 0 and 100 for Experiment 4. A rating between 0 and 49 indicates a tendency to interpret temporal indexicals from the perspective of the speaker/narrator, while a rating between 51 and 100 indicates a tendency to interpret temporal indexicals from the perspective of the author.

Figure 16 further reveals a striking difference between the mean values, indicated by the red dots, and the median values, which are indicated by the horizontal lines

⁸¹Short explanation of Figure 16: the red dot marks the mean value while the bold horizontal line signifies the median for each condition. The boxes display where the bulk of the data, namely the 25% of data below and above the median, is located.

in bold, for all three conditions. To be specific, the median values for both condition A and B are, at 92 and 88, respectively, actually much higher than their means. In contrast, condition C has a median value of only 2, which is thus even lower than its mean value. The figure also shows that conditions A and B also differ somewhat in their distribution, as the data points for items in condition B are spread further across the scale.

Finally, the results for the four types of filler items were as expected: Type 1 fillers, featuring the temporal adverb *sofort* ('immediately') in their ID clause, received a high mean scale rating of 94.67, whereas type 2 fillers, featuring the date associated with the time of narration in their ID clause, received a low mean rating of 3.89. Similarly, type 3 fillers, featuring a third-person pronoun in their ID clause unambiguously referring to its matrix subject, received a high mean scale rating of 95.67, while type 4 fillers, featuring a first-person pronoun in their ID clause unambiguously referring to the first-person narrator, received a low mean rating of 2.21. The results for the fillers thus overall demonstrate that the study's participants possess the ability to accurately resolve questions of referential identification in unambiguous contexts, thereby lending credibility to their interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions in the regular test items.

5.6.4.2 Discussion

The results for Experiment 4 provide substantial empirical evidence that H1b is correct and that perspective shift in ID is only possible if the clause is embedded in the context of a fictional narrative. Items of either of the two conditions that established such a context displayed a significantly higher tendency for temporal indexicals to be interpreted from the perspective of the author than items that instead established a conversational context. Moreover, participants also preferred the protagonist as the perspectival center in general if the speech report was depicted as part of a narrative context, as can be inferred from the fact that both conditions A and B received a mean rating well above fifty. The opposite is the case for condition C, which established the context of a natural conversation by incorporating the ID clause into a short dialogue sequence. The results for condition C demonstrate that participants showed a strong preference to interpret temporal indexicals in ID from the speaker's perspective in conversational contexts.

The differences in interpretation and their implications for H1b are even more apparent if we look at the condition's median values instead of their means. According to the median values, temporal indexicals were interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist by the vast majority of participants if the ID clause was embedded in the context of a fictional narrative, as in conditions A and B. If the ID clause was embedded in a conversational context, as in condition C, however, the vast majority of participants interpreted temporal indexicals from the speaker's perspective – in fact, the median value of condition C is lower than the mean value for filler type

2, which explicitly mentioned the date of narration in its ID clause. This suggests that interpreting the indexicals from the speaker’s perspective was the only available reading for most participants.

It is worth taking a closer look at Figure 16 to gain a better understanding of what the individual mean and median values, and the differences between them, reveal about the results for each condition. First of all, the boxplot for condition C reveals that at least 50% of the items in this condition received a scale rating of below 2, and that half of the other 50% received scale ratings of, at most, slightly above twenty. Condition C’s mean value of 22.92 is thus clearly still much too high to accurately reflect the data and must have been distorted by a few singular, but very high ratings of individual participants or items. For condition C, the median value of 2 therefore constitutes a more accurate representation of participants overall preferences.

Things are not quite as straightforward when it comes to the results for conditions A and B: Both of their boxplots reveal that their results were spread much further across the scale than condition C’s, especially in the case of condition B. The fact that their median values of 88 and 92, respectively, are so high does reveal that at least 50% of the participants were very secure in their interpretation of the temporal indexical as referring to the reported time. However, the data points for at least half of the other 50% are scattered across the scale, between ratings of 88 and slightly below 20 in condition B. While condition B’s median value thus more accurately reflects the majority of participants’ interpretations, the far lower mean value of 64.57 cannot be solely attributed to singular data points distorting the results. Instead, it reveals a level of uncertainty in interpreting temporal indexicals in narrative contexts that is not present in conversational contexts, in which the speaker seems to be the only available perspectival center.

However, this is neither problematic nor surprising. The goal was never to prove that narrative contexts *force* a shifted reading of ID. Instead, the study aimed to show that narrative contexts *enable* such an interpretation, while conversational contexts do not. As the results of the experiment demonstrate, this is clearly the case, as condition B and, to a slightly lesser degree, condition A as well, display a much higher potential for variability in interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions than condition C. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that participants overall chose the protagonist as perspectival center in narrative contexts and were very certain of their interpretation in the majority of cases.

Somewhat unexpected, though, is the comparatively small difference in mean values between conditions A and B, which does also not significantly differ with regard to their median values. H2a predicted that discourse prominence is an important factor in interpreting perspective-dependent expressions in cases where more than one discourse referent is available to act as perspectival center for ID. Moreover,

it predicted that the results of Experiment 4 would closely resemble the results of similar previous studies on FID, in which texts featuring a homodiegetic first-person narrator displayed a stronger tendency to choose the narrator as perspectival center than texts featuring a heterodiegetic third-person narrator, which was attributed to the first-person narrator’s increased prominence. The results for Experiment 4 do mirror those of previous studies on FID in that there is a higher tendency to choose the narrator over the protagonist as perspectival center in stories featuring a homodiegetic first-person narrator. In addition, the plots in Figure 16 also illustrate that condition B received a larger number of lower ratings, indicating an interpretation from the narrator’s perspective, than condition A did. Thus, the results can overall be said to provide evidence for H2a.

Still, the fact that the protagonist is nevertheless the overall preferred perspectival center in condition B as well as in condition A and that both their mean and their median values are relatively close to each other needs to be addressed. It should be pointed out, however, that, while the effect of the narrator’s prominence on the interpretation of FID was convincingly shown to be both noticeable and significant in Experiments 2 and 3, these results did not indicate that it could completely offset readers’ overall preferred interpretation either. Thus, if readers were already inclined to select a protagonist as perspectival center – for example, due to said protagonist being locally prominent – the prominence of a homodiegetic first-person narrator could impact that preference negatively, but not to such an extent that the narrator would become the overall preferred perspectival center instead.

This is what the previous studies’ results indicate: In Experiment 2, first presented in Saure et al. (2023), the protagonist was the overall preferred perspectival center regardless of narrative situation, despite the significant effect of the homodiegetic narrator. In contrast, in Experiment 3, first presented in Hinterwimmer & Saure (2024), which used a quite similar setup, the narrator turned out to be the overall preferred perspectival center instead. Again, even though the type of narrator did affect the interpretation to a significant degree, it was not strong enough to completely overthrow readers’ overall preference for interpreting FID. However, this does not diminish the general relevance of the factor of discourse prominence for perspective interpretation. Rather, it emphasizes that the type of narrator is an important, but not the only factor impacting discourse referents’ prominence. In my discussion of the two experimental studies, I suggested that the difference in results might stem from the fact that the protagonist was locally prominent in Experiment 2, but only globally prominent in Experiment 3. One can thus surmise that local prominence simply outranks narrator type as a prominence-lending cue, which is fully in line with Bimpikou’s (2020) proposed hierarchy of perspectival centers (cf. Bimpikou 2020: 30).

With regard to the results of Experiment 4, the question is which factor lead to an

increase of the protagonist's prominence so that they were ultimately preferred over the narrator as perspectival center, even in stories featuring a first-person narrator. After all, the items were deliberately designed to make the narrator the most prominent discourse referent in condition B by additionally depicting the homodiegetic narrator as the main character of the story, and by having the two discourse referents share subjecthood in the sentence preceding the ID clause, in order to avoid one referent being favored solely due to local prominence. However, it was not factored in, while designing the test items for Experiment 4, that the ID clause itself might potentially increase the protagonist's prominence, since the protagonist inevitably functions as the clause's matrix subject. Given that previous works on the interaction between discourse prominence and perspective interpretation were focused on FID, which is not embedded in a matrix clause structure, they only provide insight into how a protagonist can be made locally prominent with regard to the directly preceding sentence.

It stands to reason, though, that the protagonist's grammatical function and thematic role in ID's matrix clause could automatically make them locally prominent, too. This would explain why participants selected the protagonist as perspectival center even when the narrator was globally prominent and neither discourse referent outranked the other in terms of local prominence solely with regard to the directly preceding clause. Moreover, if this is indeed the case, it would indicate that in narrative contexts, the matrix subject should automatically constitute the preferred perspectival center for ID due to their inherent local prominence, completely contrary to the prevailing consensus in the literature. While beyond the scope of this thesis, it should prove worthwhile to pursue this line of thought in future experimental studies: For example, one could contrast ID with FID clauses in which the protagonist is not locally prominent with regard to the preceding sentence, but the narrator is. Theoretically, the protagonist should then be chosen as the perspectival center more often for ID than for FID, due to being locally prominent in the former but not the latter case. Furthermore, both the results of the current experimental study as well as the results of Experiments 2 and 3 indicate that local prominence outranks other factors in determining a referent's prominence status. It would be of interest to test which factors, if any, might be able to override a referent's local prominence, in order to gain a better understanding of the interaction between different prominence-lending cues.

There are two further factors which might have additionally contributed both to the somewhat weakened effect of the homodiegetic first-person narrator and the increased level of uncertainty in interpretation illustrated by Figure 16, in direct comparison with the results of the other three experimental studies, which did not display similarly high levels of variation in the distribution of their data. For one thing, Experiment 4, by necessity, focused on the interpretation of temporal indexi-

cals only, whereas Experiments 2 and 3 were able to test participants' interpretation of the FID clause as a whole. One might reasonably assume that readers simply and naturally have strong and apparent inclinations when it comes to the interpretation of whole sentences in a text segment, but not when it comes to resolving questions of reference for ambiguous temporal expressions. Thus, the impact of the type of narrator on the interpretation of temporal indexicals may be too subtle to have as noticeable of an effect. Secondly, the experimental studies on FID only contrasted different types of narrative situations with each other, but did not include a condition featuring a conversational context, as was done for Experiment 4. The direct contrast with sequences of dialog in condition C, in which the speaker functions as the only available perspectival center, might have increased participants' tendency to select the protagonist as perspectival center in contexts in which perspective shift is possible, regardless of the specific type of narrator.

As was done before in Section 3.3 for Experiment 1, I want to conclude the analysis of Experiment 4's results by briefly checking if the choice of temporal indexical in each item impacted participants' interpretation. In contrast to Experiment 1, care was taken for Experiment 4 to distribute the two adverbials used in the study, namely *heute* and *morgen*, evenly across items, which means that any unexpected effects may prove to be reliably statistically significant. The factor of the matrix clause's propositional attitude verb, though, is not relevant for the analysis, as *sagen* was used for all items.

5.6.5 Effects of Temporal Indexicals

The mean values for the two temporal indexicals in all 24 test items were calculated with the same method used in the analysis of the three conditions, as described in Section 5.6.4.1. The significance was checked via a linear mixed-effects model.⁸² The mean values for both indexicals along with their confidence intervals are depicted in Table 6.⁸³

Indexical	Mean Value (Model Estimate)	CI
<i>heute</i>	47.88	[43.85 ; 51.90]
<i>morgen</i>	57.68	[53.71 ; 61.65]

Table 6: Mean continuous scale choice ratings (model estimate) and 95%-confidence intervals for temporal indexicals

The mixed-effects model showed a significant difference between the mean scale ratings for *heute* and *morgen* (estimate = 9.81, SE = 4.11, $p = 0.026$). As Fig-

⁸²The following formula was used: Answer ~ Indexical + (1 | Subjects) + (1 | Items). As before, the models did not converge until random slope effects were taken out of the equation – the calculated p-values are therefore not 100% reliable. T-tests were calculated using the Satterthwaite's method of the lmerTest packages.

⁸³Rounded to the second decimal place.

5.6 EXPERIMENT 4

Figure 17 illustrates, the two indexicals also differed noticeably with regard to their distribution.




Figure 17: Distribution of data points on a scale from 0-100 for the indexicals used in Experiment 4

These results suggest that *morgen* displays a significantly stronger tendency to be preferably interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist than *heute*, which is unexpected. Taking into account, however, that for two out of three conditions, the protagonist served as the preferred perspectival center, it would be probable to assume that roughly two thirds of all test items would reflect this preference. Therefore, the expectation would be that both indexicals should have displayed an at least slight tendency in favor of the protagonist, as they were distributed evenly across conditions. It is thus not surprising that *morgen* reflects this preference, but more so that *heute* does not. Due to these significant differences, the data was checked for interaction effects between indexicals and conditions. As the graph in Figure 18 indicates, however, the variable of indexicals did not significantly influence the effect of any of the conditions.

The question remains why *heute* appears to either show a slight preference for the speaker as perspectival center or why its preference for the protagonist is at least somewhat weakened in direct comparison with *morgen*. I am hesitant to draw conclusions about possible characteristics of specific temporal indexicals with respect to their potential for perspective shift from these results. Rather, it appears to be more plausible to attribute the difference to the specific phrasing used in the test items containing *heute*. While designing the items containing *heute*, it was noted that the ID clauses would sound more natural if the phrasing *heute noch* (roughly ‘still today’) was used instead, as the speech report always described an action which the

author plans to do at a later point in time and, depending on the time of day, *heute noch* would normally be used in German to state that one intends to do something before the day is over. However, since this phrasing would force, or at least strongly suggest, a reading of *heute* from the protagonist’s perspective, it was avoided to preserve referential ambiguity. In turn, this might have had the unintended effect of increasing participants’ tendency to interpret *heute* from the narrator’s perspective instead, as they would expect the protagonist to use *heute noch* to refer to the day of the speech event.




Figure 18: Interaction plot for conditions & temporal indexicals

Overall, the results of Experiment 4 provide valuable empirical evidence not only for the much proposed claim that fictional narration possesses a unique and inherent potential for multiperspectivity, but also for the hypothesis that this potential for multiperspectivity applies just as much to ID as it does to FID: The comparison between the two narrative contexts in conditions A and B, on the one hand, and the conversational context in condition C, on the other hand, confirmed that embedding ID clauses in narrative contexts is a necessary condition to enable perspective shift. Furthermore, the results also indicate that the perspectival center for ID is selected based on the prominence of the available discourse referents, as was shown to be the case for FID in previous studies. Before moving on to the final factor to be discussed in this study that might influence perspective shift in ID, namely the type of propositional attitude verb, the next section will discuss the possibility of interpreting FID sentences from the speaker’s perspective.

5.7 Narrator Comments and Free Indirect Discourse

In this final section of Chapter 5, I want to address a potential counterargument against my proposal, defined in H2 (cf. (101)), that ID and FID share their perspectival properties and should thus receive a uniform analysis. However, a major objection could be raised against H2 that relates to an essential difference between the two types of speech and thought representation, based on what is generally regarded as a key property of FID. While the results of Experiments 1 and 4 have demonstrated that perspective shift is possible in ID, the latter in particular has also showcased that it is *not* obligatory: Perspective shift only occurs if a protagonist is deemed to be more prominent, and therefore preferable as the perspectival center, than the narrator. This means, essentially, that, given a narrative context, *either* the narrator *or* a protagonist can serve as the perspectival center of ID. It must be emphasized that this is completely in line with what is stated in H1 (cf. (66)): H1 predicted that narrative contexts unlock the *potential* for perspective shift, but not that narrative contexts force shifted readings in ID.

If we postulate that ID and FID possess identical or, at the very least, very similar perspectival properties, then the expectation should be that they also align with regard to the optionality of perspective shift. Yet in the literature, FID is commonly defined specifically on the basis of its combination of multiple perspectives: Personal indexicals and tense forms reflect the narrator's perspective, whereas spatio-temporal indexicals, as well as other perspective-dependent expressions, are interpreted with respect to the protagonist's context. Alongside FID's reliance on contextual cues for interpretation, this is predominantly regarded as the defining feature of FID and used to identify and distinguish instances of FID from other syntactic structures in almost all prominent works on the topic (cf., *inter alia*, Sanders 1994: 191, Zeman 2017: 13, Zeman 2020a: 470, Fleischman 1991: 34, Hinterwimmer 2017: 283, Doron 1991: 53, Maier 2017: 260f., Schlenker 2004: 283). The very definition of FID itself that is prevalent in the literature therefore heavily implies, if not outright states, that only structures which have undergone perspective shift are to be regarded as FID. Consequently, this would represent a striking difference between FID and ID, as perspective shift could thus only be perceived as an optional process with regard to ID, which poses a problem for H2.

However, I propose that the prevalent definition is, in actuality, a misconception rooted in the fact that linguistic examinations of FID are primarily interested in its ability to reflect multiple perspectives at once to begin with. Due to this preoccupation with cases of FID exhibiting perspective shift, previous accounts failed to recognize or acknowledge possible instances of FID in which, instead of a protagonist, the narrator acts as the preferred perspectival center and perspective-dependent

expressions therefore remain unshifted. Although the present investigation is also focused on precisely this potential for perspective shift in speech and thought reports, I regard it as equally important to take into account and explore the circumstances under which perspective shift does *not* occur in these structures. The problem with the predominant claim that FID always entails perspective shift is that it is not the result of thorough consideration, and perhaps then well-founded dismissal, of the possibility that there might be instances of FID that do not exhibit perspective shift. Instead, this possibility is dismissed by definition and without further consideration. Moreover, this preconceived dismissal prevents an accurate comparison of the different modes of speech and thought representation, as both ID and DD can easily also accommodate contexts in which the current speaker is also the perspectival center, thereby enforcing a reading of perspective-dependent expressions from the speaker's context:

(156) a. *Etwas nervös betrete ich das Büro meiner Vorgesetzten. „Ich muss heute eine Stunde früher als sonst nach Hause“, sage ich ihr mit zitternder Stimme.*

‘A little nervously, I enter my supervisor’s office. “I have to go home an hour earlier than usual today,” I say to her in a trembling voice.’

b. *Etwas nervös betrete ich das Büro meiner Vorgesetzten. Mit zitternder Stimme sage ich ihr, dass ich heute eine Stunde früher als sonst nach Hause muss.*

‘A little nervously, I enter my supervisor’s office. I say to her in a trembling voice that I have to go home an hour earlier than usual today.’

Structures like the one in (156) are rather unremarkable and of little interest for analyses of multiperspectivity, as they do not contrast different viewpoints or bring any other context than the speaker’s default one into focus. Nevertheless, these are obviously completely acceptable and natural examples of DD and ID, respectively, and it would be preposterous to attempt to classify them as anything else merely based on the circumstance that the speaker happens to also be the author of the reported speech event. Why, then, should FID be the only mode of speech or thought representation for which it is considered a prerequisite that somebody other than the speaker must be the perspectival center? The only reason that comes to mind is if one indeed considers the characteristic that some deictic expressions are interpreted from the narrator’s context, while others are interpreted from the context of a protagonist, as the defining trait of FID. However, even if comparing FID’s properties to those of ID was of no concern, this proposed definition runs into trouble with regard to clauses like the one in (157):

(157) *Stephen schlendert in Ruhe über den Gehweg, als auf einmal ein Radfahrer haarscharf an ihm vorbeirauscht. Wütend schaut Stephen dem Mann hinterher. Also wirklich, die Radfahrer in Köln sind ja gemeingefährlich!*

‘Stephen is strolling calmly along the sidewalk when suddenly a cyclist whizzes past him at point-blank range. Stephen looks after the man angrily. Seriously, the cyclists in Cologne are just plain dangerous!’

