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  • This dissertation studies how specific features of the U.S. tax-transfer system affect families. Using quantitative life-cycle models with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents, it evaluates individual programs through counterfactual experiments. Chapter 2 quantifies how means-tested transfers and phased-in tax credits insure households against wage risk and how they interact with private insurance such as de-saving and family labor supply. For young low-income families, combining both programs provides more insurance than spending the same budget on either program alone. Chapter 3 examines U.S. tax-transfer reforms between 2004 and 2019. Although the reforms left aggregate progressivity nearly unchanged, they raised average consumption, increased consumption inequality across education groups and over the life cycle, and lowered welfare on average. Chapter 4, joint work with Christian Bredemeier, Jan Gravert, and Falko Jüßen, shows that the phase-in of the Child Tax Credit creates divorce penalties that weaken the bargaining position of the custodial parent, and shift resources within the household away from this parent. Overall, the dissertation shows that seemingly technical design features of tax-transfer programs can substantially affect insurance, inequality, and the distribution of resources within families.
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