(157) presents a short text segment featuring a both globally and locally prominent protagonist, Stephen, and a covert third-person narrator. Accordingly, Stephen necessarily functions as the perspectival center of the segment as a whole. Furthermore, as the final clause is both introduced via the interjection *also wirklich* (‘seriously’) and serves to express an opinion or attitude, it cannot be regarded as a simple, neutral stretch of narration, but rather must be some kind of speech or thought report. Thus, it can only receive an interpretation according to which it is anchored to Stephen, the perspectival center. But how should the clause be classified? Since it is neither subordinated to a propositional attitude verb, nor marked as quotation, nor explicitly specifies the author of the thought event, out of the three types of speech and thought representation, FID is clearly the only appropriate choice.

Yet the clause does not overtly signal that it mixes the contexts of narrator and protagonist with respect to the interpretation of indexicals: For one thing, it does not contain a reference to its author, via pronoun or otherwise, and thus we cannot point to the fact that third-person pronouns are used instead of first-person pronouns, thereby reflecting the narrator’s context. Certainly, this would be the case *if* we were to add a reference to the author, but that does not change the fact that the clause in (157), in its current form, cannot be identified as FID on the basis of this property. Moreover, the story is told in present tense and as a result, the potential FID clause features present tense forms as well, which thus cannot be said to unambiguously reflect the narrator’s point of view either. In short, if we were to consider the apparent combination of narrator and protagonist perspective, expressed via indexical expressions contained in the clause, as the defining and obligatory feature of FID, it would be impossible to identify the clause in (157) as an instance of FID, as it, as far as we can tell, only expresses the protagonist’s viewpoint.

However, any theory that attempts to assess both the potential and the constraints of perspective shift, in narration or otherwise, must be able to also account for sentences like the final one in (157). While most examples of FID analyzed in the literature, including this thesis, contain references to the author and past tense forms in order to showcase FID’s multiperspectivity, it would be quite arbitrary to consider these as prerequisites for a sentence to be considered for analysis as FID. A thought or utterance, of course, does not *need* to entail a reference to its author and neither do fictional narratives *need* to be narrated in past tense; present tense narration, while not quite as common as past tense narration, is nevertheless also used regularly enough in modern narrative fiction to not be simply disregarded. This is similarly observed in Fludernik (1993: 198) and Fludernik (1995: 99f.), who

determines that these characteristics are merely non-obligatory signals to identify a clause as FID, but not necessary requirements. Consequently, she identifies only two actual

minimal syntactic conditions for a FID reading to become operative [...]: the deictic (that is, anaphoric) alignment of ‘personal’ referential expressions to the deictic center of the reporting discourse, and the *ex negativo* syntactic condition that contenders for FID must not be phrased in a verb-plus-complement clause structure. (Fludernik 1995: 95)

If we take these as the essential requirements for a clause to be regarded as FID, then an FID reading can easily be accommodated for the final sentence in (157) without problem, as desired.

Turning back to the issue regarding the optionality of perspective shift in FID, these requirements technically allow us to classify any root level clause as FID which, based on certain perspectival cues, can be considered as a report of some discourse referent’s thought or utterance. As was established in the previous sections, said discourse referent must be maximally prominent either on a local or a global level. Moreover, as Experiments 2 and 3, as well as the empirical studies conducted by Bimpikou (2020), have illustrated, the factor of discourse prominence does not only pertain to the protagonists, but to the narrator as well, who, especially in stories featuring a homodiegetic first-person narrator, may even be regarded as the most prominent discourse referent, and thus as the preferred perspectival center. On the basis of these considerations, I propose that root level clauses that reflect and report the thoughts, opinions and attitude of the narrator, which have commonly been referred to as *narrator comments* (cf. Chatman 1978: 228), and which have been mostly ignored in linguistic investigations of narrative structures to date, are to be regarded as a type of FID in which the FID clause is anchored to the narrator.

In (158a), I give an example of what I regard as a typical narrator comment, similar to the ones found in the *Brenner* novels and other texts featuring a prominent narrator. The first sentence introduces a singular protagonist, Quint, followed by a clause that exhibits the typical signs of FID: Its primary purpose is the expression of some referent’s thought or attitude and it contains certain expressive elements, such as the interjection *Mann* (‘man’), as perspectival cues. While Quint would theoretically be available as perspectival center due to being locally prominent, the use of a DPro as an unambiguous reference to Quint prevents an interpretation from his point of view – as the discussion in Section 5.2.2 has shown, DPros can not refer to the perspectival center of a clause (cf. Hinterwimmer & Bosch 2017: 140, Hinterwimmer 2020: 554). As the preceding clause does not introduce any other protagonists which might alternatively act as perspectival anchor for the FID clause, it can only receive a reading in which it expresses the narrator’s perspective. This underlines further that, even in discourse contexts in which the narrator has not previously been made overt, he possesses a default prominence status that allows

him to act as perspectival anchor if no other interpretation is available. In addition, it also demonstrates that the anchoring of the clause is, in this instance at least, fully dependent on a specific perspectival cue.

- (158) a. *Quint bestellte sich einen XXL-Burger mit drei Patties und einer extra großen Portion Pommes. Mann, das konnte der doch niemals alles aufessen!*
 ‘Quint ordered an XXL burger with three patties and an extra large portion of fries. Man, he_{DPro} could never eat all that!’
- b. *Susanne schaute angewidert zu, als sich Quint einen XXL-Burger mit drei Patties und einer extra großen Portion Pommes bestellte. Mann, das konnte der doch niemals alles aufessen!*
 ‘Susanne watched in disgust as Quint ordered an XXL burger with three patties and an extra large portion of fries. Man, he_{DPro} could never eat all that!’

Now consider (158b): The second clause, which in (158a) could *only* receive an interpretation as a narrator comment, suddenly is open to be interpreted as what is traditionally perceived as FID, not due to any changes to the clause’s syntactic structure or content, but solely because another protagonist, Susanne, is additionally introduced in the preceding clause. Susanne can even be considered to be more prominent than Quint was in (158a), due to also serving as the experiencer of a perception event. Susanne is thus maximally prominent and, since the FID clause itself does not prohibit a reading from her perspective, consequently the preferred perspectival center for FID. This example is meant to illustrate two important similarities between what has been perceived as narrator comments and what is defined as FID: They are equally fully dependent on perspectival cues to be regarded as an expression of a thought in the first place, as well as fully dependent on the discourse context, and prominence-lending cues therein, for their selection of a perspectival anchor. This is further demonstrated in (159):

- (159) a. *Cordelia war den Tränen nahe, als sie verzweifelt für den Mathetest am nächsten Tag lernte. Mensch, sie konnte dieses Mal doch nicht schon wieder eine Sechs kriegen!*
 ‘Cordelia was near tears as she desperately studied for the math exam the next day. Jeez, she simply could not get another F this time!’
- b. *Cordelia hatte ein falsches Lächeln im Gesicht, als sie sich freiwillig dafür meldete, nach dem Unterricht die Tafel zu wischen. Mensch, sie war wirklich die größte Schleimerin der ganzen Schule!*
 ‘Cordelia wore a fake smile on her face as she volunteered to wipe the blackboard after class. Jeez, she was seriously the biggest suck-up of the whole school!’

Both (159a) and (159b) contain a similarly structured thought, expressed at the root level of their final sentence, that references the protagonist named *Cordelia*. Whereas the final sentence in (159a) features a clear case of FID from Cordelia's perspective, though, the continuation in (159b) can hardly be attributed to Cordelia herself as it contains a negative evaluation of her character. To arrive at a coherent interpretation, and due to the absence of any other prominent protagonists in the discourse context, we must infer that the thought expressed in (159b) belongs to the narrator. However, we do not arrive at this conclusion because of any inherent structural differences between FID and narrator comments; just like the interpretation of FID in general, the decision to interpret a sentence either as an instance of FID or as a narrator comment relies solely on linguistic cues, the content of the sentence itself and the prominence of the available discourse referents, including the narrator. This is further showcased in (160), which, in similar fashion to (158b), introduces another, locally prominent discourse referent to the example from (159b). Again, the structure or content of the final clause itself is not changed in any way, yet once more, its interpretation switches to one of FID anchored to the maximally prominent discourse referent, i.e., Leon in (160).

- (160) *Cordelia hatte ein falsches Lächeln im Gesicht, als sie sich freiwillig dafür meldete, nach dem Unterricht die Tafel zu wischen. Leon blickte zu ihr hinüber. Mensch, sie war wirklich die größte Schleimerin der ganzen Schule!*
 ‘Cordelia wore a fake smile on her face as she volunteered to wipe the blackboard after class. Leon looked over to her. Jeez, she was seriously the biggest suck-up of the whole school!’

The fact that apparent instances of FID can often be ambiguous with regard to their interpretation and may also receive readings from the narrator's perspective has been noted occasionally in linguistic works on the topic and more frequently by narratologists (cf. Steube 1985: 403, Fludernik 1993: 150, Bray 2007: 48). This is further corroborated by the results from Experiments 2 and 3. In both experimental studies, participants had to decide if the final clause in a larger text segment, which was always designed to be understood as an instance of FID, reflected the thought of a prominent protagonist or of the narrator. In Experiment 2, which featured a maximally locally prominent protagonist, the protagonist turned out to be the overall strongly preferred perspectival anchor for the FID clause. The opposite, however, was the case for Experiment 3: The thought expressed in the final clause was preferably attributed to the narrator, which resulted from reducing the protagonist's overall prominence. While the protagonist was still prominent on a global level due to their function as discourse topic, they now shared subjecthood with the homodiegetic first-person narrator – or, alternatively, with another protagonist in the item variants featuring a heterodiegetic narrator – and thus no longer served as the most locally prominent discourse referent.

A comparison of the two studies' results thus provides further credence to the hypothesis that the interpretation of a root level thought report as either FID or narrator comment primarily depends on perspectival and prominence-lending cues in the discourse context or the clause itself. This calls into question if such a strict distinction between FID and narrator comment is truly appropriate, as the two seem to only differ with regard to which discourse referent is selected as perspectival center.

There are two potential ways to describe the proposed relationship between FID and narrator comments. The first option is to consider narrator comments as a variation of FID in which the narrator acts as the perspectival center instead of a character. In this case, FID would thus have to be understood as a generic term for thought renditions at the root clause level, the interpretation of which is based on contextual, linguistic cues. Based on these cues, a discourse referent – the narrator of the story or a prominent protagonist – is chosen as the perspectival center to whom the reported thought is attributed. The alternative option is to regard narrator comments and FID as two related, but nevertheless distinct subtypes of an, as of yet undefined, superordinate category of speech and thought report. While there might be a viable argument made for this second option, it should be pointed out that it would again prevent an accurate comparison with ID and DD, as no similar distinction is made for, for example, ID representing the thought of a protagonist and ID representing the thought of the narrator or speaker.

Adopting the first option leads to an appraisal of narrator-centered FID as the *unshifted* reading of FID: Thus, not only is the clause as a whole attributed to the narrator, but *all* perspective-dependent expressions contained in the sentence are interpreted with regard to the narrator's context, i.e., in Kaplan's terms, the current context of use; this includes expressives, indexicals of all types, as well as tense. Accordingly, if narrator-centered FID contains past tense forms, it reflects an intended reference to an event or state of affairs that, from the narrator's perspective, lies in the past, which is the case in (159b) above: Cordelia being, according to the narrator, the biggest suck-up in school describes a state that applies to the story time, which is in the past with respect to the narrator's time of reference. However, the narrator is also able to express his thought's about the *current* state of things at the time of utterance, which is indicated by a switch to present tense:

- (161) *Cordelia hatte ein falsches Lächeln im Gesicht, als sie sich freiwillig dafür meldete, nach dem Unterricht die Tafel zu wischen. Mensch, zum Glück ist sie heute nicht mehr so eine furchtbare Schleimerin!*

'Cordelia wore a fake smile on her face as she volunteered to wipe the blackboard after class. Jeez, she luckily isn't such a terrible suck-up anymore nowadays!'

In contrast, protagonist-centered FID reflects the *shifted* reading of FID: Thus,

the thought as a whole, as well as all *shiftable* perspective-dependent expressions, i.e., expressives and spatio-temporal indexicals, are interpreted with regard to the protagonist's context, whereas tense and personal indexicals remain bound to the reporting context. Consequently, perspective shift in FID can be said to be just as optional of a process as it is for ID and fully dependent on the discourse context, perspectival cues and the prominence status of the available discourse referents.

A particularly intriguing case regarding shifts between narrator and protagonist is represented by contexts featuring a homodiegetic first-person narrator, i.e., stories in which the narrator is also a character participating in the actions and events of the story world. Fludernik (1993: 85) suggests that in such cases, one has to distinguish between the consciousness of the 'experiencing self', the narrator's previous self at the time of the story, and the 'narrating self', the narrator's current self at the time of narration (cf. also Rauh 1978: 132f., Fleischman 1990: 219). As the opinions of the narrator might have changed in the interim, the comments of the narrating self should not be taken to reflect the attitude of their past, experiencing self and vice versa. More importantly, FID anchored to the experiencing self, on the one hand, reflects the context of the experiencing self at the point in time in the story at which the thought event that is being reported via FID is located. Accordingly, all shiftable perspective-dependent expressions are effectively shifted to this past, reported context. FID anchored to the narrating self, on the other hand, is to be interpreted with respect to the context of utterance. This distinction might often be ambiguous for FID, but can actually also be illustrated, in an overt fashion, for ID: An interpretation from the experiencing self's perspective is reflected by a past tense form of the propositional attitude verb in the matrix clause, whereas an interpretation from the narrating self's perspective necessitates a shift to present tense forms, as illustrated in (162).

(162) *Mit einem stolzen Grinsen im Gesicht drückte mir Karl den kleinen Welpen in die Arme, den er mir als Geburtstagsgeschenk besorgt hatte.*

'With a proud grin on his face, Karl put the little puppy in my arms which he had bought as a gift for my birthday.'

a. *Ich dachte, dass dieser Schussel wohl meine Allergie vergessen hatte.*

'I thought that this scatterbrain had forgotten my allergy.'

b. *Ich denke, dass dieser Schussel wohl meine Allergie vergessen hatte.*

'I think that this scatterbrain had forgotten my allergy.'

c. *Dieser Schussel hatte wohl meine Allergie vergessen!*

'This scatterbrain had forgotten my allergy!'

In both (162a) and (162b), the narrator serves as the matrix subject of an ID clause reporting a thought about the other protagonist, Karl. However, due to the past tense form used in the matrix clause in (162a), the subordinated clause can only be interpreted as reflecting a thought of the experiencing self at the point in time at

which Karl gifts the narrator a puppy. In (162b), in contrast, present tense is used in the matrix clause and thus, the subordinated clause only allows a reading in which it reflects a thought of the narrating self at the time at which the narrator is telling this part of the story. Finally, the continuation in (162c) contains an FID clause anchored to the narrator. However, it remains somewhat ambiguous if the clause is meant to reflect a thought of the narrator at story time or at the current time of utterance, as both readings are available and plausible.

While this section has elaborated on and provided evidence for further similarities between ID and FID, specifically with regard to the optionality of perspective shift, one aspect has yet to be addressed. This pertains to a major difference that does indeed exist between FID and ID with respect to the anchoring of the thought being reported: Only for FID, it is a strict rule that, if the narrator is selected as the perspectival center, the thought as a whole has to be attributed to the narrator. In other words, the FID clause has to be interpreted as expressing a thought of the narrator and not of a protagonist; it is impossible for the narrator to act as the perspectival center of an FID clause – for example, only with regard to the interpretation of shifty indexicals – which actually reports the thought or utterance of a protagonist. The same is clearly *not* the case for ID, which has been demonstrated many times in the course of this investigation, perhaps most notably in Experiment 4: The test items used in Experiment 4 all featured ID explicitly reporting the utterance of a protagonist who functioned as the clause’s matrix subject, yet they also received readings which reflected a choice for the narrator/speaker as perspectival center.

How can we explain this disparate behavior of FID and ID? First of all, it has to be noted that *perspectival center* and what I have referred to as the *author* of a (reported) thought or utterance are to be distinguished as two fundamentally different concepts, which can, but do not have to, denote the same individual. The relation between author and perspectival center is thus quite similar to the one between perspectival center and speaker – even though the speaker may often act as the (default) perspectival center, the two can also be separated and therefore must not be confused. While one might be quick to conflate the author of a thought or utterance with its perspectival center, the distinction becomes quite clear once we consider ID: If the two always denoted the same referent, then the matrix subject of an ID clause would *always* have to be regarded as its perspectival center as well, and thus, readings in which perspective-dependent expressions are interpreted with regard to the speaker’s context should inherently be infelicitous. As this is clearly not the case, a conflation of author and perspectival center is not feasible.

The question thus becomes why the author – or anchor – of an FID clause always has to be identical with its perspectival center. The most plausible explanation is that we generally attribute a thought, attitude or opinion that is being expressed

to whichever discourse referent we regard as the perspectival center of the clause or text segment, *unless* we are given explicit reason to think otherwise and to diverge from this assumption. Whereas the speaker has been established to act as the default perspectival center, one could thus argue that the perspectival center, in turn, acts as the default author of a thought or utterance. Only by explicitly separating the two functions can a conscious distinction be made; however, precisely this is not possible in FID, as FID is specifically characterized by *not* overtly identifying its author, but instead being completely dependent on its content and linguistic cues for interpretation. ID, in contrast, does explicitly name its author in the matrix clause; if the explicitly named author does not correspond to the preferred perspectival center, which is, similarly to FID, established by contextual cues and the content of the ID clause itself, readers are therefore able to distinguish between the two.

This one key difference between FID and ID points towards ID, and not, as usually assumed, FID, possessing truly unique perspectival properties. The results of this investigation have revealed that many of the abilities and characteristics traditionally attributed uniquely to FID in the literature, such as its potential for multiperspectivity, the type of perspective-dependent expressions that can shift in its scope, its dependency on the discourse context – specifically, being embedded in a narrative context and selecting the maximally prominent discourse referent as perspectival center – are all shared by ID. ID, however, remains the only type of speech and thought representation which offers a speaker the ability to report a thought or utterance produced by another individual, but filtered through the speaker’s own point of view. The fact that ID uniquely allows for this possibility may potentially be exactly the reason why it has been commonly and mistakenly regarded not as ID’s preferred interpretation, but as its only available one.

The next chapter will shift focus to the final factor potentially impacting the interpretation of ID to be examined in the course of this investigation, which has, so far, been mostly left out of the discussion: the type of propositional attitude verb used in the matrix clause. While this might appear, at first, to be a factor which is only of consequence for ID, but irrelevant with regard to ID’s relationship to FID, the chapter will present an argument to the contrary: To be specific, I will postulate that only ID clause’s featuring propositional attitude verbs that constitute an actual speech or thought event report are admissible for a comparative analysis of ID and FID.

6 Propositional Attitudes Verbs and Thought Events

At the start of this investigation I identified four factors that might potentially play a role in influencing and guiding a reader's interpretation to favor either the protagonist or the narrator as the perspectival center of ID, given that the condition of being embedded in a narrative context is fulfilled. These factors, originally listed in (7), are repeated in (163) below:

- (163) a. **F1**: Prominence status of discourse referents
b. **F2**: Choice of propositional attitude verb
c. **F3**: Verb position in the embedded clause
d. **F4**: Choice of indexical expression

The previous chapter focused extensively on F1 and consisted of a comprehensive discussion of the role that discourse prominence plays with regard to perspectivization in speech and thought reports. Its primary purpose was to provide evidence for H2, one of my two central hypotheses, which states that FID and ID share the majority of their perspectival properties and therefore demand a uniform analysis. In accordance with Hinterwimmer (2019), Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019) and Meuser (2022), it was determined that there exists a direct correlation between the prominence status of a discourse referent and the selection of the perspectival anchor for FID. FID can only be anchored to the referent that is deemed to be – locally or globally – maximally prominent, based on a number of prominence-lending cues. This pertains not only to the protagonists, but also to the narrator: Narrators whose prominence is increased via the use of first-person pronouns have a significant impact on the interpretation of FID clauses, whereas less prominent narrators do not. Moreover, it was showcased that the interpretation of temporal indexicals in ID, too, is affected by the prominence of the available discourse referents; namely, perspective shift is facilitated by discourse contexts which feature a protagonist that is more prominent than the narrator. In short, Chapter 5 confirmed that F1 is indeed a major factor in determining the perspectival center for and thereby impacting the interpretation of both ID and FID.

I now turn my attention to F2, which addresses the role of the type of propositional attitude verb that is used in the matrix clause of German ID. As will be

shown in more detail in Section 6.2, propositional attitude verbs form a very heterogeneous class which not only encompasses reports of actual utterances or conscious thoughts produced by an individual, like *sagen* ('say') or *denken* ('think'), but also, *inter alia*, reports of a referent's doxastic or epistemic state, like *glauben* ('believe') or *wissen* ('know'). In contrast to the effect of discourse prominence, the question of whether the interpretation of shiftable indexicals might be affected by the specific type of attitude verb they are subordinated by, thereby potentially necessitating a more fine-grained (sub-)categorization, has, to date, rarely been addressed. Given the general consensus in the literature that ID does not enable perspective shift, this is not at all surprising: The correlation between discourse prominence and perspectivization, after all, had previously only been investigated with respect to FID. As the choice of propositional attitude verb is ostensibly irrelevant for FID, which is situated on the root clause level, and thus only pertains to ID, its potential relevance for the ability to shift contexts has not been recognized as a fruitful topic of investigation.

However, numerous examinations of languages which are attested to allow context shift in ID, such as Amharic (cf. Schlenker 2003), Zazaki (cf. Anand & Nevins 2004, Anand 2006), Slavé (cf. Rice 1986, Bittner 2014, Anand & Nevins 2004, Anand 2006) or Nez Perce (cf. Deal 2017 & 2020), have provided evidence that the specific type of propositional attitude verb plays a substantial role with regard to whether the subordinated ID clause will exhibit perspective shift or not.⁸⁴ In fact, the collective evidence is so strong and consistent that it prompted Deal (2020: 51) to formulate a universal hierarchical pattern of verb classes, illustrated in Figure 19, based on which she divides languages that allow context shift into three classes:

1. Languages that allow context shift only when subordinated by verbs of speech such as Zazaki (cf. Anand 2006) and Dhaasanac (cf. Nishiguchi 2019).
2. Languages that allow context shift only when subordinated by verbs of speech or verbs of thought such as Korean (cf. Park 2016) and Slave (cf. Rice 1986).
3. Languages that allow context shift only when subordinated by verbs of speech, verbs of thought or verbs of knowledge such as Nez Perce.
(cf. Deal 2020: 49ff.)

It is thus not just a possibility that perspective shift in German ID, too, could be affected by the type of propositional attitude verb, but rather the expected outcome based on the above data. I thus formulate the following general addendum to H1 (cf. (42)):

- (164) **H1c:** The potential for an indirect discourse clause to allow perspective-dependent expressions in its scope to shift to the context of a discourse

⁸⁴See Section 2.3 for a discussion of most of the aforementioned works.

referent different from the speaker is directly dependent on the type of propositional attitude verb in its matrix clause.

	Shift takes place under verbs of:		
	Speech	Thought	Knowledge
Nez Perce	✓	✓	✓
Navajo, Slave, Uyghur	✓	✓	–
Dhaasanac, Zazaki	✓	–	–

Figure 19: Implicational hierarchy of verbs (cf. Deal 2020: 51, Deal 2017: 27).

H1c is deliberately left ambiguous with regard to the specific types of attitude verbs that allow perspective shift and those that do not, since such clarification can only be achieved by a thorough comparison of the potential subgroups of verbs and their respective effects on perspective interpretation, ideally supported by empirical investigation. As such an endeavor would be far beyond the limitations of this doctoral thesis, the current chapter will only serve as a first, preliminary examination that primarily focuses on and proposes a distinction between propositional attitude verbs which report an actual speech or thought *event* and propositional attitude verbs which only reflect a discourse referent’s mental *state*.

I consider the lack of recognition for the potential relevance of the choice of propositional attitude verb for the interpretation of ID to be a critical oversight that is simultaneously a result from and a cause of the misconception that ID does fundamentally not allow context shift: The reason why the type of attitude verb has not been considered as a factor in influencing perspective shift in ID is that the possibility of perspective shift in ID is ruled out to begin with. As was discussed at length in Chapter 3 and demonstrated empirically via the results of Experiment 4⁸⁵, this is partially due to most examples of ID used in the literature to demonstrate this presumed characteristic of ID not properly establishing an unambiguously narrative context. However, it also stems from the fact that a plethora of quite different types of propositional attitude verbs are used in examples of ID to showcase its properties. This clearly reflects the underlying, implicit assumption that ID will display identical characteristics regardless of the verb used in the matrix clause; yet as Deal’s (2020) hierarchy of verbs in Figure 19 illustrates, there is no reason to assume this should be the case – quite to the contrary, there is every reason to suspect that the type of attitude verb *does* play an important role with regard to enabling context shift.

This is particularly troublesome when we take into account that these examples form the basis for theoretical considerations regarding the relationship between

⁸⁵See Section 5.6.

ID and FID. In contrast to the variation of types of propositional content that are commonly subsumed under the term *indirect discourse*, FID truly and exclusively represents reports of actual utterances or conscious thoughts produced by a discourse referent – in other words, FID clauses obligatorily constitute speech or thought events. I therefore hypothesize that misconceptions about the relation between FID and ID are, at least partially, a result from mistakenly labeling what are essentially *attitude* reports as *speech/thought* reports and subsequently expecting them to serve as a viable point of comparison to actual speech/thought reports. My argument thus entails that, in order to arrive at an accurate evaluation of how the perspectival properties of ID coincide with or differ from those attested for FID, only ID clauses which represent true speech or thought reports should be considered for the comparative analysis. Only if this condition is fulfilled should the ID clause be expected to behave similarly to FID with regard to its perspectival properties. The current considerations thus also relate to my second central hypothesis, H2 (cf. (43)), as they further clarify which instances of ID are to be considered for a uniform treatment of ID and FID. The prediction is tentatively defined in sub-hypothesis H2b.

- (165) **H2b:** The perspectival properties of indirect discourse sentences that constitute reports of actual speech or thought events are identical to the perspectival properties of free indirect discourse.

H2b does not make predictions about the perspectival properties of different types of attitude reports, i.e., ID clauses that do not constitute a speech or thought event report. This is important to note, as I do not aim to postulate that context shift is to be fully ruled out for these type of structures. As mentioned above, such stipulations would require a much more extensive examination and comparison of the individual categories of propositional attitude verbs than I can provide at this point. The essential takeaway of the above discussion, however, is that they are of no concern for an analysis that aims to compare the properties of different types of speech and thought representation, and to subsequently clarify their relationship to each other. Whether attitude reports allow context shift is to be regarded as a separate question from whether speech and thought reports do, and only the latter question is of relevance to the relationship between ID and FID.

The chapter is structured as follows: First, the required background on Davidsonian event semantics will be introduced in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 then provides an overview and classification of the different types of propositional attitude verbs. Based on the observation that FID always constitutes speech or thought reports, I will motivate a necessary distinction between attitude verbs that subordinate propositions which represent utterances or conscious thoughts, and attitude verbs that subordinate propositions which instead reflect some sort of mental state. This distinction also and especially pertains to what could be considered the quintessential

thought report verb *denken* ('think'); I will illustrate that *denken* is, in fact, ambiguous between a thought event and a belief state interpretation, and postulate that only clauses which enforce the former reading should be considered for comparison with FID. In Section 6.3, I will then demonstrate that forcing a thought event reading of ID clauses increases their similarity to FID with regard to their perspectival properties. Specifically, the section will provide first theoretical evidence that the *de dicto* / *de re* ambiguity, long argued to be an inherent property of ID in general, is resolved for ID clauses with enforced thought event readings.

6.1 Event Semantics

The current section serves to explain the central aspects of event semantics as originally envisioned in Davidson (1967/1980) and subsequently developed further by so-called 'Neo-Davidsonian' accounts. Davidson (1967/1980) conceived events as actual, concrete entities in our world which, as such, can be spatio-temporally anchored (cf. Maienborn 2005: 278). Accordingly, they possess the linguistic properties of nominal referential objects: Events can be picked up by anaphoric pronouns (166a) and are quantifiable (166b) (cf. Maienborn 2011: 806).

- (166) a. *Pia sprang auf die Bühne. Es war äußerst unerwartet.*
 'Pia jumped onto the stage. It was extremely unexpected.'
 b. *Pia vergaß zweimal ihren Text.*
 'Pia forgot her lines twice.'

Es ('it') in (166a) does not refer to the verb *sprang* ('jumped'), but rather to the event that encompassed Pia jumping onto the stage at a specific point in time at a specific location; events must therefore have a denotation in the world, in the same vein as nominal expressions, in order to be picked up via pronoun:

- (167) *Pia sprang auf die Bühne. Sie war nicht besonders hoch.*
 'Pia jumped onto the stage. It wasn't particularly high.'

Moreover, (166b) illustrates that events are quantifiable, i.e., the clause defines the number of times the event of Pia forgetting her lines took place. To Davidson, this realization held major implications for the semantic representation of verbs. Davidson (1967/1980: 118) proposed that the argument structure of certain verbs should be extended to include an additional argument position for an event variable *e*: Since events, like nominal entities, represent a referential object, they can also function as verbal arguments. However, Davidson also assumed that only action verbs, i.e., verbs that describe some kind of agentive action, represent an event and therefore require an event argument position. Verbs such as *wohnen* ('reside'), in contrast, which instead describe a (more or less permanent) state, do not have a free position for an event variable in their argument structure. Accordingly, a transitive action verb like *schlagen* ('hit') would possess three instead of two open

valency positions:

(168) $\lambda y \lambda x \lambda e [\text{schlagen}(x, y, e)]$

Davidson's theory allows for the successful inclusion of adverbial modifiers into the event structure of predicative expressions, which are interpreted as one-place predicates establishing a relation not to the verb, but to the event argument (cf. Maienborn 2011: 805). Adverbial modification is achieved via conjunction to the basic argument structure of the verbal predicate referring to the same event and thus, further information about the event, such as its time, place or manner, can be added. This process is illustrated in (169), which depicts Davidson's classic example.

(169) a. Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom with the knife at midnight.
 b. $\exists e [\text{butter}(\text{jones}, \text{the toast}, e) \ \& \ \text{IN}(e, \text{the bathroom}) \ \& \ \text{INSTR}(e, \text{the knife}) \ \& \ \text{AT}(e, \text{midnight})]$

Whether a predicate possesses a hidden event argument or not can be determined on the basis of a number of grammatical features. One of these is the ability to be combined with spatio-temporal modifiers (170a), as well as with adverbials of instrument or adverbials of manner (170b) (cf. Maienborn 2011: 808):

(170) a. i. *Piet trinkt um 10 Uhr morgens in der Kneipe einen Schnaps.*
 'Piet drinks some liquor in the pub at 10 o'clock in the morning.'
 ii. *#Piet ist um 10 Uhr morgens in der Kneipe alt.*
 '#Piet is old in the pub at 10 o'clock in the morning.'
 b. i. *Piet trinkt fröhlich einen Schnaps.*
 'Piet happily drinks some liquor.'
 ii. *#Piet ist fröhlich alt.*
 '#Piet is old happily.'

Another method of identifying events is illustrated in (171): Since events are referential objects in the world, they should be perceptible and thus be able to serve as the infinitival complement of a perception verb like *sehen* ('see').

(171) a. *Vanessa sieht Piet einen Schnaps trinken.*
 'Vanessa sees Piet drinking some liquor.'
 b. *#Vanessa sieht Piet alt sein.*
 '#Vanessa sees Piet being old.'

While Davidson's conceptualization of event arguments proved highly influential, his specification that only action verbs feature an event variable in their argument structure was determined to be much too restrictive by proponents of the so-called Neo-Davidsonian approach, which was developed primarily in Parsons (1990) and Higginbotham (1985 & 2000). The Neo-Davidsonian approach extends Davidson's original proposal in two major ways. In contrast to Davidson and in accordance

with Bach (1986: 6), who regards states and events as subtypes of *eventualities*, proponents of the Neo-Davidsonian account argue that all types of eventualities, including states, possess an argument position for event variables (cf. Higginbotham 1985: 50, Parsons 1990: 187f.). Accordingly, state verbs are predicted to feature the characteristics originally solely associated with events, including the ability to be spatio-temporally anchored. The examples in (172) illustrate that at least some predicates which describe a state can indeed be paired with spatio-temporal modifiers, as both *glücklich sein* ('being happy') and *schlafen* ('sleep') describe states in which an individual can be in for a prolonged period of time.

- (172) a. *Steve war in Spanien glücklich.*
 'Steve was happy in Spain.'
 b. *Diana schlief gestern bis nachmittags.*
 'Diana slept until afternoon yesterday.'

Higginbotham & Ramchandt (1997: 54) further propose to extend the stipulation of an eventuality argument position from verbs to all types of predicates, including nouns and adjectives. Moreover, the Neo-Davidsonian approach also diverges from Davidson's original account with regard to the suggested argument structure of verbs in general. Whereas Davidson only considered "event arguments as an additional argument of (some) verbs, Neo-Davidsonian accounts take the event argument of a verbal predicate to be its only argument" (cf. Maienborn 2016: 31). As all verbs would therefore possess only a singular argument position to be filled by the event variable, the traditional distinction between intransitive, transitive and ditransitive verbs would be of a purely syntactical nature. Thus, it would not be just adverbial modifiers which are conjoined to the event argument of a predicate, as originally envisioned by Davidson, but subjects and objects as well. Parsons (1990: 99) clarifies that each syntactic element is linked to the event via a specific thematic role, as illustrated in (173), which contains the Neo-Davidsonian version of (169b).

- (173) $\exists e[\text{BUTTER}(e) \ \& \ \text{AGENT}(e, \text{jones}) \ \& \ \text{PATIENT}(e, \text{the toast}) \ \& \ \text{IN}(e, \text{the bathroom}) \ \& \ \text{INSTR}(e, \text{the knife}) \ \& \ \text{AT}(e, \text{midnight})]$ (Maienborn 2016: 31)

In contrast to Davidson's (1967/1980) widely accepted ideas and notions, the Neo-Davidsonian approach is highly controversial and has been met with a fair amount of criticism in the literature; this pertains both to the conflation of arguments and adverbial modifiers with regard to a predicate's logical form, as well as to the stipulation made in Higginbotham & Ramchandt (1997) that all predicates possess an eventuality argument. Regarding the former, Bierwisch (2005), for example, laments that, whereas Davidson's account neatly captured the distinction between arguments as part of a verb's valency, on the one hand, and modifiers as separate predicates linked to the same event, on the other hand, Neo-Davidsonians discard this distinction completely. As a consequence, they effectively abandon the conception of

arguments as “essential, intrinsic properties” of a verb’s semantic structure (Bierwisch 2005: 21).

For our current purposes, however, the question whether events and states need to be distinguished on the basis of inherent grammatical differences or can indeed be assumed to be identical with regard to their logical form is of greater interest – a question which, as Maienborn (2011: 804) surmises, is still open to debate. While examples like (172b) undoubtedly demonstrate that Davidson was too strict in his assessment that only action verbs carry an event argument, it does not negate the fact that there are also predicates that clearly prohibit spatio-temporal anchoring, among other things, as was illustrated in (170). Consequently, there exist a number of attempts to create a more fine-grained categorization of predicate types with regard to the existence of an event(uality)⁸⁶ variable in their argument structure. The most popular of these attempts is the one proposed in Kratzer (1995), who distinguishes between two groups of predicates: Stage-level predicates (SLPs) and individual-level predicates (ILPs). Of these two, only SLPs have an eventuality argument. Thus, Kratzer (1995) takes into consideration that there *are* predicates that do not represent an eventuality; however, she also acknowledges that the extra *e*-argument is not just limited to (action) verbs either. Accordingly, her group of SLPs encompasses both other types of verbs, including state verbs, as well as adjectives (cf. Kratzer 1995: 126, Maienborn 2011: 813).

The difference between the two groups is that SLPs describe temporary properties and thus need an eventuality argument to be temporally anchored. Verbs like *sprechen* (‘speak’) and *schlafen* (‘sleep’), as well as adjectives like *müde* (‘tired’) can be categorized as SLPs. ILPs, in contrast, express inherent or permanent properties; verbs like *wissen* (‘know’) and adjectives like *alt* (‘old’) or *intelligent* belong to this group. Kratzer (1995) identifies several ways to determine if a predicate is an SLP or an ILP, partially based on previous observations by Davidson (1967/1980). Thus, she claims that only SLPs can be located in space and therefore be modified by a spatial adverbial or serve as an infinitival complement of a perception verb (see Maienborn 2016: 34f., for an overview of further SLP/ILP diagnostics). However, Maienborn (2016) points out that this is not entirely accurate: Copula verbs, in particular, uniformly do not meet the criteria for possessing an eventuality argument, regardless of whether they describe a temporary or permanent property (cf. Maienborn 2016: 41):

(174) a. i. *Henry sang auf einer Parkbank ein Lied.*

⁸⁶As discussed in Maienborn (2011), there exists both a broad and a narrow notion of events. The broader notion equates events to eventualities as defined by Bach (1986); the narrow notion, which is akin to Davidson’s (1967/1980) original definition of events, instead conceives of events as dynamic eventualities which possess an inherent culmination point and are thus to be distinguished from the static, atelic states (cf. Maienborn 2011: 810). In order to be able to clearly distinguish between events and states, I will henceforth use the term *events* whenever referring to the more narrow notion and *eventualities* whenever referring to the broader notion.

- ‘Henry sang a song on a park bench.’
- ii. *Henry schlief auf einer Parkbank.*
‘Henry slept on a park bench.’
- iii. *#Henry kannte auf einer Parkbank den Sinn des Lebens.*
‘#Henry knew the meaning of life on a park bench.’
- iv. *#Henry war auf einer Parkbank intelligent.*
‘#Henry was intelligent on a park bench.’
- v. *#Henry war auf einer Parkbank müde.*
‘#Henry was tired on a park bench.’
- b. i. *Mike hört Henry ein Lied singen.*
‘Mike hears Henry singing a song.’
- ii. *Mike sieht Henry auf einer Parkbank schlafen.*
‘Mike sees Henry sleeping on a park bench.’
- iii. *#Mike sieht Henry den Sinn des Lebens kennen.*
‘#Mike sees Henry knowing the meaning of life.’
- iv. *#Mike sieht Henry intelligent sein.*
‘#Mike sees Henry being intelligent.’
- v. *#Mike sieht Henry müde sein.*
‘#Mike sees Henry being tired.’

The examples in (174) either contain an action verb (*singen* (‘sing’)), a state verb that Kratzer (1995) would consider as an SLP (*schlafen* (‘sleep’)), a state verb she would consider as an ILP (*kennen* (‘know’)), an adjective Kratzer would consider as an ILP as well (*intelligent* (‘intelligent’)), and finally, an adjective she would consider as an SLP instead due to only describing a temporary state (*müde* (‘tired’)). (174a-i–174a-v) test whether the predicates can be modified via a spatial adverbial and (174b-i–174b-v) whether they can function as the infinitival complement of a perception verb, two well-attested methods to determine if the predicate has an eventuality argument or not. As can be seen in both cases, the action verb and the proposed SLP verb pattern alike and allow both, thereby indicating that they indeed both represent eventualities. In the same vein, the proposed ILP verb and adjective also pattern together: They can neither be spatially anchored, nor be perceived, therefore demonstrating that they do *not* represent an eventuality. Contrary to what would be expected based on Kratzer’s (1995) theory, however, the supposed SLP adjective *müde* patterns with the predicates that do not constitute eventualities.

This prompts Maienborn (2016) to further distinguish between *states*, which represent true Davidsonian states (= D-states), and *statives*, or ‘Kimian states’ (= K-states), in reference to Kim (1969). Whereas D-states are to be regarded as eventualities, K-states are defined by Maienborn (2016) as “ontologically ‘poorer’, more abstract entities than Davidsonian eventualities” (Maienborn 2016: 46); they can

be located in time, but not in space, and have “no unique manner of realization” (Maienborn 2016: 47). However, Maienborn (2016) also stresses the necessary distinction between events and states as two subtypes of eventualities – while both types may contain an eventuality argument, they fundamentally differ with regard to their dynamicity. She provides the following test to see whether a predicate describes an event or a state: The German verb *geschehen* (‘happen’) can only make anaphoric reference to the former. As observed by Maienborn (2016: 58) and illustrated in (175), D-states pattern with K-states in this regard.

- (175) a. *Henry sang ein Lied. Das geschah letzte Woche.*
 ‘Henry sang a song. That happened last week.’
- b. *Henry schlief. #Das geschah letzte Woche.*
 ‘Henry slept. That happened last week.’
- c. *Henry kannte den Sinn des Lebens. #Das geschah letzte Woche.*
 ‘Henry knew the meaning of life. That happened last week.’

For the intended classification of propositional attitude verbs in the next section, I will thus adopt Maienborn’s (2016) framework, as it accounts for the distinction between events and states without necessitating a stipulation that state verbs need or need not possess an eventuality argument, which is generally of lesser concern for the current investigation. Moreover, it provides us with a simple method to check whether specific types of attitude verbs represent an event or a state.

6.2 Classification of Propositional Attitude Verbs

In Chapter 1, propositional attitude verbs were defined, in a rather oversimplified fashion, as verbs that introduce a complement clause which expresses a thought, belief, opinion or attitude. I want to start off this section by giving a somewhat more detailed description of how propositional attitude verbs are defined in the literature. Most approaches adopt or build on the seminal definition formulated in Hintikka (1969), according to which propositional attitude verbs are quantifiers over possible worlds that are attributed to a specific individual, namely their subject. Essentially, they divide all possible worlds into two groups: The set of worlds that are in accordance with the attitude relation which supposedly holds between the individual and a proposition p , and the set of worlds that are not (cf. Hintikka 1969: 25, Lewis 1979: 513, Swanson 2012: 1541). Propositional attitude verbs thus ascribe some sort of relation between the attitude holder and the proposition which denotes a set of possible worlds. Accordingly, Hintikka (1969: 27) conceptualizes propositional attitude verbs as functions which assign to an individual a set of possible worlds.

For each attitude verb, a specific *accessibility relation* holds that directly determines the set of worlds the respective attitude verb quantifies over (cf. Hintikka 1969: 27, Swanson 2012: 1539, Delfitto & Fiorin 2020: 106). With regard to *believe*, for example, the accessibility relation B_x determines the set of possible worlds that

are compatible with everything that an individual x believes to be the case. A clause like (176) is thus true only if the set of worlds denoted by the proposition *the sun is shining* entails the set of possible worlds denoted by B_{Frank} .

(176) Frank believes that the sun is shining.

The stipulation is that individual attitude verbs may differ with regard to their accessibility relation but can otherwise receive a uniform semantic treatment (cf. also Cresswell 1985: 33f., 55).

The proposed class of propositional attitude verbs, i.e., expressions that can theoretically be captured by Hintikka's (1969) definition, is in actuality quite heterogeneous, however, with regard to the types of relations that are being denoted: It not only encompasses verbs which clarify an individual's knowledge and opinions about or feelings towards a given proposition, but also includes verbs which report that an individual has perceived an event described by or uttered a sentence containing the embedded proposition. The fuzzy boundaries of the propositional attitude verb class have consequently led to disagreements both with regard to whether there is a need for a distinct subcategorization of different attitude verb types – and the specific implementation thereof – as well as whether certain verbs belong to the class at all. *Verba dicendi* like *sagen* ('say'), for example, are considered to be typical propositional attitude verbs by Swanson (2012: 1539) or Delfitto & Fiorin (2020: 109f.), but argued to be a completely separate class of verbs in, *inter alia*, Karttunen (1974: 188), Smith (2003: 161) or Bary & Maier (2021: 20).

(177) presents an overview as well as a tentative attempt at classification of the different verb classes which are commonly regarded as propositional attitude verbs. For each class, I give a short description, a (non-exhaustive) list of German verbs belonging to the respective class, and one or two example sentences.

- (177) a. **Doxastic Attitude Verbs:** Give insight into an individual's beliefs, i.e., whether or not the individual believes the proposition in the embedded clause to hold true
 Verb list: *glauben* ('believe'), *vermuten* ('suppose'), *annehmen* ('assume'), *ahnen* ('suspect'), *bezweifeln* ('doubt'), *fürchten* ('fear')
- i. *Magdalena glaubt, dass sie bald befördert wird.*
 'Magdalena believes that she will soon be promoted.'
 - ii. *Helmut bezweifelt, dass die Polizei den Dieb schnappen wird.*
 'Helmut doubts that the police will catch the thief.'
- b. **Epistemic Attitude Verbs:** Give insight into an individual's knowledge, i.e., whether or not the individual knows if the proposition in the embedded clause accurately describes the world
 Verb list: *wissen* ('know'), *begreifen* ('realize'), *verstehen* ('understand'), *erfahren* ('learn'), *(sich) erinnern* ('remember')

- i. *Selma weiß, dass der Gärtner immer der Mörder ist.*
‘Selma knows that the gardener is always the murderer.’
- ii. *Damian erfährt, dass sein Sohn von der Schule verwiesen wurde.*
‘Damian learns that his son has been expelled from school.’
- c. **Bouletic Attitude Verbs:** Give insight into an individual’s desires, i.e., whether or not the individual wants the proposition in the embedded clause to hold true
Verb list: (*sich*) *wünschen* (‘wish’), *wollen* (‘want’), *hoffen* (‘hope’)
 - i. *Paula will, dass man sie endlich ernst nimmt.*
‘Paula wants people to finally take her seriously.’
 - ii. *Jacob hofft, dass sein Mitbewohner die Küche geputzt hat.*
‘Jacob hopes that his roommate has cleaned the kitchen.’
- d. **Emotional/Evaluative Attitude Verbs:** Give insight into an individual’s opinion or feelings towards the proposition in the embedded clause
Verb list: *freuen* (‘to be pleased’), *genießen* (‘enjoy’), *bedauern* (‘regret’), *irritieren* (‘irritate’), *nerven* (‘annoy’), *ärgern* (‘anger’), *hassen* (‘hate’)
 - i. *Greta nervt, dass ihre Eltern ihr nie zuhören.*
‘That her parents never listen to her annoys Greta.’
 - ii. *Edgar genießt, dass er die beste Note der ganzen Klasse im Test hat.*
‘Edgar enjoys that he has the best grade of the whole class in the test.’
- e. **Verba dicendi/Speech Report Verbs:** Report some type of utterance produced by an individual
Verb list: *sagen* (‘say’), *fragen* (‘ask’), *erwähnen* (‘mention’), *erzählen* (‘tell’), *berichten* (‘report’), *erklären/erläutern* (‘explain’), *schwören* (‘swear’), *behaupten* (‘claim’)
 - i. *Angela sagt, dass es draußen schneit.*
‘Angela says that it is snowing outside.’
 - ii. *Horst fragt, ob ihm jemand die Uhrzeit sagen könnte.*
‘Horst asks if somebody could tell him the time.’
- f. **Thought Report Verbs:** Report an individual’s conscious thought(s)
Verb list: *denken* (‘think’)
 - i. *Aaron denkt, dass er einen Trecker zum Geburtstag bekommt.*
‘Aaron thinks that he’ll get a tractor for his birthday.’
- g. **Verba sentiendi/Perception Report Verbs:** Report an individual’s perception(s).
Verb list: *sehen* (‘see’), *beobachten* (‘observe’), *hören* (‘hear’), *riechen* (‘smell’), *bemerkten* (‘notice’), *wahrnehmen* (‘perceive’)

- i. *Jasmin sieht, dass ihre Gäste nichts mehr zu trinken haben.*
‘Jasmin sees that her guests have nothing left to drink.’
- ii. *Cornelius hört, dass der Pizzalieferant die Türklingel betätigt.*
‘Cornelius hears that the pizza delivery man is ringing the doorbell.’

Overall, I propose a differentiation between seven distinct verb classes, some of which represent subtypes of the superordinate class of propositional attitude verbs, and some of which can be argued to represent related, but separate phenomena. The first four classes, as defined in (177a–177d), can be indisputably considered as belonging to the class of propositional attitude verbs: They either identify whether a given proposition is part of a specific referent’s doxastic or epistemic domain – i.e., these verbs clarify what the individual in question believes (177a) or knows (177b) about the validity of the embedded proposition – or they describe how a referent *feels* about the embedded proposition, i.e., whether they want it to become true (177c) and if they carry a positive or a negative stance towards it (177d). The class of emotional/evaluative attitude verbs thus convey an individual’s attitude towards a proposition in the most literal way; an argument could be made to conflate them with the class of bouletic attitude verbs, as they, too, indirectly reveal whether the referent wants the proposition to be true or not. However, there are a number of grammatical differences between the two groups which warrant the distinction.

For one thing, bouletic attitude verbs are irrealis verbs, i.e., the proposition is not considered as describing the actual, current state of the world. The verbs belonging to the class of emotional/evaluative attitude verbs, in contrast, are all factive in nature, i.e., they presuppose that the entailed proposition is true with regard to the current state of the actual world. Furthermore, the verbs in this class are unique among propositional attitude verbs in that, for many of them, the subordinated clause functions as the subject, not the object, of the matrix clause. The categorization of individual verbs can be somewhat ambiguous, as the verb *fürchten* exemplifies: While I classified it as a doxastic verb, since it clarifies what the referent believes to be true, it also informs us about the referent’s emotional attitude towards the proposition.

The final three verb classes, as defined in (177e–177g), are the ones for which I consider the classification as propositional attitude verbs debatable. As was mentioned above, *verba dicendi* (177e), in particular, have frequently been regarded as a fully separate class (cf. Karttunen 1974: 188, Smith 2003: 161, Smith 2009: 375, Bary & Maier 2021: 20), which indirectly calls into question the actual relationship between clauses featuring propositional attitude verbs and actual ID clauses: Speech reports like the one in (177e-i) are, if anything, the quintessential example for ID, after all. The common assumption that speech report verbs are propositional attitude verbs has led to the overgeneralization in the literature that other types of attitude reports are to be regarded as instances of ID as well, and therefore can

serve as a suitable basis for analyzing the properties of ID. Distinguishing speech report verbs from propositional attitude verbs thus effectively raises doubts about which structures should truly be identified as ID and, in turn, which proposed characteristics of ID are, in truth, properties of attitude reports instead. I will return to these questions shortly.

The class of speech report verbs encompasses by far the largest number of verbs. While all speech report verbs have in common that they describe the propositional content of some kind of communicative act by an individual, they are quite diverse with regard to the information they provide about said communicative act: They might clarify the type of utterance being produced, such as a question, report or declaration, or further describe the speech act itself, like *flüstern* ('whisper') or *rufen* ('shout'). Some speech report verbs additionally give the reader insight into the individual's emotive state while producing the utterance, like *klagen* ('lament') or *schimpfen* ('grumble'). Finally, many speech report verbs simultaneously serve to express the (current) speaker's opinion/attitude about the author of the utterance and thus double as expressives; these include *jammern* ('whine'), *plappern* ('babble'), *schwafeln* ('blather') or *nörgeln* ('nag'). In contrast to the typical propositional attitude verbs, however, speech report verbs do not truly specify the author's actual *attitude* towards the proposition. The verbs certainly describe a relation between an individual and a proposition – namely, the relation that the referent's utterance entailed the proposition – but they are pure acts of *external* communication and do not offer insight into what the referent actually knows, believes or feels with regard to the proposition (cf. Smith 2009: 374). Thus, (178a) is completely acceptable, whereas (178b) is clearly contradictory:

- (178) a. *Antje sagte, dass sie in ihrem Zustand noch fahren könnte. Doch sie wusste, dass das nicht stimmte.*
 'Antje said that she could still drive in her condition. But she knew that wasn't true.'
- b. *Antje glaubte, dass sie in ihrem Zustand noch fahren könnte. #Doch sie wusste, dass das nicht stimmte.*
 'Antje believed that she could still drive in her condition. #But she knew that wasn't true.'

Thought report verbs (177f) differ from speech report verbs in that they *do* offer insight into the referent's mental activities and thereby automatically into his internal attitude towards the proposition; thus, their classification as a propositional attitude verb is more intuitive and convincing. However, in contrast to the other types of attitude verbs, thought report verbs also represent a conscious act by the individual: the formulation of a thought, which constitutes an act of *internal* self-communication. This, in turn, lead some scholars to ascribe thought report verbs syntactic properties akin to those of speech report verbs, or even outright classify

them as *verba dicendi* (cf. Banfield 1982: 35f., Smith 2009: 375, Maier 2017: 264), though primarily with respect to DD: The fact that DD allows subordination via both speech and thought report verbs, but no other propositional attitude verbs, as shown in (179), is regarded as a major indication that the two pattern together as verbs of communication or discourse.

- (179) a. „*Ich treffe mich morgen endlich mit Sigmund!*“, *sagte Elsa*.
 “I’m finally meeting Sigmund tomorrow!”, said Elsa.’
- b. „*Ich treffe mich morgen endlich mit Sigmund!*“, *dachte Elsa*.
 “I’m finally meeting Sigmund tomorrow!”, thought Elsa.’
- c. # „*Ich treffe mich morgen endlich mit Sigmund!*“, *glaubte Elsa*.
 ‘#“I’m finally meeting Sigmund tomorrow!”, believed Elsa.’

The only verb that meets these criteria, i.e., that may represent a referent’s conscious thought, appears to be *denken*. With regard to a distinction between attitude reports, on the one hand, and actual ID, on the other hand, *denken* could thus theoretically be considered as belonging to either one of the two groups, as there is evidence for both.

The last verb class contains perception report verbs, or *verba sentiendi* (177g). In a similar vein to speech report verbs, verbs in this class do establish a relation between individual and proposition, namely, that the individual is perceiving the event or state described by the proposition in some fashion, but they do not actually describe an attitude the referent holds towards the proposition. We might be able to infer from the content of the subordinated clause how the matrix subject might feel about the proposition, but this is not due to inherent properties of the perception verb itself; neither does a perception report necessarily equate an update to the discourse referent’s doxastic or epistemic domain, as illustrated in (180).

- (180) a. *Ramon hörte, wie der Einbrecher das Fenster im Wohnzimmer einschlug. Aber er glaubte, dass seine Katze nur irgendetwas umgestoßen hatte.*
 ‘Ramon heard how the burglar smashed the window in the living room. But he believed that his cat had just knocked something over.’
- b. *Ramon wusste, dass der Einbrecher das Fenster im Wohnzimmer einschlug. #Aber er glaubte, dass seine Katze nur irgendetwas umgestoßen hatte.*
 ‘Ramon knew that the burglar smashed the window in the living room. #But he believed that his cat had just knocked something over.’

(180a) shows that the proposition subordinated by the perception verb may fully reflect the point of view – and therefore also the knowledge – of the speaker; thus, the proposition may describe factually what Ramon hears without Ramon possessing any actual awareness of the burglar breaking into his house.

The description of the numerous different types of verbs that might potentially be considered to be propositional attitude verbs above has served to demonstrate the actual heterogeneity of this proposed verb class. With regard to the focus of this doctoral thesis, i.e., perspective interpretation in ID, two general, but important questions arise:

1. Do the verb classes defined in (177) differ with regard to their ability to allow perspective shift of perspective-dependent expressions in their subordinated clause?
2. Are all types of propositional attitude verbs suitable to be put in relation to and compared with FID?

Neither question has been given much, if any, attention or consideration in the literature. This is not to say that there is a general lack of proposals for more fine-grained classifications of propositional attitude verbs (see, for example, Partee 1973a); however, these accounts are rarely concerned with the role of propositional attitude verbs as a factor in facilitating perspective shift (for an exception, see Anand & Hacquard 2008, who discuss the interpretation of epistemic modals in the scope of different types of attitude verbs). Works that are specifically interested in and discuss the similarities and differences between the three types of speech and thought representation, on the other hand, either do not distinguish between the different verb classes and conflate all of them as examples of ID, such as Banfield (1982), Schlenker (2003 & 2004) or Sharvit (2008), or if they do, do not take that as impetus to reconsider the traditionally assumed limitations of German or English ID with regard to context shift, like Maier (2017), Smith (2009) or Deal (2020). Smith (2009), for example, does distinguish between verbs of communication, verbs that express a mental state, which are taken to encompass *think* as well, elements that express evaluations and emotions and finally, verbs of perception. Yet at no point is even the possibility brought up that, for example, verbs of communication might behave differently with regard to perspective shift in ID than verbs expressing a mental state; instead, the consensus in the literature that in ID, all indexicals are obligatorily interpreted with regard to the current context of utterance, is reiterated (cf. Smith 2009: 375).

As was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the data collected in works researching context shift in ID for languages like Amharic, Nez Perce, Slave or Zazaki, such as Anand (2006), Deal (2020) or Bittner (2014), strongly indicate that there is a hierarchy among propositional attitude verbs with regard to whether they enable context shift in a given language or not.⁸⁷ Deal (2020) in particular attributes the potential for perspective shift in an ID clause to the syntactic size and complexity of the subordinated clause: In order to account for the stacking of operators in

⁸⁷See Section 2.3.1 for a detailed description of their findings.

the clause’s left periphery, which she proposes to be responsible for facilitating context shift, she stipulates that only propositional attitude verbs which embed suitably large syntactic structures should be able to allow shifts for multiple types of indexicals. In accordance with the joint data collected by the aforementioned accounts and others, she determines that speech report verbs subordinate the syntactically largest complement clauses. Deal (2020) concludes that “verbs of speech are more likely to allow indexical shift in their complement than are verbs of thought, which in turn are more likely to allow indexical shift in their complement than are verbs of knowledge” (Deal 2020: 51).

While we have tentatively rejected operator-based accounts due to their neglect of contextual factors, Deal’s hierarchy of verbs (see Figure 19; Deal (2020: 51)) allows us to make predictions about the potential for perspective shift in German ID clauses with regard to the type of verb in the matrix clause. Most importantly, perhaps, it indicates that it is not just a possibility that the potential for perspective shift in ID might be dependent on the type of attitude verb, but that this should be the expectation: Aside from Nez Perce, none of the investigated languages allow context shift under *all* (tested) types of propositional attitude verbs. However, every language that enables perspective shift in ID, at the very least, does so if the clause constitutes a speech report.

Accordingly, this is also the prediction we can make at this point regarding German ID. It is not necessary to stipulate that indexicals must be able to shift in the scope of any type of propositional attitude verb in order to generally argue in favor of the potential for perspective shift in ID – it is only necessary to stipulate that they can shift in the scope of speech report verbs. This does not rule out the possibility that, for example, doxastic attitude verbs allow context shift, too; German might very well turn out to be a language like Nez Perce. However, more empirical data is required to draw conclusions about the potential for multiperspectivity in attitude state reports, as the experimental studies conducted for the current investigation deliberately focused on speech and thought report verbs exclusively. I aim to directly compare the capability of the different types of propositional attitude verbs defined in (177) in future studies. For now, I consider it safe to assume that the possibility that *only* verbs reporting an attitude or mental state, but not speech or thought report verbs, facilitate context shift in German ID is – if not impossible – highly unlikely based on Deal’s (2020) hierarchy.

The rest of this chapter will be concerned with answering the second question regarding the relationship between ID and FID. In contrast to the heterogeneous class of structures that are typically identified as ID, FID – and, in fact, DD as well – can *only* represent either a speech or a thought *event*. An interpretation of the exemplary FID clause in (181) according to which the clause reports Veronika’s mental attitude – be it doxastic, epistemic, bouletic or emotional/evaluative – is not

available.

- (181) *Veronika schaute Sam wütend an. Verdammt nochmal, dieser verlogene Mistkerl würde sich nie ändern!*
 ‘Veronika looked furiously at Sam. Damn it, this lying bastard would never change!’

We can certainly infer that the proposition contained in the FID clause is something which Veronika believes to be true, but the reading of (181) distinctly differs from that of (182):

- (182) *Veronika schaute Sam wütend an. Sie glaubte, dass dieser verlogene Mistkerl sich nie ändern würde.*
 ‘Veronika looked furiously at Sam. She believed that this lying bastard would never change.’

The belief described in (182) may originate in the moment at which Veronika looks at Sam, in which case we can infer that she will continue to hold this belief from that point on. However, (182) also allows an interpretation in which Veronika has held this belief even before she looks at Sam – in fact, it might have been a belief she has held for a very long time. Whichever reading one prefers, the conclusion is the same: A belief report clearly describes an abstract, mental *state* (cf. Maier 2017: 265). What is reported in (181), on the other hand, is an *event* – a thought event, to be exact. The only possible reading of the FID clause in (181) is that at the specific moment in time at which Veronika looks at Sam, described in the preceding clause, there is an internal act of self-communication in which Veronika consciously formulates a specific thought, the form and content of which are reported in the FID clause. It may well be the case that the proposition of Sam being a lying bastard who will never change was part of Veronika’s belief domain before this moment in time, but the FID clause nevertheless represents a specific formulation of that belief as a concrete thought at a concrete point in time.

Both thoughts in general and FID specifically are frequently conceptualized as events in the literature (cf. Dirscherl & Pafel 2015: 23f., Maier 2017: 268, Egetenmeyer 2020: 4, Hinterwimmer 2019: 87, Hinterwimmer & Meuser 2019: 183). Hinterwimmer (2019), for example, states that a clause can only be interpreted as FID if the reader accommodates

the existence of a mental event whose temporal location coincides with that of the eventuality introduced by the immediately preceding sentence and whose experiencer is some protagonist mentioned in that sentence – namely an event of a protagonist thinking the thought whose content is provided by the sentence in FID mode (Hinterwimmer 2019: 87).

Egetenmeyer (2020) further clarifies that an FID event “is a discourse entity which is a proper part of the discourse passage it occurs in” and which “maintains specific

temporal relations to the surrounding co(n)text” (Egetenmeyer 2020: 10). To be precise, the FID event is spatio-temporally anchored to a previously introduced *prominent* time point (see Egetenmeyer 2020: 16ff., for a comprehensive explanation of how the prominence of a time point can be established; see also Chapter 5 for a detailed definition of (discourse) prominence in general).

I propose that only verbs which similarly constitute an actual speech or thought event are suitable to serve as a basis of comparison to FID; consequently, only ID clauses featuring a speech or thought event report verb can be expected to exhibit identical perspectival properties, including the ability for perspective shift. In order to assess which verbs are even to be considered for a comparative analysis, I will next test which of the verb classes defined in (177) have an event argument using the method suggested by Maienborn (2016) and defined in the previous section: As illustrated in (175), *geschehen* (‘happen’) can only make anaphoric reference to actual events, but not to D- or K-states. To start with, I will test the method on the two classes that unambiguously represent an event and a state, respectively: speech report verbs and doxastic attitude verbs. The claim that speech report verbs always introduce an utterance event into the discourse is relatively uncontroversial and has been recognized by Anand & Hacquard (2008: 37), Deal (2017: 37), Maier (2017: 262f.) and Bary & Maier (2021: 3). The latter postulate that it is precisely this property of speech report verbs that enables shifted readings in DD and FID, as “only these eventive reports can be used to describe certain specific details about the speech event itself — e.g., focusing on the actual words, the manner of speaking, or the content expressed” (Bary & Maier 2021: 3).

Doxastic attitude verbs like *glauben* (‘believe’), on the other hand, are commonly analyzed as “mere reports of static states of mind” (Anand & Hacquard 2008: 37, cf. also Maier 2017: 265). (183) confirms these assessments of speech report and doxastic attitude verbs by demonstrating that only the former pass the *geschehen*-test. For the method to accurately determine whether the matrix predicate represents an event or a state, the proposition in the subordinated sentence has to constitute a state, since *geschehen* can otherwise make reference to the event described in the embedded clause, thereby distorting the results of the test, which is illustrated in (183c).

- (183) a. *Michael sagte, dass Andrea zwei Schwestern hatte. Das geschah letzten Montag.*
 ‘Michael said that Andrea had two sisters. That happened last Monday.’
- b. *Michael glaubte, dass Andrea zwei Schwestern hatte. #Das geschah letzten Montag.*
 ‘Michael believed that Andrea had two sisters. #That happened last Monday.’
- c. *Michael glaubte, dass Andrea ihr Auto verkaufen würde. Das geschah*

letzten Montag.

‘Michael believed that Andrea would sell her car. That happened last Monday.’

As was shown numerous times in the course of this investigation, and as is illustrated again in (184b) below, FID can also represent speech events. Thus, ID clauses featuring speech report verbs, in contrast to clauses featuring doxastic attitude verbs, are suitable for comparison with FID.

(184) a. *Nils blickte mich entschuldigend an. Er sagte, dass er echt gerne auf meine Hochzeit kommen würde, aber leider an dem Tag schon was vor hatte. Darauf konnte ich nichts entgegenen.*

‘Nils looked at me apologetically. He said that he would really love to come to my wedding, but unfortunately he already had plans that day. I wasn’t able to say anything in reply.’

b. *Nils blickte mich entschuldigend an. Wie schade, er würde ja echt gerne auf meine Hochzeit kommen, aber er hatte leider an dem Tag schon was vor! Darauf konnte ich nichts entgegenen.*

‘Nils looked at me apologetically. What a shame, he would really love to come to my wedding, but unfortunately he already had plans that day! I wasn’t able to say anything in reply.’

The examples in (185) showcase that both bouletic and emotional/evaluative attitude verbs do not pass the *geschehen*-test and therefore also do not qualify for comparative analysis with FID. Things are a bit more complicated with regard to the class of epistemic attitude verbs, however. As the differences in acceptability between (185c) and (185d) illustrate, attitude verbs which simply give insight into whether the embedded proposition is part of the referent’s knowledge domain or not, on the one hand, constitute mental states. Attitude verbs like *erfahren* (‘learn’), on the other hand, which describe an *update* to the referent’s knowledge state, i.e., the embedded proposition is added to the set of propositions which the referent knows to be true, constitute events.

(185) a. *Michael hoffte, dass Andrea zwei Schwestern hatte. #Das geschah letzten Montag.*

‘Michael hoped that Andrea had two sisters. #That happened last Monday.’

b. *Michael irritierte, dass Andrea zwei Schwestern hatte. #Das geschah letzten Montag.*

‘That Andrea had two sisters irritated Michael. #That happened last Monday.’

c. *Michael wusste, dass Andrea zwei Schwestern hatte. #Das geschah letzten Montag.*

‘Michael knew that Andrea had two sisters. #That happened last Monday.’

d. *Michael erfuhr, dass Andrea zwei Schwestern hatte. Das geschah letzten Montag.*

‘Michael found out that Andrea had two sisters. That happened last Monday.’

Does this mean that ID clauses containing ‘knowledge update’ verbs are suitable for a comparative analysis with FID? Not quite, because the event of learning whether a proposition is true or not does not necessarily equate to the formulation of an utterance or a conscious thought that could be expressed via FID. However, a knowledge update event can in turn *trigger* a thought event, for example, and this is what distinguishes it from mental states: A conscious thought can function as a singular, specific expression of a proposition that is part of the set of propositions which make up an individual’s doxastic, epistemic or bouletic domain, but the thought event cannot be initiated solely by the mental state itself. Consider (186):

(186) *Michael begutachtete interessiert Andreas Familienalbum. Aha, sie hatte also zwei Schwestern!*

‘Michael examined Andrea’s family album keenly. Aha, so she had two sisters!’

As a result of looking at the family album, Michael gains the information of Andrea having two sisters and, as a consequence, this new-found knowledge triggers the thought event that is being reported via FID. But the two events are not identical: Michael could have registered the information without formulating a conscious thought about it. As was mentioned above, Egetenmeyer (2020) postulates that FID events are spatio-temporally anchored to prominent time points introduced in the discourse context. I consider this to be the case with regard to knowledge update events; the thought event represented by FID is anchored to the knowledge update event and therefore understood as occurring concurrently. The same applies to *verba sentiendi*.

(187) *Michael sah, dass Andrea zwei Schwestern hatte. Das geschah letzten Montag.*

‘Michael saw that Andrea had two sisters. That happened last Monday.’

As (187) demonstrates, perception report verbs also constitute events, yet in this case as well, they may trigger a thought, but do not equate to one. This is further showcased in (188):

(188) *Michelle lag entspannt im Bett, als plötzlich etwas ihre Wange streifte.*

‘Michelle was lying relaxed in bed when suddenly something brushed her cheek.’

a. *Sie blickte zur Seite und sah, dass eine gigantische Ratte neben ihr auf dem Kopfkissen saß.*

‘She looked to the side and saw that a giant rat was sitting next to her on the pillow.’

- b. *Sie blickte zur Seite. Neben ihr auf dem Kopfkissen saß eine gigantische Ratte.*

‘She looked to the side. A giant rat was sitting next to her on the pillow.’

- c. *Sie blickte zur Seite. Oh Gott, da saß ja eine gigantische Ratte neben ihr auf dem Kopfkissen!*

‘She looked to the side. Oh God, there was a giant rat sitting next to her on the pillow!’

The continuation in (188b) is intuitively interpreted as an implicit perception report of what Michelle sees, i.e., we understand that she perceives that there is a rat sitting next to her despite it not being stated outright. For all intents and purposes, (188b) and (188a) are identical with regard to the fact that the proposition in the second clause constitutes a perception report. However, only (188c) features an FID clause as a continuation, and as a result, the final clause is not just interpreted as a perception of Michelle, but as a conscious thought event that is triggered by the simultaneously occurring perception event, which serves as the FID event’s spatio-temporal anchor.

This leaves the class of thought report verbs, which only contains *denken* (‘think’). Based on the fact that thoughts in general and FID thought reports in particular are almost uniformly considered to represent events (cf. Dirscherl & Pafel 2015: 23f., Maier 2017: 268, Egetenmeyer 2020: 4, Hinterwimmer 2019: 87, Hinterwimmer & Meuser 2019: 183), the expectation would be for clauses featuring *denken* to also be regarded as constituting thought event reports. However, this is not the case: Anand & Hacquard (2008: 37), for example, assign *think* to the same group as *believe*, i.e., verbs that describe a doxastic attitude and constitute reports of static states of mind, as does Deal (2020), who defines a “thinking state” as “the set of worlds compatible with what is thought” (Deal 2020: 31). Maier (2017) even distinguishes between the use of *think* in DD and the use of *think* in ID: With regard to “direct thought reports”, he states that they assert “the existence of a thinking event with a linguistic form. [...] In other words, in direct thought reports, thinking is conceptualized as silently speaking to yourself” (Maier 2017: 264). ID clauses featuring *think*, in contrast, are lumped together with doxastic and epistemic attitude verbs like *believe* or *know* as ‘typical attitude reports’ (cf. Maier 2017: 265).

The treatment of thought report verbs is thus quite inconsistent, in particular with regard to the fact that conscious thoughts are otherwise stipulated to constitute events, not mental states. This inconsistency, I postulate, stems from an inherent and general ambiguity with regard to the interpretation of *denken/think*: Though one may intuitively assume that *denken* always represents the act of formulating a thought, it actually also allows for a doxastic reading akin to the meaning of *believe*,

which might potentially even be considered as the naturally preferred interpretation. This second reading of *denken* constitutes the description of an individual's belief state and therefore needs to be classified as a doxastic attitude verb. As formulated in H2b (cf. (165)), however, I hypothesize that only ID clauses which reflect reports of actual speech or thought events possess identical perspectival properties to those of FID. Accordingly, ID clauses featuring *denken* in its belief state interpretation are neither suitable for comparison with FID, nor can be expected to exhibit the same characteristics, in particular with regard to the ability of enabling context shift for indexicals in their scope. The first reading of *denken*, in contrast, constitutes an actual thought event, meaning a spatio-temporally anchored event in which an individual consciously formulates a thought as an act of internal self-communication. Thus, an ID clause unambiguously featuring a thought event interpretation of *denken* is suitable for comparison with FID and can be predicted to facilitate context shift.

My argument that *denken* can, and is more likely to, represent a belief report rather than a thought report is based on examples like (189) and (190).

(189) *Tim denkt, dass die Erde eine Scheibe ist.*

‘Tim thinks that the world is flat.’

≠ *Tim hat (in diesem Moment) den Gedanken, dass die Erde eine Scheibe ist.*

‘(At this moment), Tim has the thought that the world is flat.’

The intuitive interpretation of the ID clause in (189) is *not* one in which we infer, due to the use of present tense, that at the moment of utterance, the individual Tim is formulating a conscious thought about the world being flat – in fact, Tim does not even have to be present for the speaker to utter (189). Instead, the clause is understood as describing a belief relation between Tim and the embedded proposition, which the speaker assumes to accurately represent Tim's doxastic state at the time of utterance. As a mental state, there is no inherent, implicit temporal endpoint to (189); the clause *Tim denkt, dass die Erde eine Scheibe ist* might hold true at the current moment and also still hold true ten years from now. This is further demonstrated in (190):

(190) *Als ich ein Kind war, dachte ich, dass es den Osterhasen wirklich gab.*

‘When I was a child, I thought that the Easter bunny was real.’

≠ *Als ich ein Kind war, hatte ich den Gedanken, dass es den Osterhasen wirklich gab.*

‘When I was a child, I had the thought that the Easter bunny was real.’

We naturally interpret the clause to mean that the speaker thought the Easter bunny was real for a prolonged period of time during his childhood. However, we do not derive from (190) the meaning that there was a specific moment during the speaker's childhood in which he formulated a conscious thought akin to the FID

clause in (191b). In both (189) and (190), we could interchange *denken* with *glauben* ('believe') without changing the interpretation of the clause as a whole. As the FID versions of (189) and (190) illustrate, FID does not allow these belief state readings: In (191a), we can only derive the reading that Tim is currently consciously thinking about the world being flat, and in (191b), we must infer that the speaker is reporting a specific thought event he had about the Easter bunny when he was a kid.

- (191) a. *Tim kichert vergnügt, während er einen neuen Eintrag für seinen Blog verfasst. Natürlich, die Erde ist eine Scheibe!*
 'Tim chuckles happily as he writes a new entry for his blog. Of course, the earth is flat!'
- b. *Als ich ein Kind war, war ich sehr fantasievoll und naiv. Hurra, den Osterhasen gab es wirklich!*
 'When I was a child, I was very imaginative and naive. Hooray, the Easter bunny was real!'

These examples demonstrate that a belief report reading of *denken* is not only possible, but even the more natural interpretation if there are no explicit indicators that the ID clause is to be understood as a thought event report. This observation carries immense implications with regard to the validity of previous analyses of ID's characteristics. Earlier in this section, I argued that a major problem with accounts investigating the perspectival properties of ID in general, and in relation to other types of speech and thought representation like FID specifically, is that they do not distinguish between attitude state reports and actual speech and thought event reports, as they conflate both under the umbrella term *propositional attitude verb*. As it turns out, this not only relates to ID clauses featuring obvious doxastic or epistemic attitude report verbs like *glauben* or *wissen* ('know'), but even to ID clauses featuring *denken*, which might be considered to be the quintessential ID verb, alongside *sagen* ('say'). Practically all works researching the properties of ID base their observations on examples in which the embedded clause is subordinated via *denken/think*, without recognizing that these ID clauses, in contrast to FID, do not necessarily generate thought event readings.

There are ways to enforce a thought event interpretation of *denken*, however, and thus to allow for an accurate analysis of ID as a true thought report, akin to FID and DD; one of these ways is to use the alternative phrasing *sich denken* ('think to oneself'). If we insert this alternative phrasing into the ID examples from (189) and (190), the belief report reading becomes unavailable:

- (192) a. *Tim denkt sich, dass die Erde eine Scheibe ist.*
 'Tim thinks to himself that the world is flat.'
 = *Tim hat (in diesem Moment) den Gedanken, dass die Erde eine Scheibe ist.*
 '(At this moment), Tim has the thought that the world is flat.'

- b. *Als ich ein Kind war, dachte ich mir, dass es den Osterhasen wirklich gab.*
 ‘When I was a child, I thought to myself that the Easter bunny was real.’
 = *Als ich ein Kind war, hatte ich den Gedanken, dass es den Osterhasen wirklich gab.*
 ‘When I was a child, I had the thought that the Easter bunny was real.’

The difference between ID clauses containing *sich denken* and ones featuring *denken* is further substantiated by the results of the *geschehen*-test. As (193) demonstrates, *sich denken*, due to only allowing a thought event reading, easily passes the test, whereas the acceptability of (193a) is questionable at best.

- (193) a. *Michael dachte, dass Andrea zwei Schwestern hatte. ??Das geschah letzten Montag.*
 ‘Michael thought that Andrea had two sisters. ??That happened last Monday.’
 b. *Michael dachte sich, dass Andrea zwei Schwestern hatte. Das geschah letzten Montag.*
 ‘Michael thought to himself that Andrea had two sisters. That happened last Monday.’

There are other ways to force a thought event reading of *denken*, as well; namely, belief state readings are ruled out if the verb is modified by a spatial adverbial (194a) or an adverbial of manner (194b), which, in accordance with Maienborn’s (2016) distinction of D-states and K-states⁸⁸, indicates that doxastic attitude verbs constitute K-states.

- (194) a. *Tim denkt auf einer Parkbank, dass die Erde eine Scheibe ist.*
 ‘Tim thinks on a park bench that the world is flat.’
 b. *Tim denkt wütend, dass die Erde eine Scheibe ist.*
 ‘Tim thinks angrily that the world is flat.’

As shown in (195), and in contrast to (193a), *denken* also passes the *geschehen*-test if modified in these ways. For the rest of the investigation, however, I will focus on the difference in interpretation between *denken* and *sich denken*, specifically, for simplicity’s sake.

- (195) a. *Michael dachte auf einer Parkbank, dass Andrea zwei Schwestern hatte. Das geschah letzten Montag.*
 ‘Michael thought on a park bench that Andrea had two sisters. That happened last Monday.’
 b. *Michael dachte erstaunt, dass Andrea zwei Schwestern hatte. Das geschah letzten Montag.*

⁸⁸See Section 6.1.

‘Michael thought in amazement that Andrea had two sisters. That happened last Monday.’

In the final section of this chapter, I will provide initial evidence that enforcing a thought event report interpretation of ID affects its perspectival properties, enhancing its propensity to reflect the protagonist’s rather than the speaker’s point of view. To be specific, the preliminary analysis will show that one of the major arguments against a uniform treatment of ID and FID, the *de dicto* / *de re* ambiguity, can be resolved for unambiguous thought report ID clauses.

6.3 Thought Events and the *de dicto* / *de re* Ambiguity

In Section 4.1, some of the major arguments regarding why FID and ID ostensibly require substantially different analyses, as brought forth by Schlenker (2004), were discussed. One of these arguments, repeated in (196), concerns the *de dicto* / *de re* ambiguity, which is supposedly exhibited by ID, but not by FID.

(196) FID does not allow for any *de dicto* / *de re* ambiguity, whereas ID does (cf. Schlenker 2004: 284; Schlenker 2011: 1598).

As described in detail in that section, the distinction between *de re* and *de dicto* readings pertains to the designation of individuals or objects in speech, thought or attitude reports. A *de re* reading reflects the perspective of the current speaker, which means that a term used in the original utterance is replaced by the speaker’s choice of referential expression. A *de dicto* reading, in contrast, keeps the designations used in the actual utterance intact, thereby reflecting the perspective of the protagonist. ID is generally assumed to be ambiguous with regard to whether referential expressions in the scope of the propositional attitude verb in the matrix clause are to be read *de re* or *de dicto*. Thus, either reading can potentially be the preferred or even the only coherent one, depending on the discourse context and the content of the clause itself. In the classic example by Reinhart (1983), illustrated in (197a), only a *de re* reading for the first use of *his mother* is available, as the clause would otherwise be contradictory.

(197) a. Oedipus believed that his mother wasn’t his mother.
b. #His mother was not his mother, Oedipus believed.

(Reinhart 1983: 173, ex. 6 & 7, also cited in Schlenker 2004: 284, ex. 8)

FID, however, only allows *de dicto* interpretations, which renders the FID version of the clause in (197b) infelicitous. Thus, the two modes of speech and thought representation are argued to fundamentally differ from each other in this respect (cf. also, *inter alia*, Sharvit 2004: 313, Schlenker 2004: 284, Sharvit 2008: 367).

After the classification of propositional attitude verbs into several subtypes and the explicit distinction between attitude state verbs and event report verbs proposed

in the previous section, the problem with Reinhart's (1983) example – which served as the foundation for all subsequent accounts declaring that ID is inherently ambiguous with regard to *de dicto* / *de re* readings – becomes quite apparent: (197a) does clearly not depict a thought report, but a description of Oedipus' doxastic state. Even without the explicit use of *believe*, it is obvious that we cannot infer from (197a) a situation in which Oedipus might have formulated a conscious thought akin to *[That individual over there] is not my mother*. Moreover, as was also demonstrated in the previous section, FID always constitutes an utterance or thought event, but cannot report mental states. Thus, FID is not a suitable alternative to belief state reports like the one in (197a) in general, regardless of whether a *de dicto* reading would be incoherent or not. In short, (197) represents an inherently flawed basis for comparison of ID and FID. In fact, aside from one exception, which I will address shortly, all examples used by Reinhart (1983) constitute clear belief state reports featuring *believe*.

A simple solution to this problem is to replace the doxastic attitude verb *believe* with a verb that actually constitutes a thought event and then compare the possible interpretations of referential expressions in a true ID thought report with those of an FID thought report. Since *think* seems to be the only verb that is able to express a conscious thought event, we thus get the structure in (198a). However, as was also noted in the previous section, *think*, if not modified further, allows for and, in fact, prefers a doxastic state reading. If *think* is intuitively interpreted as reporting Oedipus' mental state rather than a specific thought event, we should expect it to pattern with *believe* and enable *de re* readings. As (198a) shows, this is the case: The ID clause, for which only a *de re* interpretation would be coherent, is completely acceptable.

- (198) a. Oedipus thought that his mother wasn't his mother.
 b. #Oedipus thought to himself that his mother wasn't his mother.

Yet we can also force a thought event reading of *think*, either by using the alternative phrasing *think to oneself* or by modifying it via a spatial adverbial or an adverbial of manner, which was illustrated in (192-195). My hypothesis H2b (cf. (165)) entails that specifically ID clauses which actually reflect speech or thought event reports possess perspectival properties that are identical to those of FID. This also pertains to the *de dicto* / *de re* ambiguity: If FID only allows *de dicto* readings, then the prediction is that speech and thought report ID clauses – and only those in particular – should also only allow *de dicto* readings. This is confirmed by (198b), which features the phrasing *thought to himself*, thereby enforcing the thought event reading of *think*. In turn, the only available reading for the embedded proposition is one in which Oedipus assigns to the individual that he designated as *my mother* the property of not being his mother, which is contradictory, thus rendering the clause infelicitous in the same vein as the FID version in (197b). In other words, (198b)

is only true if Oedipus, at a specific point in time, conceived the conscious thought displayed in (199a) – which, as strange and contradictory as it is, can theoretically also be reported via FID.

- (199) a. My mother is not my mother.
 b. Oedipus looked at the woman in front of him. Hmm, his mother was not his mother!

Further examples – this time for German ID and FID – demonstrating how true thought event reports, in contrast to belief state report readings of *denken* ('think'), only allow *de dicto* interpretations are provided in (200), (201) and (202). To be precise, the examples are meant to show that this applies to all types of referential expressions, including proper names, descriptive DPs and pronouns, respectively.

- (200) *Max und Sven campen im Wald. Max wollte Sven einen Streich spielen und verkleidete sich heimlich als Bigfoot. Als er aus dem Gebüsch spazierte, erkannte Sven ihn nicht und erschreckte sich fürchterlich.*

'Max and Sven were camping in the forest. Max wanted to play a prank on Sven and secretly disguised himself as Bigfoot. When he walked out of the bushes, Sven didn't recognize him and was terrified.'

- a. *Sven dachte, dass Max Bigfoot war.*
 'Sven thought that Max was Bigfoot.'
 b. *#Oh Gott, Max war Bigfoot!*
 '#Oh God, Max was Bigfoot!'
 c. *#Sven dachte sich, dass Max Bigfoot war.*
 '#Sven thought to himself that Max was Bigfoot.'

The context of (200) establishes that Max has disguised himself as Bigfoot and, importantly, that Sven is not aware of this fact and does not recognize him. Thus, only a *de re* reading is available for the ID clause in (200a), according to which the designation *Max* is supplemented by the narrator in reference to the individual to which Sven assigned the property of being Bigfoot. The narrator, as the one telling the story, is aware of who 'Bigfoot' actually is, and is thus free to refer to him as Max. From Sven's perspective, on the other hand, the property of being Bigfoot is assigned to the figure he sees walking out of the bushes, which he does not equate with Max. A *de dicto* reading, according to which Sven designates that figure as *Max*, would stand in contradiction with the sentence directly preceding the ID clause, and therefore be incoherent. This is the case for the FID version in (200b), which, as presumed, only allows the *de dicto* interpretation. The important thing to note is that the version of the ID clause in (200c), which uses *dachte sich* and thus forces a thought event reading, patterns with the FID clause and not the belief state report ID clause in (200a): The only possible reading for the continuation in (200c) is one in

which Sven is consciously ascribing to the individual he knows as Max the property of being Bigfoot, i.e., a *de dicto* reading. As that reading is incoherent with the discourse context, (200c), like (200b), is infelicitous.

The same can be observed in (201) with regard to the DP *der blutrünstige Axtmörder* ('the bloodthirsty axe murderer'):

(201) *Von der Polizei verfolgt eilte der mordlustige Axtmörder auf der Suche nach einem geeigneten Versteck durch die Nachbarschaft. Milan saß gerade an seinem Schreibtisch, als es an seiner Haustür klingelte. Er öffnete die Tür und lächelte den zwei Meter großen Hünen vor sich höflich an.*

'Pursued by the police, the murderous axe murderer hurried through the neighborhood in search of a suitable hiding place. Milan was sitting at his desk when the doorbell rang. He opened the door and smiled politely at the two-meter-tall giant in front of him.'

a. *Milan dachte, dass der blutrünstige Axtmörder ein harmloser Verkäufer war.*

'Milan thought that the bloodthirsty axe murderer was a harmless salesman.'

b. *#Ach, der blutrünstige Axtmörder war ein harmloser Verkäufer!*

'#Ah, the bloodthirsty axe murderer was a harmless salesman!'

c. *#Milan dachte sich, dass der blutrünstige Axtmörder ein harmloser Verkäufer war.*

'#Milan thought to himself that the bloodthirsty axe murderer was a harmless salesman.'

Both from the context and the content of the final clause itself, it is apparent that only the narrator, but not Milan, is aware of the person standing at the door being an axe murderer. Thus, we can again only arrive at a *de re* reading for (201a), as there is neither reason to believe that Milan possesses the knowledge to use the designation *der blutrünstige Axtmörder* for his visitor, nor would it be coherent with ascribing his visitor the property of being a harmless salesman. As before, both (201b), featuring an FID version of the clause, and (201c), containing *dachte sich* in the ID clause, only allow *de dicto* interpretations, rendering the clauses contradictory. Finally, (202) demonstrates that the interpretation of third-person pronouns, too, is dependent on whether the clause represents an attitude state or a thought event report. In the story, Betty disguises herself as a man to join the military. Her instructor clearly falls for her disguise, as he ascribes to her the property of being a brave man. Accordingly, the instructor would naturally use male pronouns to refer to Betty. Thus, any use of female pronouns in reference to Betty in attitude, speech or thought reports must instead be taken to reflect the narrator's perspective.

(202) *Als Krieg ausbrach, wollte Betty unbedingt dabei helfen, ihr Heimatland zu*

verteidigen. Da Frauen jedoch nicht im Militär dienen durften, schnitt Betty kurzerhand ihre Haare ab und verkleidete sich als Mann. Wenige Tage später musterte der Ausbilder im Trainingscamp seinen neuen Rekruten anerkennend.

‘When war broke out, Betty was determined to help defend her homeland. However, as women were not allowed to serve in the military, Betty quickly cut off her hair and disguised herself as a man. A few days later, the instructor at the training camp looked approvingly at his new recruit.’

a. *Der Ausbilder dachte, dass sie ein tapferer Mann war.*

‘The instructor thought that she was a brave man.’

b. *#Famos, sie war ein tapferer Mann!*

‘#Splendid, she was a brave man!’

c. *#Der Ausbilder dachte sich, dass sie ein tapferer Mann war.*

‘#The instructor thought to himself that she was a brave man.’

This does not pose a problem for the doxastic state interpretation of *denken* in (202a), which again facilitates a *de re* reading of the clause. Such an interpretation is not available for (202b) or (202c): These continuations of (202) force a *de dicto* reading according to which the instructor would be aware of his new recruit actually being a woman, which would be at odds with his thought about his recruit being ‘a brave man’.

The examples above therefore confirm that referential expressions consistently and regardless of the specific type of expression only allow *de dicto* readings if the sentence constitutes an actual thought event report; this holds true for both FID and ID. Though the acceptability judgments are solely based on my own intuitions, they nevertheless provide strong initial evidence that the type of propositional attitude verb, and whether it represents a state or an event, needs to be regarded as a major factor influencing the perspectival potential of ID. I aim to pursue this line of thought and to gather empirical data in support of my hypotheses via further experimental studies in future research.

As a final point, I want to address another example provided by Reinhart (1983), depicted in (203), that poses a potential problem for the proposed analysis. In contrast to all of her other examples showcasing the supposed *de dicto* / *de re* ambiguity in ID, the one in (203) features a speech report verb instead of the doxastic attitude verb *believe*.

(203) **Original utterance:** Max: “My mother is going to visit me”.

a. **ID:** Max said that a famous actress was going to visit him.

b. **FID:** A famous actress was going to visit him, Max said.

(adapted from Reinhart 1983: 174f., ex. 15)

As Reinhart (1983) correctly points out, assuming a context in which Max’s mother

is a famous actress and the speaker is aware of this fact, Max's original utterance can be reported via an ID clause like the one in (203a). As Max did not originally use the designation *a famous actress* to refer to the individual that is his mother, (203a) represents a *de re* report in which the speaker inserted his own preferred referential expression. The FID version in (203b), in contrast, only allows a *de dicto* reading and is therefore not suitable as a report of Max's actual utterance. The problem with regard to my proposal is that a speech report verb like *say* undoubtedly constitutes a speech *event* and not a mental *state*; in other words, the expectation would be that it should pattern with thought event reports, yet it does not. However, this only presents a problem if the type of propositional attitude verb is stipulated to be the only major factor affecting perspective interpretation in ID; but as argued and illustrated in detail during the course of this investigation, ID's potential for multiperspectivity and propensity for context shift is, in fact, dependent on a combination of multiple factors. Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 in particular demonstrated that perspective shift in both ID and FID is reliant on a narrative context and on the presence of a prominent discourse referent to serve as perspectival anchor, respectively. The former, specifically, is not suitably established in (203a).

A fundamental difference between speech report verbs, on the one hand, and thought report verbs, on the other hand, is that speech events are acts of *external* communication, whereas thought events are acts of *internal* self-communication (cf. Smith 2009: 374f., Maier 2017: 264). As such, we naturally infer from an ID speech report like the one in (203a) that Max must have addressed his utterance to someone, i.e., that there must be an implicit addressee. Since no other discourse referent is introduced or mentioned, Max's original addressee must have been the speaker. Thus, the most natural interpretation of (203a) is as a report of an utterance that was part of a conversation between Max and the implicit speaker – or, in other words, as part of a conversational context. As the results for Experiment 4 have confirmed, however, perspectivization is speaker-bound in conversational contexts and perspective shift of spatio-temporal indexicals, for example, not possible. It stands to reason, then, that *de re* readings, too, are facilitated by conversational contexts, as they reflect the perspective of the speaker, i.e., the default perspectival center. Accordingly, the acceptability of such a reading in the context of (203) decreases substantially if we rule out the implicit interpretation as an act of communication between Max and the speaker, like in (204) below:

(204) Max said to himself that a famous actress was going to visit him.

In contrast to (203a), the role of the speaker as Max's addressee is explicitly removed, as the speech event now unambiguously constitutes an act of self-communication. Consequently, it is much harder to reconcile (204) as an accurate report of Max's original utterance in (203); a *de dicto* reading of (204) instead seems to be the much more natural – if not to say the only available – interpretation. I thus attribute

the acceptability of (203a) to its intuitive interpretation as part of a conversational context, which constitutes the naturally preferred reading for speech report verbs if no indication for an alternative interpretation, such as an unambiguously narrative context, is given. For thought event reports via ID, on the other hand, an interpretation as part of a fictional narration is the naturally preferred one, which is illustrated in (205):

- (205) Do you still remember our old classmate Ernie? I met him at the gym yesterday.
- a. Ernie thought that he would be married by now.
 - b. ??Ernie thought to himself that he would be married by now.

(205) provides a context that is unambiguously conversational, as the sentences clearly represent an act of communication between the speaker and some unknown addressee, in which the speaker recounts an occurrence from his day-to-day life. Whereas the use of the doxastic state report version of *think* in (205a) is perfectly fine in such a context, the forced thought event report version in (205b) is marked, if not outright infelicitous. The reason for this is that, while there are numerous imaginable ways with regard to how a normal speaker may gather knowledge about another person's mental state, such as his beliefs or desires, he nevertheless possesses no actual insight into their mental processes, and therefore cannot report actual thought events. Neither their form nor their content is available to the speaker, unless the author of the thought verbalizes his thought in a subsequent speech event – in which case the speaker would naturally produce a speech report ID clause rather than a thought report one. Thus, (205) once again underlines the necessity of a narrative context for perspective shift and additionally indicates an intriguing interaction between the factors of context and propositional attitude verb class: ID clauses constituting actual thought event reports appear to only be available in narration and thus mirror FID in this regard as well, further illustrating the similarities between the two modes of thought representation.

7 Conclusion

The aim of this doctoral thesis was to investigate the perspectival properties of German indirect discourse (ID) and to evaluate its potential for multiperspectivity. To this end, I gathered evidence in support of the following two central hypotheses H1 and H2, both of which diverge from the general consensus found in the literature.

- (206) a. **H1:** Perspective-dependent expressions in German indirect discourse clauses can be interpreted from the perspective of the matrix subject (= the author of the subordinated thought or utterance) instead of the matrix speaker given that certain conditions are fulfilled.
- b. **H2:** Free indirect discourse is not a hybrid of indirect and direct discourse, but the root clause equivalent of indirect discourse, as they share the majority of their perspectival characteristics. Accordingly, the two types of speech/thought representation should receive a uniform analysis, whereas direct discourse has to be regarded as a case of pure quotation.

It is commonly assumed that all perspective-dependent expressions in ID must be interpreted with regard to the current context of utterance and therefore reflect the point of view of the speaker, who acts as the default perspectival center (cf. Doron 1991: 53, Sanders 1994: 48f., Schlenker 2004: 283f., Sharvit 2008: 355, Maier 2017: 260). As formulated in H1, I postulated that this assumption is a misconception which stems from a lack of recognition of the necessary conditions for perspective shift; once these conditions are fulfilled, certain elements in ID are able to shift to the context of the utterance or thought's original author. As a consequence, ID's relation to other modes of speech and thought representation needs to be reevaluated: To be specific, I proposed that free indirect discourse (FID), generally considered to be a hybrid of direct discourse (DD) and ID and a unique example of multiperspectivity in language (cf. Banfield 1982: 98, Sanders 1994: 55, Schlenker 2004: 283, Zeman 2020a: 470), in actuality shares most of its perspectival properties with ID. Accordingly, ID and FID are much closer in nature to each other than previously thought and thus demand a uniform way of analysis. This is expressed in H2.

In the course of this investigation, I identified the conditions which need to be fulfilled to unlock ID's ability for context shift and examined several factors guiding and affecting the interpretation of certain perspective-dependent expressions in its scope, specifically temporal indexicals. The following three aspects, deemed to be

incremental in influencing ID's perspectival properties, and their impact on perspective interpretation in ID were analyzed in detail: (i) narrative contexts in Chapter 3; (ii) discourse prominence in Chapter 5 and (iii) the choice of propositional attitude verb in Chapter 6. In addition, four experimental studies were conducted in order to provide empirical evidence for the central hypotheses, in particular concerning the effects of narrative context and discourse prominence.

Chapter 2 primarily served as an introduction to the central theoretical concepts with regard to perspectivization in language, in general, and to the different types of speech and thought representation specifically. In Section 2.1, I clarified the necessary distinction between *indexicals*, i.e., directly referential elements that belong to one of the three dimensions of deixis, and *expressives*, i.e., non-deictic elements whose interpretation is nevertheless dependent on the context of the current perspectival center. Furthermore, the core ideas of Kaplan (1989), which served as the foundation for most subsequent works on the topic of indexicals, were summarized. Most importantly, Kaplan rejected the idea that indexicals could potentially be shifted to any other context than that of the actual speech act and formulated a prohibition of 'monstrous' operators that might induce context shifts (cf. Kaplan 1989: 511).

I next established the general characteristics of the the three modes of speech and thought representation, ID, DD and FID, in Section 2.2, and described their similarities and differences, as proposed in the literature. Whereas DD represents an act of pure quotation, fully reproducing the *form* of the original utterance, ID is generally thought of as merely reporting its propositional *content*; as such, all indexicals in the scope of the matrix verb are assumed to obligatorily reflect the reporting context rather than the reported context (cf. Banfield 1982: 54, Sanders 1994: 85, Smith 2003: 160, Hinterwimmer & Meuser 2019: 179). FID, which relies on linguistic cues for its interpretation, is thought of as a hybrid of ID and DD due to sharing certain characteristics with both: While personal indexicals and tense forms reflect the speaker's context, as is supposedly the case in ID, all other perspective-dependent expressions, including spatio-temporal indexicals, are shifted to the context of another protagonist (cf. Fleischman 1991: 34, Schlenker 2004: 283, Banfield 1982: 98f., Hinterwimmer & Meuser 2019: 179, Sharvit 2008: 353). Consequently, FID is regarded as an exemplary case of multiperspectivity, effectively expressing both the speaker's and the author's viewpoints simultaneously, and therefore has been a primary focus of linguistic research into perspective shift. As outlined in H1 and H2, I disagree on both accounts: I proposed that the same expressions in ID can shift as in FID, given that certain conditions are fulfilled, and moreover, that perspective interpretation in ID is affected by the same factors as FID, in contrast to DD. As a result, the definition of FID as a hybrid of ID and DD is obsolete; FID displays exactly the same perspectival properties as ID and should thus rather be regarded

as its root clause equivalent.

I then discussed several approaches that have advocated for the potential of perspective shift in ID in Section 2.3. Most of these accounts, however, such as Schlenker (2003), Anand (2006) and Deal (2020), focus on somewhat more exotic languages such as Amharic, Slave or Nez Perce instead of English or German ID, for which they generally rule out the potential for perspective shift. Thus, context shift is regarded as a language-specific phenomenon that can be attested for languages like Amharic, but is absent from others. These accounts have in common that they disagree with Kaplan's prohibition of monsters and regard propositional attitude verbs as context-shifting operators or, alternatively, as elements that introduce one or more monstrous operators into the syntactic structure of the subordinated clause.

Whereas Schlenker (2003) attributes the fact that not all indexicals in a given ID clause in Amharic shift when embedded via a monstrous operator to the lexical specification of the individual types of deictic expressions, both Anand (2006) and Deal (2020) instead focus on the properties of the operator itself. To be precise, they postulate a set of context-shifting operators which only affect indexicals of a specific type. Attitude verbs then differ both with regard to which operator they take as sister and whether they introduce an operator at all. The main difference between Anand's (2006) and Deal's (2020) approaches is that Deal assumes that attitude verbs can stack multiple operators in the left periphery of their embedded clause, each responsible for shifting a different type of indexical (cf. Deal 2020: 5). Based on the data from multiple languages, Deal (2020) derives a hierarchy of monstrous operators in the syntactic structure of subordinate clauses, depicted in (57), which accounts for crosslinguistic variation but also for recognizable patterns between languages.

I briefly reviewed whether these approaches could theoretically be applied to German ID as well and deemed Deal's operator-based framework to be particularly well-suited to capture its properties: Her account incorporates a lexically bundled operator OP_{ADV} that covers both temporal and spatial indexicals, i.e., the deictic elements which are able to shift in FID and which I posit to be shiftable with respect to German ID as well. Stipulating the existence of such an operator in German would thus both explain why these elements shift, but personal indexicals and tense forms do not, and why the spatio-temporal indexicals appear to obey Anand's (2006) *SHIFT-TOGETHER* constraint. Finally, I explored the few works which have previously proposed that spatio-temporal indexicals can be interpreted with respect to the reported context in German or English ID, namely Plank (1986), Rothkegel (2019) and Anderson (2019). The latter two in particular conducted a number of experimental studies which provided initial empirical evidence that context shift is possible and may sometimes even represent the preferred interpretation in ID for German and English, respectively. I argued, however, that their experiments would

have yielded even better results with regard to the acceptability of shifted ID readings if they had embedded the ID clauses in their test items in an unambiguously narrative context.

In Chapter 3, I elaborated on the idea that actual shifts in perspective are only possible in the context of fictional narration, due to narration's inherent potential for multiperspectivity (cf. Rauh 1978, Banfield 1982, Sanders 1994, Zeman 2019b, Zeman 2020a). I proposed that the essential condition that needs to be fulfilled to enable perspective shift in both FID and ID is to embed the respective clause in a narrative context. While FID has often been hailed as a unique example of narration's ability to switch between different viewpoints and to access the inner thoughts of protagonists in the story world, however, the possibility that ID's perspectival properties might similarly be dependent on the overall discourse context has been completely disregarded in the literature.

After establishing the necessary narratological background by briefly describing the key concepts and terms of Stanzel's (1986) and Genette's (1980) groundbreaking models in Section 3.1, I elaborated on how FID's characteristics have been commonly linked to its primary – if not exclusive – use in narration in Section 3.2. Banfield (1982), for example, analyzes FID as effectively speakerless sentences, whose unique grammatical structure is attributed to narration's lack of a communicative purpose. As such, a sentence in a narrative text does not require the existence of a narrator/speaker to utter it, which in turn allows for other referents to act as the clause's perspectival center (cf. Banfield 1982: 97). Zeman (2020a), in contrast, assumes that narration always features a narrating instance, even if only as a referential center rather than a subjective consciousness, and attributes FID's multiperspectivity to the unique hierarchical structure of narrative texts: It is precisely the fact that narrator and protagonists exist on different planes of existence which enables the narrator to report the characters' inner thoughts via FID (cf. Zeman 2017: 12, Zeman 2020a: 23).

I generally agree with Zeman's assessment, but posited that it also applies to ID. My primary argument thus entailed that ID only unlocks its full perspectival potential in narrative contexts. In contrast to FID, though, which is a purely literary phenomenon and thereby automatically facilitates such an interpretation, ID can be – and commonly is – used in conversational contexts as well. The narrative context must therefore be established explicitly to enable perspective shift in ID, which most accounts that previously attempted to assess ID's ability for perspective shift, such as Schlenker (2004), failed to do. This hypothesis was subsequently corroborated by the results for Experiments 1 and 4, presented in Section 3.3 and Section 5.6, respectively, as well as the observation made in Section 6.3 that actual thought event reports via ID are only possible in narration.

In Experiment 1, as reported in Section 3.3, I conducted an acceptability rat-

ings study which contrasted ID clauses containing temporal indexicals like *morgen* ('tomorrow') with equivalent DD and FID clauses, as well as with ID clauses featuring anaphoric temporal adverbials such as *am nächsten Tag* ('the next day'). The clauses were embedded in contexts that were deliberately designed to provide the ideal environment for perspective shift: The test items were constructed to resemble narrative text segments, thereby fulfilling the condition of a narrative context. Moreover, the author of the reported thought or utterance was established as maximally prominent and the alternative phrasing *sich denken* ('think to oneself') was used in the ID matrix clause to enforce thought event readings. Importantly, the discourse contexts and the content of the speech/thought reports were crafted as to make the shifted interpretation of the temporal indexicals the only coherent ones. According to the consensus in the literature, such a reading should nevertheless be infelicitous for ID, which therefore should be expected to be rated significantly less acceptable than items in the other three conditions. However, as I predicted, this was not the case: ID clauses containing shifted temporal indexicals received a mean rating of 5.43 on a Likert scale from 1-7, which was not significantly lower than the mean ratings of items in the other conditions. Thus, the results for Experiment 1 confirmed H1: If all necessary conditions are fulfilled, perspective shift in ID is regarded as an acceptable and natural phenomenon; a substitution of the indexical via an anaphoric adverbial is neither necessary nor preferred, as has often been claimed in the literature.

After having thus demonstrated that ID does allow for the same indexicals to shift as FID, I next evaluated some of the arguments against a uniform treatment of the two modes of speech and thought representation, as formulated by Schlenker (2004: 283f.), in Chapter 4. As it turned out, the majority of these arguments were founded on the misconception that ID is fundamentally anchored to the speaker's context, while FID allows perspective shift and mirrors the style of speech and choice of expressions used in the original utterance/thought. These arguments could therefore be dismissed on the basis of my empirical results as well as numerous literary examples provided by Fludernik (1993) and McHale (1983). I then discussed the three most prominent approaches to explain perspective shift in FID in Section 4.2, in order to evaluate which one was best-suited for the desired uniform analysis of ID and FID: a double-context account, as proposed in Doron (1991), Schlenker (2004) and Eckardt (2014), a covert operator-approach, as argued for in Sharvit (2008), or a mixed quotation analysis, as presented in Maier (2015 & 2017).

While the prior examination of Deal's (2020) account showcased that operator-based approaches are theoretically able to accurately describe the characteristics of both FID and ID, they do not factor in the effect of the overall discourse context. As I deem contextual factors, such as a narrative environment or the prominence status of discourse referents, to have a direct and significant impact on perspective inter-

pretation in ID and FID, however, which is also supported by the empirical data I collected via the experimental studies, I instead tentatively adapted Eckardt's (2014) implementation of the double-context analysis. Eckardt (2014) assumes that, in addition to the speaker's context C , an additional context c of a protagonist can be introduced in the text preceding the FID clause, thereby facilitating perspective shift; spatio-temporal indexicals are lexically specified to be interpreted with regard to c once it has been introduced, whereas personal indexicals and tense are always bound to C (cf. Eckardt 2014: 188). Her account can thus easily be modified to specify further that c can only be introduced in narrative contexts and that a protagonist must be maximally prominent to provide a context that FID can be anchored to.

In Chapter 5, I extensively examined the role of discourse prominence as one of the major factors influencing perspective interpretation in both FID and ID. On the basis of the theoretical considerations in Hinterwimmer (2019) and Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019) and the experimental results presented in Bimpikou (2020) and Meuser (2022), I argued that, if the condition of narrative context is fulfilled, perspective shift in FID and ID is dependent on the introduction of a maximally prominent discourse referent to serve as perspectival anchor. As has been shown in, *inter alia*, Meuser (2022), FID is infelicitous if it expresses the thought of a referent with a low prominence status; prominence-lending cues, such as subjectivity or topicality, can increase a discourse referent's local or global prominence to make him suitable as a perspectival center. I hypothesized that the same holds true for ID: Even in narrative contexts, spatio-temporal indexicals may only shift if the matrix subject – or, alternatively, even another character – is deemed to be more prominent than the narrator. This reliance on the factor of discourse prominence thus represents another similarity between ID and FID that sets them apart from DD, the interpretation of which is not affected by the available referents' prominence.

In the first half of the chapter, I exclusively focused on discourse prominence's effect on the interpretation of FID to form a measure of comparison for the subsequent analysis of ID in the second half of the chapter. To this end, I first provided a more detailed definition of discourse prominence in Section 5.1 and then described the experimental studies conducted by Hinterwimmer & Meuser (2019) and Meuser (2022), which investigated the prominence-lending cues determining the perspectival anchor for FID in discourse contexts with more than one protagonist, in Section 5.2. While these works provide crucial evidence for the relevance of prominence for perspective interpretation, they do not address the role of the speaker/narrator. Consequently, I next discussed accounts that specifically examine the interplay between narrator and protagonist prominence, namely Hinterwimmer (2018 & 2020) and Bimpikou (2020). Whereas the former analyzed the effect of narrators whose prominence is increased via evaluative commentary, the latter conducted a series

of experimental studies to test whether homodiegetic first-person narrators are preferred over prominent protagonists as perspectival anchors for FID.

In Section 5.3, I presented the results of Experiment 2, which were previously published in Saure et al. (2023) and build on these prior investigations by directly comparing the effects of covert heterodiegetic third-person narrators, homodiegetic first-person narrators and prominent, evaluative third-person narrators on the interpretation of FID. The experiment consisted of a continuous scale choice study in which participants were asked to attribute an FID clause to either the narrator or a locally prominent protagonist. The results showed an overall strong preference for the protagonist as perspectival center across conditions, which is in line with Bimpikou's (2020) results, who similarly observed the strong effect of local prominence (cf. Bimpikou 2020: 30). However, the homodiegetic first-person narrator, in contrast to the evaluative third-person narrator, showed a significantly higher tendency to be selected as anchor for FID.

In order to assess whether this effect was due to the use of first-person pronouns raising the narrator's prominence status or due to the narrator's homodiegetic nature, a follow-up study, Experiment 3, was conducted, which was previously published in Hinterwimmer & Saure (2024). The design and results of Experiment 3 were presented in Section 5.4. The experiment used a similar setup and item design as in Experiment 2, but instead contrasted the effect of heterodiegetic third-person narrators, homodiegetic first-person narrators and heterodiegetic first-person narrators; the main goal of the study was to test whether the latter would pattern with other heterodiegetic or with other types of first-person narrators to determine which property was the deciding factor in influencing the choice of perspectival anchor. The results showed that the two types of first-person narrators had a similarly strong effect on the interpretation of FID. In contrast to Experiment 2, they also indicated an overall preference for the narrator as perspectival center, which was attributed to a change in the item design that decreased the protagonist's local prominence. The combined results for Experiments 2 and 3 thus provided substantial evidence that local prominence and the use of first-person pronouns are particularly vital cues when selecting a perspectival center.

Section 5.5 focused on the effect of discourse prominence on the interpretation of ID, which had, as of yet, been ignored as a potential topic of research, in order to test whether it mirrored the results for FID. I first discussed the possibility, raised by the results of Hinterwimmer's (2019) and Meuser's (2022) investigations, that perspective-dependent expressions in ID might also be anchored to the context of a discourse referent different from both the narrator and the author of the thought or utterance, if said referent was deemed to be maximally prominent. Next, I examined whether ID was receptive to the same prominence-lending cues as FID by manipulating the local or global prominence of the available protagonists in text

segments featuring a covert – and thus not very prominent – narrator. Based on these examples, it was determined that ID is similarly anchored to the maximally prominent discourse referent, though it was observed that, in contrast to FID, the local prominence of the author was boosted to a certain degree due to serving as the subject of the matrix clause.

Subsequently, I conducted a fourth experimental study, Experiment 4, to test the interaction between narrator and protagonist prominence in text segments featuring ID clauses, the results of which were reported in Section 5.6. In order to be able to compare the results to those of Experiments 2 and 3, the experiment used a similar setup and item design, though with alterations to account for the characteristics of ID; most importantly, as ID explicitly names the author of the reported utterance, it was not possible to task participants with attributing the clause as a whole to either protagonist or narrator. Instead, they were asked to identify the reference of a temporal indexical inside the scope of the ID clause, specifically whether it represented the time of narration or the time of the original speech event. As the previous studies had confirmed that homodiegetic first-person narrators affected the interpretation of FID due to their increased prominence, Experiment 4 similarly contrasted narrative texts featuring heterodiegetic third-person narrators with ones featuring homodiegetic first-person narrators. Moreover, the experiment additionally contrasted these narrative contexts with conversational contexts, in order to gather empirical evidence for the hypothesis that narration is truly unique in its potential for multiperspectivity.

The results for Experiment 4 confirmed that there is a striking difference in interpretation between ID in narrative contexts and ID in conversational contexts: While the former displayed a preference for the protagonist as perspectival center – though with a significantly higher tendency to select the narrator in texts featuring a first-person narrator – the latter showed a strong preference for the speaker instead. The study thus not only indicated that the interpretation of ID is indeed affected by the relative prominence of narrator and protagonists, but also provided significant empirical evidence both for the unique potential for multiperspectivity inherent to fictional narration in general, and specifically with regard to unlocking the ability for perspective shift in ID.

In Section 5.7, I addressed a potential problem for a uniform treatment of FID and ID, namely, that perspective shift in ID is optional, whereas it appears to be obligatory in FID. However, I postulated that FID, too, can be anchored to the narrator instead of the protagonist, as the results of Experiments 2 and 3, as well as the studies by Bimpikou (2020) had indicated, in which case spatio-temporal indexicals naturally do not shift either. To be precise, I proposed that structures which have commonly been referred to as ‘narrator comments’, and which have been largely ignored by linguistic examinations of narrative texts, are, in truth, FID

clauses for which the narrator has been selected as perspectival center, due to various perspectival and/or prominence-lending cues. Both FID and ID thus have in common that they only exhibit perspective shift *if* a protagonist has been established as more prominent than the narrator. As linguistic analyses of FID are primarily interested in its ability to express the narrator's and the protagonist's contexts simultaneously, however, they have ignored potential instances of FID that lack this property, and instead identified it as FID's defining feature.

A key difference between ID and FID, though, is that, if the narrator is selected as perspectival center for ID, this affects only the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions in its scope. In FID's case, on the other hand, it affects the interpretation of the clause as a whole, which must then be understood as a thought belonging to the narrator rather than the character. The reason for this, as I outlined in Section 5.7, is that, while *perspectival center* and *author of a thought* need to be regarded as two separate concepts, – as otherwise the matrix subject of an ID clause would obligatorily have to function as its perspectival center in all circumstances – they are ascribed to the same individual if not explicitly indicated otherwise. For FID, this is impossible, as one of its defining features is not being explicitly marked as a thought or utterance, and consequently, a referent that is selected as FID's perspectival center must also be interpreted as its author. For ID, in contrast, the author is explicitly named in the matrix clause and thus can theoretically diverge from whichever discourse referent is determined to be the preferred perspectival center via linguistic cues in the discourse context. It is thus a unique property of ID to enable a divergence between the author of an utterance or thought and its perspectival center.

Finally, in Chapter 6, I offered a tentative analysis of what I regard as another major factor in facilitating context shift in ID: the choice of propositional attitude verb in the matrix clause. Whereas FID always constitutes a speech or thought *event*, propositional attitude verbs form a highly heterogeneous class, which also encompasses verbs representing mental states. This disparity, however, has not been given much attention in works focusing on the similarities and differences between ID and FID, nor has it been considered much whether ID's perspectival properties might change depending on the matrix verb. I therefore proposed that only ID clauses featuring verbs which unambiguously constitute a speech or thought event are suitable for a comparison with FID and can be expected to display the same perspectival properties. After first introducing some key concepts of Davidsonian as well as Neo-Davidsonian event semantics in Section 6.1, I next classified seven individual subgroups of propositional attitude verbs in Section 6.2. I then used a method proposed by Maienborn (2016) to test which of these constitute actual events.

It was observed that *denken* ('think'), which is commonly used in the literature

for examples of ID and appears to be represent a thought event, actually allows for an intuitively preferable doxastic attitude state interpretation. However, the alternative phrasing *sich denken* ('think to oneself') can be used instead to force a thought event report interpretation, which, I postulated, would affect ID's perspectival properties and enhance its propensity for perspective shift. I provided first evidence for this theory in Section 6.3 with regard to the *de dicto* / *de re* ambiguity: As has been claimed by, *inter alia*, Schlenker (2004) and Sharvit (2008), only ID allows both *de dicto* and *de re* readings for referential expressions in its scope, whereas the same elements can only be interpreted *de dicto* in FID. I demonstrated via a number of examples that only ID clauses featuring a mental state verb – including *denken* – exhibit this ambiguity in interpretation. Once we force a thought event report reading of *denken*, in contrast, the *de re* reading becomes unavailable. Thus, actual thought event reports, regardless of whether they are depicted via ID or FID, consistently only allow *de dicto* readings.

(207) provides an overview and summary of the main arguments and findings of the investigation as a whole:

- (207)
- i. Perspective shift is generally possible and natural in German ID, but only if the ID clause is embedded in the context of a fictional narrative, due to narration's inherent potential for multiperspectivity.
 - ii. The same perspective-dependent expressions are affected by context shifts in ID and FID: Spatio-temporal indexicals and expressives are able to shift, whereas personal indexicals and tense remain strictly bound to the context of utterance.
 - iii. Once the condition of being embedded in a narrative context is fulfilled, the discourse referent who is deemed to be maximally prominent with regard to the previous discourse context – be it the narrator or a protagonist – serves as the preferred perspectival center for ID and FID.
 - iv. Narrator comments constitute FID clauses for which the narrator was selected as the perspectival center. Context shift is thus optional for both ID and FID and is only facilitated if a protagonist is deemed to be the preferred perspectival center due to the interaction of various perspectival and prominence-lending cues.
 - v. While FID obligatorily conflates its author and its perspectival center, ID possesses the ability to differentiate between the two and thus uniquely enables a speaker to report another individual's thought or utterance completely filtered through the speaker's point of view.
 - vi. Only ID clauses featuring a speech/thought event report verb are suitable for a comparative analysis of ID and FID, and can be expected to

exhibit similar perspectival properties.

- vii. Both ID and FID thought event reports only allow *de dicto* readings of referential expressions.

(207-ii)–(207-iv) as well as (207-vii) in particular illustrate that ID and FID share the majority of their perspectival properties: Their interpretation is determined or affected by the same linguistic cues and the same perspective-dependent elements may shift when in their scope. Altogether, I take these results as strong evidence that H2 is correct as well.

While the current investigation has thus shed light on various factors and aspects that influence and relate to perspective shift in ID, specifically, and speech and thought reports in general, many unanswered questions still remain. Due to the limitations of this doctoral thesis, two of the factors potentially impacting the interpretation of ID that were identified in (7) had to be left unaddressed. One of these concerns the specific type of perspective-dependent expression. In order to avoid unplanned side effects caused by possible differences between indexicals and expressives, on the one hand, and spatial and temporal indexicals, on the other hand, with regard to their ability to shift, I deliberately restricted the analysis to ID clauses featuring temporal indexicals only.

Based on the fact that spatio-temporal indexicals in FID can be interpreted from the protagonist’s perspective, I postulated that temporal and spatial indexicals would pattern together in ID as well, i.e., that both are theoretically able to shift. In Section 2.3.2 in particular, a few examples were discussed which indicated that spatio-temporal indexicals in German ID obey *SHIFT-TOGETHER* – if a temporal indexical contained in an ID clause demands a shifted reading to be coherent, spatial indexicals can only receive a shifted reading, too. It needs to be pointed out, though, that these conclusions are not based on empirical evidence as of yet, and require further examination. In general, the results of Experiments 1 and 4, which showcased that shifted readings of German ID clauses are possible and preferred in narrative contexts, respectively, can only be taken as concrete evidence for the shiftability of temporal indexicals. While it is to be expected that spatial indexicals will exhibit the same behavior as they do in FID, this hypothesis should be confirmed in further experimental studies which either similarly test the acceptability or preferred interpretation of spatial indexicals exclusively or in direct comparison with temporal indexicals.

The same applies to non-deictic perspective-dependent expressions such as predicates of personal taste like *lecker* (‘tasty’) or *nervig* (‘annoying’), epithets like *dieser Schmarotzer* (‘this freeloader’) and modal particles like *wohl* (roughly ‘apparently’). While several proposed analyses of expressives were briefly discussed in Section 2.1.3, including Lasersohn (2005) and Potts (2007a), as well as Harris (2012) in Section 2.2, the discussion was preliminary at best and did not cover their interpretation

in ID. In this case, too, I theorized that expressives behave in ID as they do in FID, i.e., that they can express the point of view of the protagonist instead of the speaker's. As was illustrated in Section 6.3, thought event reports in ID only allow *de dicto* readings of referential expressions, which can be considered as evidence that at least certain expressives can be interpreted with regard to the reported context. These findings should be corroborated by future empirical research investigating the potential interpretations of different types of expressive elements in speech and thought reports.

The second factor that was not examined in the course of this investigation, but might potentially impact perspective interpretation in ID, concerns the position of the verb in the embedded clause. In German, there are verbs like *bedauern* ('regret'), which only embed clauses in which the finite verb is in final position (VF-clauses), but also others like *sagen* ('say') that can additionally subordinate clauses in which the verb is instead in second position (V2-clauses), i.e., the typical root clause structure in German declarative clauses. For simplicity's sake, the analyses and experimental studies conducted for this investigation only covered ID featuring VF-clauses. However, as has been argued in Gärtner (2002: 39), V2-clauses, in contrast to VF-clauses, possess an assertional proto-force that could plausibly affect the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions (see also, *inter alia*, Meinunger 2006, Antomo & Steinbach 2010, Reis 2016, Freywald 2016, Lohnstein & Tsiknakis 2020). The factor thus addresses the possibility that subordinate clauses featuring a verb second word order might more easily facilitate context shift of indexicals than subordinate clauses featuring verb final word order. While the current investigation primarily focused on contextual factors, such as discourse prominence, influencing perspective shift, an examination of the effect of the verb position – as well as, potentially, the difference between finite and infinite subordinate clauses – would help clarify the interaction between sentence-level and discourse-level factors. As such, it should serve as a fruitful future topic of investigation that could offer new insights into the properties of speech and thought reports, as well as of subordinated V2-clauses in general.

Another factor that requires more attention pertains to the correlation between the type of propositional attitude verb in the matrix clause and the interpretation of perspective-dependent expressions in ID. Though Chapter 6 did focus on this aspect, the analysis was only preliminary in nature; neither did I discuss previous accounts which provided attempts at classification of the different types of attitude verbs, nor did I gather empirical evidence in support of my arguments via additional experimental studies. While the distinction between event and state report attitude verbs seems to be on the right track, further work is necessary to gain a better understanding of the specific effect of – as well as the differences between – the individual verb types. For one thing, the experimental studies conducted for this

investigation solely focused on speech and thought event reports. Though attitude verbs which describe a referent's mental state were deemed to not be suitable for comparison with FID, this does not rule out that they might nevertheless allow for elements to shift in their scope, or that the various classes of mental state report verbs, such as doxastic, bouletic or epistemic attitude verbs, could potentially display further differences with respect to their perspectival characteristics.

In order to determine the full extent of German propositional attitude verbs' perspectival properties, I plan to conduct additional experiments directly comparing and contrasting the preferred interpretations of perspective-dependent expressions in ID in relation to the verb class of the matrix verb. Moreover, I aim to further pursue the line of thought established in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 regarding my hypothesis that ID clauses constituting speech and thought event reports bear a stronger resemblance to FID in terms of their perspectival properties. While I focused on the felicity of *de dicto* and *de re* readings in particular, it remains to be seen whether there are more similarities to uncover that are only shared by speech/thought event but not by mental state reports. Furthermore, as the acceptability judgments in those sections were solely based on my intuitions, the next step is to provide empirical evidence for my proposal, starting with a planned acceptability rating study testing whether *de re* readings are rated infelicitous by other German native speakers as well. On a final note, at numerous times during the investigation, I have postulated that many, if not all, of the findings also apply to English ID. This hypothesis, too, should be investigated empirically by replicating the experimental studies conducted for this investigation in English and testing whether the results mirror those for German ID as proposed.

It is safe to say that much work still needs to be done before we can truly claim to fully understand the complex mechanisms of perspective shift, let alone the phenomenon of perspectivization in language in general. With the investigation conducted for this doctoral thesis, however, I have hopefully dispelled several widespread misconceptions about the perspectival properties of indirect discourse and its relation to free indirect discourse: The common claim that the former does not allow for shifty indexicals in its scope to be interpreted with regard to the reported context is evidently false; consequently, the definition of the latter as a hybrid of ID and DD and a unique example of multiperspectivity needs to be reevaluated considerably. Moreover, the experimental studies have provided significant evidence for the inherent potential for multiperspectivity in narration, as well as for the important role of discourse prominence in governing perspective interpretation in both ID and FID. Future examinations of speech and thought reports can build on these results by ensuring that the necessary conditions to enable context shift are fulfilled and, most importantly, by recognizing and accounting for ID's true perspectival potential in their analysis.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Experimental Items – Experiment 1

- (1) Letzten Herbst wollte Bernd aufgrund seiner Hausstauballergie mal wieder einen gründlichen Hausputz machen. Doch er zögerte das Putzen immer weiter hinaus, sodass er eines Morgens mit verstopfter Nase aufwachte.
 - a. ID_{deictic}: Bernd dachte sich, dass er besser schon gestern mit dem Putzen begonnen hätte.
 - b. DD_{deictic}: „Mist, ich hätte besser schon gestern mit dem Putzen begonnen“, dachte Bernd.
 - c. FID_{deictic}: Mist, er hätte besser schon gestern mit dem Putzen begonnen!
 - d. ID_{non-deictic}: Bernd dachte sich, dass er besser schon am Tag zuvor mit dem Putzen begonnen hätte.

- (2) Letzten Sommer fuhr Valeria mit ihrem Fotografie-Equipment routinemäßig zu einer Hochzeit. Nachdem sie das Fotoshooting mit der zickigen Braut vor der eigentlichen Trauung beendet hatte, legte sie eine kurze Trinkpause ein.
 - a. ID_{deictic}: Valeria fragte sich, wie sie diese Furie heute nur aushalten sollte.
 - b. DD_{deictic}: „Puh, wie soll ich diese Furie heute nur aushalten“, fragte sich Valeria.
 - c. FID_{deictic}: Puh, wie sollte sie diese Furie heute nur aushalten?
 - d. ID_{non-deictic}: Valeria fragte sich, wie sie diese Furie an diesem Tag nur aushalten sollte.

- (3) Die junge Marie verfolgte im Sommer 2012 besonders gespannt die paralympischen Spiele im Fernsehen. Da sie selber Rollstuhlbasketball im Verein spielte, fieberte sie ganz besonders mit der deutschen Frauenmannschaft mit.
 - a. ID_{deictic}: Marie sagte sich, dass sie sich morgen beim Training auch wieder richtig ins Zeug legen würde.
 - b. DD_{deictic}: „Oh ja, morgen werde ich mich beim Training auch wieder richtig ins Zeug legen“, sagte sich Marie.
 - c. FID_{deictic}: Oh ja, morgen würde sie sich beim Training wieder richtig ins Zeug legen!

- d. ID_{non-deictic}: Marie sagte sich, dass sie sich am folgenden Tag beim Training auch wieder richtig ins Zeug legen würde.

Appendix B

Experimental Items – Experiment 2

- (1) a. Als Julia, komplett mit Reithelm und Gerte ausgerüstet, in den Stall kam, war Tarek dabei, ein Pferd zu satteln. Er legte dem sonst so nervösen Hengst in kürzester Zeit den Sattel an und das Tier beruhigte sich sofort und ließ sich von ihm streicheln. Sie sah ihm erstaunt vom Rand der Box dabei zu.
- b. Als Julia, komplett mit Reithelm und Gerte ausgerüstet, in den Stall kam, war ich dabei, ein Pferd zu satteln. Ich legte dem sonst so nervösen Hengst in kürzester Zeit den Sattel an und das Tier beruhigte sich sofort und ließ sich von mir streicheln. Sie sah mir erstaunt vom Rand der Box dabei zu.
- c. Als Julia - ein etwas schüchternes Mädchen leider - in den Stall kam, war Tarek dabei ein Pferd zu satteln, der blöde Wichtiguer. Er legte dem sonst so nervösen Hengst in kürzester Zeit den Sattel an, und das war echt ein wildes Vieh, da kann man nichts sagen. Sie sah ihm erstaunt vom Rand der Box dabei zu.

FID: Wow, dieser Schönling kannte sich ja echt gut aus mit Pferden!

- (2) a. Als Sascha im Restaurant von der Toilette zurückkam, blätterte Elisa immer noch in der umfangreichen Speisekarte. Sie seufzte und schlug erneut die erste Seite auf, auf der die Suppen und Vorspeisen aufgelistet waren. Er setzte sich an den Tisch und sah sie erwartungsvoll an.
- b. Als Sascha im Restaurant von der Toilette zurückkam, blätterte ich immer noch in der umfangreichen Speisekarte. Ich seufzte und schlug erneut die erste Seite auf, auf der die Suppen und Vorspeisen aufgelistet waren. Er setzte sich an den Tisch und sah mich erwartungsvoll an.
- c. Als der ungeduldige Sascha im Restaurant von der Toilette zurückkam, blätterte Elisa immer noch unentschlossen in der Speisekarte, wie man es ja leider von ihr kennt. Sie seufzte theatralisch und schlug schon wieder die erste Seite auf. Er setzte sich an den Tisch und sah sie erwartungsvoll

an.

FID: So, jetzt musste sich diese lahme Ente doch langsam entschieden haben!

- (3) a. Während Tatjana Drinks an der Bar holte, war Silas schon weiter in den Club vorgedrungen, der an diesem Abend gut gefüllt war. Er tauchte in die Menge ein und begann direkt zum Beat der Musik zu tanzen. Sie hörte ihn laut durch den ganzen Club grölen.
- b. Während Tatjana Drinks an der Bar holte, war ich schon weiter in den Club vorgedrungen, der an diesem Abend gut gefüllt war. Ich tauchte in die Menge ein und begann direkt zum Beat der Musik zu tanzen. Sie hörte mich laut durch den ganzen Club grölen.
- c. Während die miesepetrige Tatjana widerwillig Drinks an der Bar holte, war Silas bereits ganz übermütig weiter in den Club vorgeprescht. Er tauchte in die Menge ein und begann wie ein Irrer zu tanzen, wie immer total auf Eskalation aus. Sie hörte ihn laut durch den ganzen Club grölen.

FID: Oha, dieser Partylöwe war ja wirklich kaum aufzuhalten!

Appendix C

Experimental Items – Experiment 3

- (1) a. Es war ein heißer Sommertag, als Diana mit einem tropfenden Eis in der Hand in Toms Büro vorbeischaute. Sich nach vorne beugend bekleckerte Diana, zur Zeit auf Jobsuche, Tom mit dem schmelzenden Eis. Sie versuchten, den Fleck direkt rauszuwaschen.
- b. Es war ein heißer Sommertag, als Diana mit einem tropfenden Eis in der Hand in meinem Büro vorbeischaute. Sich nach vorne beugend bekleckerte Diana, zur Zeit auf Jobsuche, mich mit dem schmelzenden Eis. Wir versuchten, den Fleck direkt rauszuwaschen.
- c. Lass mich dir von dem Tag erzählen, als Diana mit einem tropfenden Eis in der Hand in Toms Büro vorbeischaute. Gedankenlos bekleckerte Diana, ein ungeschickter Tollpatsch, wenn ich ehrlich bin, Tom mit dem schmelzenden Eis. Sie versuchten, den Fleck direkt rauszuwaschen.

FID: Puh, das war aber wirklich ärgerlich!

- (2) a. Es war ein grauer Montagmorgen in der Buchhaltung, als Mahmut in Silkes Beisein die Quartalszahlen auswertete. Trotz des großen Aufwands

bat Mahmut, dreimaliger Mitarbeiter des Monats, Silke die Ergebnisse nochmals zu überprüfen. Sie holten die Ordner mit den relevanten Unterlagen in ihr Büro.

- b. Es war ein grauer Montagmorgen in der Buchhaltung, als Mahmut in meinem Beisein die Quartalszahlen auswertete. Trotz des großen Aufwands bat Mahmut, dreimaliger Mitarbeiter des Monats, mich die Ergebnisse nochmals zu überprüfen. Wir holten die Ordner mit den relevanten Unterlagen in unser Büro.
- c. Ich erzähle dir jetzt mal von dem Morgen in der Buchhaltung, an dem Mahmut in Silkes Beisein die Quartalszahlen auswertete. Total von oben herab bat Mahmut, ein echt pedantischer Besserwisser, das sag ich dir, Silke die Ergebnisse nochmals zu überprüfen. Sie holten die Ordner mit den relevanten Unterlagen in ihr Büro.

FID: Au Backe, da waren wohl Überstunden angesagt!

- (3) a. Es war ein ruhiger Vormittag in der Sporthalle, als Pia unter Tims Anleitung für das anstehende Basketballturnier trainierte. Mit einem kräftigen Pass spielte Pia, eine talentierte Spielerin, Tim den Ball in der Nähe des Korbes zu. Sie hatten bereits ein Dutzend Körbe geworfen, ohne dass der Ball auch nur ein einziges Mal sein Ziel verfehlte.
- b. Es war ein ruhiger Vormittag in der Sporthalle, als Pia unter meiner Anleitung für das anstehende Basketballturnier trainierte. Mit einem kräftigen Pass spielte Pia, eine talentierte Spielerin, mir den Ball in der Nähe des Korbes zu. Wir hatten bereits ein Dutzend Körbe geworfen, ohne dass der Ball auch nur ein einziges Mal sein Ziel verfehlte.
- c. Ich erzähle dir jetzt eine Geschichte, die davon handelt, wie Pia unter Tims Anleitung für das anstehende Basketballturnier trainierte. Total fit spielte Pia, eine beeindruckende Sportskanone, das kann ich dir sagen, Tim den Ball in der Nähe des Korbes zu. Sie hatten bereits ein Dutzend Körbe geworfen, ohne dass der Ball auch nur ein einziges Mal sein Ziel verfehlte.

FID: Echt spitze, bei dieser Leistung war der Sieg garantiert!

Appendix D

Experimental Items – Experiment 4

(1) a. **Freitag, der 06.01.2017 – Max im Karaokefieber**

Am Montag war Max mit seiner hübschen Arbeitskollegin Henriette in einer Karaokebar. Nachdem er als nächstes Lied ein romantisches Liebesduett ausgewählt hatte, lächelte er Henriette verträumt an. Während sie gemeinsam das Lied sangen, funkte es ganz gewaltig zwischen ihnen.

b. **Freitag, der 06.01.2017 – Ich im Karaokefieber**

Am Montag war ich mit meinem hübschen Arbeitskollegen Max in einer Karaokebar. Nachdem ich als nächstes Lied ein romantisches Liebesduett ausgewählt hatte, lächelte ich Max verträumt an. Während wir gemeinsam das Lied sangen, funkte es ganz gewaltig zwischen uns.

c. *Freitag, der 06.01.2017 – Henriette und Sylvia, zwei alte Schulfreundinnen, machen einen kleinen Spaziergang im Wald.*

Henriette: Ach, übrigens, am Montag war ich mit meinem schnuckeligen Arbeitskollegen Max in einer Karaokebar.

Sylvia: Nein, echt?! Habt ihr ein romantisches Liebesduett zusammen gesungen?

Henriette: Oh ja, und während wir gemeinsam das Lied sangen, funkte es ganz gewaltig zwischen uns!

ID: Max sagte, dass er sich gerne morgen wieder zum Karaoke treffen würde.

(2) a. **Donnerstag, der 08.10.2009 – Elises Waldspaziergang**

Am Dienstag ging Elise neben ihrem Ehemann Harald im Wald spazieren. Während sie den Wegesrand nach Pilzen absuchte, griff sie liebevoll nach Haralds Hand. Nachdem sie die Hälfte des Weges hinter sich gebracht hatten, entdeckten sie an einer Lichtung zahlreiche Pfifferlinge.

b. **Donnerstag, der 08.10.2009 – Mein Waldspaziergang**

Am Dienstag ging ich neben meiner Ehefrau Elise im Wald spazieren. Während ich den Wegesrand nach Pilzen absuchte, griff ich liebevoll nach Elises Hand. Nachdem wir die Hälfte des Weges hinter uns gebracht hatten, entdeckten wir an einer Lichtung zahlreiche Pfifferlinge.

c. *Donnerstag, der 08.10.2009 – Harald und Karl, zwei Rentner, spielen*

zusammen Boule.

Harald: Am Dienstag war ich übrigens mit Elise im Wald spazieren.

Karl: Ach, richtig, ihr wolltet ja Pilze suchen gehen. Habt ihr welche gefunden?

Harald: Ja, ganz viele! Nach der Hälfte des Weges entdeckten wir an einer Lichtung zahlreiche Pfifferlinge.

ID: Elise sagte, dass sie heute eine Pilz-Tarte zubereiten würde.

(3) a. **Donnerstag, der 15.07.2010 – Tims Vormittag im Freibad**

Am Dienstag verbrachte Tim mit seiner Freundin Kira den Vormittag im Freibad. Nachdem er einen Kopfsprung vom Startblock gemacht hatte, schwamm er Kira vergnügt in die Arme. Doch als sie zu der Wasserrutsche laufen wollten, braute sich am Himmel ein Gewitter zusammen.

b. **Donnerstag, der 15.07.2010 – Mein Vormittag im Freibad**

Am Dienstag verbrachte ich mit meinem Freund Tim den Vormittag im Freibad. Nachdem ich einen Kopfsprung vom Startblock gemacht hatte, schwamm ich Tim vergnügt in die Arme. Doch als wir zu der Wasserrutsche laufen wollten, braute sich am Himmel ein Gewitter zusammen.

c. *Donnerstag, der 15.07.2010 – Kira und ihre beste Freundin Anna trinken zusammen Kaffee.*

Kira: Ach ja, das wollte ich dir noch erzählen...Am Dienstag war ich mit Tim im Freibad.

Anna: Bei den aktuellen Temperaturen? Ihr seid ja verrückt! Habt ihr die neue Wasserrutsche ausprobiert?

Kira: Das hatten wir vor. Doch als wir gerade dorthin laufen wollten, braute sich am Himmel ein fettes Gewitter zusammen.

ID: Tim sagte, dass er vielleicht morgen nochmal ins Freibad gehen würde.